

VOLUME 104 • NUMBER 4 • OCTOBER 1999

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
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
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## In This Issue

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This issue contains essays by many historians. It includes two articles, an *AHR Forum*, responses to the June *Forum Essay*, and a three-part review essay. The articles analyze debates over feminism, social science, and the family in Europe and North America and attempts at social engineering by the Soviets. The *Forum* addresses the issue of regionalism in the past with essays on Modern Europe and East Asia and comments from historians of the United States South and Southeast Asia. The *Forum Essay* responses continue the discussion begun in the June issue about the impact of borders and borderlands on intercultural relations in colonial North America and their implications for colonial regimes in other times and places. The article section concludes with three reviews that place David S. Landes's *Wealth and Poverty of Nations* in a broad historiographical context. In addition, the issue contains our usual array of book and film reviews.

### Articles

**Ann Taylor Allen** notes that the intellectual history of Western Europe and North America at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century is often characterized by such terms as “cultural pessimism” and “alienation.” She maintains that these characterizations are based on views of a minority of the population, primarily male academic, artistic, literary, and political elites. Women, Allen asserts, were also important in the intellectual life of an era in which an upsurge in feminist organizing encouraged a flowering of feminist scholarship. She develops that point by recovering the debate about the origins of the family, monogamous marriage, and the subordinate status of women. Beginning in 1860 and focusing on the years from 1890 to 1914, Allen demonstrates that feminist scholars responded to the changing intellectual paradigms of the era not, as did many of their male contemporaries, with anxiety, pessimism, or a flight to the irrational, but rather with a new optimism and confidence. In doing so, she revives the debates these women had with contemporaries such as Max Weber, Friedrich Engels, Carl Jung, and Sigmund Freud. Allen's essay integrates cultural and intellectual history to make a major contribution to the history of social science.

**Amir Weiner** analyzes purification policies in Soviet socialism. He situates Soviet social engineering within the European ethos of modernity, and then assesses the

eschatological-millennarian view of history that set the Soviets apart from other polities. Weiner argues that the totalization of the Marxist social model, especially in the wake of World War II, seriously challenged the primacy of a social approach to purification and helped establish a quasi-biological approach that was put into practice, although it never won philosophical or ideological endorsement. And the policy inevitably provoked comparisons with Nazi biological-racial engineering programs. Using examples of the campaigns against the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the Jewish minority, Weiner contends that the Soviet policies were ethnically based. But, he maintains, the Nazi and Soviet enterprises must be distinguished because, even when put into practice, the Soviet excision policy was eliminationalist and not based on a racial-biological code. Instead, he asserts, it relied on memory and its hierarchies of commemoration. Weiner's essay thus adds significantly to our understanding of modern state policies toward ethnic and racial minorities.

### ***AHR Forum***

**Celia Applegate** begins the *Forum* "Bringing Regionalism Back to History" by critiquing the dispersed discussions about the role of regions in European history, particularly their relationship to discussions of nationalism and modernization. She argues that even though regional history has been freed from the deep obscurity in which it lay during the heyday of modernization theory, there remains no synthetic view of what European history might look like when written from the perspective of Europe's regional rather than its national diversity. Applegate goes on to analyze three prominent forms of research on European regionalism: considering regions, not nations as the locus of economic and political change; examining the ways that identity formation and cultural change have centered in regional, rather than national, contexts; and emphasizing regions as spatial and geographic entities and thus as places subject to the forces of cultural and political change. She points out not only the ways that modernization theory limited our understanding of Europe's regions but also the more recent problems of looking at regions in purely constructivist terms.

**Kären Wigen** extends the *Forum* by surveying recent trends in the study of regions in East Asia. Focusing on China and Japan, she identifies three overlapping genres of work: discursive analyses of diverse regional imaginaries, attempts to reformulate core-periphery relations as dynamic and contested, and explorations of regional identities (including the "portable localisms" of diasporic populations) as a form of cultural and political capital. She concludes with a call to integrate these increasingly fluid conceptions of the region into a broad geo-historical vision where regional dynamics can be understood as both larger units in national or transnational terms and smaller ones such as the neighborhood and household.

Two commentators continue the *Forum* discussion of regionalism. **Michael O'Brien**, a historian of the United States South, suggests that many of the analytical

perspectives advanced by Applegate and Wigen have long been familiar in the writing of southern history. He also asserts that the value of interrogating the history of the regionalist idea, which (being dependent on the establishment of the nation-state) does not much predate the twentieth century, is very much associated with rational planning, and offers a political language of cooperative stability that accepts the legitimacy of the nation. Yet, he maintains, modern history around the world does not validate such a language of stability as a description of what has occurred or many wish to have occur. Thus O'Brien cautions that the essays too closely echo the discourse that is natural to stable (if federal) polities such as the United States to describe places in the world remarkable for their instability. **Vicente L. Rafael**, a cultural historian of Southeast Asia, brings his experiences in area studies and cultural studies to his analysis of regionalism as a subject of historical inquiry. He argues for the need to destabilize and thereby localize regionalism and to recognize the contingency of modernity when viewed through the prism of regionalism. He also chronicles the intellectual journeys of particular individuals such as Southeast Asian studies scholars George Kahin and Benedict Anderson and offers some compelling speculations on why such scholars are drawn to study particular places. Rafael thus adds issues of cultural theory and individual agency to the discussion of regionalism and history.

### ***Forum Essay: Responses***

**Jeremy Adelman** and **Stephen Aron**'s essay in the June 1999 issue, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," was the first part in our *Forum* on "Borders and Borderlands." They took up Herbert Bolton's six-decade-old call for a comparative and common history of the Americas to offer a framework that seeks to explain the diverse patterns of intercultural relations that characterized various North American frontiers. The *Forum* concludes in this issue with a second part that contains three comments on Adelman and Aron's essay. **Evan Haefeli** urges scholars of North American frontiers to consider their work in a broader context that would enable them to develop an analytical framework useful to the study of frontier encounters around the globe and throughout history. **Christopher Ebert Schmidt-Nowara** raises questions about the intellectual foundations of the transnational history of North America by invoking the work of Latin American and Spanish historians and intellectuals who have also analyzed the cultural and political connections among empires, national states, and subaltern groups. **John R. Wunder** and **Pekka Hämäläinen** critique the essay for misrepresenting the historiography on the topic, avoiding issues of political economy and the environment, and, most important, failing to recognize indigenous agency. **Adelman** and **Aron** complete this two-part *Forum Essay* by engaging these critiques.

**Review Essays**

The three review essays use an assessment of David S. Landes's recent book, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*, to explore the nature and meaning of Western hegemony during the last few centuries. They each do so from a different analytical perspective. **Joel Mokyr**, an economic historian, offers a succinct overview of the questions raised by European global dominance, particularly its technological creativity, over the last two centuries. He appreciatively yet critically assesses Landes's contention that European ascendancy sprang from distinctive attitudes and culture and his failure to address critical issues of economic and institutional analysis. **Donna J. Guy**, a historian of Latin America, considers Landes's book a brilliant but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to write a global and comparative history of capitalism based on geographic determinism, religion, and the morality of cultures. She contends that he used his extensive bibliography to reinforce his own prejudices about the superiority of Protestant culture in Europe and thus explain why some cultures have achieved economic success while others have failed. Guy suggests that Latin America, particularly Argentina, illustrates the weaknesses of his argument. **Charles Tilly**, a historical sociologist, assesses *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* as a work of multi-level historical analysis. He probes the limitation of a cultural explanation of European dominance in terms of either national or world history. Taken together, the three review essays demonstrate why European hegemony remains such a critical but elusive issue.



and suffragettes, 1830-1840.

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# The Suffragette

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**"Suffragette" Week.—"March On! March On!"**

This drawing for the British periodical *The Suffragette* (April 25, 1913) transforms the imagery of Eugène Delacroix's painting *Liberty Leading the People* (1830) into a vision of matriarchal power. A mother in classical dress leads a peaceful army of women. A winged Mercury leads the way. The forward momentum of the figures and the spreading rays of the sun evoke hope and optimism. Artist unknown.

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# Feminism, Social Science, and the Meanings of Modernity: The Debate on the Origin of the Family in Europe and the United States, 1860–1914

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ANN TAYLOR ALLEN

OF THE YEAR 1913, THE VIENNESE NOVELIST Robert Musil wrote, “The time was on the move . . . But in those days no one knew what it was moving towards. Nor could anyone quite distinguish between what was above and what was below, between what was moving forward and what backwards.”<sup>1</sup> This new relationship to time, space, and history pervaded literature, the arts, and the social and natural sciences in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century, from about 1890 until 1914. William Everdell, the author of a recent book on the intellectual history of this era, defines its central theoretical project as “the profound rethinking of the whole mind set of the nineteenth century.” This process of rethinking eroded familiar nineteenth-century European and North American paradigms: beliefs in progress and in seamless continuity were shaken by a new emphasis on rupture, randomness, and “ontological discontinuity,” and reliance on scientific objectivity by a recognition of the subjective element in all thought and observation. Most of the literature on European and North American intellectual history at the turn of the century emphasizes the problematic and disorienting effects of (as Everdell puts it), “the impossibility of knowing even the simplest things that the nineteenth century took for granted.”<sup>2</sup> In fact, the characterization of the period from 1890 to 1914 as an era of pessimism, alienation, and anxiety has become a cliché of intellectual history. In German political thought, Fritz Stern describes a mood of “cultural despair”; for the social sciences, writes Lawrence Scaff, “the central problem appears to be the same in every case: a sense that unified experience lies beyond the grasp of the modern self and that malaise and self-conscious guilt have become inextricably entwined with culture.” Eugen Weber remarks that, in France at the turn of the century, “the discrepancy between material progress and spiritual dejection re-

I would like to express my gratitude to the Stanford Institute for Research on Women and Gender and to the University of Louisville for providing the environment and the financial support for the preparation of this article. I also thank Karen Offen of the Stanford Institute and Marilyn Boxer of San Francisco State University for sharing the results of their research, and Karen Offen, Thomas R. Trautmann of the University of Michigan, and David Lindenfeld of Louisiana State University for reading and commenting on earlier versions of the article.

<sup>1</sup> Robert Musil, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, 1930; quotation from the English translation, *The Man without Qualities*, Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser, trans. (New York, 1980), 3.

<sup>2</sup> William R. Everdell, *The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth-Century Thought* (Chicago, 1997), 10–11.

minded me of my own era.”<sup>3</sup> In Britain, the literary critic Terry Eagleton refers to a “cataclysmic crisis of Victorian rationality.”<sup>4</sup> In the Austrian Empire, Carl Schorske describes “autumnal pessimism.”<sup>5</sup> Even in the still optimistic culture of the United States, according to Daniel J. Wilson, philosophers faced a “crisis of confidence” as their cultural authority was challenged by the natural sciences.<sup>6</sup> In Western European civilization as a whole, Modris Eksteins identifies a spirit of “orgiastic-nihilistic irony” among the essential preconditions for the senseless violence of World War I.<sup>7</sup> The editors of a recent anthology of articles on this period, Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, criticize the “distinctly simplistic” tendency of many historical accounts to “concentrate on individual as well as social alienation as particularly characteristic of fin de siècle feeling.”<sup>8</sup>

“One of the tasks of women’s history,” wrote Joan Kelly in 1977, “is to call into question accepted schemes of periodization.”<sup>9</sup> This article will revise the conventional picture of this era by looking at one of its most important and least recognized developments—the flowering of feminist intellectual creativity that produced some of the first scholarly analyses of the position of women in prehistory, history, and the modern era. The context for such analyses was provided by one of the era’s most important intellectual controversies, which concerned the origins of the family, patriarchy, and the subordination of women. The importance of feminist scholarship to the intellectual life of this era has seldom been recognized; indeed, the accounts quoted above base their picture of Western culture at the turn of the twentieth century wholly or chiefly on the experience and ideas of one segment of the population, male academic, literary, and artistic elites. But, as Kelly suggested through the question “Did women have a Renaissance?” accepted characterizations of an era and its culture often do not include the experience of subordinated or silenced groups, and the full consideration of such groups can not only supplement but fundamentally change these characterizations. Recent developments in intel-

<sup>3</sup> Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (1961; rpt. edn., New York, 1965); Lawrence A. Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber* (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), 80; Eugen Weber, *France: Fin de Siècle* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 3. For other examples, see Arthur Mitzman, *Sociology and Estrangement: Three Sociologists of Imperial Germany* (New York, 1973); Mitzman, *The Iron Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber* (1970; rpt. edn., New Brunswick, N.J., 1985); Fritz Pappenheim, *The Alienation of Modern Man: An Interpretation Based on Marx and Tönnies* (1959; rpt. edn., New York, 1968); E. G. Jacoby, *Die moderne Gesellschaft im sozialwissenschaftlichen Denken von Ferdinand Tönnies: Eine biographische Einführung* (Stuttgart, 1971); *Degeneration: The Dark Side of Progress*, J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman, eds. (New York, 1985); Susan J. Navarette, *The Shape of Fear: Horror and the Fin de Siècle Culture of Decadence* (Lexington, Ky., 1998). Harry Liebersohn, *Fate and Utopia in German Sociology, 1870–1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), dissents somewhat from this picture but emphasizes that the conventional view does emphasize “tragic pessimism” (2). H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890–1930* (New York, 1958), stresses the problematic and pessimistic implications of research in the social sciences (329–35).

<sup>4</sup> Terry Eagleton, “The Flight to the Real,” in *Cultural Politics at the Fin de Siècle*, Sally Ledger and Scott McCracken, eds. (Cambridge, 1995), 13.

<sup>5</sup> Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York, 1980), 20.

<sup>6</sup> Daniel J. Wilson, *Science, Community, and the Transformation of American Philosophy, 1860–1930* (Chicago, 1990), 121–49.

<sup>7</sup> Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Boston, 1989), xiv.

<sup>8</sup> *Fin-de-Siècle and Its Legacy*, Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, eds. (Cambridge, 1990), 3.

<sup>9</sup> Joan Kelly, “Did Women Have a Renaissance?” rpt. in *Women, History and Theory: The Essays of Joan Kelly* (Chicago, 1984), 19.

lectual history, particularly the “linguistic turn,” have encouraged the inclusion of subordinated groups by shifting attention away from prominent authors and their works to the many ways in which texts are read, and meaning is made, within culture. Dominick LaCapra, for example, has pointed out that ideas are created not only by individual authors but also by the many readers, commentators, and critics (or “communities of discourse”) who, often over the course of many generations, discuss, revise, and expand on ideas received from the culture’s dominant texts.<sup>10</sup> I shall demonstrate the emergence of a feminist community of discourse, and show that these feminist scholars responded to the era’s changing theoretical paradigms not, as did some of their male contemporaries, with despair, anxiety, alienation, or a flight into the irrational but with a new sense of optimism and intellectual empowerment.<sup>11</sup>

The article will trace the debate on the origins of the family from its beginnings around 1860 until 1914, with a particular focus on the years after 1890. During the period from 1860 to 1890, the explosive expansion of data on human societies past and present provided the basis for the first evolutionary theories of the origins and development of the family. At first, these theories supported typically Victorian narratives of progress that affirmed Western forms of the patriarchal family as the culmination of human development. But around 1890, a turn to cultural relativism in the social sciences called all such paradigms—including the superiority of Western forms of the family—into question. Most existing accounts of this controversy—including those by feminist scholars—are centered chiefly or only on prominent male thinkers, and thus conclude that its result was the vindication of patriarchy.<sup>12</sup> I will argue that, on the contrary, the very conception of patriarchy as a historical phenomenon, contingent on time and place, provided the basis for the emergence of a feminist critique of male supremacy, in both the past and the present, that has continued throughout the century.

This critique of patriarchy emerged in the context of a much broader discourse, which included male and female, obscure and illustrious, anti-feminist and feminist speakers; the feminists’ contribution will be embedded in this context. All of the theorists to be included here came from the Western world, the majority from the German and English-speaking cultures, and some from France, the Netherlands,

<sup>10</sup> Dominick LaCapra, *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983), 36–37.

<sup>11</sup> Paraphrasing Karen Offen, I here define “feminist” as a person (male or female) who recognizes “the validity of women’s own interpretation of their lived experiences and needs,” protests against the institutionalized injustice perpetrated by men as a group against women as a group, and advocates the elimination of that injustice by challenging the various structures of authority or power that legitimate male prerogatives in a given society. Karen Offen, “Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach,” *Signs* 14 (Autumn 1988): 152.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, George W. Stocking, Jr., *Victorian Anthropology* (New York, 1987), 186–238; Stocking, *After Tylor: British Social Anthropology, 1888–1951* (Madison, Wis., 1995), 3–160; Thomas R. Trautmann, *Lewis Henry Morgan and the Invention of Kinship* (Berkeley, Calif., 1987); Elizabeth Fee, “The Sexual Politics of Victorian Anthropology,” in *Clio’s Consciousness Raised: New Perspectives on the History of Women*, Mary S. Hartman and Lois W. Banner, eds. (New York, 1974), 86–102. Some excellent studies of American female intellectuals of this era, for example, Rosalind Rosenberg, *Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of Modern Feminism* (New Haven, Conn., 1982), and Desley Deacon, *Elsie Clews Parsons: Inventing Modern Life* (Chicago, 1997), have appeared, but their results have not been integrated into mainstream works of intellectual history. More works by feminist historians and theorists will be cited below.

and Scandinavia. But the significance of their ideas was by no means confined to the West. As the following pages will show, the polarity of male and female was often used as an analogy through which other polar oppositions—such as prehistory and history, civilization and barbarism, reason and emotion, *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*—were understood. These concepts became central to the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology, through which Western observers interpreted both their own and non-Western cultures. As many of the feminist authors to be quoted acknowledged, their critique of patriarchy would never have been possible without the awareness of cultural variation brought by encounters with other peoples. The impact of the transition to be discussed here, from Victorian myths of progress to cultural relativism, has shaped attitudes toward gender relations and toward non-Western cultures throughout the twentieth century.

THE DEBATE ON THE ORIGINS OF PATRIARCHY was, of course, not new in 1860. In fact, the seventeenth-century British philosophers John Locke and Thomas Hobbes had recognized the bond of mothers to children as more natural, and thus in a sense more primary and fundamental, than that of fathers. Their conclusion, that the patriarchal family nonetheless had (in Locke's words) a "Foundation in Nature" was not so much argued as asserted on the basis of the male's natural superiority in strength and reason.<sup>13</sup> In the eighteenth century, missionaries such as the Jesuit Joseph François Lafitau reported matrilineal societies among the Iroquois and other Native American peoples and even speculated that this might have been the original form of the human family.<sup>14</sup> French women who belonged to the utopian socialist movements of the 1830s and 1840s were inspired by the Romantic movement's exaltation of nature as a source of moral values to invoke the natural mother-child bond against the injustice of a civil-law system that gave total power in the family to husbands and fathers. One such socialist author passionately asserted (in an 1834 pamphlet), "Woman is the family, and the child should bear her name."<sup>15</sup> But among the problems facing these early socialists was the lack of a historical basis for their challenge to the patriarchal family.

No such basis was provided by the major works on the history and status of women that appeared in the next two decades. For these works (chiefly written by male intellectuals) claimed that patriarchy had existed throughout human history. The French historian Ernest Laboulaye, who was among the first serious scholars of women's history, concluded that existing French laws on the family, as enshrined in

<sup>13</sup> Susan Moller Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought* (Princeton, N.J., 1979), 197–202; compare also Carole Pateman, "Genesis, Fathers, and the Political Liberty of Sons," in Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, Calif., 1988), 77–115; John Locke, *An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government*, 1690, rpt. in *The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill*, Edwin A. Burt, ed. (New York, 1939), 434–35; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1651, rpt. in Burt, *English Philosophers*, 193–94.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph Campbell, "Introduction," in Johann Jakob Bachofen, *Myth, Religion, and Mother-Right: Selected Writings of J. J. Bachofen*, Ralph Manheim, trans. (Princeton, N.J., 1967), xxxiii.

<sup>15</sup> E. A. Casaubon, *La femme est la famille* (Paris, 1834), 8; see also Claire Goldberg Moses, "The Evolution of Feminist Thought in France, 1829–1889" (PhD dissertation, George Washington University, 1978), 200–06; and Susan K. Grogan, *French Socialism and Sexual Difference: Women and the New Society, 1803–1844* (London, 1992).



the Napoleonic Code, represented the culmination of a history of enlightened reform.<sup>16</sup> Auguste Comte, founder of the field of sociology, asserted authoritatively that the present-day status of women reflected “the natural subordination of woman, which has reappeared under all forms of marriage, in all ages.”<sup>17</sup> John Stuart Mill, though strongly dissenting from such views, nonetheless traced women’s subjection to “the very earliest twilight of human society,” when “every woman . . . was found in a state of bondage to some man,” and saw the improvement of women’s status as the necessary outcome of a general pattern of progress in Western society.<sup>18</sup>

By 1861, the center of the debate shifted to the new discipline of legal history. In a magisterial work, the British jurist Sir Henry Maine declared that the original basis of society was the patriarchal family, traceable not only to the Old Testament but to the Roman legal tradition that culminated in the conception of *patria potestas*. To Maine, whose chronological framework, based on biblical chronology, traced the age of the earth only to 4004 BCE, these Old Testament and classical societies seemed very close to the origin of humanity. Maine did not intend to defend this form of the family; on the contrary, he criticized current British laws and, in his most famous formulation, advocated the necessary and beneficial progress of the marriage relation “from status to contract.”<sup>19</sup> However, even this representative example of the Victorian paradigm of progress also raised unanswerable questions. Maine, whose conception of historical development was based wholly on the decisions of lawmakers, could give no plausible explanation why this development had occurred only in Western societies.

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, when biologically based theories of behavior had become central to scientific discourse—“for the apotheosis of Reason,” remarked Mill, “we have substituted that of Instinct”<sup>20</sup>—such an intellectually based theory of human development could not go unchallenged. The alternative view came from an unlikely source, for the Swiss legal scholar Johann Jakob Bachofen was as far removed from feminist controversy as any conservative patrician could be. Born in 1815 into the mercantile ruling class of Basel, Bachofen studied law in several European countries. In Berlin, he studied under the legal scholar Friedrich Karl von Savigny, the prime exponent of Romantic theories of law as the expression of the history and spirit of a people; in Paris, he may well have been exposed to the work of Laboulaye among other historians; in London, he visited the British Museum. During a scholarly sojourn in Rome, he observed, with great alarm, the revolutionary events of 1848. As democratic movements in Basel

<sup>16</sup> Karen Offen, “The Beginnings of Scientific Women’s History in France, 1830–1848,” *Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History*, 3–5 November 1983, John F. Sweets, ed. (Lawrence, Kans., 1984), 255–71.

<sup>17</sup> Auguste Comte, “Social Statics; or Theory of the Spontaneous Order of Human Society,” in *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, Harriet Martineau, trans., 3 vols. (London, 1986), 2: 284; see also Terry R. Kandal, *The Woman Question in Classical Sociological Theory* (Miami, Fla., 1988), 7.

<sup>18</sup> John Stuart Mill, *The Subjection of Women*, 1859, rpt. in *On Liberty: Representative Government; The Subjection of Women*, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, ed. (London, 1912), 432.

<sup>19</sup> Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (1861; rpt. edn., London, 1954), 100. See also Rosalind Coward, *Patriarchal Precedents: Sexuality and Social Relations* (London, 1983), 35–44; and Adam Kuper, “The Rise and Fall of Maine’s Patriarchal Theory,” in *The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine: A Centennial Reappraisal*, Alan Diamond, ed. (Cambridge, 1991), 99–110.

<sup>20</sup> Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 430; compare Coward, *Patriarchal Precedents*, 31.



threatened the position of his class, Bachofen's youthful liberalism swiftly gave way to disillusionment. In the 1850s, he gave up his university professorship and most of his public offices, withdrew to a comfortable life of independent scholarship, and pursued first medieval and then classical studies in a search for the roots from which he believed that the European civilization of his era had been so calamitously torn.<sup>21</sup>

At the time when Bachofen wrote, the modern fields of archaeology, anthropology, or ethnology hardly existed, and Troy, Mycenae, Knossos, and the cities of Mesopotamia were as yet unexcavated. In his search for the origins of human society, the Swiss scholar was drawn to the earliest period then known to classical scholarship, the archaic period of Greek civilization (about 1000 to 700 BCE), which, in the context of the short biblical chronology, seemed close to the beginning of the human race.<sup>22</sup> Bachofen's source material was limited to the relatively small number of artifacts and texts of that period to which he had access during his visits to Italy, Greece, and the British Museum. His scholarly method, which marked him as a belated representative of the Romantic movement, was regarded by his contemporaries as impossibly outdated and unscientific. This judgment has been affirmed by contemporary feminist scholars, who have criticized Bachofen for mistaking myth for history, as if his interpretation of myth had been simply erroneous or naïve.<sup>23</sup> But in many ways, Bachofen's analysis of mythology as a form of symbolic expression, though it looked backward to the Romantic movement, also anticipated much later insights of psychoanalysis and modern social science. Certainly, he regarded mythology as a valid historical source, though not for a factual history of events—in fact, he regarded the era's positivist historical method with great contempt. His interest, rather, was in the structures of knowledge and consciousness that underlay all events and functioned as “the lever of history.”<sup>24</sup> The window into these deeper structures was provided by the symbolic language of mythology, which he interpreted intuitively, through “the shorter path of the imagination, traversed with the force and swiftness of electricity.”<sup>25</sup> Bachofen (whose approach somewhat resembled that of present-day deconstructionists) read the texts of the archaic period with particular attention to their gaps, silences, and inconsistencies. These he attributed to an editing process through which traces of a more ancient narrative had been expunged from the historical record.

In a hefty and erudite volume (it contained many quotations in the original

<sup>21</sup> Johann Jakob Bachofen, “Lebens-Rückschau,” 1854, rpt. in Bachofen, *Mutterrecht und Urreligion: Eine Auswahl*, Rudolf Marx, ed. (Stuttgart, 1954), 1–18; in English translation as “My Life in Retrospect,” in Bachofen, *Myth, Religion, and Mother-Right*, 3–21. See also Karl Meuli's thorough biographical sketch, “Nachwort,” *Johann Jakob Bachofens gesammelte Werke*, Meuli, ed., 10 vols. (Basel, 1943–), 3: 1012–79; and Lionel Gossman, *Orpheus Philologus: Bachofen versus Mommsen on the Study of Antiquity* (Philadelphia, 1983), 1–30.

<sup>22</sup> On the chronological perspective of Bachofen and Maine, see Trautmann, *Lewis Henry Morgan*, 58–84.

<sup>23</sup> For example, by Paula Webster, “Matriarchy: A Vision of Power,” in Rayna R. Reiter, *Toward an Anthropology of Women* (New York, 1975), 143: “Bachofen's work has been appropriately criticized for its lack of empirical data and its substitution of mythology for history.” Of course, very little such empirical data was available before 1861!

<sup>24</sup> Johann Jakob Bachofen, “Mother-Right,” excerpted and translated in *Myth, Religion, and Mother-Right*, 85; *Das Mutterrecht: eine Untersuchung über die Gynäcratie der alten Welt nach ihrer religiösen und rechtlichen Natur* (Stuttgart, 1861); rpt. of vols. 2 and 3 of *Bachofens gesammelte Werke*.

<sup>25</sup> Bachofen, “Lebens-Rückschau,” 11.

Greek) published in 1861, he announced his results: the theory that the earliest form of social organization had been based on what he called *Mutterrecht*, a family and kinship system centered on women. An elaborate evolutionary narrative explained this system's rise, fall, and replacement by patriarchy. The history of the human race, Bachofen generalized, could be understood as a struggle to rise from the material and physical to the abstract and rational level. In its earliest and most "material" stages of development, the human race had lived not in orderly nuclear families but in a state of total sexual promiscuity under the auspices of the goddess of lust, Aphrodite. As fatherhood was not known, inheritance and family structure were matrilineal. The mother-child bond was the first social tie and the basis of the first moral sensibility. "Woman at this stage," states a much-quoted passage, was "the repository of all culture, of all benevolence, of all devotion, of all concern for the living and grief for the dead."<sup>26</sup> The term *Mutterrecht* denoted matrilineal inheritance and family structure, and not necessarily political rule by women; the use of "matriarchate" as a translation was thus often misleading. In fact, Bachofen portrayed this first, Hobbesian stage as one of male dominance and sexual exploitation of women; and he speculated that, although men liked this existence well enough, women found it nasty, brutish, and short. Through the moral authority conferred by motherhood, they forced men to enter into marriage and familial ties, thus initiating a more genuinely matriarchal second, or Demetrian phase, in which the goddess of grain presided over a settled rural culture, marked by a reverence for the earth and for natural processes, piety, hospitality, and solidarity: "an air of tender humanity permeates the culture of the matriarchal world."<sup>27</sup>

But, as Bachofen recounted, this classical period of matriarchy was disrupted by women's resort to arms and violence to defend their rule against male aggression. The female warriors, or Amazons, soon converted to the new cult of Dionysus, phallic god of male fertility, who transported his female votaries into wild ecstasies of drunkenness and lust, "showing how hard it is at all times for women to observe moderation."<sup>28</sup> Such unfeminine excesses doomed the matriarchy, which was soon conquered by the forces of male supremacy. The victory of patriarchy was celebrated in the worship of male gods, such as Apollo, who symbolized the "heavenly light" of rationality. Maternity was a natural, paternity a legal relationship; and thus, Bachofen concluded, "the triumph of paternity brings with it the liberation of the spirit from the manifestations of nature, a sublimation of human existence over the laws of material life."<sup>29</sup>

Bachofen's text can be and (as we shall see) often was read as a classically "Victorian" narrative of progress and seamless development, justifying essentialist notions of male and female nature. Feminist authors of the 1970s rightly criticized his overtly Victorian notions of womanhood: "Bachofen's matriarch is a far cry from today's liberated women," complained the anthropologist Joan Bamberger.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Bachofen, *Myth, Religion, and Mother-Right*, 79.

<sup>27</sup> Bachofen, *Myth, Religion, and Mother-Right*, 80.

<sup>28</sup> Bachofen, *Myth, Religion, and Mother-Right*, 100.

<sup>29</sup> Bachofen, *Myth, Religion, and Mother-Right*, 109.

<sup>30</sup> Joan Bamberger, "The Myth of Matriarchy," in *Woman, Culture, and Society*, Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds. (Stanford, Calif., 1974), 265; compare also Coward, *Patriarchal Precedents*, 34.

However, as LaCapra has pointed out, a reading based only on the author's overt intentions can seldom capture either the complex, sometimes contradictory implications of a text or the many interpretive possibilities it offers.<sup>31</sup> In fact, many aspects of Bachofen's narrative subverted rather than supported the conventional assumptions of his age. Ironically, considering his conservative distaste for the Enlightenment, Bachofen lent scholarly authority to one of that era's most radical ideas: that the dominance of man over woman, like other political arrangements, was not inevitable but was contingent on time, place, and culture.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, this system of domination could never be secure, for the ascendancy of patriarchy depended on an imperfect process of what would later be called sublimation, and was constantly subverted by the forces of irrationality and emotionalism that Bachofen stereotyped as female, or "matriarchal." The history of culture, he wrote, showed "how hard it has been for men, at all times and amid the most varied religious constellations, to overcome the inertia of material nature and to assume the highest calling, the sublimation of earthly existence to the purity of the divine father principle."<sup>33</sup> And Bachofen's tone subverted his overt message, for it was elegiac rather than triumphal—a conservative dislike for modern times spoke through his poetic evocation of the organic, pious, and pacific values of the lost matriarchal world. Finally, Bachofen's picture of women was by no means totally "essentialist," for as a Romantic, he reveled in myth and history as a treasury of the grotesque, marvelous, and fantastic, and lavished his considerable literary skill on pictures of women, not just as decorous matrons but as bloodthirsty warriors, stern despots, crazed Dionysian votaries, lustful sexual predators, even as poetic lesbians. Much material would later be found to fuel the feminist imagination here.

The failure of Bachofen's weighty tome to gain public attention in the 1860s was due chiefly to its Romantic style, so alien to the positivist scholarly methods that were then at the height of their influence. But before his death in 1882, he saw many of his basic ideas affirmed by the new field of anthropology. In the 1860s, a change in chronological orientation, which the historian Thomas Trautmann has called the "time revolution," replaced the short biblical chronology with a greatly lengthened estimate of the age of the earth and of the human race. The authority of biblical and classical texts as sources for the origins of human society was now discredited, and the focus of research shifted to existing non-Western societies, which seemed to offer more reliable insights into the period of human development now known as prehistory.<sup>34</sup> While invalidating Bachofen's scientific framework, however, the new research paradoxically raised his status and visibility as a scholar by affirming some of his ideas, including the variability of forms of the family and the possibility, now confirmed by anthropological evidence, of woman-centered familial and kinship structures. Anthropologists first used this information to reinforce typical Victorian

<sup>31</sup> LaCapra, *Rethinking Intellectual History*, 36–37.

<sup>32</sup> On Enlightenment views of male supremacy, see Karen Offen, "Contextualizing the Theory and Practice of Feminism in Nineteenth-Century Europe," in *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*, Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, eds. (Boston, 1998), 327–55; compare Sherry Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature to Culture?" in Rosaldo and Lamphere, *Woman, Culture, and Society*, 67–88.

<sup>33</sup> Bachofen, *Myth, Religion, and Mother-Right*, 118.

<sup>34</sup> Trautmann, *Lewis Henry Morgan*, 58–83, 205–30; Thomas R. Trautmann, "The Revolution in Ethnological Time," *Man*, n.s., 27 (1992): 379–97.

paradigms of progress, which ranked “savage” societies as the lowest and Western civilized societies as the highest stage of human development. “Men in savagery,” wrote the American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan, had been providentially “left behind to testify concerning the early condition of mankind in general.”<sup>35</sup> Morgan, who had studied the Iroquois, asserted in 1877 that family organization everywhere had developed from promiscuity through matriarchy (meaning matrilineal inheritance and an equal position for women in society) to patriarchy. The Scottish anthropologist John Ferguson McLennan reached a similar conclusion even earlier, in 1865.<sup>36</sup> Although they had reached these results before they read Bachofen, Morgan and McLennan subsequently acknowledged the central importance of what Morgan called his “work of vast research.”<sup>37</sup>

In the 1880s, both the British anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor and the German Adolf Bastian, founders of the field in their respective countries, hailed Bachofen as a pioneer and affirmed the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy as an essential and universal stage in cultural development. But the integration of Bachofen’s theory into a narrative of progress from “low” to “high” civilization required the anthropologists to ignore, refute, or ridicule the aspects of his theory that questioned conventional beliefs in progress, including his interest in the mythology and legends of cultures that the new generation of scholars considered primitive. Though conceding that women’s status might be higher in societies with matrilineal or matrilineal family structures, most ethnologists believed that actual female political dominance, which could not be documented in existing societies, was a fantasy. Most portrayed the period they called “matriarchal” as a brutal and barbarous period and patriarchy, though oppressive to women, as a step forward in the evolution of human culture. Morgan attributed the rise of patriarchy to the accumulation of property in the hands of men, and the British anthropologist Sir John Lubbock likewise to both the rise of private property and the development of familial love, which he identified with the recognition of paternity.<sup>38</sup> As Elizabeth Fee points out, the overt and intentional content of early anthropological works thus certainly confirmed conventional beliefs in male supremacy.<sup>39</sup>

However, the expanded view of human prehistory, which had seen the rise and fall of so many human cultures, also left all essentialist notions of human nature open to contestation. The German-born socialists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were voracious readers of anthropological literature, particularly of the works of

<sup>35</sup> Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient Society; or, Researches in the Lines of Human Progress, from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* (London, 1878), 59. See also Trautman, *Lewis Henry Morgan*. A survey of the various interpretations of Bachofen that, despite its very slight attention to feminist interpretations, is still useful is *Das Mutterrecht von J. J. Bachofen in der Diskussion*, H.-J. Heinrichs, ed. (Frankfurt, 1987).

<sup>36</sup> John Ferguson McLennan, *Primitive Marriage: An Inquiry into the Origin of the Form of Capture in Marriage Ceremonies*, Peter Riviere, ed. (1865; rpt. edn., Chicago, 1970).

<sup>37</sup> Morgan, *Ancient Society*, 347; John Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man, Mental and Social Conditions of Savages* (London, 1870); compare Fee, “Sexual Politics,” 94; and Trautmann, *Lewis Henry Morgan*, 179–204.

<sup>38</sup> See Stocking, *After Tylor*, 3–34; and Uwe Wesel, *Der Mythos vom Matriarchat: Über Bachofens Mutterrecht und die Stellung der Frauen in frühen Gesellschaften* (Frankfurt, 1980).

<sup>39</sup> Fee, “Sexual Politics,” 100–03.

Morgan.<sup>40</sup> In his treatise *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, written in 1884, after the death of Marx but faithful to his ideas, Engels asserted that the age of primitive matriarchy had been marked by gender equality and communal ownership of property, and that the establishment of private ownership in land and slaves had brought the “world-historical defeat of the female sex.”<sup>41</sup> The victory of patriarchy had brought the reign not of superior rationality but of inequality and injustice.

Many works of socialist authors, among whom the most widely read was the head of the German Social Democratic Party, August Bebel, shared Engels’s conception of the history of the family.<sup>42</sup> Their polemic against bourgeois marriage was based firmly on Bachofen’s theory of primordial promiscuity, which Morgan had confirmed. Marriage, argued these socialist theorists, was not a universal aspect of human culture but had arisen only when men sought to ensure orderly inheritance by including women among their ever more numerous possessions. Engels and Bebel certainly did not advocate a return to “mother-right,” which they too regarded as a primitive stage of civilization. By placing the struggle of the sexes in prehistory, the socialist theorists effectively removed it from the present; in fact, by subsuming women within the family, they denied them any other interests than those of the men of their class. Nonetheless, socialist theorists firmly insisted that patriarchy was not the culmination of a history of progress but an evanescent stage in human development that would give way to egalitarian forms of marriage and society.<sup>43</sup>

The same questioning about the transition from female-headed to male-headed forms of the family was also carried on in the new field of sociology. The influential Herbert Spencer, founder of the field in Britain, used anthropological data to support his theory of “Social Darwinism,” which applied the laws of natural selection to the development of society. The matrilineal family, he asserted, had been inadequate to provide for its offspring; only fathers could adequately protect women and children, and thus prevailing forms of monogamous marriage were “the natural form of sexual relation for the human race.”<sup>44</sup> But the assumption that patriarchy meant progress was vigorously challenged by the American sociologist Lester Frank Ward, who devoted much of his career to exposing and contesting Spencer’s use of Darwinian theory to justify a complacent acceptance of the economic and political status quo. Ward, a convinced socialist and feminist, argued that evolutionary advantage was conferred by cooperation as well as by competition, and that the evolution of the brain had endowed human beings with the

<sup>40</sup> Karl Marx, *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*, Lawrence Krader, trans. and ed. (Assen, 1972).

<sup>41</sup> Friedrich Engels, *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums, und des Staates*, 1884; quotation from the English translation, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State in the Light of the Researches of Lewis Henry Morgan* (New York, 1942), 50.

<sup>42</sup> August Bebel, *Die Frau in der Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, und Zukunft* (Zurich, 1883); English translation, *Woman in the Past, Present and Future* (London, 1885); Paul Lafargue, *La question de la femme* (Paris, 1904).

<sup>43</sup> Engels, *Origin of the Family*, 163; Bebel, *Woman in the Past, Present and Future*; compare Coward, *Patriarchal Precedents*, 146–71.

<sup>44</sup> Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, 3 vols. (New York, 1901), 1: 654. Volume 1 was first published in 1876.



potential for more rational forms of social organization. Ward reversed dominant assumptions about gender by attributing the power to transcend “nature” through rationality to females. He based his “gynecocentric” theory of social evolution on anthropological discoveries, including “the astonishingly extensive researches of Bachofen,” the works of Morgan, and on alternative interpretations of Darwinian biology. In all species from insects to human beings, he claimed that the female was the stronger and more essential organism and the male “a mere afterthought of nature.”<sup>45</sup> Drawing on Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, Ward insisted that in early human beings as in other animal species, females had originally exercised dominance in selecting their male mates as well as in other aspects of life. The matriarchal period, a period of motherly nurture, order, and nonviolence, had been disrupted only by male usurpation of power, from which all social problems, such as war, inequality, and disease, had resulted. Ward envisaged the reconciliation of the sexes through new and egalitarian forms of romantic love.<sup>46</sup>

THUS, BY THE 1890s, THE VICTORIAN NARRATIVES OF PROGRESS that had justified the rise of patriarchy had already been contested, and their erosion provided an opening for some of the first explicitly feminist scholarly interpretations. The very prominent and visible American feminists Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Matilda Joslyn Gage had argued since the 1870s that the Christian churches constituted the major obstacle to the advancement of women.<sup>47</sup> Both Stanton and Gage were thus receptive to Bachofen’s thesis, to which Stanton was introduced by the British scientist and active feminist Karl Pearson in 1890.<sup>48</sup> Although unable to read Bachofen’s *Das Mutterrecht* in the original (which was not, and in fact has never been, fully translated into English), the American feminists could learn of its central argument from the many English-language scholarly works they used in their research, among which those of Morgan figured prominently.

Their studies resulted in two of the earliest and most significant works of feminist history: Stanton’s “The Matriarchate or Mother-Age,” first delivered as an address to the National Council of Women in 1891, and Gage’s *Woman, Church and State: A Historical Account of the Status of Women through the Christian Ages; With Reminiscences of the Matriarchate*, first published in 1893. Although dependent on the work of male scholars, both authors also specifically contradicted conventional associations of patriarchy with progress. They refused to accept the view of the matriarchal period as a primitive phase; on the contrary, they argued that this system had prevailed in many high civilizations, including that of ancient Egypt.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Lester Frank Ward, *Pure Sociology: A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society* (New York, 1903), 314.

<sup>46</sup> Ward, *Pure Sociology*, 297; Lester Frank Ward, “Our Better Halves,” *The Forum* 6 (November 1888): 266–75. See also Clifford H. Scott, *Lester Frank Ward* (Boston, 1976).

<sup>47</sup> Matilda Joslyn Gage, “Woman, Church, and State,” in *History of Woman Suffrage*, Susan B. Anthony, Matilda Joslyn Gage, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, eds., 3 vols. (Rochester, N.Y., 1881–82), 1: 753–99.

<sup>48</sup> Elizabeth Cady Stanton, *Eighty Years and More*, 1898, intro. by Ellen Carol DuBois; afterword Ann D. Gordon (Boston, 1993), 430–31.

<sup>49</sup> Elizabeth Cady Stanton, “The Matriarchate or Mother-Age,” in *Transactions of the National Council of Women of the United States*, Rachel Foster Avery, ed. (Philadelphia, 1891), 223; see also the



Although Gage denied that matrilineal institutions had their origin in an age of sexual promiscuity, the less conventional Stanton was quite prepared to admit that women had first gained supremacy during a period when "sex relations being transitory and promiscuous, the idea of paternity was unknown."<sup>50</sup> Both portrayed the matriarchate in its period of mature development as a model of female humanitarianism, justice, and equality. And both turned Bachofen on his head; the triumph of patriarchy was not a victory for order and rationality but rather for all kinds of regression. The patriarchy, insisted Gage, "was the rule of men whose lives and religion were based on passions of the grossest kind."<sup>51</sup> The witch burnings of the Christian Middle Ages, both speculated, had brought the final defeat of matriarchal institutions and the descent of a patriarchal dark age.<sup>52</sup>

Feminist scholars not only reversed the still-conventional narrative of progress, but in the process they developed the epistemological perspective that was characteristic of the 1890s: the critique of claims to objectivity and the perception of the subjective element in all knowledge. Gage attributed androcentric theological traditions to "the overheated fires of [male] feeling"; Stanton argued that male historians wrote from their "own true inwardness" and that women must "question all historians, sacred and profane, who teach by examples or precepts any philosophy that lowers the status of the mothers of the race."<sup>53</sup> And for Stanton and Gage, the challenge to objectivity produced not anxiety or doubt but a new optimism and confidence. "The assertion that women have always been physically inferior to men, and consequently have always been held in a subject condition, has been universally believed," Stanton argued. "The worst feature of these assumptions is that women themselves believe them . . . Fortunately historical research has at last proved the fallacy of these assumptions and all the arguments that grow out of them."<sup>54</sup> However, the attempts of Gage and Stanton to gain acceptance for this view of women's history within a mainstream, organized feminist movement failed, for such movements in the United States were dominated by the religious women who would later likewise reject the great project of Stanton's last years, *The Woman's Bible*, which also contained references to the "matriarchate."<sup>55</sup> Perhaps for this reason, the works of Stanton and Gage were seldom cited by the next generation of feminist intellectuals.

IN THE DECADE OF THE 1890s, this view of matriarchy as a universal early stage in the development of human society was increasingly called into question by the newest

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same text in *Free Thought Magazine* 19 (June 1901): 267–72; (July 1901): 320–25; Matilda Joslyn Gage, *Woman, Church, and State: A Historical Account of the Status of Woman through the Christian Ages: With Reminiscences of the Matriarchate* (1893; rpt. edn., New York, 1972), 225.

<sup>50</sup> Gage, *Woman, Church, and State*, 16; Stanton, "Matriarchate," 221.

<sup>51</sup> Gage, *Woman, Church, and State*, 43; see also Stanton, "Matriarchate," 226.

<sup>52</sup> Stanton, "Matriarchate," 227; Gage, *Woman, Church, and State*; see also Karl Pearson, "Evidences of Mother-Right in the Customs of Medieval Witchcraft," in Pearson, *The Chances of Death and Other Studies in Evolution*, 2 vols. (London, 1897), 1–50.

<sup>53</sup> Gage, *Woman, Church, and State*, 47; Stanton, "Matriarchate," 270.

<sup>54</sup> Stanton, "Matriarchate," 218.

<sup>55</sup> For a general discussion of Gage, Stanton, and matriarchal theories, see Donna A. Behnke, *Religious Issues in Nineteenth-Century Feminism* (Troy, N.Y., 1982), 159–65.

research in the academic fields of biology, anthropology, and ethnology.<sup>56</sup> Darwinian theory, the social implications of which were first fully explored during this decade, compared the family patterns of human beings to those of other animals.<sup>57</sup> Among the most influential of the Darwinian theorists was the Finnish anthropologist Edward Westermarck. The aspect of Bachofen's and Morgan's theories that Westermarck sought to refute was the assumption, disturbing to the defenders of Christian morality, that the original and therefore perhaps the most "natural" state of human sexuality was promiscuity. Westermarck's widely read book on the origins of the family, first published in 1891, used arguments originated by Darwin to dismiss this possibility and to assert the universality of male dominance. From "what we know of the jealousy of all male quadrupeds, promiscuous intercourse is utterly unlikely to prevail in a state of nature," Westermarck argued.<sup>58</sup> Likewise, the period's most influential work on the origins of religion, James George Frazer's *Golden Bough* (first published in 1890) insisted that, despite the existence of matrifocal kinship systems and mother-goddesses, both marriage and male dominance were universal aspects of culture in past and present.<sup>59</sup>

But the effect of the new research was to introduce new questions rather than to provide answers. By the daunting profusion of his examples, Westermarck had in fact dissolved normative notions about the family and gender relations in what the sociologist C. Wright Mills later called a "lethal bath of facts" showing the immense variation in codes of sexual morality across time and space.<sup>60</sup> Likewise, Frazer, who found the resemblance between "savage" and Christian religious practices disturbingly close, undermined confidence in the moral superiority of Western religion and culture. These works thus dealt a major blow to linear theories of progress and encouraged the turn to cultural relativism, which affected many aspects of social-science research after 1900. As George W. Stocking remarks, this era saw the beginnings of the process of dehistoricization, through which anthropology and other social sciences changed their focus from evolution through time to variety among and within existing cultures.<sup>61</sup> The struggle between "primitive" and "civilized" values was no longer seen as past but as present, played out in contemporary society and, increasingly, in the individual psyche. In this context, Bachofen's work was open to a host of new interpretations. To be sure, the factual accuracy of his picture of primeval matriarchy was largely discredited in the light of more reliable data. But other aspects of his scholarly approach that had been ridiculed by the previous generation, such as his view of mythology and symbolism as windows into human consciousness, were greeted with a new enthusiasm by innovators in such fields as sociology, psychology, and psychoanalysis. Many of

<sup>56</sup> Among the most significant of these many works: Charles Letourneau, *La condition de la femme dans les diverses races et civilisations* (Paris, 1903); and Otis Tufton Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture* (1894; New York, 1899).

<sup>57</sup> Stocking, *After Tylor*, 151–230.

<sup>58</sup> Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, 3d edn. (London, 1903), 117.

<sup>59</sup> James George Frazer, *The Golden Bough: Studies in the History of Oriental Religion*, 2 vols. (1914; rpt. edn., 1922), 2: 210–17.

<sup>60</sup> C. Wright Mills, "Edward Alexander Westermarck and the Application of Ethnographic Methods to Marriage," in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, Harry Elmer Barnes, ed. (Chicago, 1965), 663, quoted in Deacon, *Elsie Clews Parsons*, 50.

<sup>61</sup> Stocking, *After Tylor*, 230; Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, 326.

Bachofen's central insights—the culture-producing role of women and mothers, patriarchy as imperfect sublimation, gender relations as the basis of symbolic representation—now influenced new theoretical interpretations of contemporary Western society and the psychic forces that drove it.

Among the most important works that drew on Bachofen as well as many other texts was the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies' path-breaking work *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Community and Society), first published in 1887 but not widely read until the turn of the century. Tönnies held that social bonding arose from human individual psychology and took two forms: *Gemeinschaft*, or community, and *Gesellschaft*, or society. In his preface, Tönnies paid tribute to "the inordinately informative insight with which Bachofen (*Mutterrecht*) and Morgan (*Ancient Society*) have penetrated the history of the family, the community, and institutions in general."<sup>62</sup> The concept of *Gemeinschaft*, or community, was based in part on Bachofen's picture of the matriarchate—it was the organic, traditional, and emotional bond of family, village, and tribe, epitomized by the mother-child relationship. *Gesellschaft*, by contrast, was the impersonal, rational, and legally regulated bond linking members of a commercial or business corporation, state bureaucracy, or other such structure, and its quintessential expression was the contract. These categories, in which all of social life was contained, were gendered; Tönnies designated *Gemeinschaft* as a feminine and *Gesellschaft* as a masculine principle, and sometimes used gender relations as an analogy for other fundamental social oppositions: "as the sexes depend upon living together . . . so stand country and city, the mass of the people and the ruling class, in mutual dependence on each other."<sup>63</sup>

The history of modern society, in Tönnies' analysis, had brought the predominance of *Gesellschaft* over *Gemeinschaft*, and thus the repression of female by male values. Tönnies contested the conventional association of this development with "progress." In the same elegiac tone in which Bachofen had lamented the decline of the matriarchy, he deplored the estrangement of the modern individual from the sustaining energies of home, soil, and family.<sup>64</sup> Tönnies' sociology thus broadened Marx's basic concept of alienation by adding a psychological and sociological dimension to its original economic meaning.<sup>65</sup> However, because he identified the male-stereotyped values of *Gesellschaft* with civilization, he saw little possibility for the return of *Gemeinschaft*, although late in his career he hoped that socialism might bring back some of the lost spirit of community.<sup>66</sup>

The gendered categories of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* became basic to the

<sup>62</sup> Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie* (1887; rpt. edn., Darmstadt, 1964), xxiv; quotation from the English translation of the preface in Tönnies, *On Sociology: Pure, Applied and Empirical: Selected Writings*, Werner J. Cahnman and Rudolf Heberle, eds. (Chicago, 1971), 22.

<sup>63</sup> Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, 148–51; Ferdinand Tönnies, "The Concept of Gemeinschaft," in Tönnies, *On Sociology*, 71.

<sup>64</sup> Ferdinand Tönnies, "The Individual and the World in the Modern Age," in Tönnies, *On Sociology*, 288–317; see also David Lindenfeld, "Tönnies, the Mandarins and Modernism," *German Studies Review* 11 (February 1988): 60–77.

<sup>65</sup> Compare Lindenfeld, "Tönnies, the Mandarins and Modernism," 66–77.

<sup>66</sup> Ferdinand Tönnies, "Historicism, Rationalism, and the Industrial System," in Tönnies, *On Sociology*, 266–87.

development of sociology at the turn of the century. Building on Tönnies' concept of alienation, Georg Simmel asserted that modern society had created cultural forms and institutions (objective culture) that, though originally intended to enhance human possibilities, had become detached and estranged from the human spirit that produced them and thus operated to confine and constrain it. Like Tönnies' *Gesellschaft*, Simmel's "objective culture" was distinctively male: "there is no sense in which culture exists in a domain that lies beyond man and woman. It is rather the case that . . . our objective culture is thoroughly male."<sup>67</sup> By suppressing the female, who for Simmel embodied subjectivity, emotional integrity, and a holistic view of reality, male objective culture had cut itself off from the wellspring of its original energies. Simmel, though a feminist, saw little prospect of women's advancement, for, as culture was essentially male, women could not participate in its creation without denying their basic nature.<sup>68</sup> Simmel influenced Max Weber, the most prominent sociologist of the era, who also insisted that the triumph of rationality and calculation over female-identified emotionality was necessary—any reversal of the process would bring disorder—and developed the metaphor of civilization as an "iron cage" to express both the inevitability and the tragedy of this development.<sup>69</sup> These German sociologists gained international prominence as innovators in their field and interpreters of problems that were widely regarded as common to all modern Western societies.

SUCH PRESTIGIOUS FIGURES AS Tönnies, Weber, and Simmel are often taken as representative of an age of anxiety and pessimism; as H. Stuart Hughes remarks of Weber, the vision of the future that they offered "was bleak in the extreme."<sup>70</sup> But in describing alienation as a universally human experience, these sociologists had failed to apply their own critique of objectivity self-reflexively and to recognize the element of subjectivity in their own ideas.<sup>71</sup> By contrast to this male academic elite, whose traditional cultural authority was threatened in the modern world, most feminist intellectuals of this era did not view modernity with such pessimism—though acknowledging that patriarchy was indeed an iron cage, they aspired to escape from it. The many feminist theorists of this era who cited Bachofen's and other similar theories were not primarily interested in proving the historical existence of matriarchy; in fact, many acknowledged that the scientific evidence for such a period was ambiguous. Rather, they used the concepts of matriarchy and patriarchy (as Tönnies had used "community" and "society") as ideal types, or generalized models through which to interpret complex issues. Some of the hottest

<sup>67</sup> Georg Simmel, "Weibliche Kultur," in Simmel, *Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essays* (Leipzig, 1911); quotation from the English translation "Female Culture," in *Georg Simmel on Women, Sexuality, and Love*, Guy Oakes, trans. and ed. (New Haven, Conn., 1984), 67.

<sup>68</sup> Simmel, "Female Culture," 101. On Simmel's view of women, see Kandal, *Woman Question*, 156–76.

<sup>69</sup> Max Weber, "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* 20 (1905):188; quotation from the English translation in *Max Weber: Selections in Translation*, W. G. Runciman, ed., Eric Matthews, trans. (Cambridge, 1978), 170.

<sup>70</sup> Hughes, *Consciousness and Society*, 332.

<sup>71</sup> Compare Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 267–68.

public debates of the period—centered on such issues as the reform of family law, the rights of unmarried mothers and their children, the support of mothers by the state, and sexual morality—provided the context for feminists’ assertions of the importance of motherhood to culture. *Das Mutterrecht* was a useful source because it described various phases of “mother-right,” from promiscuity to the orderly, female-headed household, and could thus support varied approaches to sexual morality.

In France, a translation of the introduction to *Das Mutterrecht* was undertaken in 1903 by a small and vocal group of feminists, the French Group for Feminist Studies (Groupe Français d’Etudes Féministes), who focused their efforts chiefly on the reform of marriage law. They translated only Bachofen’s ample introduction (the entire volume, they explained, would have been too long and therefore too expensive for most women to buy) and struggled valiantly with the “interminable sentences in which, according to the genius of the German language, the meaning appears only with the very last word.”<sup>72</sup> In their introduction, the group’s president, Jeanne Oddo-Deflou, remarked specifically on the androcentric bias of supposedly objective male scholarship and noted caustically that the rejection of Bachofen’s thesis by male academics was all the more reason for feminists to take an interest in it. She rejected male scholars’ association of matriarchy with primitivism and emotionality, and of patriarchy with rationality. Like Stanton, she asserted that the mother-age civilization, in which institutions and government promoted human health and welfare, had been supremely rational. It was patriarchy that had led the human race into irrationality, the prime example of which was the legal primacy given to the rights of fathers over those of mothers; other abuses had followed from this.<sup>73</sup> Even though Oddo-Deflou reveled in aspects of Bachofen’s work, such as the exuberantly imaginative portrayal of women that more conventional scholars had dismissed, she was clearly much less interested in the historical accuracy of such images than in their symbolic appeal. She depicted the Amazons as role models for later feminist generations, although she reassured readers that contemporary Amazons aspired to conquer “without helmet or breast-plate . . . in the arena of reason.”<sup>74</sup>

In 1905, the Group for Feminist Studies founded a periodical, *L’entente*, which published articles not only on the matriarchate but on many other aspects of women’s history. The group became the center of an intellectual avant-garde stressing women’s right to higher education and professional development as well as the reform of family law.<sup>75</sup>

French socialist feminists developed a more explicitly Marxist version of this same discourse on prehistory. The prominent theorist Aline Valette harked back to an original female-headed culture that had been destroyed by male expropriation of

<sup>72</sup> Johann Jakob Bachofen, *Les droits de la mère dans l’antiquité: Préface de l’ouvrage de J-J Bachofen*, trans. and ed. by the Groupe Français d’Etudes Féministes (Paris, 1903), 14.

<sup>73</sup> Jeanne Oddo-Deflou, intro., *Les droits de la mère*, 36–38. The translators acknowledged the work of Alexis Giraud-Teulon, *Etudes sur les sociétés anciennes: La mère chez certains peuples d’antiquité* (Paris, 1867), but criticized him for his skepticism about the existence of matriarchy as a universal stage of human evolution (*Les droits de la mère*, 13).

<sup>74</sup> Oddo-Deflou, *Les droits de la mère*, 25; see also Cleyre Yvelin, ed., *Etude sur le féminisme dans l’antiquité* (Paris, 1908), 5–7.

<sup>75</sup> Laurence Klejman and Florence Rochefort, *L’égalité en marche: Le féminisme sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1989), 178–89.



mothers' rights to their children—a prototype, she asserted, of the later capitalist expropriation of the workers' right to the value of their labor. Both feminist groups envisaged the result of the downfall of patriarchy not as a new mother-age but as an age of gender equality.<sup>76</sup>

In the English-speaking world, where women gained access to academic positions much earlier than their continental counterparts, the feminist challenge to patriarchal bias began to have a substantial impact on some academic disciplines. Among the best known of this first generation of women academics was Jane Ellen Harrison, a distinguished classical scholar and fellow of Girton College, Cambridge. Harrison was a member of a school known as the Cambridge Ritualists (also including such prominent Oxonians as Gilbert Murray), which used methods derived from the social sciences, particularly anthropology, to develop new perspectives on the Greek and Latin classics.<sup>77</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, who was deeply influenced by Bachofen, had modified conventional pictures of a rational and virtuous Greek civilization by emphasizing the Greeks' emotional and licentious (or Dionysian) proclivities.<sup>78</sup> Harrison cited Bachofen as well as other anthropological literature to argue that the ancient matrilineal society of Greece had revered the forces of life, nature, change, and sexuality through its worship of male and female nature deities such as Dionysus. Later Greek civilizations had replaced these deities with the male-dominated Olympic pantheon (headed by the domestic tyrant Zeus) in order to impose the patriarchal conservatism that still dominated Western civilization. "In the Homeric Olympians," declared Harrison, who had defied her own conventional family to become a scholar, "we see mirrored a family group of the ordinary patriarchal type, a type so familiar that it hardly arrests attention."<sup>79</sup> Thus for Harrison, the idea of a matriarchal past reinforced not essentialized images of womanhood but, on the contrary, a critique of patriarchal religion in the classical past and in contemporary Western society.

Matriarchal theories also inspired many English-speaking feminist theorists of this period; only two prominent examples can be given here. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, among the most scientifically sophisticated and original minds produced by American feminism, was a great admirer of Lester Ward and his gynocentric theory; "nothing so important to humanity," she insisted, had "been advanced since the theory of evolution."<sup>80</sup> Among the other influences on Gilman as well as on many of her contemporaries was the work of the American anthropologist Otis

<sup>76</sup> Aline Valette, *Socialisme et sexualisme: Programme du Parti Socialiste Féminin* (Paris, 1893). On French socialist feminism, see Marilyn Boxer, "French Socialism, Feminism and the Family in the Third Republic," *Troisième République* (Spring–Fall 1977): 129–67. Boxer points out that Valette's theory of "sexualisme" was based on that of a male colleague, Dr. Paul Bonnier.

<sup>77</sup> On Harrison's life and work, see the excellent biography of Sandra J. Peacock, *Jane Ellen Harrison: The Mask and the Self* (New Haven, Conn., 1988); see also Robert Ackerman, *The Myth and Ritual School: J. G. Frazer and the Cambridge Ritualists* (New York, 1991).

<sup>78</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik* (Leipzig, 1872); English translation, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, Francis Golffing, trans. (New York, 1956).

<sup>79</sup> Jane Ellen Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1903), 260. On the impact of Bachofen's thesis on classical scholarship, see Stella Gorgoudi, "Creating a Myth of Matriarchy," in Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot, eds., *A History of Women in the West*, 5 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 1: 449–56.

<sup>80</sup> Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *The Man-Made World; or, Our Androcentric Culture* (1911; rpt. edn., New York, 1970), i.



Tufton Mason, who had concluded from the profuse anthropological data on the role of women in non-Western cultures that women had been the original creators of industry, the arts, government, religion, and most other aspects of civilization.<sup>81</sup> Gilman argued that women had originally been the dominant sex, which needed men only (as in some animal species) for purposes of fertilization. "The woman, the mother," she declared in her treatise of 1911, "is the first coordinator, legislator, and executive."<sup>82</sup> The contemporary "androcentric culture," based on an irrational glorification of the trivial male fertilizing function, had "resulted in arresting the development of half the world."<sup>83</sup> For Gilman, "the matriarchate" functioned much more as an imaginative than as a scientific concept. Her fictional account of an all-female utopia, *Herland*, contested the conventional categories of social science by showing emotion and rationality, community and society as perfectly harmonious rather than in conflict.<sup>84</sup>

The British feminist Frances Swiney, who was the head of the Cheltenham Suffrage Society as well as a widely published author, cited Bachofen, Morgan, Ward, and Mason in support of a central concern of British suffragists of her era—the struggle against venereal disease, prostitution, and child mortality. Swiney was not the first to popularize these authors in Britain, for in the 1890s their theories had been discussed by such prominent reformers as the socialist and biologist Karl Pearson and the feminist author Mona Caird, both of whom were ardent believers in the "mother-age," and the essayist and novelist Olive Schreiner, a skeptic.<sup>85</sup> Swiney glowingly described a golden age when male sexuality had been disciplined by women to serve the needs of orderly reproduction and health. Her best-known treatise, *The Bar of Isis*, lauded the decree of this ancient mother-goddess making sexual intercourse during pregnancy and lactation unlawful. Violation of this decree by the "abnormal and fostered sexuality of the human male," she charged, had undermined the health of women, children, and the population generally and made women's bodies into "the refuse-heap of sexual pathology."<sup>86</sup> The League of Isis, a society Swiney founded in 1907, heralded a new age of empowered motherhood in pamphlets with such titles as "The Mother of the Race."<sup>87</sup> The ideas of both Gilman and Swiney were publicized in the periodicals of the British suffrage and other reform organizations.<sup>88</sup> Most British and American suffragists evoked the matriarchal past in support of what was called the "social

<sup>81</sup> Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*.

<sup>82</sup> Gilman, *Man-Made World*, 183.

<sup>83</sup> Gilman, *Man-Made World*, 36.

<sup>84</sup> Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Herland*, Ann J. Lane, intro. (New York, 1979).

<sup>85</sup> Pearson, "Evidences of Mother-Right"; Mona Caird, *The Morality of Marriage and Other Essays* (London, 1897), 21–36; Ruth First and Ann Scott, *Olive Schreiner: A Biography* (London, 1980), 289.

<sup>86</sup> Frances Swiney, *The Bar of Isis; or, The Law of the Mother* (London, 1909), 53, 43. See also Swiney, *The Awakening of Women; or, Woman's Part in Evolution*, 3d edn. (London, 1908).

<sup>87</sup> George Robb, "Eugenics, Spirituality, and Sex Differentiation in Edwardian England: The Case of Frances Swiney," *Journal of Women's History* 10 (Autumn 1998): 108–09.

<sup>88</sup> For example, "The Primal Power: Speech Delivered by Mrs. Perkins Gilman at the London Pavilion, Monday, May 19, 1913," *The Suffragette*, June 6, 1913; "The Real Devil: Lecture by Mrs. Perkins Gilman," *The Vote*, July 4, 1913; Frances Swiney, "Womanhood versus Motherhood," *The Malthusian*, November 15, 1909; see also articles by Swiney in *Westminster Review*, May 1901, October 1901, March 1905, April 1905.

purity” argument, which upheld traditional standards of female sexual morality but insisted that men, too, must follow them.<sup>89</sup>

However, matriarchal theories could also be used to challenge such standards, and this was by far their most controversial and notorious application. In the Netherlands and Germany, highly public debates on family law, and especially on the legal status of unmarried mothers and their children, raised questions about patriarchal family organization. Feminist groups attributed the shockingly high rate of infant mortality among “illegitimate” children to laws that in the Netherlands forbade paternity suits altogether and in Germany limited child-support obligations. Whereas most feminists in both countries argued for the enforcement of paternal responsibility, small but vocal groups dissented. Citing Bachofen in support of their contention that matriliney was the oldest and most “natural” form of the family, they argued that unmarried mothers should not be forced to undergo the humiliation of paternity suits but should instead receive financial support and legal recognition from the state.

In the Netherlands, this argument emanated chiefly from a small group who in the period 1893–1895 contributed to the journal *Evolutie*, published by the organization *Vrije Vrouwen* (Free Women) and edited by Wihelmine Drucker.<sup>90</sup> In Germany, it was most conspicuously advanced by a group founded in 1905, the *Bund für Mutterschutz* (League for the Protection of Mothers). The group’s founder was Ruth Bré (her real name was Elisabeth Bouness), who was herself an illegitimate child. Bré proposed that unmarried mothers should form a matriarchal colony of mothers and children in the countryside, and she called on the state to support this scheme. The league soon attracted prominent figures: bourgeois feminists such as Helene Stöcker, socialists such as Lily Braun and Henriette Fürth, as well as some male sexual reformers. This new leadership rejected Bré’s utopian plan on both theoretical and practical grounds. Matriarchy, insisted Helene Stöcker, had been a primitive phase of an evolutionary process that should result in the reconciliation rather than the separation of men and women.<sup>91</sup> Likewise, Drucker and other Dutch feminists declared that parental responsibility should be shared by men and women.

But both the German and the Dutch groups attacked the moral code that sacrificed the rights of mothers and children to those of fathers, and both demanded equal inheritance rights for illegitimate children and the support of single mothers by some form of state-sponsored insurance. A major source of theoretical and practical ideas for the League for the Protection of Mothers was the Swedish reformer Ellen Key. Though not a believer in primeval matriarchy, Key affirmed Bachofen’s theory that women’s motherly love had been the first form of altruism in human society, and thus the source of all “helpfulness, compassion, far-thinking

<sup>89</sup> On this movement in Britain, see Sheila Jeffreys, *The Spinster and Her Enemies: Feminism and Sexuality, 1880–1930* (London, 1985); and Lucy Bland, *Banishing the Beast: Sexuality and the Early Feminists* (New York, 1995).

<sup>90</sup> Selma Sevenhuijsen, “Mothers as Citizens: Feminism, Evolutionary Theory and the Reform of Dutch Family Law, 1870–1910,” in *Regulating Womanhood: Historical Essays on Marriage, Motherhood and Sexuality*, Carol Smart, ed. (London, 1992), 167–86.

<sup>91</sup> Ann Taylor Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Germany, 1800–1914* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1991), 173–88; many more sources are given in the notes to this chapter.

tenderness, personal love.”<sup>92</sup> She was among the first feminist theorists to propose that the state must take some responsibility for supporting children, a provision that would enable women to fulfill their desire for children without dependence on men. Key asserted that mother-headed families, though an offense to conventional notions of morality and propriety, were not contrary to nature, for they replicated “the arrangement which is already found in the lower stages of civilization, the arrangement which nature herself created.”<sup>93</sup> Many members of the league went further to affirm what they called the New Ethic: the right of women to choose their own forms of sexual self-expression, within or outside marriage.<sup>94</sup> Many also advocated women’s right to control their reproductive lives through access to contraception and to legalized abortion. A vision of motherhood as a creative and life-giving force, free of patriarchal restraint, inspired the program of these sex reformers. “Inviolable and universally valid is not marriage, this contract regulating sexual relations, but motherhood alone,” wrote the German socialist Henriette Fürth, “the creative principle underlying all that is.”<sup>95</sup>

The New Ethic was supported in the Netherlands only by a few intellectuals and in Germany chiefly by supporters of the League for the Protection of Mothers, which, though its total membership of 3,800 was large for such a radical group, included only a small minority of German feminists. Nonetheless, the influence of these groups on public discourse was out of all proportion to their size. The New Ethic became the fashionable topic of the day, and the German sexual radicals, in particular, influenced debates on sexual morality throughout the Western world.<sup>96</sup> Many members of mainstream feminist movements were alarmed at the implications of the new theories for the institution of marriage, for they feared that the subversion of laws on marriage and the normative status of the two-parent family might have disastrous consequences for the many women who were still dependent on male breadwinners.

Among the most scholarly and thoughtful of such moderate feminists was Marianne Weber, a leader of the mainstream German feminist organization, the Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine (League of German Women’s Organizations). As early as 1904, Marianne Weber had warned against the tendency to believe that the matriarchal era was a “lost paradise.”<sup>97</sup> Both she and her eminent husband, Max Weber, condemned the League for the Protection of Mothers as (in Max’s professorial opinion) “an utterly confused bunch,” who advocated “crass hedonism

<sup>92</sup> Ellen Key, *The Renaissance of Motherhood*, Anna E. B. Fries, trans. (New York, 1914), 102–03, a collection of her essays in English.

<sup>93</sup> Ellen Key, *Kvinnorörelsen* (Stockholm, 1909); quotation from the English translation, *The Woman Movement*, Mamah Bouton Borthwick, trans. (New York, 1912), 150.

<sup>94</sup> Sevenhuijsen, “Mothers as Citizens,” 172–74; and Selma Sevenhuijsen, *De Orde van het Vaderschap: Politieke Debatten over ongehuwd Moederschap, Afstamming en Huwelijk in Nederland, 1870–1900* (Amsterdam, 1987), 138–49; Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood*, 188–205.

<sup>95</sup> Henriette Fürth, “Mutterschaft und Ehe,” *Mutterschutz* 1 (1905): 28.

<sup>96</sup> See, for example, Nancy F. Cott, *The Grounding of Modern Feminism* (New Haven, Conn., 1987), 40–41, on the attitudes of American feminists toward their European counterparts.

<sup>97</sup> Marianne Weber, “Die historische Entwicklung des Eherechts,” in *Frauenfragen und Frauengedanken* (Tübingen, 1919), 10–19. On Marianne Weber, see Guenther Roth, “Marianne Weber and Her Circle,” new introduction to Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1988), xv–lxi.

and an ethics that would benefit only men.”<sup>98</sup> In her monumental study, *Wife and Mother in Legal History*, published in 1907, Marianne devoted an entire chapter to a refutation of Bachofen and his socialist interpreters. Matrilineal family structures, she argued, had not constituted a universal first stage of civilization, and where they had existed had not ensured a high status for women, who were usually under the control of male relatives. And marriage had not enslaved but, on the contrary, advanced women by guaranteeing the legitimate status of their children.<sup>99</sup> Max, who was likewise concerned about the use or misuse of scholarship to support political agendas, supported these views.<sup>100</sup>

However, Marianne also argued that, just as the family had evolved throughout prehistoric and historic time, it must continue to change in the direction of equality. She advocated not only equal rights for women over property and children but also divorce by mutual consent. And both she and Max, who had engaged in “countless confidential conversations” with their friends concerning personal ethics, admitted that the ideal of monogamous marriage was not attainable by everyone. Marianne emphasized in a speech of 1907 that people who did not live according to this ideal should not therefore automatically be regarded as immoral. As his biographer Arthur Mitzman has noted, Max’s idea of “charisma,” the revitalizing force that overcomes alienation and restores emotional wholeness, was in many ways informed by this new view of sexual morality.<sup>101</sup>

Another kind of objection, equally important for the future development of feminism, was raised by the French socialist feminist Madeleine Pelletier. As an amateur anthropologist, Pelletier was skeptical about the historical existence of matriarchy.<sup>102</sup> As a clear-sighted and uncompromising critic of gender stereotypes, she saw many dangers in her fellow feminists’ high-flown exaltation of the maternal role, which she perceived as confining rather than liberating. Men’s respect for motherhood or worship of mother-goddesses had not brought women equality in the past, nor would it in the future. “Future societies may build temples to motherhood,” snapped Pelletier, “but only to lock women into them.”<sup>103</sup>

Whatever their disagreements, all of these feminist thinkers cited the evolutionary history of the family to support their contention that, like earlier forms of the family, its present-day forms were also destined for extinction. Pelletier militantly advocated the right of women to control or to reject reproduction altogether through legalized contraception and abortion. Along with many other socialists,

<sup>98</sup> Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild* (1926; rpt. edn., Heidelberg, 1950), 412; English translation, Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography*, Harry Zohn, ed. and trans. (New York, 1956), 373.

<sup>99</sup> Marianne Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung: Eine Einführung* (Tübingen, 1907), 24–77.

<sup>100</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, 1921, Ephraim Fischhoff, et al., trans., Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., 3 vols. (New York, 1968), 1: 370–72.

<sup>101</sup> Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, 380–90. Of course, the relationship of Max and Marianne and the ways in which it influenced Max’s views on sexuality have been much discussed; see particularly Mitzman, *Iron Cage*, 277–98; Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage*, 108–18; and Klaus Lichtblau, “The Protestant Ethic versus the ‘New Ethic,’” in *Weber’s Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts*, Hartmut Lehmann and Guenther Roth, eds. (Cambridge, 1993), 179–94.

<sup>102</sup> On Pelletier’s education, see the excellent biography by Felicia Gordon, *The Integral Feminist: Madeleine Pelletier, 1874–1939* (Minneapolis, 1990), 24–74.

<sup>103</sup> Madeleine Pelletier, *La femme en lutte pour ses droits* (Paris, 1908), 37.

such as the American Charlotte Perkins Gilman, the Germans Lily Braun and Henriette Fürth, and the British Alice Melvin and H. G. Wells, she envisaged new forms of family organization such as the collective household, where married and single residents would share common kitchen, laundry, and child-care facilities.<sup>104</sup> A particularly controversial contribution to this discussion came from the young American anthropologist and student of Franz Boas, Elsie Clews Parsons, who was also influenced by the French Group for Feminist Studies.<sup>105</sup> In a book entitled *The Family*, which was published in 1906 as a textbook for college courses, Parsons admitted that the existence and extent of the matriarchal stage of family development was “a matter of controversy.”<sup>106</sup> But she was in no doubt that present-day forms of male supremacy were subject to the same evolutionary forces that had shaped the family throughout its history. In order to adapt to the social conditions of the present, she argued, the family must change to provide economic independence and reproductive self-determination for women, freedom of divorce and remarriage, and tolerance for premarital sexual relations and temporary “trial marriages.” In fact, she speculated, with advancing contraceptive technology, “the need for sexual restraint as we understand it may disappear.”<sup>107</sup> “The morality of the barnyard!” fumed the *New York Herald*; “the most revolutionary and indecent performance of anything I have ever heard,” agreed the reviewer for the *Evening Sun*.<sup>108</sup>

By 1900, the discussion of the origins and evolution of the family had become so pervasive that it included many diverse groups and provided the basis for a variety of philosophical and literary agendas. Much the best-known and most influential reception of Bachofen was by a predominantly male German avant-garde, located in Munich and clustered around the charismatic poet Stefan George. The George circle, which included many openly homosexual men, so epitomized the intellectual counter-culture of the German Empire that it was known as “das geheime Deutschland” (secret Germany). Many members of this group had connections to other prominent theorists, such as the Webers, Simmel, and the psychoanalyst Carl Gustav Jung.<sup>109</sup> In 1897, a subgroup that called itself the “Cosmic Circle” (Kosmische Runde), and was headed by the philosopher Ludwig Klages, the

<sup>104</sup> Madeleine Pelletier, “Feminism, the Family and the Right to Abortion,” Marilyn Boxer, trans., *French-American Review* 6 (Spring 1982): 3–24; Lily Braun, *Frauenarbeit und Hauswirtschaft* (Berlin, 1901); Henriette Fürth, *Die Hausfrau* (Munich, 1914); Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Women and Economics* (Boston, 1898); Alice Melvin, “Abolition of Domestic Drudgery by Cooperative House-keeping,” *The Freewoman* 1 (April 11, 1912): 410–12; H. G. Wells, *Socialism and the Family* (London, 1906).

<sup>105</sup> Deacon, *Elsie Clews Parsons*, 113.

<sup>106</sup> Elsie Clews Parsons, *The Family: An Ethnographical and Historical Outline with Descriptive Notes, Planned as a Text-Book for the Use of College Lecturers and of Directors of Home Reading Clubs* (New York, 1906), 297.

<sup>107</sup> Parsons, *Family*, xi, 349.

<sup>108</sup> *New York Herald*, November 18, 1906; *New York Evening Sun*, November 17, 1906; quoted in Deacon, *Elsie Clews Parsons*, 69.

<sup>109</sup> On these relationships, see Martin Green, *The von Richthofen Sisters: The Triumphant and the Tragic Modes of Love; Else and Frieda von Richthofen, Otto Gross, Max Weber, and D. H. Lawrence in the Years 1870–1970* (New York, 1974).



classical scholar Karl Wolfskehl, and the poet Alfred Schuler, made *Das Mutterrecht* into a cult classic.<sup>110</sup> Even this male-dominated group was not insulated from feminist criticism. The liveliest account of the group is a novel (*Herrn Dames Aufzeichnungen*, or *Mr. Dame's Notes*) written by one of its female members, the Countess Franziska zu Reventlow, who, like her contemporary Thomas Mann, had escaped from a proper North German family to lead a bohemian life in the Munich artists' quarter of Schwabing. "Bachofen is a well-known scholar," Reventlow's protagonist is told when he arrives in Schwabing, "and if you want to live permanently in our neighborhood, you must read him."<sup>111</sup>

For the Cosmic Circle, the world of Bachofen's matriarchy was what Jung would later term the collective unconscious—in the words of Klages, "the original consciousness (*Urbewußtsein*) of the human race"—which had too long been repressed by a now decadent and declining civilization.<sup>112</sup> They proclaimed the imminent return of matriarchy, which would put an end to rationality, Christian ethics, and modern technological and social progress and liberate the bracing and purgative forces of sex, race, and blood. This vision included the "liberation" of women through sexual promiscuity and a matrilineal family structure that made paternity irrelevant. "According to Bachofen, hetaerism [promiscuity] was the earliest life-style," remarks a female character in Reventlow's novel, "and in Wahnmoching [Schwabing] we also think it's just the greatest [*die enormste*]."<sup>113</sup>

The Cosmic Circle, like the rest of George's entourage, rejected all of the goals of feminism along with all other manifestations of modernity. Reventlow became known as the epitome of matriarchal morality through her sexual adventures and her refusal to name the father of the resulting son, but she nonetheless saw the misogynist, racist, and generally reactionary implications of the group's agenda. Not only did she poke fun at costume balls at which staid professors appeared dressed as Dionysus and engaged in pompous revelries, but she perceived that this male-defined conception of sexual "liberation" did not, in the end, liberate women: "for most of them," reflects one of her characters, "it's actually a misfortune."<sup>114</sup> And she also saw the cult's most sinister possibility: the creation of a pseudo-scholarly basis for the Aryan racial myth. The Cosmic Circle broke up due to the anti-Semitism of Ludwig Klages, who blamed the Jews for the development of patriarchal religion and thus for all the evils of civilization and turned this vitriolic accusation against his Jewish colleague, Wolfskehl.<sup>115</sup> During the 1920s, anti-Semitic interpretations of Bachofen would reinforce the growth of National Socialist ideology.

<sup>110</sup> Karlhans Kluncker, *Das geheime Deutschland: Über Stefan George und seinen Kreis* (Bonn, 1985), 97–107; see also Wolf Lepenies, *Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology*, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (Cambridge, 1988), 258–77.

<sup>111</sup> Franziska Gräfin zu Reventlow, *Herrn Dames Aufzeichnungen, oder Begebenheiten aus einem merkwürdigen Stadtteil*, 1913, rpt. in Franziska Gräfin zu Reventlow, *Gesammelte Werke in einem Band*, Else Reventlow, ed. (Munich, 1925), 750–51.

<sup>112</sup> Ludwig Klages, *Vom kosmogonischen Eros* (1922; rpt. edn., Bonn, 1963), 226; Carl G. Jung, "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, 1936, rpt. in *The Collected Works of Carl G. Jung*, R. F. C. Hull, trans. (Princeton, N.J., 1970), 9: 87–110.

<sup>113</sup> Reventlow, *Herrn Dames Aufzeichnungen*, 750–51.

<sup>114</sup> Reventlow, *Herrn Dames Aufzeichnungen*, 759.

<sup>115</sup> Kluncker, *Das geheime Deutschland*, 106.



Thus in the pre-war era, the disturbing vision of female power evoked by the term “matriarchy” was no longer relegated to prehistory but was used in the present, by feminists and anti-feminists alike, to attack revered ideals of family, gender, and sexual morality. The apprehensions that this critique aroused were powerfully expressed in the visual arts of the era, in which themes from classical mythology were often used to depict the threat to civilization posed by the anarchic force of unchained feminine power.<sup>116</sup> Popular works such as Otto Weininger’s *Sex and Character* (1903) likewise warned against the threat to Western culture posed by the growing influence of women, whom Weininger associated with irrationality and sexual disorder.<sup>117</sup> In the immediate pre-war years, the flamboyant and destructive tactics adopted by British militant suffragettes added to these fears. In a widely read novel of 1909, *Ann Veronica*, H. G. Wells strongly suggested that the new theories of prehistory and history encouraged the “bitter vindictiveness” and the “hostility to men” that he embodied in a fictional suffragette, Miss Miniver. “The primitive government was the Matriarchate. The Matriarchate!” she stridently proclaims. “The Lords of Creation just ran about and did what they were told.”<sup>118</sup>

FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS, one of this period’s most influential theoretical projects, was reckoned by its contemporary critics among the symptoms of this sexual disorder, but it can also be understood as an attempt to contain sex through the restabilization of patriarchy. In its fundamental philosophical and psychological assumptions, psychoanalysis owed much to the Romantic movement, and to Bachofen as its belated representative.<sup>119</sup> During the years 1912–1913, the debate on the origin of the family was central to the development of the psychoanalytic movement, as it was shaped by the schism between the followers of Sigmund Freud and those of his former protégé, Carl Gustav Jung. Jung was born in Basel, where Bachofen had become a legend in academic circles, and his works of this era, although they did not cite Bachofen (who was not considered scientifically reputable) clearly showed his influence. The primary attachment to the mother in the individual psyche corresponded, in Jung’s system, to the original matriarchal phase of human development.<sup>120</sup> Among the many issues in the Freud-Jung controversy was Freud’s theory that the Oedipus complex—the (male) child’s incestuous desire for the mother and sexual rivalry with the father—was the universal basis of personality development. In a letter of 1912, Jung asked Freud how the Oedipus complex could have developed during the “early, cultureless

<sup>116</sup> Bram Dijkstra, *Idols of Perversity: Fantasies of Feminine Evil in Fin-de-Siècle Culture* (New York, 1986).

<sup>117</sup> Compare Nancy A. Harrowitz and Barbara Hyams, *Jews and Gender: Responses to Otto Weininger* (Philadelphia, 1995).

<sup>118</sup> H. G. Wells, *Ann Veronica* (1909, rpt. edn., London, 1993), 29.

<sup>119</sup> Compare Frank J. Sulloway, *Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend* (New York, 1979), 369–74.

<sup>120</sup> On maternal archetypes, see Carl G. Jung, *Symbols of Transformation*, 1912, R. F. C. Hull, trans. (Princeton, N.J., 1956), 207–393; Richard Noll, *The Jung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic Movement* (Princeton, 1994), 169–76; Henri F. Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York, 1970), 727–30; Erich Neumann, *The Great Mother: An Analysis of the Archetype* (Princeton, 1954), 28–29 and *passim*.

period of matriarchy . . . There, the father was purely fortuitous and counted for nothing, so he would not have had the slightest interest (considering the general promiscuity) in enacting laws against the son. (In fact, there was no such thing as a father's son)."<sup>121</sup> During these years, Jung was strongly attracted to the ideas of the Cosmic Circle (to which he was exposed through his colleague and patient Otto Gross); he, too, was determined to overthrow the sexual repression enforced by patriarchal religious and family structure and to return to the more permissive morality he associated with the matriarchal past.<sup>122</sup> Freud's assertion of the universality of patriarchy was at the same time a defense of psychoanalysis against cooptation by the advocates of a sexual radicalism he abhorred. "Many authors regard a primordial state of promiscuity as unlikely," responded Freud to Jung. "Mother-right should not be confused with gynaecocracy . . . Mother-right is perfectly compatible with the polygamous abasement of woman. It seems likely that there have been father's sons at all times."<sup>123</sup>

Freud's treatise of 1913, *Totem and Taboo*, used anthropological data to explore the origins of patriarchy. The theoretical background to this work was the controversy over the origin of the incest taboo, which had been found to be common to all human societies. Among "primitive" peoples, anthropologists such as the British W. Robertson Smith, James George Frazer, and J. J. Atkinson had discovered that rules regulating intermarriage were enforced through the creation of groups who were forbidden to marry among themselves. These groups often imagined a distinctive totem animal as a common father and revered him through ritual feasts.<sup>124</sup> Atkinson started from Darwin's picture of the original human family as a horde ruled by a single dominant male, who had sexual access to all the females and drove away his sons when they became sexual rivals. He speculated that at some point one of the females had managed to prevent the banishment of her sons by inducing them to renounce sexual relations with female members of the group, thus establishing the incest taboo, the totem group, and the law of exogamy.<sup>125</sup>

Freud drew a more bloodthirsty picture: the adolescent sons, mad with desire for the females of the group, had banded together to kill and cannibalize the father. But then, stricken with terrible guilt, they had renounced the rewards of their crime, the sexual possession of the females, and had raised the murdered father to the status of a god (originally the totem), whom they periodically placated through the ritual enactment of the original murder and cannibal feast. Freud conceded that a period of female dominance corresponding to Bachofen's "matriarchy" might have existed after the father's murder, but the creation of a new patriarchal system had soon followed. Thus patriarchy, and its enforcement through the Oedipus complex, had developed from "this memorable, criminal act with which so many things began, social organization, moral restrictions, and religion."<sup>126</sup> Freud confessed

<sup>121</sup> *The Freud-Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung*, William McGuire, ed., Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull, trans. (Princeton, N.J., 1974), 503 (Jung to Freud, May 8, 1912).

<sup>122</sup> Noll, *Jung Cult*, 158–59.

<sup>123</sup> McGuire, *Freud-Jung Letters*, 504 (Freud to Jung, May 14, 1912).

<sup>124</sup> Stocking, *After Tylor*, 125–44.

<sup>125</sup> J. J. Atkinson, *Primal Law* (London, 1903) (published in the same volume with Andrew Lang, *Social Origins*), 230–38.

<sup>126</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Totem und Tabu: Einige Übereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und*

himself at a loss to "indicate the place of the great maternal deities who perhaps everywhere preceded the paternal deities," for he considered that God had always been "at bottom . . . just an exalted father."<sup>127</sup>

Freud's anthropology was soon challenged by experts. However, the Freudian theory of the human personality became immensely important to the culture of the 1920s, and thus has often been identified by historians as a factor in the decline of feminism during that decade.<sup>128</sup> But the implications of Freudian theory for feminism have in fact been more ambiguous. Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex recast Bachofen's narrative: in the life of each individual, an era of maternal love and permissiveness (infancy) is ended through the imposition of patriarchy in the form of the internalized enforcement of the incest taboo, which becomes the basis of the child's entry into the adult world.<sup>129</sup> By reconceptualizing a historical process as a psychic one, Freud did indeed argue that the origins of patriarchy were, and must be, replicated in each individual's development. But he nonetheless retained many aspects of the narrative's original structure as a story of conflict, repression, and sublimation. For Freud, gender consciousness is not entirely an innate characteristic but develops over the life of the individual, partly in response to culture. Thus the Freudian framework has accommodated some important feminist works, including those of Simone de Beauvoir.<sup>130</sup> And Freud himself did not glorify patriarchy but shared some of his contemporaries' perceptions of its negative consequences: the reign of the father-gods still caused neurosis and misery. "It must be said that the revenge of the deposed and reinstated father has been very cruel," he concluded in *Totem and Taboo*; "it culminated in the dominance of authority."<sup>131</sup>

In 1913, in the same year as Freud wrote, the British suffragist and journalist Catherine Gascoigne Hartley told the same story with a more positive outcome to emphasize not the universality but the evanescence of patriarchy.<sup>132</sup> Hartley, who was widely read in feminist and other progressive circles, had much the same qualifications (or lack of them) for this intellectual task as her eminent contemporary; she, too, was an amateur in the field of anthropology, and she had read the same body of literature, including Bachofen and Atkinson.<sup>133</sup> Even though she accepted Atkinson's story of the primal family, Hartley criticized its highly biased

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*Neurotiker* (Leipzig, 1913); rpt. of vol. 9 of Freud, *Gesammelte Werke chronologisch geordnet*, Anna Freud, ed., 17 vols. (London, 1947–55). Quotations are from the English translation, *Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics*, A. A. Brill, trans. (New York, 1918), 382.

<sup>127</sup> Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 192, 190.

<sup>128</sup> For example, by Susan Kingsley Kent, *Making Peace: The Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain* (Princeton, N.J., 1993), 126–30.

<sup>129</sup> Ellenberger, *Discovery of the Unconscious*, 218–23; Noll, *Jung Cult*, 171.

<sup>130</sup> Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism: Freud, Reich, Laing, and Women* (New York, 1975), 16–29.

<sup>131</sup> Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 193.

<sup>132</sup> Catherine Gascoigne Hartley, *The Truth about Woman* (New York, 1913); Hartley, *The Position of Woman in Primitive Society: A Study of the Matriarchy* (London, 1914).

<sup>133</sup> For example, see "Evening Discussion Meetings, Mrs. Gallichan on 'Woman and Her Relationship to Man,'" *The Vote*, October 10, 1913. For biographical information on Hartley (1869–1929), who sometimes wrote under the name of Mrs. Walter Gallichan, see *Who Was Who, 1916–1928* (London, 1929), 471–72.

assumption that the women of the group would have played a wholly passive role. On the contrary, she speculated, the first enforcement of the incest taboo must have been due to the agency of the women, who objected to the patriarch's sexual molestation of their daughters and banishment of their sons and, through their unity and numbers, were able to oppose his "egoistical" authority. According to Hartley, the collective action of the women had initiated the period of matriarchy that Bachofen had so poetically described. This was, however, a transitional period, for the young men and women sought partners from other groups and gradually built up the institution of the nuclear family, in which males gained authority. But the age of patriarchy was also clearly transitional, and contemporary developments, particularly of the women's movement, pointed the way to a new age of gender equality. "We stand in the first rush of a great movement," she concluded in 1914. "It is the day of experiments . . . We are questioning where before we have accepted, and are seeking out new ways in which mankind will go . . . will go because it must."<sup>134</sup>

THIS ARTICLE HAS CONCENTRATED ON THE PERIOD FROM about 1860 until 1914 because these were the years when the historical origin of the family occupied a prominent position in academic and political discourse. During the 1920s, academic social scientists gave up historical for functionalist approaches to human society, which focused on the working of institutions such as patriarchy rather than on their origins.<sup>135</sup> And, as feminist intellectuals aspired to enter the academy, they were under pressure to conform to the norms of academic disciplines. When Mathilde Vaerting, the only woman to gain a professorship of sociology during the Weimar Republic, attempted to revive the theory of primordial matriarchy in a book published in 1921, she was derided by her colleagues for advocating "feminism in the guise of science."<sup>136</sup> Robert Briffault's *The Mothers*, which used the historical development of the family as an argument for the reform of marriage, was rejected as unscientific by the prominent social scientists of the day, especially by Bronislaw Malinowski, then a leading figure in the field of anthropology.<sup>137</sup> However, theories of matriarchal origin continued to influence many fields, including psychiatry, social theory, and political discourse on left and right.

At the dawn of the "new" feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the theories of Bachofen and Engels experienced a brief revival in popular feminist literature. Troubled both by conventional ideas of biological determinism and Simone de Beauvoir's assertion that women had always been "the second sex," some feminist activists responded favorably, as had their forerunners at the turn of the century, to the picture of an age when women ruled; and socialist feminists found a powerful

<sup>134</sup> Hartley, *Position of Women in Primitive Society*, 266.

<sup>135</sup> Stocking, *After Tylor*, 292.

<sup>136</sup> Theresa Wobbe, "Mathilde Vaerting (1884–1977)," in *Frauen in den Kulturwissenschaften*, Barbara Hahn, ed. (Munich, 1994), 123–35, quotation p. 129.

<sup>137</sup> Robert Briffault, *The Mothers: A Study of the Origins of Sentiment and Institutions*, 3 vols., 1927; abridged edn., Gordon Rattray Taylor, ed. (New York, 1959); Briffault and Bronislaw Malinowski, *Marriage Past and Present: A Debate between Robert Briffault and Bronislaw Malinowski*, M. F. Ashley Montagu, ed. (Boston, 1956). The interchange published here dates from a radio broadcast of 1927.

source of inspiration in Engels's theory that connected the oppression of women with the rise of private property and capitalism.<sup>138</sup> But this enthusiasm was short-lived; early texts on the origins of the family, scholars soon charged, had promoted essentialized images of women, and had furthermore been tainted with an outworn and oppressive Victorian confidence in progress and in the superiority of Western institutions.<sup>139</sup>

Such judgments largely ignore both the many feminist participants in the debate and its significance for the intellectual life of the period in which feminist scholarship first flourished. Far from reinforcing Victorian ideals of womanhood and the superiority of Western forms of the family, the discourse ultimately opened these ideas to contestation. Accurate knowledge of the origins of the family, wrote Elsie Clews Parsons in 1906, would sweep away "the most notable survivals of primitive taboo," which serves "the preservation of the group's social customs and traditions."<sup>140</sup> To conventional religious and secular ideals of the family, "that fair Family Tree," exulted Jane Ellen Harrison in 1912, "anthropology, sociology, and psychology have continued to lay the axe."<sup>141</sup> Although Harrison's triumphalism was clearly premature, for new theories of the natural rightness and universality of patriarchy would arise, they now had to be argued for rather than simply assumed. While today's readers can certainly see elements of essentialism in the discourse on the origins of the family, feminists of this era were far more aware of the ways in which it had undermined conventional views of women's nature and potential. In 1922, Mary Ritter Beard, who was in many ways the founder of American women's history, paid tribute in a speech given in Tokyo to the importance of anthropological discoveries for her own evolving view of the active and creative role of women in history. In 1942, Charles and Mary Beard wrote retrospectively that, by contrast to the conventional political history that entirely ignored women, anthropological literature at the turn of the century (specifically, the works of Morgan, Ward, and Otis Tufton Mason) had "found women at the very center of civilization in origin and development—as creators and preservers of the arts and that perennial moral strength of civilization."<sup>142</sup>

During the era from 1890 to 1914, feminist intellectuals used research in the social sciences in order to create new approaches to knowledge and new views of

<sup>138</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *Le deuxième sexe*, I. *Les faits et les mythes*; II. *L'expérience vécue* (Paris, 1949); Elizabeth Fisher, *Woman's Creation: Sexual Evolution and the Shaping of Society* (New York, 1979); Adrienne Rich, *Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution* (New York, 1976); Evelyn Reed, *Woman's Evolution: From Matriarchal Clan to Patriarchal Family* (New York, 1975); *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*, Zillah R. Eisenstein, ed. (New York, 1979); Marilyn French, *Beyond Power: On Women, Men, and Morals* (New York, 1985).

<sup>139</sup> Kathleen Gough, "The Origin of the Family," in Reiter, *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, 51–76; Coward, *Patriarchal Precedents*, 253–86; Fee, "Sexual Politics."

<sup>140</sup> Parsons, *Family*, x.

<sup>141</sup> Jane Ellen Harrison, *Homo Sum: Being a Letter to an Anti-Suffragist from an Anthropologist* (New York, 1912), 11.

<sup>142</sup> Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *The American Spirit: A Study of the Idea of Civilization in the United States* (New York, 1942), 397–419; Nancy F. Cott, *Putting Women on the Record: Mary Ritter Beard through Her Letters* (New Haven, Conn., 1991), 26–27. For some contemporary theories about the origin of the family, see (among many other examples) Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (New York, 1986); Margaret Ehrenberg, *Women in Prehistory* (Norman, Okla., 1989); Heide Göttner-Abendroth, *Das Matriarchat: Geschichte seiner Erforschung* (Stuttgart, 1995); Lawrence Osborne, "The Women Warriors," *Lingua Franca* 7 (December–January 1998): 50–58.



the historical and contemporary roles of women. Our recognition of the significance of this development should modify still-conventional views of the intellectual life of this period, which is usually characterized through terms such as “disenchantment,” “cultural pessimism,” and “orgiastic-nihilistic irony” and introduced by textbooks under such headings as “Culture and Crisis,” “Uncertainty in Modern Thought,” “From Optimism to Anxiety,” and “Consciousness and Confusion.”<sup>143</sup> If seen within the framework of the era’s own critique of objectivity and emphasis on multiple perspectives, cultural pessimism represented less a universally human “modern dilemma” than the specific dilemma of male elites who, though sometimes critical of authority structures such as patriarchy, nonetheless regarded their decline as a threat to rationality, order, and civilization itself.<sup>144</sup> Although they shared the same analytic framework, feminist intellectuals did not respond with uncertainty, despair, or nihilism but with a new intellectual confidence; for them, the downfall of patriarchy meant not the destruction but the realization of civilization. Nineteenth-century beliefs in progress and in objectivity had justified male supremacy. The erosion of these beliefs through the new discourses on cultural relativism and historical evolution created a climate in which gender could be recognized not as ordained by divine will or by biological determinism but as constructed by history and culture. And the view of history that these feminists created emphasized not degeneration but renewal, and not the despair of rationality but new access to its empowering potential. In 1909, members of the Actresses’ Franchise League, a British group that used theatrical performances to support the suffrage cause, enacted a play by Cicely Hamilton, *The Pageant of Great Women*, commemorating the achievements of women throughout history. “Feeling the riot and rush of crowding hopes,” concluded a character identified only as “a woman,” “’Tis good to be alive when morning dawns.”<sup>145</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Eksteins, *Rites of Spring*, xiv; Richard L. Greaves, Robert Zaller, and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, *Civilizations of the West: The Human Adventure* (New York, 1992), 813; John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill, and John D. Buckler, *A History of Western Society: Since 1300*, 5th edn. (Boston, 1998), 927; Thomas F. X. Noble, et al., *Western Civilization: The Continuing Experiment*, 2d edn. (Boston, 1998), 880; Eugen Weber, ed., *Movements, Currents, Trends: Aspects of European Thought in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Lexington, Mass., 1992), 203.

<sup>144</sup> Hughes, *Consciousness and Society*, 15.

<sup>145</sup> Cicely Hamilton, *A Pageant of Great Women* (London, 1910), 68. See also Lis Whitelaw, *The Life and Rebellious Times of Cicely Hamilton: Actress, Writer, Suffragist* (Columbus, Ohio, 1991), 86–88. Compare Liebersohn, *Fate and Utopia*, 194–96. Liebersohn stresses some of the utopian aspirations of this era and also finds the conventional emphasis on pessimism and alienation disproportionate. He does not, however, deal with the issue of gender relations.

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**Ann Taylor Allen** is a professor of history at the University of Louisville, in Louisville, Kentucky. A graduate of Bryn Mawr College, she received the doctoral degree from Columbia University in 1974. Her first book, *Satire and Society in Wilhelmine Germany: Simplicissimus and Kladderadatsch, 1890–1914* (1984), is based on a dissertation supervised by Fritz Stern. Since 1980, Allen has done research and published on the history of feminist movements in Germany during the period 1800–1920. This research has resulted in many articles and a book, *Feminism and Motherhood in Germany, 1800–1914* (1991). The present article grew out of a new project on the comparative history of feminism and motherhood in Europe and North America.



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## Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism

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AMIR WEINER

Therefore as soon as a spark appears it must be snuffed out, and the yeast separated from the vicinity of the dough, the rancid flesh cut off, and the mangy animal driven away from the flock of sheep, lest the entire house burn, the dough spoil, the body rot, and the flock perish. [The heretic] Arius was one spark in Alexandria; but because he was not immediately suppressed, the entire world was devastated with his flame.

St. Jerome, *Commentariorum in Epistolam ad Galatas libri tres*.<sup>1</sup>

IN THE WAKE OF THE DISINTEGRATION of the Soviet polity, scholars have thoroughly reevaluated basic categories in Soviet history such as class, ethnicity, and nationality, as well as the policies associated with them. Amazingly enough, however, with rare exceptions, these categories and policies have been treated as the context for evaluating Soviet practices rather than being contextualized themselves. This essay seeks to advance the current discussion by situating these concepts within the overarching Soviet enterprise: the unfolding revolutionary transformation of society from an antagonistically divided entity into a conflict-free, harmonious body. The view of society as a malleable construct went hand in hand with a continuous purification campaign seeking to eliminate divisive and obstructing elements. Exclusion and violence, in this light, were not random or merely preventive police measures that delineated the boundaries of the legitimate and the permissible but, rather, integral parts of the ongoing community-structuring enterprise.<sup>2</sup> I trace the

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<sup>1</sup> St. Jerome, *Commentariorum in Epistolam ad Galatas libri tres*, in *Patrologia latina*, vol. 26, J.-P. Migne, ed. (Turnhout, Belgium, n.d.), col. 430. I thank Brad Gregory for pointing out this reference to me.

<sup>2</sup> For insightful treatments of the inherent relationship between violence and attempts to implement utopian enterprises, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991); Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews: Vol. 1, The Years of Persecution, 1933–1939* (New York, 1997), chap. 3; Peter Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia,” in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., *A State of Nations: Empire and*

rationale of the Soviet Marxist quest for purity by focusing on three crucial components: the correlation between the progression of the revolutionary time line and the measures taken to realize the socialist utopia, the impact of Nazism and capitalism on the Soviet political and social calculus, and the sites of excision. The marked emphasis on ideology does not deny nor diminish the impact of circumstances, especially those of the magnitude experienced during World War II, or the role of institutions such as the political police, the NKVD, which had a vested interest in a permanent purge. It does explain, however, why the Soviets reacted in the unique way they did to the same circumstances experienced by other polities, why their unique punitive institutions were created in the first place, and why the regime pursued its purification campaigns well after the conditions that initiated them had dissipated.<sup>3</sup>

MARXIST REGIMES STRUGGLED with assigning primacy to either the "objective" category of class origin or to the "subjective" criteria of conduct and experience. In polities founded on the Marxist premise of the primacy of acculturation, but simultaneously engaged in the constant eradication of social strata presumed to be illegitimate, the tension between nurture and nature was constant.<sup>4</sup> It intensified as the Soviet polity advanced along the road to socialism and communism and radicalized its purification policies both qualitatively and quantitatively. Following the establishment of socialism and especially in the wake of World War II, social and ethnic categories and practices were totalized in a marked shift: enemy groups previously considered to be differentiated, reformable, and redeemable were now

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*Nation-Making in the Soviet Union, 1917–1953* (forthcoming); Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1978); Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995), chap. 7; Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, 1986), chaps. 8–9; and Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991* (New York, 1994); Daniel Orlovsky, "The Hidden Class: White-Collar Workers in the Soviet 1920s," in Lewis Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class and Identity* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994), 220–52; and Andrzej Walicki, *Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia* (Stanford, Calif., 1995).

<sup>3</sup> The scope of this essay limits the discussion to the framing of party-state logic and the impact of cataclysmic events. This is not to deny the considerable role local populations played in delineating the socio-ethnic body. For an excellent treatment of the Soviet investment of power in the community to execute key policies (if not to frame them), see Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, N.J., 1989). Also Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, forthcoming), chaps. 5–6.

<sup>4</sup> On the prevalence of this dilemma in Stalinist Russia and the struggles of individuals to cope with it, see Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, chaps. 5–6; Igal Halpin, "From Darkness to Light: Student Communist Autobiography during NEP," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45 (1997): 210–36; and Jochen Hellbeck, "Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44 (1996): 344–73. On the tension between "class as political behavior" and "natural redness" in Communist China, see Lynn T. White III, *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution* (Princeton, N.J., 1989), 222–25, 267; Richard Curt Kraus, *Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism* (New York, 1981), 89–141; and the contributions by Stuart Schram, Susan Shirk, Jonathan Unger, and Lynn White III, in James L. Watson, ed., *Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China* (Cambridge, 1984). See also Arendt's suggestive chapter on "race-thinking before racism" in *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 150–84.

viewed as undifferentiated, unreformable, and irredeemable collectives. This totalization of the Marxist sociological paradigm challenged the commitment to the primacy of nurture over nature in the ongoing social engineering project, inviting comparison with contemporary biological-racial paradigms, most notably, that of Nazi Germany—a comparison the Soviets were well aware of yet wanted to avoid at all costs. The absence of genocidal ideology and institutions allowed for different modes and sites of total excision from the socio-ethnic body within the socialist utopia. Still, Soviet contemporaries continued to confront the ever-present shadow of the biological-racial ethos.

The Soviet purification drive operated on a universal-particularistic axis, combining the modern European ethos of social engineering with Bolshevik Marxist eschatology.<sup>5</sup> Their fusion created a stable menu of categories and practices and a dynamic mode of applying them. The Soviet state emerged and operated within an ethos aptly named by Zygmunt Bauman as the “gardening state,” which appeared ever more universal in the wake of the Great War. This cataclysmic event brought to fruition the desires for a comprehensive plan for the transformation and management of society, one that would create a better, purer, and more beautiful community through the removal of unfit human weeds. It was, in a word, an aesthetic enterprise. The unprecedented increase in the capacities and aspirations of the state went hand in hand with the view of society as raw material to be molded into an ideal image. The transformation—or removal—of the individual and the community became the accepted goal of the state both in its welfare and its punitive policies.<sup>6</sup>

The European impetus to sculpt society seemed to develop boundlessly and

<sup>5</sup> For overdue and successful attempts to contextualize Soviet population policies within the ethos of Enlightenment, see Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, on the welfare state; Yuri Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994); and Francine Hirsch, “Empire of Nations: Colonial Technologies and the Making of the Soviet Union, 1917–1939” (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1998), on the role of social-scientific disciplines; Peter Holquist, “Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work: Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Context,” *Journal of Modern History* 69 (September 1997): 415–50, on the emerging “gardening” state; Katerina Clark, *Petersburg: The Crucible of Revolution* (Cambridge, 1995), on the cross-ideological phenomenon of Romantic anti-capitalism. In his intriguing analysis of political religion, Philippe Burrin concluded that totalitarian regimes (the political religions of communism, fascism, and Nazism) were incompatible with the course and demands of modernity, and were bound to disintegrate if only because their attempt to impose unanimity and undifferentiation ran against the grain of centuries of European cultivation of the individual as an agent of his own salvation. See Burrin, “Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept,” *History and Memory* 9 (Fall 1997): 321–49, here at 342. However, one cannot gloss over the fact that the social, political, and economic institutions employed by totalitarian regimes for managing their populations were the epitome of modernity.

<sup>6</sup> See Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, Calif., 1998), 119–80; Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, 65, 91–93. For a recent impressive treatment of the “gardening state” in various societies and ideologies, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, Conn., 1998). Scott, however, approaches the “gardening state” as a starting point in the practice of social engineering schemes, glossing over the ways in which multiple non-state agencies—including those conventionally considered liberal and progressive—initiated and often launched transformative schemes. This pattern was particularly noticeable in pre-Soviet Russia before the party-state consolidated its role as the sole organ of transformation. For the role of ethnographers in the shaping of population policies in Imperial Russia, see Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors*, 95–129; Holquist, “To Remove, to Extract, to Exterminate”; and David Alan Rich, *The Tsar’s Colonels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), esp. 29–64, for the role of military reformers. For the continual impact of ethnographers in the Soviet polity during the pre-war era, see Francine Hirsch, “The Soviet Union as

across ideologies. From Russia, Maxim Gorky observed in late November 1917 that "the working class is for [V. I.] Lenin what ore is for a metalworker . . . He [Lenin] works like a chemist in a laboratory, with the difference that the chemist uses dead matter . . . [whereas] Lenin works with living material."<sup>7</sup> But Bolshevik Marxism was not alone in its refusal to accept human nature and society as they were. Rather, the tension between nature and nurture was encoded within the larger pan-European view of modernity whereby political authorities increasingly sought to define and manage virtually all critical public and private spheres. The expanding welfare state and the cleansing state were opposite ends of the inclusionary-exclusionary axis, which became the trademark of transformative modern politics.<sup>8</sup> Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the remapping of Europe increasingly evolved around what was referred to as "voluntary resettlement," "population exchanges," or the "unmixing of peoples," a rather polished, ex-post-facto legitimization of ethno-religious cleansing.<sup>9</sup> By the late 1930s, the chronological starting point of our discussion, the transformation of society had already been established as a cross-ideological phenomenon, involving liberal, socialist, and fascist politics alike.<sup>10</sup> And so in 1942, Eduard Benes, the figurehead of liberal democracy in Central Europe, could state as a matter of fact that "national

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a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category *Nationality* in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses," *Slavic Review* 56, no. 2 (1997): 251–78.

<sup>7</sup> *Novaia zhizn'* 10 [23] November 1917, as cited in Maxim Gorky, *Untimely Thoughts: Essays on Revolution, Culture and the Bolsheviks 1917–1918*, Herman Ermolaev, trans. (New Haven, Conn., 1995), 89.

<sup>8</sup> Between 1935 and 1975, none other than the Swedish welfare state forced the sterilization of nearly 63,000 people, mostly women, often because they were considered racially or socially inferior. About 4,500 mental patients had been forced to undergo lobotomies under officially encouraged eugenics programs that started in the 1920s. Gunnar Broberg and Mattias Tyden, "Eugenics in Sweden: Efficient Care," in Broberg and Nils Roll-Hansen, eds., *Eugenics and the Welfare State: Sterilization Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland* (East Lansing, Mich., 1996), 109–10; "A Survey of the Nordic Countries," *The Economist*, January 23, 1999; "Sweden Plans to Pay Sterilization Victims," *New York Times*, January 27, 1999.

<sup>9</sup> The systematic uprooting of Muslims patterned after the conscious urge to reorder society and the increasing desire for ethno-religious homogeneity in the course of Imperial Russian consolidation of rule over Crimea and the Caucasus, along with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Balkan nationalism is considered a turning point in modern population policies. Willis Brooks, "Russia's Conquest and Pacification of the Caucasus: Relocation Becomes a Pogrom in the Post-Crimean War Period," *Nationalities Papers* 23 (1995): 675–86; Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationalhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, 1996), 152–56; Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, to Exterminate"; Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914* (Madison, Wis., 1985), 65–75. For a stimulating discussion on the emergence and evolution of corporate expulsions carried out by the secular state striving for purity of its realm, see Benjamin Kedar, "Expulsion as an Issue of World History," *Journal of World History* 7, no. 2 (1996): 165–80.

<sup>10</sup> For insightful analyses of this phenomenon, see Michael Geyer, "The Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945," in John Gillis, ed., *The Militarization of the Western World* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1989), 65–102; and Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 148–78. Whereas the origins and frequent use of mass population transfers were unmistakably European, they were soon adapted by postcolonial non-European regimes as well. Despite the passage of time and the new research on individual cases, Joseph Schechtman's work is still a valuable starting point. See *European Population Transfers, 1939–1945* (New York, 1946); *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945–1955* (Philadelphia, 1962); and *Population Transfers in Asia* (New York, 1949). Also see István Deák, "How to Construct a Productive, Disciplined, Monoethnic Society: The Dilemma of East Central European Governments, 1914–1956"; Gordon Chang, "Social Darwinism versus Social Engineering: The Education of Japanese Americans during World War II"; Norman Naimark, "Ethnic Cleansing between Peace and War," in Amir Weiner, ed., *Modernity and Population Management in the Twentieth Century* (Stanford, forthcoming).

minorities are always a real thorn in the side of individual nations,” and that the ideal state of linguistic and national homogeneity could be reached only by extensive population transfers.<sup>11</sup> A little less than two years later, in a meeting with Joseph Stalin, Benes concluded that “the defeat of Germany presents us with the singular historical possibility to radically clean out the German element in our state,” a policy that was faithfully executed at the end of the war.<sup>12</sup> This powerful ethos would wane only in the mid-1950s, when European regimes and parties appeared to accept some limits on their transformative powers.<sup>13</sup>

Whatever its ideological coloring, social engineering possessed a tremendous capacity for violence. The mobilization of the legal and medical professions for the goal of perfecting society shifted the political discourse to new realms. The pretense of scientific criteria and measures to study and work on the population meant that the state would employ the most advanced and radical tools in its quest for a purer, better society. The urge to maximize the management of society gave birth to a myriad of institutions for activities such as passport control, surveillance, and physical and mental cataloguing, without which the radical transformation of populations could not have taken place.<sup>14</sup> And it was perfectly logical that the most radical forms of mass extermination were preceded by smaller scale destruction of groups categorized as incompatible and irredeemable both medically and legally, then supplemented by military-industrial methods of operation.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Benes vowed that the mistake of 1919, when “idealistic tendencies” were governing, would not be repeated. This time, it would be necessary to carry out population transfers on “a very much larger scale than after the last war.” Eduard Benes, “The Organization of Post-War Europe,” *Foreign Affairs* (January 1942): 235–39.

<sup>12</sup> Benes to Stalin, December 16, 1943, quoted in Naimark, “Ethnic Cleansing.”

<sup>13</sup> The renunciation of mass terror in the Soviet Union, the abandonment of collectivization, and acceptance of a *modus vivendi* with the church in East-Central Europe, along with the abandonment of integral socialism by the German Social Democratic Party, were key markers of this shift. The various origins of the scaling down of state ambitions—self-imposed limitations by Stalin’s successors fearing another endless cycle of terror in the Soviet Union and the rise of effective civil societies in liberal democracies—pointed to a common reluctance to accept without challenge the costs of transformative drives. However, collectivization and the Cultural Revolution in China and the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, to cite two examples, were powerful reminders that elsewhere the idea of violent transformation still resonated.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, the Nazis’ use of the meticulous Dutch registering and mapping of the population for the implementation of their anti-Jewish policies in Bob Moore, *Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands 1940–1945* (London, 1997), 194–99; and Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 78–79. For the Soviet use of passportization in executing deportations in the annexed territories in 1939, see Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 188–89; and for the defining and persecuting of internal enemies throughout the pre-war era, Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique,” in Weiner, *Modernity and Population Management*.

<sup>15</sup> For the Pan-European discourse of degeneration, see Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848–1948* (Cambridge, 1989). Of the voluminous literature on the lethal combination of legality and biological-medical science in the service of modern extermination campaigns, see especially Omer Bartov, *Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation* (Oxford, 1996), esp. 67–70; Ingo Müller, *Hitler’s Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich* (Cambridge, 1987); Michael Stollis, *The Law under the Swastika: Studies on Legal History in Nazi Germany* (Chicago, 1998); Michael Burleigh, *Death and Deliverance: “Euthanasia” in Germany 1900–1945* (Cambridge, 1994); Henry Friedlander, *The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995); Detlev Peukert, “The Genesis of the ‘Final Solution’ from the Spirit of Science,” in Thomas Childers and Jane Caplan, eds., *Reevaluating the Third Reich* (New York, 1993), 234–52. See also Richard Weisberg, *Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France* (New York, 1996), for the culpability of the legal ethos and profession in the persecution of the French Jewry; and David Horn, *Social Bodies: Science, Reproduction, and Italian Modernity* (Princeton, N.J., 1994), on the



Where the paradigm of modernity falls short is by not providing a satisfactory explanation for the *evolution* of purification drives in totalitarian systems. If the urge to perfect societies stemmed from the universal axis of modernity, its implementation acted on clearly particularistic urges. First, the “gardening state” blossomed throughout Europe no less than in the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Great War, the European political landscape was marked by planned economies, elaborate surveillance systems, and thoroughly politicized eugenics research. Yet it was the Soviet polity that ended up with teleology as its economic *modus operandi* alongside a system of concentration camps, mass deportations, and killings.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, the Soviets went out of their way to underline this difference. Unlike the Philistines who constantly lament brutality and the loss of lives and preach reconciliation, the ultimate goal of the social engineering project—a genuine moral-political unity of society—could be reached only through an irreconcilable and violent struggle, declared Soviet ideologues.<sup>17</sup> Second, the campaign to eradicate internal enemies within the totalitarian state intensified *after* all residues of political opposition had been crushed and, in the Soviet case, following the declaration that Socialism had been built.<sup>18</sup> Terror becomes total, Hannah Arendt observed, when it becomes independent of all opposition.<sup>19</sup>

The key to the distinctive development of the Soviets’ purification drive lay in the volatile fusion of historical time and its ultimate goal. It was an eschatological worldview in the sense of belief in an end to History; it was apocalyptic in its belief in the imminence of the End and that, in the wake of reaching socialism, Soviet people were living at the final stages of History; it was millenarian in its belief that the final cataclysm would be followed by the kingdom of communism, namely a conflict-free and harmonious society, the very feature that set it apart from other totalitarian enterprises, which espoused a cyclical conception of time and envi-

employment of reproductive policies and technologies in the service of social engineering in interwar Italy.

<sup>16</sup> Tim McDaniel’s interpretive essay, *The Agony of the Russian Idea* (Princeton, N.J., 1996), esp. 86–117, is an excellent starting point for a discussion on the tenuous relations between modernization, communist ideology, and the Russian heritage. Unlike McDaniel, however, I am inclined to view the totalitarian-revolutionary ethos as one ingrained in pan-European modernity, though one that acted on particularistic ideologies, largely because of its aspiration for a total transformation of society. The Russian heritage was certainly crucial for the evolution of Soviet communism, yet similar patterns in Nazi Germany and Marxist regimes in Asia and Africa point to a supranational, cross-cultural ideological phenomenon. In this sense, and despite its underlying teleological reasoning, Jacob Talmon’s magisterial trilogy is on the mark in identifying the issue as a primarily ideological phenomenon rooted in the Enlightenment era. See Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London, 1952); *Political Messianism—The Romantic Phase* (London, 1960); *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of the Revolution* (London, 1981). See also Bernard Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche* (Princeton, 1986), for emphasis on the attempts of various European thinkers to overcome the dehumanizing spirit of modern society and their dissatisfaction with the limited scope and impact of a political revolution such as the French Revolution.

<sup>17</sup> Georgii Glezerman, *Likvidatsiia ekspluatators’kikh klassov i preodolenie klassovykh razlichii v SSSR* (Moscow, 1949), 229.

<sup>18</sup> In his speech at the meeting of SS major-generals at Posen on October 4, 1943, when the extermination process was reaching its maximum intensity, Heinrich Himmler stated that no danger was expected at that point from communists in the Reich since “their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentration camps.” *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality (Washington, D.C., 1946), 4: 560.

<sup>19</sup> Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 464.



sioned an endless struggle for domination and survival.<sup>20</sup> The quest for purity was neatly tied to *the* distinguishing aspect of the Bolshevik utopia: from the moment of its establishment in power, the Soviet regime imposed a time line marking concrete stations on the road to realization of the communist utopia. Thus in 1947, the draft of the party program set the goal of “building of a communist society in the USSR in the course of the next twenty to thirty years,” and in 1948, a leading political theoretician could declare confidently that,

if it was possible to organize a socialist society on the whole within twenty years from the moment of the triumph of Soviet power under the most difficult circumstances, then it is entirely possible to assume that after the triumphant conclusion of the Patriotic War and the restoration of the ruined people’s economy, two more decades will be enough to roughly erect the highest stage of communism. *Therefore, the generation which in 1920 was fifteen to twenty years old will live in a communist society.*<sup>21</sup>

A year later, communism was said to be around the corner, with each day bringing forward more evidence of the triumphant march to communism, including the markers of communist harmony—liquidation of the great schisms between mental and physical labor and between town and village—as the first secretary of the All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth (Komsomol) assured the delegates to the Eleventh Congress of the organization in March–April 1949. The “overwhelming majority” of Soviet youth, noted another secretary, already possessed “all the elements of the character of the man of Communist society.”<sup>22</sup> On the eve of the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, Stalin threw his personal weight behind the matter when he sought in his last major work on *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* to rush the march toward the higher stage of communism by creating a central barter system that would replace collective farm property and commodity exchange in the countryside, which he viewed as the last existing obstacles to a full-blown communist economy.<sup>23</sup> And with the addition of the new socialist “shock brigades”—the People’s Democracies in East Asia and

<sup>20</sup> For an excellent introduction to these concepts and the tensions they created in the early medieval era, see Richard Landes, “Lest the Millennium Be Fulfilled: Apocalyptic Expectations and the Pattern of Western Chronography 100–800 CE,” in Werner Verbeke, *et al.*, *The Use and Abuse of Eschatology in the Middle Ages* (Leuven, 1988), 137–211. Both fascism and Nazism aimed at the creation of militaristic societies living off war. In the case of the Nazis, final victory was not necessarily viewed as the only possible outcome. Here, I concur with Burrin, who emphasizes Nazism’s, and Hitler’s in particular, “sense of its own fragility.” Burrin, “Political Religion,” 339–40; Geyer, “Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945,” 101; Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *The Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997), 40. Ironically in this light, the Soviet Union, which is a marginal addendum to the Nazi state in Zygmunt Bauman’s account, appears as the ultimate expression of the gardening state, as it was the only totalitarian enterprise with a certain vision of its final goal.

<sup>21</sup> Indeed, this confident prediction was presented as a “scientific answer to the question on the historical epochs of building communism [that] we find in the writings of Lenin and Stalin.” Tsolak Stepanian, “Usloviia i puti perekhoda ot sotsializma k kommunizmu,” in F. Konstantinov, *et al.*, *O sovetskom obshchestve: Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1948), 539, 540, 542, italics in the original. The political importance assigned to this intriguing collection of essays was underlined by its large circulation: some 120,000 copies printed for the 1948 and 1949 edition. Stepanian’s elaboration on his essay was published in 1951 under the title *O postepennoi perekhode ot sotsializma k kommunizmu* and printed in 200,000 copies. Several other essays were developed into monographs and enjoyed similar mass circulation. For the 1947 party program, see Elena Zubkova, *Obshchestvo i reformy 1945–1964* (Moscow, 1993), 93.

<sup>22</sup> *Komsomolskaia pravda*, March 30 and April 2, 1949.

<sup>23</sup> “*Ekonomicheskie problemy sotsializma v SSSR*,” and “*Otvet tovarishcham Saninnoi A.V. i*

Europe—which altered the pre-war isolation, “the mighty motherland” was said to be in the flower of its strength, possessing “everything necessary for building of a complete communist society.”<sup>24</sup>

These time markers had a direct impact on the definition of the “weeds” intruding on the harmonious garden and the measures taken to uproot them. Groups and individuals perceived to be hostile were continuously referred to in biological-hygienic terms, whether vermin (*parazity, vrediteli*), pollution (*zasorenost'*), or filth (*griaz'*), and were subjected to ongoing purification.<sup>25</sup> Yet the implications of this biological-hygienic rhetoric were not static. With the declaration of Socialism built, the victorious outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and communism in sight, the eradication of “this debris of the old world, a weed that somehow grew up between the stones of our radiant building,”<sup>26</sup> assumed even more urgency. In his well-known speech at the February–March 1937 plenary session of the Central Committee, Stalin explicitly identified the new type of internal enemy in the age of socialism, the elusive one, a theme that he had already begun to develop in 1933 at the completion of collectivization. Since official ideology and its institutional implementation were infallible, errors and failures could be attributed only to the ill-will of individuals. After several decades of socialism in power and constant purges, the continued existence of such human weeds must be a result of their devious and elusive nature. Like a cancer, they mutated themselves in different forms and various locations. And since this vermin could not repent, it had to be removed from the body in its entirety. The question was only how. The former brand of internal enemies, argued Stalin, was openly hostile to the Soviet cause by virtue of social origin and professional orientation and could not be mistaken for anything other than that. The new saboteurs, on the other hand, were “mostly party people, with a party card in the pocket, i.e., people who formally are not alien. Whereas the old vermin turned against our people, the new vermin, on the contrary, cringe before our people, extol our people, bow before them in order to win their trust.”<sup>27</sup> Such enemies, reasoned Stalin, would resort to the most extreme measures in their struggle against the Soviet state. The latter must guarantee the excision of this vermin from its midst.

Stalin's warning was repeatedly invoked in the postwar purge campaigns but with an additional edge. The moral-political unity gained by the relentless and thorough purge was posited against the proliferation of “fifth columns” in the rest of Europe, which, in the Soviet view, was a major factor in its quick collapse before the Nazi

Venzheneru V.G.,” in I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 3 vols., Robert H. McNeal, ed. (Stanford, Calif., 1967), 3 (16): 205–07, 294–304.

<sup>24</sup> See the speeches by Georgii Malenkov and Stalin at the Nineteenth Party Congress, *Pravda*, October 6 and 15, 1952.

<sup>25</sup> On Soviet preoccupation with the purity of the collective body with a special focus on the 1920s, see Eric Naiman, *Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology* (Princeton, N.J., 1997).

<sup>26</sup> *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, February 12, 1953.

<sup>27</sup> I. Stalin, “O nedostatках partiinoi raboty i merakh likvidatsii trotskistskikh i inkh dvurushnikov: Doklad na Plenum TsK VKP (b) 3 Marta 1937,” *Bol'shevik* 7 (1937): 7. See Hiroaki Kuromiya's examination of the January 1933 speech in his *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s* (Cambridge, 1998), 184–85.

onslaught.<sup>28</sup> With the announcement in mid-January 1953 of the uncovering of the “Doctors’ Plot,” a group of physicians, the majority of whom were Jews, accused of plotting to murder Soviet leaders, *Komsomol’skaia pravda* reminded Soviet youth that even when defeated the enemy does not rest. “Having won the war we turned to construction again because we love life and youth, because we want to make our land a flourishing garden. But while we build we must remember that the enemy will continue to send spies onto our home front, to recruit all kinds of scum in order to undermine our strength, to poison our joyous, happy life . . . the greater the successes in building communism in the USSR, the more active and vile the operations of the imperialists and their myrmidons,” concluded the call for vigilance. Like the biblical serpent, these enemies were the most elusive imaginable. “The spies and saboteurs sent to us by the imperialist intelligence services or recruited by them within the country from among incompletely routed anti-Soviet scum do not operate openly. They operate ‘on the sly,’ they mask themselves in the guise of Soviet persons to penetrate our institutions and organizations, to worm their way into confidence and conduct their foul work,” was *Izvestiia*’s editorial from the same day. An unwaivering vigilance was required in order to “ensure the cleansing of people’s minds from the survivals of capitalism, from the prejudices and harmful traditions of the old society,” concluded the editorial.<sup>29</sup>

The arrival of socialism ordained new sites of excision. First, with the destruction of antagonistic classes, internal enemies became enemies of the people and were to be sought in new realms.<sup>30</sup> By then, it was the nationality question that harbored the clearest and most present danger to the moral-political unity of all the people, declared Stalin in the Seventeenth Party Congress of 1934, underlining the increasing ethnicization of the Soviet social body and the shift in the search for the enemy within. The fight against recurrences of nationalist views had become the most critical task in the struggle against the last vestiges of capitalism in the consciousness of people, echoed Dmitrii Chesnokov, a prominent party ideologue, in 1952. The residue of “zoological” chauvinism, especially in regions that were temporarily exposed to fascist propaganda during the German occupation, represented a stubborn intrusion on Soviet harmony and called for the most severe measures if harmony was to be maintained, Chesnokov concluded.<sup>31</sup>

Second, Soviet relations to the parallel modern politics across the European continent were not merely phenomenological. Rather, the Soviets were constantly checking their methods in the European mirror. The anxiety of potential degeneration into a zoological ethos was strongly present in the minds of Soviet contem-

<sup>28</sup> L. Smirnov, “Neustanno povyshat’ politicheskuiu bditel’nost’ sovetsskikh liudei,” *Bloknot agitatora* 3 (January 1953): 11, 15–17; and Glezerman, *Likvidatsiia*, 193–94, 219–20.

<sup>29</sup> *Komsomol’skaia pravda*, January 15, 1953; *Izvestiia*, January 15, 1953.

<sup>30</sup> The category of “enemies of the people” was codified in Article 131 of the 1936 constitution. A year later, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the October Revolution at the time when the Terror was reaching its climax, V. M. Molotov pointed to the “unprecedented inner moral and political unity of the people” that was forged through wrenching the country free from the rotting capitalist society and in the ordeal of heroic struggle against the exploiting classes and foreign intervention. This unity also meant that by now the enemies of the Communist Party and the Soviet government had become enemies of the people,” concluded Molotov. *Pravda*, November 7, 1937.

<sup>31</sup> Dmitrii Chesnokov, *Sovetskoe sotsialisticheskoe gosudarstvo* (Moscow, 1952), 209. The necessity for coercion in the age of harmony and socialist democracy was hammered out by Chesnokov throughout the entire exhaustive text. See 246, 556.

poraries. Throughout the 1930s, Soviet leaders, notably Stalin himself, reacted vehemently against any suggestion that their sociologically based model of the human subject could be equated with any biologically based, genetically coded enterprise, whether the racial Nazi polity or eugenics and euthanasia policies, which enjoyed widespread acceptance during that decade. When the totalization of categories and practices in the wake of the war drove home the inevitable comparison with the Nazi racial-biological code, the Soviets went out of their way to emphasize that their destruction of internal enemies was not genocidal and that, unlike the death camps, their own penal system remained true to its corrective mandate.<sup>32</sup>

The specific sites of purification derived from this anxiety. The acute Soviet awareness of being equated with the Nazi racial-biological enterprise and the fact that total excision did not necessarily imply physical elimination pointed to other sites of purification in addition to deportations or executions. Memory was a key political arena where the body social was delineated. Inclusion and exclusion within the Soviet body were defined to a large degree through both the commemoration of cataclysmic events and the simultaneous erasure of the counter-memories of groups and events deemed incompatible with communist harmony. In the highly stylized Soviet polity, hierarchies of commemoration reflected the political status of groups. World War II played a central role in this process, especially as the experience of the war turned into the core legitimizing myth of the Soviet polity, along with the denunciation and removal of some key elements of the Stalinist regime and the routinization of other fundamentals of the revolutionary ethos.<sup>33</sup> The exclusion of certain groups from official representations of the wartime Soviet fighting family and the denial of particularistic suffering destined groups to political invisibility, depriving them of official recognition of their distinct, collective identities.

This essay examines the varieties of the Soviet purification drives as they evolved in relation to two groups that came to epitomize the obstacles to harmony from the late 1930s on: the Ukrainian nationalist movement (a political-ideological effort identified with its place of origin, Western Ukraine, but often substituted for the entire Ukrainian nation) and the Jewish minority.<sup>34</sup> The sites of the Soviet drive

<sup>32</sup> "In contrast to the capitalist countries, where concentration camps are sites of torture and death, the correctional labor camps of the Soviet state are a distinctive school for the re-education of a worldview bequeathed to us by the capitalist society," claimed a 1944 internal pamphlet of the Cultural-Educational Department of the GULAG. M. Loginov, "Vozvrashchennye k zhizni," Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter, GARF), f. 9414, op. 4, d. 145, l. 3. Notably, a decade earlier, it was the Western penal system that was the favorite point of reference. *Belomor: An Account of the Construction of the New Canal between the White Sea and the Baltic Sea*, Maxim Gorky, L. Auerbach, and S. G. Firin, eds. (New York, 1935), 328.

<sup>33</sup> On the hegemonic status of the myth of the war within the Soviet pantheon of "Great Events" and its role in the articulation of political identities, see Amir Weiner, "The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the Construction of Political Identities within the Soviet Polity," *Russian Review* 55 (October 1996): 638–60.

<sup>34</sup> It appears that Soviet leaders, most notably Nikita Khrushchev, believed that Stalin would have liked to turn the postwar eradication campaign in Western Ukraine into an anti-Ukrainian crusade per se. Throughout 1956–1957, Khrushchev repeatedly suggested that only the sheer number of 40 million Ukrainians prevented Stalin from deporting all Ukrainians after the war. See Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" on February 20, 1956, in *Khrushchev Remembers* (New York, 1971), 652; and his comments during the special session of the Central Committee in June 1957. Vladimir Naumov and Terence Emmons, eds., *Rossia XX vek: Dokumenty; Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, 1957* (Moscow, 1997), 452.

explored here are the central-western regions of Ukraine, which served as a laboratory for social-ethnic engineering for every political movement that gained the upper hand there, beginning with the deportations of Germans, Poles, and Jews by the czarist government in 1915, and followed by the upheavals of the civil war, collectivization drive, and famine. From the early 1930s, the population in these regions was subjected to consecutive deportations of ethnic minorities and mass executions during the Terror, followed by Nazi population policies and Ukrainian nationalist ethnocentric policies, and finally by the resumption of the Soviet purification drive in the wake of World War II. The history of these regions offers a unique insight into the evolution of Soviet population policies.

AS THE NAZI WAR MACHINE began to roll back across the European continent, nations appeared determined to exact revenge on those deemed collaborators with the Nazi occupiers. Following humiliating defeats and years of occupation, the purge of the national body became the order of the day. On the surface, the European purification enterprise appeared universal and grappled with common core dilemmas regarding its form, extent, limits, and categories.

In their search for solutions to these dilemmas, nations referred primarily to familiar paradigms. Indeed, most European countries had had prior experience in mass exclusionary and reintegrative social operations. In the wake of the Great War, during which many of these nations had been occupied, European countries acquired rich experience in the use of amnesty legislation and the resocialization of political opponents and criminal offenders, albeit with different degrees of success and popular approval. For instance, bitter debates over the reintegration of World War I collaborators took place in Belgium, which delayed amnesty legislation until 1937, while in the Netherlands the resocialization policy of criminal offenders was enacted methodically through an extensive network of prison and aftercare associations, including churches and trade unions. It came as no surprise that the relapse of some of the rehabilitated collaborators in Belgium into similar criminal behavior during the Second World War worked to toughen attitudes toward amnesty and rehabilitation, while in the Netherlands the resocialization programs and facilities for criminals were easily converted to reintegrate their World War II black sheep.<sup>35</sup>

Less expected was the early realization that the prosecution of collaborators was not a challenge to the pre-war order but, rather, a manifestation of its continued power. A full investigation of collaboration—and not merely of those who served in the German punitive and propaganda institutions—threatened to open a Pandora's box of de facto accommodation by many of the sitting bureaucratic, judicial, and economic elites. In essence, the entire existing order. And since the latter showed no signs of acquiescence, the debate soon devolved into partisan politics. Public life

<sup>35</sup> As late as 1955, some 60,000 Belgians were still stripped of all or part of several political and civil rights. Mass reinstatement of rights was made possible only in 1961 after the intervention of the European Court. In Holland, on the other hand, by January 1948, the foundation in charge of the resocialization of political delinquents employed 320 staff members and 16,000 supervisors who oversaw 42,000 former collaborators. See Lucien Huyse, "La reintegrazione dei collaborazionisti in Belgio, in Francia e nei Paesi Bassi," *Passato e presente* 16, no. 44 (1998): 118–19, 123.






FIGURE 1: "French Justice." A Soviet mockery of the lenient French treatment of wartime collaborators. The prosecutor offers the accused collaborators a seat at the judges' podium. "Fratsuzskaia femida," by L. Soifertis, in *Krokodil* (January 30, 1953).

under Nazi occupation was left out of the investigation, as were numerous high officials who fit well into the renewed conservative order.<sup>36</sup> While the postwar European state was busily extending its domain into practically every sphere of society, the temptation to recall strayed, yet seasoned, bureaucrats was easily rationalized. The impact of the unfolding Cold War could not be ignored, either. In Hungary, a tiny communist party vying for more members opted for mass recruitment of none other than the rank-and-file of the Arrow Cross, the fascist organization now in disgrace whose class orientation was deemed more important than its political past.<sup>37</sup> On both sides of the European divide, the developing conflict dictated a facade of national unity. Unpleasant and painful reminders were shelved, or rather erased from the official memory of the war.

Wartime experience, however, defied a universal definition of collaboration. In the vengeful atmosphere of devastated Poland, attending concerts at which German

<sup>36</sup> Martin Conway, "The Liberation of Belgium, 1944–1945," in Gill Bennett, ed., *The End of the War in Europe 1945* (London, 1996), 117–38; here, 125; Conway, "Justice in Post-War Belgium: Popular Passions and Political Realities," *Cahiers d'histoire du temps présent* 2 (1997): 7–34; Luc Huyse and Steven Dhondt, *La repression des collaborations 1942–1952: Un passe toujours present* (Brussels, 1993).

<sup>37</sup> As a result, party ranks swelled from 30,000 in February 1945 to 500,000 in October of that year. Margit Szollosi-Janze, "'Pfeilkreuzler, Landesverräter und andere Volksfeinde': Generalabrechnung in Ungarn," in Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., *Politische Säuberung in Europa: Die Abrechnung mit Faschismus und Kollaboration nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 1991), 355.



music was performed was deemed a collaborative act by the secret courts. At the same time, in so many countries from France to Norway to Hungary, the very same people both collaborated and resisted in accordance with their perceptions and expectations of German policies and the changing tide of the war.<sup>38</sup> Neither martyrs nor evildoers were in the majority in Nazi-occupied Europe. And it was precisely this gray mosaic that stood in the way of national reconstruction.

At its core, the purge of collaborators was not merely about retribution or restoration. Deep down, it was about the shaping of postwar society. Purification was a transitional medium between the imperfect past and the improved—if possible, perfect—society of the present and future. If the European experience is taken as a whole, it appears that a precondition for the success of purification was an ideal representation of the people as a positive, undifferentiated entity. “The People” as one mythic group had to be exonerated from charges of collaboration. The charge of collaboration was assigned to isolated patches of weeds. In a concrete, tactical calculus, the blame for the initial humiliating defeats and atrocities would be shifted from segments of one’s own society to an alien element. A dignified future required a heroic past. And if the past was to be a guide to the future, it had to be painted in crisp colors. No shades of gray would interfere with the heroic tale of the struggle between good and evil.<sup>39</sup> And so, as quickly as the vengeful spirits arose, so, too, did they abate. All over Europe, retribution against alleged collaboration faded away at a truly amazing pace, and arguments in favor of the reintegration of convicted collaborators surfaced shortly after the end of the hostilities.

The Soviet experience, too, pointed to an earlier paradigm, but one that accentuated the sharp distinctions between totalitarian and other political enterprises. The Soviet policy of purge was not merely reactive. Nor was it conditioned by tactical requirements. Rather, purification and reintegration were complementary components of the colossal project of building a new socialist polity. Specific developments in the domestic and international arena affected the choices of targets, but the goals and methods of dealing with these targeted groups and individuals were subjected to an ongoing endeavor of restructuring. If the study of the horrifying wartime losses and destruction helps to explain the harsh retaliation of the Soviets, then the reading of the war into the progressing revolutionary narrative elucidates the unique choices of methods.

The war was not merely an unpleasant accident, nor was it a customary clash between two major powers. It was the realization of a historical nightmare, one that Soviet power expected from the moment of its inception. Throughout the 1930s, Soviet citizens were constantly warned against the evils of German fascism and its

<sup>38</sup> István Deák, “Collaboration/Accommodation/Resistance,” a paper presented in a conference on “Remembering, Adapting, Overcoming: The Legacy of World War Two in Europe,” Remarque Institute, New York University, April 24–27, 1997; Deák, “Civil Wars and Retribution in Europe 1939–1948,” *Zeitgeschichte* 7–8/25/Jahrgang 1998.

<sup>39</sup> Quite likely, the most imaginative exercise in the European postwar creation of the “Good People” took place in France under the auspices of Charles de Gaulle. In his contempt for the defeated 1940 generation and the minuscule Resistance, the French leader resurrected the generation of 1914 as the embodiment of the new France. See Pieter Lagrou, “Heroes, Martyrs, Victims: A Comparative Social History of the Memory of World War II in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1945–1965” (PhD dissertation, Catholic University of Leuven, 1996).

implications for the USSR. The dominant theme of the Terror in 1937–1938 was the excision of fascist agents from the Soviet body politic. If the alleged crimes of the sinners in the late 1930s were presumed to anticipate the forthcoming catastrophe of the capitalist encirclement, then the alleged crimes in the 1940s were perceived as the full-blown actualization of the worst fears of the preceding decade. In the postwar official narrative, the war was perceived as the inevitable outcome of historical forces. “It would be wrong,” declared Stalin in his election speech on February 9, 1946, “to think that the Second World War was a casual occurrence or the result of the errors of any particular statesmen, though mistakes were made. Actually, the war was the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism.”<sup>40</sup>

In this light, collaborators were not the by-products of the war but eternal enemies whom the war and occupation helped uncover. Their destruction was therefore not merely an act of defense but the execution of the Will of History. The passage of time did not work to moderate the punitive policies against those accused of collaboration. Whereas French politicians were quick to interpret public opinion surveys supporting a reconciliation bill as a mandate for enacting amnesty, Valentin Ovechkin’s pleas for compassion toward those who went through the hell of occupation remained unheeded.<sup>41</sup> “Solicitude for the welfare of traitors who helped the Nazis lacerate France shows up the present-day collaborationists in their true colors. Birds of a feather,” was the bitter reaction of Soviet newspapers when the French National Assembly launched the debate over the final legislation of mass amnesty for convicted collaborators in December 1952.<sup>42</sup> As Europe was moving fast on the road to amnesty and rehabilitation, the Soviet Union in contrast intensified its campaign of retribution.

Ultimately, Soviet purification drives were never restrained by circumstances. The purge of the party—the vanguard of the Soviet polity—was not subject to administrative-managerial requirements, nor did the admission that many communists had not risen to the occasion form an obstacle to the purge.<sup>43</sup> When the population at large was purged, entire ethnic groups were stigmatized as collaborationist and deported into the Soviet interior. Within the grand scheme of social engineering, even the loss of face was not a weighty factor. And no external pressure, such as the European Court exerted on Belgium in 1961, was allowed to interfere with the pursuit of purity.

However, the Soviet purification drive was not entirely different from the European purge. If the postwar experience of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and

<sup>40</sup> I. V. Stalin, “Rech na predvybornom sobranii izbiratel’ Stalinskogo Izbiratel’nogo okruga goroda Moskvy,” in Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 3 (16): 2.

<sup>41</sup> Following the May 1949 call by President Vincent Auriol for national reconciliation, opinion polls showed that 60 percent of the French population supported a reconciliation bill. Several consecutive laws in 1951 and 1953 practically allowed for amnesty of the clear majority of convicts and release of most detainees. Hence, in Belgium during 1950, there were only 6,115 collaborators in prison (23.5 percent of the total number convicted), 6,715 in France (27.6 percent), and about 3,000 in the Netherlands (8.9 percent). By 1955, the numbers were 487 (1.9 percent) for Belgium, 424 (1.7 percent) for France, and 365 (1.1 percent) for the Netherlands. Huyse, “La reintegrazione,” 121; Valentin Ovechkin, *Z frontovym pryvitiom* (Kiev, 1946).

<sup>42</sup> “Amnesty for Traitors,” *New Times* (Moscow) 49 (December 3, 1952): 19–20; “Krestovyi pokhod frantsuzskoi reaktsii,” *Izvestiia*, December 7, 1952.

<sup>43</sup> Weiner, “Making of a Dominant Myth,” 645–49.

Yugoslavia is any indication, it appears that multi-ethnic formations in many ways comprised a distinct effort at purification. Wherever collaboration was presumed to have had an ethnic face, the process of the purge continued well beyond that of the more homogenous polities and assumed a more vindictive character.<sup>44</sup> Indeed, here lay the gravest challenge to the ideal representation of the “Good People,” a challenge that resonated most clearly in the Soviet Union. One could think, and with considerable justification, that the uninhibited savagery of the German occupation of the Soviet territories would perpetuate the myth of the “Good People” and make the purge of the collaborationist weeds a common national enterprise. Finding themselves at the bottom of the Nazi racial hierarchy, the Slavic populations soon discovered that the various distinctions the Nazis applied to each of them mattered little in the New Order. But the harmonious representation of the People collided with the unintended legacy of Soviet pre-war nationality policy. The racially based Nazi ethos had fallen on fertile ground. The principled cultivation of ethnic particularism by the Soviets, be it the creation of ethno-national territories or the ethnicization of the enemy-within category, rendered critical segments of society susceptible to ethnically based visions and practices. In such a milieu, the occupation of the non-Russian Slavic republics for most of the war, and the slightest preferential treatment by the Germans, triggered contemporaries’ reflection on the consequences of the ethnicized Soviet world.<sup>45</sup> In many regions, the Soviet nation-building project had to be reconciled with the ethnic legacy of collectivization, famine, and deportations. Similarly, the postwar translation of ethnically based hierarchies of heroism into hierarchies of loyalty was a powerful challenge to the myth of the “Good People.” This leads us to consider briefly the nature of the Soviet purification drive as it evolved prior to the cataclysm of World War II, against which background the magnitude of the postwar cleansing must be measured.

IN A POLITY BUILT ON THE PREMISE of “national in form, socialist in content,” ethnicity was not expected to become the primary category in social engineering. Early on, however, the brutal experience of the Don Cossacks during the Russian civil war and the suspicion cast on the Polish and German minorities throughout the 1920s made it clear that this neat distinction between form and content was difficult to maintain.<sup>46</sup> As the Soviet crusade approached the realm of socialism, the tenuous

<sup>44</sup> Thus, in ethnically divided Belgium, where ethnic Walloons constituted the core of the collaborationist movement, 53,005 of the 57,052 (92.9 percent) people prosecuted for various collaborationist offenses were found guilty. Martin Conway, *Collaboration in Belgium: Leon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement* (New Haven, Conn., 1993), 277.

<sup>45</sup> An intriguing linkage between Soviet passport policy and German racial policies and the impact on the Kiev wartime population is offered by Lev Dudin in his memoirs. *Velikii mirazh*, Hoover Archives, Stanford, California, Nicolaevsky Collection, series 178, box 232, folders 10–11, p. 73.

<sup>46</sup> 1919 witnessed the first recorded occurrence of conflating the body national and social with anti-Cossack campaign in the Don region. Notably, this was a brief episode, as the regime retreated from the practice for fear of denigrating the Marxist enterprise into a “zoological” project. See Peter Holquist, “Conduct Merciless, Mass Terror: Decossackization on the Don, 1919,” *Cahiers du monde russe* 38, nos. 1–2 (1997): 127–62. Tellingly, in a review of the political situation in Podillia province in 1925, the discussion of espionage referred only to the large Polish-Catholic minority, which, it was argued, had yet to be sovietized and was drawing the attention of the Polish government. Partiinyi

balance between social and ethnic origins increasingly tilted in the direction of the latter. True, class would continue to be the *raison d'être* of the revolutionary enterprise to the very end, a concept written into the structure of each and every Soviet institution. It was not for nothing that Stalin, the very person who renounced class heredity as a detrimental factor in determining political legitimacy, went out of his way to scorn party members in the Seventeenth Party Congress who “dropped into a state of foolish rapture in the expectation that soon there will be no classes and therefore no class struggle.”<sup>47</sup> But overshadowed by Stalin’s often-quoted remark was the addendum that the survivals of capitalism were “much more tenacious in the sphere of the national problem . . . because they are able to disguise themselves in national costume.”<sup>48</sup> The threats to the aspired harmony assumed an ethnic face.

The conflation of class and ethnic categorization resurfaced with a vengeance once collectivization began. Soviet power forcefully drove home the ethnicization of class-enemy categories, especially when applied to the ethnic mosaic of the border regions. Already at the onset of the assault on the well-off peasants, or kulaks, in January 1930, local party organizations were ordered by the Ukrainian Central Committee to “devise special perspectives with regard to the national minorities districts (Germans, Bulgarians, and others).”<sup>49</sup> And since Poles—as well as Germans and Jews—were perceived as kulaks by nature, they were marked for collectivization regardless of socioeconomic status.<sup>50</sup>

The ascendance of ethnicity within the excision enterprise was further accentuated when deportations commenced in March 1930. The Politburo’s order specifically targeted ethnic Poles irrespective of the stage of collectivization and regardless of their material position.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, only half of those deportees from the border belt of the Ukrainian Republic in 1930 were classified as kulaks.<sup>52</sup> With socialism built, ethnic hostility replaced class antagonism as the primary category intruding on harmony, a shift that was underscored when the purification drive

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arkhiv Vinnyts'koi Partii (hereafter, PAVO), f. 29, op. 1, d. 172, l. 45. On the tenuous relations between the Soviet authorities and the German minority throughout the 1920s, see *Nimtsi v Ukraini 20–30-ti rr. XX st.* (Kiev, 1994); I. M. Kulnych and N. V. Kryvets, *Narysy z istorii nimets'kykh koloni v Ukraini* (Kiev, 1995); Harvey Dyck, *Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933* (New York, 1966); and Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 112–47, for Weimar’s policies within the broader framework of an external, active homeland assuming responsibility for its diaspora co-ethnics.

<sup>47</sup> I. V. Stalin, “Otchetnyi doklad XVII s’ezdu partii,” in *Sochineniia*, 13 (Moscow, 1951), 351.

<sup>48</sup> Stalin, “Otchetnyi doklad XVII s’ezdu partii,” 361. A key marker in this shift was Stalin’s letter to *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* in which the Soviet leader asserted that an alliance with “oppressed peoples and colonies”—and not with oppressed classes among these peoples—had always been the cornerstone of Bolshevik ideology. Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors*, 259.

<sup>49</sup> PAVO, f. 29, op. 1, d. 577, l. 133.

<sup>50</sup> The conflation of class and ethnicity with regard to the Polish minority was captured in the rhyme *raz Poliak—znachit kulak* (all Poles are kulaks). Cited in Terry Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” *Journal of Modern History* 70 (December 1998): 837. For complaints by the Vinnytsia regional committee about the breakdown of the collectivization drive in the Jewish communities in the region in late 1934 due to “counter-revolutionary nationalist and clerical” activity, see PAVO, f. 136, op. 3, d. 225, ll. 19–21.

<sup>51</sup> Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniiia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (hereafter, RTsKhIDNI), f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, ll. 109–10. The quota for Ukraine was set at 10,000–15,000 households and the Belorussian border regions at 3,000–3,500 families. For Soviet policy toward the Polish minority, see Mykolaj Iwanow, *Pierwszy Narod Ukrany: Polacy w Związku Radzieckim 1921–1939* (Warsaw, 1991).

<sup>52</sup> Ihor Vynnychenko, *Ukraina 1920–1980-ki: Deportatsii, zaslannia, vyslannia* (Kiev, 1994), 24.

accelerated in the mid-1930s. Well before deportations resumed in early 1935, every ethnic German living in the Soviet Union was “individually registered to the fullest extent” and his or her personal data transmitted to the Central Committee.<sup>53</sup> On November 5, 1934, the Central Committee in Moscow ordered local authorities throughout the Soviet Union to “remove the hostile anti-Soviet element from the German villages and deport them out of the region and to apply the harshest methods against the most active ones.” The decree was implemented despite awareness of a steep decline in the absolute number of ethnic Germans in the border regions during the preceding period.<sup>54</sup>

The ethnicization of categories intensified the drive to homogenize the Soviet body social. Those marked for deportation were classified as “undesirable elements,” and the enterprise was officially characterized as a “cleansing of the mass pollution of the [Polish] national village soviets.”<sup>55</sup> Hand in hand, scores of national soviets and schools were declared artificial and counterrevolutionary institutions. On the path to communism, the reference to any structure as an artificial creation by a foreign organization marked it as a weed to be uprooted from the Soviet garden. It seemed no accident that district authorities were ordered to explain to parents that children should be instructed in their “mother tongue,” and consequently several hundred schools were converted to Ukrainian language schools.<sup>56</sup> The same rationale was offered in late 1937 when the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee (Orgburo) decreed the liquidation of a large number of national districts and village soviets (German, Polish, Estonian, Finnish, Koreans, Bulgarians, and others) throughout the entire union. The Orgburo declared them to be artificial creations that did not correspond to their national composition and, even worse, the creations of “enemies of the people led by bourgeois nationalists and spies.”<sup>57</sup> Simultaneously, the Far East region was cleared of all ethnic Koreans,<sup>58</sup> and large numbers of Germans, Poles, and Latvians were arrested or executed regardless of their social class, occupation, or geographical location. In some Ukrainian regions, arrests and executions eliminated almost all Germans and Poles.<sup>59</sup>

Finally, the Terror delivered a brutal message regarding the limits of redemption in the wake of triumphalistic socialism. In his canonization of the history of the Communist Party, the *Short Course*, Stalin celebrated the physical annihilation of

<sup>53</sup> Ingeborg Fleischhauer and Benjamin Pinkus, *The Soviet Germans: Past and Present* (London, 1986), 90.

<sup>54</sup> PAVO, f. 136, op. 3, d. 225, ll. 23–31.

<sup>55</sup> Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob"iednan' Ukrainy (hereafter, TsDAHOU), f. 1, op. 16, d. 12, ll. 39, 280; GARF, f. 5446, op. 16a, d. 265, l. 14.

<sup>56</sup> PAVO, f. 136, op. 3, d. 371, l. 5; PAVO, f. 136, op. 6, d. 591, ll. 1–3, 11.

<sup>57</sup> The Central Committee approved the resolution on December 17. Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennykh Dokumentov (hereafter, TsKhSD), f. 89, op. 62, d. 6, l. 14; d. 4, l. 1; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 114, d. 829, ll. 119, 121, 123–26.

<sup>58</sup> Nikolai Bugai, *L. Beria-I. Stalinu: "Soglasno Vashemu ukazaniiu . . ."* (Moscow, 1995), 18–25; Michael Gelb, “An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans,” *Russian Review* 54 (July 1995): 389–412.

<sup>59</sup> For Ezhov's (the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs) orders requesting the arrest of members of these communities on July 25 and August 11, 1937, see *Butovskii poligon, 1937–1938* (Moscow, 1997), 348, 353–54. At the height of the Terror in the Stalino region in the Donbas, 80.2 percent of the 3,777 Poles and 84.6 percent of the 4,265 ethnic Germans arrested between September 1937 and February 1938 were executed. Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas*, 231–33.



the elusive enemies who managed to survive previous cycles of purification. With Socialism built, extermination was the only way to cope with those who had not yet redeemed themselves.<sup>60</sup> It seemed no accident that the first salvo of the ensuing terror was directed at the punished and pardoned. Indeed, the latter figured prominently in the Politburo resolution of July 2, 1937, "Concerning Anti-Soviet Elements." Having been punished and stripped of their hostile class identity, these individuals and groups appeared to have redeemed themselves through productive labor, which won them not only the restoration of voting rights but also the release of some from the special settlements. Indeed, only two years earlier, the rehabilitation of former kulaks was trumpeted as the triumph of nurture over nature. Celebrating the completion of the White Sea Canal, the authors of the special commemorative volume noted that "on the whole kulaks were the hardest to educate . . . but even in these *half-animals*, the idolaters of private property, the truth of collective labor at last *undermined a zoological individualism*."<sup>61</sup> Accordingly, on January 25, 1935, all former kulaks regained their voting rights.<sup>62</sup> But two and a half years later, the Central Committee identified recently rehabilitated former kulaks as the principal anti-Soviet element, responsible for a barrage of diversionary acts in the countryside. In spite of regaining their civil rights and permission to return from exile to their homes, they had allegedly resumed hostilities against the socialist state. In essence, they proved to be immune to socialist corrective measures and were consequently irredeemable. They were marked for immediate arrest and execution.<sup>63</sup> In the era of socialism, redemption was not offered twice.

Still, the pre-war cleansing policies maintained several key features that set them apart from those of the postwar era. First, they aimed largely at cleansing specific territorial space—mainly border regions populated by minorities with an external active homeland—or politically suspicious segments of these communities, but not entire peoples, which meant that targeted groups were treated as differentiated entities.<sup>64</sup> The lists of deportees from villages with "concentrated Polish and German populations" were to include "independent peasants who did not fulfill their obligations to the government and unreliable collective farmers [*kolkhozniki*]," just as the arrest and execution lists for these nationalities at the height of the Terror consisted of mainly political émigrés, alleged spies, and people working in sensitive industries. Equally important, deportees often remained within the boundaries of the Ukrainian Republic.<sup>65</sup> Hence, even after the conclusion of

<sup>60</sup> *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, edited by a commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.) (New York, 1939), 346–48.

<sup>61</sup> *Belomor*, 341, italics added.

<sup>62</sup> GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 949, l. 77.

<sup>63</sup> For the July 2, 1937, resolution of the Politburo and the Central Committee, see *Trud*, June 4, 1992.

<sup>64</sup> While Soviet anxiety over external homelands appealing to their brethren within the Soviet Union or the fear of disloyalty in case of invasion should not be underestimated, they have to be squared with a military doctrine that at the commencement of deportations of Poles and Germans from the borderlands outlined a single option of an offensive into the enemy territory. See Raymond Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), 67–68, 435–36; Mark von Hagen, "Soviet Soldiers and Officers on the Eve of the German Invasion: Towards a Description of Social Psychology and Political Attitudes," *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique* 18, nos. 1–3 (1991): 95.

<sup>65</sup> In 1935, some 9,829 households were marked for deportation within the republic's boundaries,



repetitive waves of deportations, border regions were still populated by tens of thousands of members of the deported groups, just as members of the marked groups residing outside the targeted region were left unharmed, notably including Koreans.<sup>66</sup>

Second, differentiation often left the door open for possible redemption. The GULAG doors kept revolving, with 20 to 40 percent of the inmates released annually.<sup>67</sup> Rehabilitation of deported kulaks continued throughout the second half of the 1930s. The Council of People's Commissars Resolution on October 22, 1938, provided children of former kulaks with internal passports and the right to move to their place of choice (with the exception of closed districts), a right that elevated them not only above their previous status but also above the rest of the Soviet peasantry, which was deprived of passports and hence the right of free movement.<sup>68</sup> Surveillance reports on deportees divided them into subgroups corresponding to their potential for redemption. Hence the 15,000 ethnic Germans deported in the spring of 1936 were split into a first group composed mostly of demobilized Red Army servicemen, who responded to the resettlement with optimism; a second group that felt cheated but could be redeemed with the right dose of propaganda; and a third, whose expectations of a German invasion and unification with their German brethren marked them as hopeless.<sup>69</sup> Consequently, ethnic Germans throughout the Soviet Union were still regarded as reliable enough to be drafted into the Red Army, a policy that was bound to change only after this minority (and others) was targeted in its entirety with the outbreak of the war. Even Koreans residing outside the Far East were inducted into the Red Army, and their wartime exploits would be recognized and rewarded by the Soviet state.<sup>70</sup>

Notably, the war itself soon became a redemptive vehicle for pre-war outcasts. On April 11, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) passed a resolution that allowed the drafting of former kulaks into military service. The spouses and children of the draftees were released from the special settlements and received

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mainly to Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Odessa. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 16, d. 12, ll. 38, 314; GARF, f. 5446, op. 16a, d. 265, l. 14. Beginning in 1936, however, deportees were directed to Kazakhstan and Siberia. PAVO, f. 136, op. 3, d. 362, l. 7; TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 16, d. 13, l. 49. For categories of arrests of various ethnicities in the summer of 1937, see *Butovskii poligon*, 348, 353–54.

<sup>66</sup> Gabor Rittersporn, "‘Vrednye elementy,’ ‘opasnye men’shinstva’ i bolshevitskie trevogi: Massovyie operatsii 1937–38 gg. i etnicheskii vopros v SSSR," in Timo Vihavainen and Irina Takala, eds., *Vsem'e edinoi: Natsionalnaia politika partii bolshevikov i ee osushchestvlenie na Severo-Zapade Rossii v 1920–1950-e gody* (Petrovsk, 1998), 115; Gelb, "Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation," 406. On the eve of the deportations in early 1935, Polish national soviets in the Vinnytsia region consisted of 77,545 people. Yet some 55,610 Poles were still counted in the Vinnytsia region in the 1939 census, as well as 95,679 in the Kamianets'-Podil's'kyi region and 30,509 in the Kiev region. The census also counted 13,720 ethnic Germans in these regions, many of whom were later drafted by the Germans into the police and civilian administration following the invasion in June 1941. PAVO, f. 136, op. 6, d. 503, ll. 63–65; *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1939 goda: Osnovnye itogi* (Moscow, 1992), 68–69; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 83, l. 3. On the German and Polish communities in Vinnytsia in mid-1943, see the account by the Ukrainian nationalist activist Mykhailo Seleshko, *Vinnytsia: Spomyny perekkladacha komisii doslidiv zlochyniv NKVD v 1937–1938* (New York, 1991), 124, 132–33.

<sup>67</sup> J. Arch Getty, Gábor T. Rittersporn, and Victor N. Zemskov, "Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Pre-War Years: A First Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence," *AHR* 98 (October 1993): 1041.

<sup>68</sup> GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 925, ll. 282–83.

<sup>69</sup> GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 36, l. 15.

<sup>70</sup> Gelb, "Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation," 406–07; Bugai, *L. Beria-I. Stalinu*, 22.

passports. In 1943 alone, this cohort amounted to 102,520 people.<sup>71</sup> As the head of the GULAG administration noted with unconcealed satisfaction, many of those released served with distinction, including five who had received the nation's highest award, Hero of the Soviet Union. Inmates, including "politicals" of the Terror era, were encouraged to follow these examples and win their way back into society. Nor should the release of some 43,000 Poles categorized as members of an "enemy nation" merely two years before be ignored.<sup>72</sup> In 1944, the NKVD and the USSR Procuracy agreed not to prosecute former kulaks who left the special settlements for various wartime services and failed to return. Mass rehabilitation intensified in the postwar years. In 1946, the regime removed all limitations imposed on the families of former kulaks who had children in the Soviet Army, were participants in the Great Patriotic War, or received governmental awards, and on women who married local residents.

With World War II, the ethnicization of categories of the enemy within came full circle. An apparent consequence of the wartime redemption was the substitution of ethnicity for class as the dominant inmate category in the Soviet penal system. On the eve of the war, 90.9 percent of the 977,000 people recorded living in the special settlements were classified as kulaks or family members of kulaks.<sup>73</sup> But on the eve of the final wave of releases in early 1954, members of the 1929–1933 generation numbered only 17,348 people.<sup>74</sup> By then, the vacuum created by the release of 975,000 camp inmates to the front between 1941 and 1944 was filled with inmates from the nationalities deported during the war, the newly annexed Baltics, western Ukraine, and Belorussia.

THE WAR SAW A STARK SHIFT in the purge policies from cleansing certain spaces to cleansing peoples in toto. The pre-war focus on specific border regions was replaced by the targeting of each and every member of a stigmatized group regardless of geographical location or service rendered to the Soviet state. Whatever anxieties and inhibitions that had brought to a halt excision campaigns like that against the Cossacks in 1919 were now removed. Excision was intended to be total, irreversible, and pursued relentlessly. The treatment of ethnic Germans served as a model for this new stage. Hence the decree on the resettlement of the Volga Germans on August 28, 1941, was followed by decrees that extended resettlement to all ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union and that ordered the removal of all ethnic Germans from the ranks of the fighting Red Army. Remarkably, the decrees followed an earlier official recognition of the voluntary enrollment of the community for the

<sup>71</sup> GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 140, l. 12.

<sup>72</sup> The releases were ordained by decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union from July 12 and November 24, 1941, and GKO special resolutions in 1942–1943. The decrees, which affected about 577,000 inmates, ordered the release of those convicted for absenteeism, moral and insignificant malfeasances, and economic crimes. Political categories were not covered by the decrees. "Gulag v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Doklad nachal'nika GULAGa NKVD SSSR V.G. Nasedkina, Avgust 1944 g.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 3 (1994): 64–65. For wartime mobilization and rehabilitation campaigns inside the camps, including the use of letters by former inmates serving at the front, see Loginov, "Vozvrashchennye k zhizni," 4b, 11–12b, 14b–15.

<sup>73</sup> GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 612, l. 42.

<sup>74</sup> GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 925, ll. 280–84.

Soviet cause and the heroic fight of some of its members against the Nazi invaders.<sup>75</sup> Moreover, as one scholar aptly observed, the deportation resolution was framed as a prophylactic measure rather than a punitive one, where the Germans were accused of harboring scores of diversionist and hostile attitudes to Soviet power as opposed to performing concrete anti-Soviet acts.<sup>76</sup> The same applied to all other ethnic groups marked for excision in the wake of the war. Whereas during the pre-war era the presence of relatives who had served in the Red Army or partisan detachments was enough to protect kulak families from being deported,<sup>77</sup> by the end of World War II, officers and soldiers of the deported nationalities were severed from their units, often to be sent to the newly established special regime camps or work battalions while the war was still being waged.<sup>78</sup> As indicated by the assault on the communal structure of the above communities as well as the Jewish community, the postwar calculus was indifferent to the security of the borders and the existence of hostile external homelands of stigmatized nationalities. The enemy within was ostracized and acted on as a totality. Those convicted of political crimes were exiled indefinitely upon completion of their sentences.<sup>79</sup> With the building of communism set as a political goal and with a time line in place, the belief in the malleability of the human subject in general and of internal enemies in particular eroded.

Wartime conditions, especially in the occupied territories, furthered ethno-national divisions, for example, German differentiation of POWs (such as the release of ethnic Ukrainians),<sup>80</sup> the passivity of the majority of the population, and the fact that the partisan movement was disproportionately populated by ethnic

<sup>75</sup> Tellingly, in the course of a conversation with a correspondent, Genrikh Geiman, one of these Soviet Germans, referred to his unit as an "international brigade," consisting of Russians, Ukrainians, Mordovians, and Germans. "Yes, I am a German. And I hate with all my heart he who calls himself the leader of Germany. I will fight him to my last drop of blood," declared Geiman. The interview was published the same day the authorities issued the deportation decree. *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, August 28, 1941. For the September 8, 1941, decree on the removal of ethnic German servicemen from the ranks of the Red Army, see Meir Buchsweiler, ed., "A Collection of Soviet Documents Concerning Germans in the USSR," *Research Paper No. 73, the Marjorie Mayrock Center for Soviet and East European Research* (Jerusalem, 1991), 17. For the extension of the deportation of ethnic Germans to the rest of the union, see O. L. Milova, ed., *Deportatsii narodov SSSR (1930-e–1950-e gody)* (Moscow, 1995), 2: 54–56, 79–89, 118–30.

<sup>76</sup> J. Otto Pohl, *The Stalinist Penal System* (Jefferson, N.C., 1997), 74.

<sup>77</sup> Deportation decrees of kulaks in 1930 strictly forbade the exile of such families and even of youth who broke with their kulak families. For a decree of August 23, 1931, by the Politburo enforcing previous decrees issued by the Central Committee on January 30 and February 24, 1930, see *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 4 (1994): 171.

<sup>78</sup> By March 1949, some 63,660 former Red Army frontline servicemen from nationalities deported during and after the war were counted in the special settlements. This figure included 33,615 ethnic Germans, 8,995 Crimean Tatars, 6,184 Kalmyks, 4,248 Chechens, 2,543 Karachai, and 946 Ingush. Nikolai Bugai, "40–50-e gody: Posledstviia deportatsii narodov (Svidetel'stviui arkhivy NKVD-MVD SSSR)," *Istoriia SSSR* 1 (1992): 134; *Tak eto bylo: Natsional'nye repressii v SSSR 1919–1952 gody* (Moscow, 1993), 1: 312; Aleksander Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and the Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War* (New York, 1979), 83. On the special regime camps established in December 1941 for Red Army soldiers captured by the Germans and people who lived in the German occupation zone, see Nicolas Werth and Gael Moullec, eds., *Rapports secrets soviétiques: La société russe dans les documents confidentiels, 1921–1991* (Paris, 1994), 391.

<sup>79</sup> See the decree of February 21, 1948, of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, GARF, f. 7523, op. 36, d. 345, ll. 53–54.

<sup>80</sup> Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies* (London, 1981), 412–14; Harvard University Refugee Interview Project (hereafter, HURIP), no. 548, p. 1. The discriminatory policy in favor of the Ukrainian POWs was abandoned in early November 1941, under

Russians. Already during the war, the Soviet criminalization of passivity (directed against the “hubbies” hiding behind women’s skirts, as one partisan leader referred to those who claimed to be terrorized by the prospects of Nazi retaliation<sup>81</sup>) assumed a clear ethnic face. Finally, the ferocious clashes with nationalist separatist movements significantly contributed to the hardening of Soviet attitudes toward domestic enemies. But wartime circumstances alone cannot account for the qualitative shift in the Soviet purification drive. Their meaning for and impact on contemporaries could not be detached from the preceding Soviet experience and treated as universal. The endurance and institutionalization of state revenge against those identified as internal enemies set the Soviet Union apart from other European countries and the United States, and points to another explanation. Wartime circumstances were read into the progressing narrative of the revolution, which was itself undergoing change at the time.

REFLECTING ON HIS WARTIME EXPERIENCE in Yugoslavia, Milovan Djilas, then a communist partisan leader, rationalized the execution of the leaders of a certain clan, whose members were friendly to the communist partisans, as the failure of some of its members to subject their “primeval clan ties” and loyalties to that of their political organization. The agitated members of the Tadic clan were executed together with royal officers, “not merely for economy but to associate the fate of party enemies with that of outside enemies.” This ideological commitment, noted Djilas, allowed for opponents, whoever they were, to be dealt with in summary fashion.<sup>82</sup> Djilas would later conceptualize the role of ideology in the practice of violence. “No matter what your ideology may be,” said Djilas, “once you believe that you are in the possession of some infallible truth, you become a combatant in a religious war. There is nothing to prevent you from robbing, burning and slaughtering in the name of your truth, for you are doing it with a perfectly clear conscience—indeed the truth in your possession makes it your duty to pursue it with an iron logic and unwavering will . . . [I]deology demands the liquidation of your enemies, real or imagined.”<sup>83</sup> With the inspiration of revolutionary idealism, neither mass brutality in general nor the killing of individuals in particular was considered regrettable or detrimental. Indeed, while the Soviet practice of violence could be and was triggered by specific circumstances such as military necessity, its logic was anchored in ideology. Violence was applied within a well-defined ideological framework, which earmarked certain groups based on preconceived biases and was incorporated into an all-encompassing drive to purify the socio-national body. Any potential restraint on the exterminatory campaign against the Ukrainian nationalists was neutralized by an appeal to higher loyalties. Brutalities were committed as the ultimate expression of loyalty to the socialist drive and its

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pressure from both the German civilian administration and army commanders, who sought to use the POWs as auxiliary laborers.

<sup>81</sup> Aleksei Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (Moscow, 1986), 405–06.

<sup>82</sup> Milovan Djilas, *Wartime* (New York, 1977), 164–65; and Djilas, “Christ and the Commissar,” in George Urban, ed., *Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World* (London, 1982), 203–08.

<sup>83</sup> Djilas, “Christ and the Commissar,” 207.

administrative embodiments: the Communist Party and the Soviet Ukrainian nation.<sup>84</sup>

In this light, the very existence of the Ukrainian nationalists was a violation of the natural order, and hence no mitigating circumstances could be allowed in assessing their crimes. Nor would utilitarian considerations play a role in the fight against them. They would have to be excised from the Soviet Ukrainian body. Soviet intelligence reports reveal that the Soviets were aware of the nationalists' clashes with the Germans.<sup>85</sup> Knowledge, however, did not imply recognition. Notably, the reports carefully emphasized that the shift in the nationalists' policy resulted not from a change of heart or convictions but merely from disappointment at their treatment by the Germans. For the Soviets, the very existence of the nationalists was the bone of contention, not their tactics or alliances.

The total alienation of the nationalist cause was captured in a colorful passage by Dmitrii Medvedev, a partisan leader-turned-writer. Referring to his own contacts with the nationalist leader "Bul'ba" (Borovets) and his entourage, Medvedev explained the national and linguistic alienation of the latter:

The speech of the "hetman" was incomprehensible, a barbarian mixture of Ukrainian and German words. It was a language, as we later realized, broadly used by those Ukrainian nationalists brought up in the pubs of Berlin and in the taverns of Ottawa and Chicago, persons without a passport, without a homeland, subjects of the international black market, rascals, ready to sell themselves to the Gestapo or the Intelligence Service or the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other bourgeois espionage organization.

National ostracization was augmented by a touch of class alienation. "Whereas the [Bul'ba] wore a *zaporozhtsa* [a Ukrainian national shirt], the [others] preferred a European suit, a colorful tie and manicured fingernails, which were considered a sign of special refinement among the bandits," noted Medvedev.<sup>86</sup>

The nationalists were de-individualized, portrayed as an undifferentiated collective, detached from any specific domestic intimate environment, and often referred to as animals. Killing them was not to involve any sense of guilt.<sup>87</sup> Thus members of the Soviet polity should engage in systematic elimination of the "snake-like, slavish dogs of the Nazi hangmen," the "Ukrainian-German fascists" or the "agents of foreign intelligence services," rather than mere "Ukrainian nationalists." Nikita

<sup>84</sup> See Alexander Alvarez, "Adjusting to Genocide: The Techniques of Neutralization and the Holocaust," *Social Science History* 21 (Summer 1997): 139–78, esp. 152–53. For a pioneering study of the key relations between the transformation of loyalties into the ideological realm and the radicalization of the political scene, see Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* (Cambridge, 1965). For suggestive observations on the analogous Nazi understanding and practice of violence, see Omer Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941–1945: German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare* (New York, 1986); Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich* (New York, 1991); and notably in areas not subjected to the anti-Bolshevik-Slavic crusade, see Mark Mazower, "Military Violence and National Socialist Values: The Wehrmacht in Greece 1941–1944," *Past and Present* 134 (February 1992): 129–58; Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–1944* (New York, 1993).

<sup>85</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, ll. 36–37. Significantly, the antagonistic relations between the Germans and Ukrainian nationalists in the region had already been noted in an earlier report, dated September 30, 1942. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 124, ll. 26–27.

<sup>86</sup> Dmitrii Medvedev, *Sil'nye Dukhom* (Moscow, 1951), 84, 86.

<sup>87</sup> See the suggestive insights of Ofer Zur, "The Love of Hating: The Psychology of Enmity," *History of European Ideas* 13, no. 4 (1991): 345–69, esp. 362–64; and James A. Aho, *This Thing Called Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy* (Seattle, 1994).



Khrushchev told a plenum of the Central Committee, "They [the Ukrainian nationalists] killed themselves trying to please their master—Hitler, and to get only a small portion of the loot for their doggish service. The German invaders shed the blood of Soviet Ukraine, shot hundreds of thousands of Soviet people—women, the elderly and children. *The Ukrainian-German Nationalists* assisted and at present [continue to] assist the Germans in these bloody crimes, fulfilling the role of hangmen."<sup>88</sup> To make things worse, while the German component of the evil duo was beaten and driven out of the homeland, its Ukrainian counterpart continued the destructive mission. The efforts to sabotage the restoration of the economy were seen as the fulfillment of German instructions. Hence the internal enemy remained foreign even when its foreign ally invader was expelled from Soviet territory. The nationalists' efforts to disassociate themselves from their alliance with the Germans were dismissed by Khrushchev as a play in the face of inevitable defeat.<sup>89</sup>

On the battlefield, therefore, the campaign against the nationalists was deliberately launched as a war without prisoners. Between February 1944 and May 1946, 110,825 nationalists were killed within a territory inhabited by less than 9 million ethnic Ukrainians.<sup>90</sup> NKVD reports on individual clashes with nationalist detachments repeatedly failed to mention prisoners taken alive, emphasizing almost total annihilation.<sup>91</sup> Deportations reached their climax between 1939 and 1953, when some 570,826 people were deported from Ukraine without permission to return.<sup>92</sup> A close look at the deportation figures, however, highlights the exterminatory character of the anti-nationalism campaign in the field. Between February 1944 and January 1946, the NKVD claimed to have detained 110,785 bandits (50,058 were convicted), but only 8,370 people were arrested as members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and 15,959 as active insurgents. The 182,543 nationalists deported from the seven western regions between 1944 and 1952 included family members of OUN or the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and their supporters, non-adults, and families of those killed in clashes. Simply put, most of the active nationalist guerrillas were killed on the battlefield.<sup>93</sup> On the battlefield, "We did not

<sup>88</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 1, d. 664, ll. 262–63. Khrushchev, it should be emphasized, was informed that the Germans persecuted, if only occasionally, the Ukrainian nationalists, as well. A report by the communist underground in Bar district, which was submitted to him on February 2, 1945, stated that in early 1943 the Gestapo arrested and executed many of the nationalist activists. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, d. 166, l. 12.

<sup>89</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 1, d. 664, ll. 265, 267. The association of the nationalist cause with foreign powers persisted throughout the Soviet period, with the identity of the foreign patron changing according to the contemporary geopolitical calculations. Thus when the authorities intensified the campaign against the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church in Western Ukraine, it was the Vatican that was blamed for financing and actively guiding the operations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State, 1939–1950* (Toronto, 1996), 204–07, 238–39; Luka Kyzia and M. Kovalenko, *Vikova borot'ba Ukraïns'koho naroda proty Vatikanu* (Kiev, 1959), 200–07, 221–29.

<sup>90</sup> GARF, f. 9478, op. 1, d. 349, ll. 1, 5, 9; TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2867, l. 26. Ivan Bilas, *Represyivno-karal'na systema v Ukraini, 1917–1953* (Kiev, 1994), 1: 181.

<sup>91</sup> Following one such clash on May 6, 1944, in the Khmil'nyk district, the NKVD was reported to have killed sixty-seven guerrillas. Twenty wounded managed to escape to the forests, and only one person was taken prisoner. Arkhiv Upravliniia Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy po Vinnyts'koi oblasti (hereafter, AUSBVO), d. 26674, ll. 37, 46, 51; Tsentral'nyi Arkhiv Vnutrennykh Voisk Ministerstva Vnutrennykh Del Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter, TsAVVMVDRF), f. 488, op. 1, d. 51, l. 10.

<sup>92</sup> Bugai, *L. Beria-I. Stalinu*, 6, 212.

<sup>93</sup> Quite tellingly, people categorized as kulaks and their family members counted for merely 12,135

take prisoners as a rule. If we did take prisoners, we shot them after a preliminary interrogation," a commissar of a partisan detachment casually told members of the Commission for the Compilation of the Chronicles of the Great Patriotic War.<sup>94</sup>

Accordingly, the execution of captured nationalist guerrillas became a didactic public spectacle, with party officials presiding over summary trials and hangings in the village square.<sup>95</sup> Quite likely, the ritual of hanging, which had already been practiced against convicted collaborators, was intended to add an element of humiliation and terror, since the Soviet Criminal Code spoke only of shooting (*rasstrel*) as the exceptional measure of punishment for extremely serious crimes.<sup>96</sup> Once again, a comparison with other countries is telling. Estimates for the Netherlands were three or four deaths on the occasion of arrests and forty deaths in the internment camps caused by resistance members acting as guards. In the significantly more violent Belgium, there were about forty extra-judicial executions.<sup>97</sup> In the USSR, public executions of alleged collaborators with the Germans were something to brag about when party officials recounted their recent experience in the partisans' ranks. The Special Department of the Lenin Mounted Brigade, which operated for a short time in the Vinnytsia region, was reported to have executed, often in public, no fewer than 825 collaborators. If the figures provided by the brigade's leaders are taken at face value, then the number of people executed by a single partisan brigade, not necessarily the largest one and operating within a rather small region in Ukraine, amounted to 13.7 percent of the total number of summary executions before and during the liberation of France, and 233 percent of those in Belgium.<sup>98</sup> Finally, violence was exercised primarily for political

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of the 182,543 people deported between 1944 and 1948 at a time of an intense collectivization drive in the western provinces. Bilas, *Represyivno-karal'na systema*, 1: 181; Vynnychenko, *Ukraina 1920–1980-kh*, 82; GARF, f. 7523, op. 109, d. 195, l. 49.

<sup>94</sup> Institut Istorii Rossii, Otdel rukopisnykh fondov, f. 2, op. 9, d. 3, l. 5.

<sup>95</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 1361, ll. 9–10.

<sup>96</sup> See Article 21 of the Soviet Criminal Code of 1926, which remained in force until 1960 (with the exception of 1947 to 1950 when the death penalty was abolished). *The Russian Penal Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic* (London, 1934), 10. Boris Levytsky claimed that in April 1945 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decreed death by hanging as a deterrent to spies, deserters, and saboteurs. Levytsky, however, did not support this claim with any document. Boris Levytsky, *The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police 1917–1970* (New York, 1972), 167. Still, it seems that hanging was practiced not only in summary trials on the battlefield but also in more formal procedures against collaborators. Already in July 1943, eight Soviet citizens convicted of collaboration were hanged in the city square of Krasnodar in front of 30,000 people, and newsreels of the trial and the hangings were shown in local cinemas. *Pravda*, July 19, 1943; Arie J. Kochavi, *Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 64–65. General Andrei Vlasov and his close associates were allegedly executed in this manner in Moscow after being convicted of treason and collaboration with the Germans. Catherine Andreyev, *Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement* (Cambridge, 1987), 79.

<sup>97</sup> Evidence gathered from personal communication with Luc Huyse. At present, there are still no official figures for the two countries.

<sup>98</sup> Marcel Baudot's careful study of summary executions in France came up with a total of 6,029 people executed until the liberation in November 1944. Another 1,259 summary executions were carried out afterward when the jurisdiction of a legal purge went into full effect. Cited in Henry Rousso, "L'épuration en France: Une histoire inachevée," *Vingtième siècle: Revue d'histoire* 33 (March 1992): 82–83. For earlier and slightly higher estimates, see Peter Novick, *The Resistance versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France* (New York, 1968), 60–78, 202–08. In Belgium, according to a German account, some 353 executions of people in German service, police, and fascist organizations were carried out between August 1942 and June 1944. After the war, partisans claimed to have

rather than military reasons. Soviet authorities made extensive use of the Destruction Battalions (*istrebitel'nye bataliony*)—auxiliary detachments of armed civilians charged with hunting down German and nationalist stragglers—while professing their negligible military value in the pre-1939 Soviet territories. The value of these formations, noted the deputy head of the Ukrainian NKVD, was the radicalization and proliferation of violence among the population at large, a key consideration in the Soviet Manichean worldview.<sup>99</sup>

As summary executions of presumed collaborators proliferated in the initial stage of liberation, the returning Soviet powers moved quickly to curtail them. Immediately upon liberation, Red Army officers were said to prosecute, and in some cases execute, partisans who exacted arbitrary revenge after the liberation.<sup>100</sup> Random retributions, which often bordered on anarchy, were not merely a threat to state authority; for the latter, revenge was not necessarily the main motivation. The exercise of retribution only by Soviet authorities integrated it into the overall purification drive, which by now engulfed every layer of the polity. The return of the regime as the sole arbiter and executor of revenge meant that the purge would be conducted along lines that could hardly be imagined in a random, popularly initiated purge. Extra-judicial justice operated as a cathartic moment, after which exhaustion, the desire to forget the imperfect past, and the impulse to reinstate a certain equilibrium would combine to extinguish the flames of arbitrary acts. This, however, was not to happen. The transfer of the prosecution of alleged wartime collaborators and bystanders to the jurisdiction of the NKVD Military Tribunals signaled that purges would become a permanent component in the political and social life of the liberated regions.

The irreversibility of any form of collaboration was further underlined by the absolute denial of political or social rehabilitation, even given the dire need for experienced personnel, a policy that set the Soviet Union further apart from other European countries that had been occupied by the Germans. In France, the willingness of large segments of the population to accept certain acts of collaboration as legitimate, albeit undesirable, acts of survival was taken by the authorities as a mandate for mass amnesty. In the Soviet Union, by contrast, the presence of similar sentiments worked to solidify the regime's resolve to excise collaborators, regardless of circumstances and the need for their services. And unlike France, there was no political or social redemption for people known to have served under the occupation authorities.<sup>101</sup> There, noted Soviet commentators, the replenishment of the state and military apparatus with former Vichyites amounted to a

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executed about 1,100 collaborators. Etienne Verhoeyen, *Belgie bezet, 1940–1945* (Brussels, 1993), 416–22.

<sup>99</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 1, d. 664, ll. 201–03.

<sup>100</sup> HURIP, no. 121, p. 12; no. 64, p. 3; TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 4980, l. 154.

<sup>101</sup> On the impressive comeback of Vichy officials, including the highest governmental offices, and the profound continuities in personnel and administrative patterns in postwar France, see Bertram Gordon, "Afterward: Who Were the Guilty and Should They Be Tried?" in Richard Golsan, ed., *Memory, the Holocaust, and French Justice: The Bousquet and Touvier Affairs* (Hanover, N.H., 1996), 179–98; Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940–1944* (New York, 1972), 330–57; Philip M. Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London, 1958).

conscious blurring of the distinction between victims and victimizers.<sup>102</sup> Nor could the stain of collaboration be removed by postwar performance. Soviet authorities continued to exact revenge on those suspected of collaboration down to the bottom of the social ladder. Professional and bureaucratic skills counted for nothing even in the face of severe shortages. Time and again, successful rural experts and *kolkhozniki* were denied governmental awards based on their spotty wartime records.<sup>103</sup> Tellingly, crimes appeared as a biological trait when the definition of irredeemable sins was extended to include blood relatives of collaborators. Scores of individuals were denied awards merely for being related to people who served as policemen or in the Vlasov army.<sup>104</sup> Sons, after all, could be responsible for their fathers.

Along with the revival of capital punishment for political crimes, the irredeemability of the Ukrainian nationalists was codified on April 6, 1950, by order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This directive replaced shorter deportation terms for those exiled from Ukraine between 1944 and 1949 with permanent exile (*navechno*), most notably the 182,543 members and supporters of the OUN-UPA and their families. By 1950, Ukrainian nationalists appeared beyond hope, and their exclusion from the Ukrainian body national was meant to be permanent. Accordingly, families of both arrested and slain nationalist activists were deported. The death of the latter was not necessarily redemptive.<sup>105</sup>

Purification continued relentlessly. As European legislators were feverishly passing amnesty laws for convicted wartime collaborators, in the Soviet Union the search for and prosecution of alleged collaborators intensified. Between September 20 and October 10, 1947, alone, 326 people were arrested in the eastern regions of Ukraine on charges of collaboration with the German occupation authorities, making them the single largest group of the 668 people charged with “anti-Soviet activity.”<sup>106</sup> The 1955 amnesty decree of wartime collaborators excluded those convicted of murder and torture of Soviet citizens, a rather fatal exception. Whereas by 1958 in France, all those convicted of participating in the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane, the single largest wartime massacre of a non-Jewish population, were released from prison, the Soviet regime continued to prosecute and execute similar cases well into the 1980s. As late as December 1984, military

<sup>102</sup> *New Times* (Moscow) 49 (December 3, 1952): 19–20; *Izvestiia*, December 7, 1952. The contamination of postwar France was rounded out by allegations of forced recruitment of tens of thousands of German prisoners of war into the Foreign Legion, which was a conscious state act. Such an act was in line with the similar alleged release from prisons of hundreds of “SS cutthroats” in the Federal Republic of Germany and their recruitment into the new German army. *Izvestiia*, January 22 and 28, 1949; *Pravda*, December 27, 1952.

<sup>103</sup> One such list from October 13, 1948, included active collaborators but also some who had refused to enroll in Soviet partisan detachments. Derzhavnyi arkhiv Vinnyts’koi oblasti (hereafter, DAVO), f. 2700, op. 7c, d. 136, l. 58.

<sup>104</sup> DAVO, f. 2700, op. 7c, d. 136 l. 52.

<sup>105</sup> O vypolnenii prikaza MVD SSSR no. 00248 ot 15 apreliia 1950 goda “Ob ob”iavlennii vyselentsam ‘ounovtsam’ ob ostavlennii ikh navechno v spetsial’nykh poseleniiaakh.” GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 547, ll. 6–8; d. 896, l. 11; f. 7523, op. 109, d. 195, l. 49. Capital punishment was removed from the Soviet penal code in May 1947. Its restoration for nonpolitical offenses took place only after Stalin’s death. Peter Solomon, *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin* (Cambridge, 1996), 412.

<sup>106</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 4978, ll. 25–54. Here, l. 29.

tribunals sentenced to death individuals guilty of killing Soviet POWs, activists, Jews, and communist partisans.<sup>107</sup>

Nor did the post-Stalin amnesty signal rehabilitation. Individuals associated with nationalist forces in Ukraine were released from the camps in early 1954, but it was only in mid-1991, with the looming demise of the Soviet system, that they were granted complete rehabilitation, on the grounds that “their hands were not stained with blood.”<sup>108</sup> The same logic was applied to the national arena, where the decaying regime mobilized all its resources in a vain effort to block the rehabilitation of OUN-UPA in western Ukraine. Damning information from the KGB archives about UPA atrocities was circulated in press conferences and published in the popular press. Graphic data on massacres of peaceful citizens, ethnic Poles, and Soviet activists, and the close collaboration with the Nazis, were used to underline the essence of the nationalist movement as alien to the national body.<sup>109</sup> In response to pleas by the L’viv regional party committee secretary, the Central Committee in Moscow addressed the issue in a specific decree. The Central Committee went out of its way to prevent the “justification of the crimes of the OUN bands under the guise of criticism of Stalinism.” To counter the rehabilitation efforts by a variety of opposition groups in western Ukraine, it ordered the release of archival documentaries on the nationalist atrocities during and after the war, arranged for young people to meet victims of the nationalists, and organized a scholarly conference on the “anti-people” deeds of the OUN-UPA. With the approach of the fiftieth anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, the treacherous nationalists were to be exposed. As long as the Myth of the War was the pillar of the polity’s legitimacy, the excision of the nationalist cause was non-negotiable.

IT COMES AS NO SURPRISE that the totalization of Soviet practices in the quest for purity brought to the fore the inherent tension between the biological and the sociological categorization of the enemy within, and consequently the inevitable comparison to Nazi Germany, the other totalitarian enterprise. Nowhere else was this issue exposed more clearly than in the Soviet policy toward its Jewish minority. In the wake of the war and the trauma of the Holocaust, conducted extensively on

<sup>107</sup> Sarah Farmer, *Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999), 169. See *Izvestiia*, December 24, 1984, for the trial and execution of three individuals convicted of mass executions of Soviet partisans. A valuable, though incomplete, survey of Soviet war crime trials is in Lukasz Hirsowicz, “The Holocaust in the Soviet Mirror,” in Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey Gurock, eds., *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945* (New York, 1993), 39–46.

<sup>108</sup> Such was the case of Olga Shubert, who was seventeen years old when she joined the UPA in November 1943. Captured by the NKVD shortly afterward, Shubert insisted under interrogation that she had joined after the commander of the unit promised her protection from deportation to forced labor in Germany. Shubert was sentenced to twenty years but was released in February 1954. It was only in April 1991 with the looming demise of the Soviet system that she succeeded in her quest for rehabilitation. Nearly forty years after the event, Shubert was granted complete rehabilitation on the grounds that “her hands were not stained with blood.” The stain of nationalist activity, however, was almost irremovable. AUSBVO, d. 26674, l. 72.

<sup>109</sup> TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 20, d. 25, ll. 1–5; Vasilii Evtushenko, “Banderovshchina,” *Soiuz* 9 (February 1990): 14.





FIGURE 2: "Two Boots Make a Pair." A Soviet depiction of the Ukrainian nationalism movement as an alien body, blood brother of the Nazi executioner. "Dva choboy—para," by O. Koziurenko (Kiev, 1945). Courtesy of the Central Scientific Library, Kiev.

Soviet soil with the implicit and often explicit approval of the local populace, as well as a wave of popular and official anti-Semitism that swept the immediate postwar era, ordinary Jewish citizens and activists began to ponder the unthinkable: was there a logical affinity between the two ideologies? Already in the summer of 1944, a group of disgruntled, demobilized Jewish servicemen protested in a letter to Stalin that the Ukrainian Communist Party had "a lot in common with the course that

originated earlier from the chancery of Goebbels, whose worthy transmitters turned out in the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine."<sup>110</sup> This point was also laid out bluntly by Vasilii Grossman in his epic *Life and Fate*, which he started writing at this time. Grossman chose none other than the triumphant moment and site of Stalingrad to underline the common ethos of the Nazi and Soviet enterprises:

Suddenly, probably because of the war, he began to doubt whether there really was such a gulf between the legitimate Soviet question about social origin and the bloody, fateful question of nationality as posed by the Germans . . . To me, a distinction based on social origin seems legitimate and moral. One thing I am certain of: it's terrible to kill someone simply because he's a Jew. They're people like any others—good, bad, gifted, stupid, stolid, cheerful, kind, sensitive, greedy . . . Hitler says none of that matters—all that matters is that they're Jewish. And I protest with my whole being. But then we have the same principle: what matters is whether or not you're the son of an aristocrat, the son of a merchant, the son of a kulak; and whether you're good-natured, wicked, gifted, kind, stupid, happy, is neither here nor there. And we're not talking about the merchants, priests and aristocrats themselves—but about their children and grandchildren. Does noble blood run in one's veins like Jewishness? Is one a priest or a merchant by heredity?<sup>111</sup>

Indeed, in the wake of the war, Soviet public representations increasingly identified Jews as inherently resistant to Soviet acculturation and, even more threateningly, as an undifferentiated entity. As early as December 1941, during a conversation with a visiting Polish delegation, Stalin found time to reflect on the martial qualities of the warring sides. The Slavs, observed the Soviet leader, are "the finest and bravest of all airmen. They react very quickly, for they are a young race which hasn't yet been worn out . . . The Germans are strong, but the Slavs will defeat them." Jews, on the other hand, were repeatedly referred to as "poor and rotten soldiers."<sup>112</sup>

A core message of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign in the late 1940s was that the Jew remained a Jew, an eternal alien to the body national, no matter what the circumstances. As such, he had to be stripped of the false layers within which he deceptively wrapped himself. In early 1949, the Soviet press violated one of the taboos of Bolshevik revolutionary culture when it started disclosing pseudonyms. The birth names of assimilated Jewish figures in the arts were regularly attached to their assumed ones. And so the literary critic Ilia Isaakovich Stebun learned, along with the readers of the republic's main newspaper, that at the end of the day, after honorable service at the front and a career of writing in the Ukrainian language, he was still Katsenelson. Similarly, the poet Lazar Samilovich Sanov found out that his own work in the Ukrainian language and service as a war correspondent did not

<sup>110</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2366, l. 25.

<sup>111</sup> Vasilii Grossman, *Zhizn' i sud'ba* (Moscow, 1988), 542–43. In his letter to Khrushchev on February 23, 1962, requesting the publication of his novel, Grossman noted that he had started writing it already during Stalin's life. *Istochnik* 3 (1997): 133.

<sup>112</sup> Stanislaw Kot, *Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia* (Oxford, 1963), 153. Stalin's comments were actually triggered by the derogatory remarks of General Anders, who referred to the Jews as draft dodgers, deserters, and speculators "who will never make good soldiers." Kot, 153. In his memoirs, Anders confirmed Kot's account of Stalin's anti-Semitic comments, although he went out of his way to dispel the allegations of his own anti-Semitism by elaborating on the long history of anti-Semitism of the Bolsheviks in general and of Stalin in particular. Władysław Anders, *Bez ostatniego rozdziału: Wspomnienia z lat 1939–1946* (Newtown, Wales, 1950), 118, 124–25.

change the fact that he was still Smulson, just as Zhadanov was still Livshits and Gan remained Kagan.<sup>113</sup>

When the anti-Semitic campaign was reaching its climax in early 1953, the alleged Jewish resistance to Soviet acculturation called for uncompromising methods by the authorities. While exposing an accused Jewish embezzler in the small town of Zhmerynka who, needless to say, had managed to avoid the front during the Great Patriotic War (“he fell ill precisely at the end of June 1941”), the satirical magazine *Krokodil* posed a rhetorical question: “To tell you the truth, we became tired of reading your decisions scattered there: ‘to reprimand, to point out, to suggest,’ etc. *Doesn’t it seem to you, comrades, that you overestimate the educational significance of these resolutions of yours? And, anyway, who are you trying to reeducate? With such touching forbearance, too?*”<sup>114</sup> The Jew, simply put, proved to be the anomaly in the Marxist premise of the primacy of nurture over nature. He was immune to reeducation. In early 1953, with the recent executions of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee leadership, the unfolding Doctors’ Plot, and rumors about the inevitable mass deportation of Jews dominating the day, the recommendation to transfer the case to the regional prosecutor (an office famed for meting out swift and harsh punishments) sent the unequivocal message that there was only one way to deal with such types.<sup>115</sup> As the living antithesis to the core Soviet myths of hard and honest socialist labor and the martyrdom of the recent war, the Jew was beyond redemption. His nature was immune even to the powerful acculturation of nearly four decades of Soviet life.<sup>116</sup>

Uncovering the *real* Jew, however, was not confined to the Stalin era. Several years later, it was the turn of the de-Stalinizing Khrushchev to warn other communists against false hopes of acculturating the Jew. While attending a session of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, Khrushchev urged the Poles to correct the “abnormal composition of the leading cadres” as the Soviets successfully had done. Staring hard at the chairman of the meeting, Roman Zambrowski, who was born Zukerman, Khrushchev exclaimed: “Yes, you have many leaders with names ending in ‘ski,’ but an Abramovich remains an Abramo-

<sup>113</sup> “Do kantsa razgromit kosmopolitov-antipatriotov!” *Pravda Ukrainy*, March 6, 1949; “Bezridni kosmopolity—nailiutishi vorohy radians’koi kul’tury,” *Naddnistrrians’ka zirka*, March 27, 1949.

<sup>114</sup> Vasilii Ardamatskii, “Pinia iz Zhmerinki,” *Krokodil* 8 (March 20, 1953): 13.

<sup>115</sup> In his memoirs, Aleksandr Nekrich claimed that he knew “for certain” of a brochure written by Dmitrii Chesnokov explaining the need for deporting the Jews. The brochure was ready for distribution when Stalin died. Nekrich, *Otreshis ot strakha: Vospominaniia istorika* (London, 1979), 114. Nekrich’s allegation was recently corroborated by Iakov Etinger, a former professor at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. According to Etinger, the book by Chesnokov argued that the Jews proved to be “unreceptive” to socialism. Iakov Etinger, “The Doctors’ Plot: Stalin’s Solution to the Jewish Question,” in Yaacov Ro’i, ed., *Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union* (Essex, 1995), 118. Throughout the Soviet Union, the secret police recorded private conversations of both Jewish and non-Jewish citizens in which the deportation of the Jews was accepted as a fait accompli. See the documents assembled by Mordechai Altschuler, “More about Public Reaction to the Doctors’ Plot,” *Jews in Eastern Europe* (Fall 1996): 34, 45, 52, 55, 56–57.

<sup>116</sup> The impact of the events of February 1953 on popular perceptions was evident in the reactions to the announcement of Stalin’s ailment in early March. A Muscovite locksmith was recorded by the Ministry of State Security declaring that “if Comrade Stalin does not get better, then we must go to Israel and destroy the Jews.” Cited in “Pervaia protalina—pokhorony Stalina,” *Komsomol’skaia Pravda*, March 5, 1993. As a cosmopolitan entity, the Jew had to be excised not merely from the Soviet body politic but from the universal body politic as well.

vich. And you have too many Abramoviches in your leading cadres.”<sup>117</sup> Sometime later, while reflecting on the evident failure of the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan to establish itself as a national homeland for Soviet Jewry, Khrushchev concluded that it was the result of historical conditions. Yet his description of the sociological was practically biological. “They [the Jews] do not like collective work, group discipline. They have always preferred to be dispersed. They are individualists,” Khrushchev told *Le figaro* in an interview in March 1958. Finally, in the crudest officially ordained anti-Semitic publication to emerge from the Soviet system, Trohym Kychko’s *Iudaizm bez prikhas*, Nazi-like vocabulary and illustrations drove home the message of alienation of everything distinctively Jewish from the tradition of progressive humanity in general, the Soviet family in particular, and even more specifically, from the Ukrainian nation. Portrayed as speculators and hostile to manual labor, collaborators with the Nazis, and murderers of Symon Petliura, Jews were entirely excluded from the October Revolution, the Great Patriotic War, and Ukrainian aspirations for independence—all subjects of core myths within the Soviet milieu.<sup>118</sup>

But this complete exclusion concealed a crucial difference between the Nazi and Soviet enterprises. The class-based Soviet theory and practices of structuring society seemed to present an ominous obstacle to the application of uniform social targeting. Classes, strata, and layers were neither faceless nor homogeneous. Rather, they were variegated and arranged in a hierarchical order based on the services their members had rendered to the communist drive. Responsibility and accountability were assessed on the individual’s merit, even though this principle was often compromised in the course of exercising the structuring acts. Maxim Gorky was not off the mark when he stated in his celebratory volume of the construction of the White Sea Canal that “the dictatorship of the proletariat has once more earned the right to declare: ‘I do not fight to kill as does the bourgeoisie: I fight to resurrect toiling humanity to a new life. I kill only when it is not possible to eradicate the ancient habit of feeding on human flesh and blood.’”<sup>119</sup> Moreover, individuals maintained the right to appeal and often did so successfully.<sup>120</sup> No one could articulate this principle better than Stalin, and for good reason. In a series of speeches delivered as the Terror approached its climax, Stalin explained its guidelines. Concluding his remarks to the plenary session of the Central Committee on March 5, 1937, Stalin warned the delegates not to confuse sworn and irredeemable enemies with those who recanted and redeemed themselves when they joined forces with the Bolsheviks in the anti-Trotskyite campaign or those “who, at one point happened to be walking along the street where this or that Trotskyite happened to be walking, too.” “In this question, as in all other questions, *an individual, differentiated approach* is required. We must not treat all alike,”

<sup>117</sup> Joseph B. Schechtman, *Star in Eclipse* (New York, 1961), 81. According to Benjamin Pinkus, this statement was authenticated by Jewish immigrants to Israel who held important posts in the Polish party and government. Pinkus, *The Soviet Government and the Jews* (Cambridge, 1984), 487, n. 38.

<sup>118</sup> Trohym Kychko, *Iudaizm bez prikhas* (Kiev, 1963), 160–61, 164–66.

<sup>119</sup> *Belomor*, 338.

<sup>120</sup> Thus the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Republic commuted five of the eight death sentences passed by the Military Tribunal of the NKVD in Vinnytsia during the third quarter of 1945. PAVO, f. 136, op. 13, d. 48, ll. 52–54.

concluded Stalin.<sup>121</sup> Three months later in a speech before the Military Council of the Defense Ministry on June 2, 1937, in the wake of the liquidation of the military leadership, Stalin reflected on the tension arising from the Soviet search for the enemy within. Reminding his audience of Lenin's noble and Friedrich Engels's bourgeois origins on the one hand, and of the proletarian origins of Leonid Serebriakov and Iakov Livshits (former Central Committee Secretary and Deputy People's Commissar of Communications, respectively) who turned out to be bad apples on the other, Stalin concluded:

Not every person of a given class is capable of doing harm. Individual people among the nobles and the bourgeoisie worked for the working class and not badly. Out of a stratum such as the lawyers came many revolutionaries. Marx was the son of a lawyer, not a son of a *batrak* [agricultural laborer] or of a worker. Among these strata can always be found people who can serve the cause of the working class, no worse, [but] rather better, than pure-blooded proletarians. That is why the general standard, that this is not a *batrak's* son, is an outdated one, not applicable to individual people. *This is not a Marxist approach . . . This, I would say, is a biological approach, not a Marxist. We consider Marxism not a biological science, but a sociological science. Hence this general standard is absolutely correct with regard to estates, groups, strata, [but] it is not applicable to every individual who is not of proletarian or peasant origins.*<sup>122</sup>

Indeed, the Soviets persistently rejected the primacy of the biological over the sociological. The principle of human heredity and its potential practices, whether exterminatory euthanasia or constructive eugenics, were officially repudiated in the Soviet Union from the early 1930s on. What is more, the Soviet Union was practically alone among the major countries in the 1930s in its rejection of euthanasia or sterilization of the mentally retarded, a practice that was embraced, often enthusiastically, on both sides of the Atlantic. In such an atmosphere, Nobel Prize-winning doctor Alexis Carrel could call on modern societies to do away with the mentally retarded and criminals who cost a fortune to maintain in asylums and prisons. "Why do we preserve these useless and harmful beings? Why should society not dispose of the criminals and the insane in a more economical manner?" asked Carrel. The worst criminals (including the insane and people who misled the public in important matters), he concluded, "should be humanely and economically disposed of in small euthanasic institutions supplied with proper gases . . . Modern society should not hesitate to organize itself with reference to the normal individual. Philosophical systems and sentimental prejudices must give way before

<sup>121</sup> "Zakliuchitel'noe slovo tovarishcha Stalina na plenum TsK VKP (b) 5 marta 1937 g.," *Bol'shevik* 7 (1937): 19.

<sup>122</sup> "Rech' I. V. Stalina v Narkomate oborony, 2 iyunia 1937 g.," *Istochnik* 3 (1994): 73–74, italics added. For an intriguing analysis of the primacy of the individual in Soviet state violence, see Holquist, "State Violence as Technique." In this light, and without underestimating Stalin's anti-Semitism, Lenin could be recognized as a scion of the aristocracy but not as the grandson of the Jew Moishe Itskovich Blank. When Lenin's eldest sister, Anna Elizarova, reminded Stalin in 1932–1933 of the Jewishness of their grandfather, her reasoning for publicizing this fact ran against the grain of the Marxist ethos. Lenin's Jewish origins "are further confirmation of the exceptional abilities of the Semitic tribe," she wrote Stalin in 1932. In another letter, a year later, Anna wrote Stalin that "in the Lenin Institute, as well as the Institute of the Brain . . . they have long recognized the gifts of this nation and the extremely beneficial effects of its blood on mixed marriages." Stalin's refusal to publish a word about the matter became the rule for years to come. Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Lenin* (New York, 1994), 8–9.



such a necessity.”<sup>123</sup> In Nazi Germany, as several scholars have recently reminded us, euthanasia was a key element in ideology and practice, and the forerunner of the persecution of the Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals, in sharp contrast to the Soviet purification drive, which at no point was anchored in genocidal ideology.<sup>124</sup> Without it, the operation of industrialized killing—the aspect that set the Holocaust apart from other genocides—was inconceivable.<sup>125</sup>

The same logic applied to eugenics, the constructive twin of euthanasia. In his 1935 *Out of the Night: A Biologist's View of the Future*, Hermann Muller, the chief advocate of eugenics in the Soviet Union, argued that with artificial insemination technology, “in the course of a paltry century or two . . . it would be possible for the majority of the population to become of the innate quality of such men as Lenin, Newton, Leonardo, Pasteur, Beethoven, Omar Khayyam, Pushkin, Sun Yat Sen, Marx . . . or even to possess their varied faculties combined . . . which would offset the American prospects of a maximum number of Billy Sundays, Valentinos, Jack Dempseys, Babe Ruths, even Al Capones.”<sup>126</sup> But when Muller forwarded a copy of his book to Stalin in May 1936 and assured him that “it is quite possible, by means of the technique of artificial insemination which has been developed in this country, to use for such purposes the reproductive material of the most transcendently superior individuals, of the one in 50,000, or one in 100,000, since this technique makes possible a multiplication of more than 50,000 times,” he practically sealed his fate and the fate of eugenics in the Soviet Union for the next three decades. Stalin read the book, and although he did not respond in writing or verbally until June 1937, his actions spoke for themselves. Muller escaped the Soviet Union by the skin of his teeth, but his cohort was shot to a man. The Institute of Medical Genetics was disbanded, and the era of Lysenkoism and its doctrine of acquired characteristics was ushered in. In the long process of constructing a socialist society, acculturation prevailed over biology as the means of both the expansion and purification of the polity.

And indeed, there was not, nor could there be, a highly placed Jew such as Lazar Kaganovich in the Nazi leadership; nearly half a million Jews could neither serve in the Wehrmacht nor become members of the National Socialist Party. It did not

<sup>123</sup> Alexis Carell, *Man, the Unknown* (London, 1935), 318–19. On the wide approval of sterilization of the mentally ill in interwar Europe and the United States, see H. Friedlander, *Origins of Nazi Genocide*, 7–9, 18.

<sup>124</sup> Michael Burleigh, *Death and Deliverance*; H. Friedlander, *Origins of Nazi Genocide*. There was, however, a single incident that accentuated the rule. In early 1938, about 170 invalid prisoners in the Moscow oblast, who had already been tried and convicted for petty crimes such as theft and vagrancy, were tried again for the same charges, only this time they were sentenced to death. The operation was run by the special troika of the NKVD of the Moscow Region (the body that reviewed cases and passed sentences during the Terror). The motive behind the execution appeared to be making room for the arrival of deported Germans, Poles, Latvians and other ethnic groups. The chairman of the troika, Mikhail Ilich Semenov, was himself tried and executed in the summer of 1939. *Soprotivlenie v Gulage: Vospominaniia, Pis'ma, Dokumenty* (Moscow, 1992), 114–27.

<sup>125</sup> Ironically, Grossman, who insisted on the commonality of the Soviet and Nazi polities, was also the first observer to recognize that the “conveyor belt execution” was the distinguishing feature of the Nazi exterminatory practices. See his description of Treblinka in *Hasefer Hashahor*, 495–515, esp. 507. For a recent penetrating analysis of the Holocaust as militarized-industrial killing rooted in the ethos of the Great War, see Bartov, *Murder in Our Midst*.

<sup>126</sup> Mark B. Adams, “Eugenics in Russia, 1900–1940,” in Adams, ed., *The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia* (New York, 1990), 194–95.

matter if they had excelled in the ranks of the German army in the Great War. There was one Jew, and he could not be Nazified. The Jew was an enemy not because of a role he played or a position he represented. He was evil incarnate, irredeemable, and unreconstructed, and as such, had to be exterminated. The basis on which the extermination of the Jewish “lice” took place was neither that of religion nor law but the racial biopolitics of genetic heredity.<sup>127</sup> That was not the case in the Soviet Union. True, enacting the motto “sons are not responsible for their fathers” proved difficult. Just two years after Stalin’s famous dictum, NKVD and party investigators were busily plunging into the records of members of the Communist Party, resurrecting from oblivion the original sin of the wrong social origin to destroy scores of true believers and their families. In the wake of the Terror, it appeared as if the stain of bad social origin was unremovable and incurable. It took the war to realize and institutionalize Stalin’s dictum in Soviet political life. Nevertheless, even at the height of the officially endorsed anti-Semitic campaign, there were hundreds of thousands of Jews in the ranks of the party, the army, and scores of other political institutions. Restrictions on the number of Jews in state institutions (*numerus clausus*) could and did coexist side by side with Jewish high officers, Heroes of the Soviet Union, and party activists.<sup>128</sup> The Nazi antithesis was still a powerful deterrent, especially regarding the Jews. The United Nations draft resolution of the Genocide Convention on November 21, 1947, provided the Soviets with the opportunity to elaborate their own definition of excisionary and exterminatory ideologies and practices. In his comments on the treaty, Aron Trainin, then the leading Soviet authority in international law, agreed with the prevailing notion of genocide as extermination of national or racial collectives. His points of disagreement, however, were telling. First, argued Trainin, however extreme the persecution of political opponents based on political motives may be, it does not constitute genocide.<sup>129</sup> Second, the definition of genocide should not be confined to physical extermination but applied to the curtailment of collective national-cultural rights as well. “Of course, in the land of the Soviets, where the Leninist-Stalinist national politics triumphs and the cooperation of nations is a political reality, there is no problem of national rights and national minorities,” wrote Trainin. It was, however, the case in the capitalist world, where class

<sup>127</sup> Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 114, 146–47. In this sense, Saul Friedländer’s recent introduction of “redemptive anti-Semitism” as the guiding logic of Nazi attitudes toward the Jews requires some modification. Redemption implies a linear concept of historical time and a certain finality, both alien to the Nazis’ nihilistic, violent, and cyclical view of history, one filled with nightmares of a possible defeat at the hands of the Jews. Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, 73–112. For a lucid analysis of the place of the Jew within the Nazi racial hierarchy in theory and practice, see John Connelly, “Nazis and Slavs: From Racial Theory to Racist Practice,” *Central European History* 32, no. 1 (1999): 1–33.

<sup>128</sup> A rare admission by a Soviet official of a de facto *numerus clausus* for Jews was offered by Ekaterina Furtseva, secretary of the Central Committee, during an interview with *National Guardian*, June 25, 1956. “The Government had found in some of its departments a heavy concentration of Jewish people, upwards of 50% of the staff,” said Furtseva. “Steps were taken to transfer them to other enterprises, giving them equally good positions and without jeopardizing their rights.” These steps were misinterpreted as anti-Semitic, Furtseva reassured the interviewer. Pinkus, *Soviet Government and the Jews*, 58–59.

<sup>129</sup> Eventually, the Soviets and their allies succeeded in omitting the category of political groups from the draft, in a deviation from an earlier resolution of the General Assembly. Nehemiah Robinson, *The Genocide Convention: Its Origins and Interpretation* (New York, 1949), 15.

exploitation could be identified with national oppression. Not only lynch trials but also a dense net of national-cultural barriers separate Negroes in the United States from the white population, Trainin continued.

Accordingly, international law should struggle against both lynch trials, as tools of physical extermination of Negroes, and the politics of national cultural oppression. Therefore, along with physical and biological genocide, the notion of national-cultural genocide must be advanced, a genocide that sets for itself the goal of undermining the existence and development of national and racial groups.<sup>130</sup>

In essence, these were the twin pillars of Soviet population policies: the application of state violence anchored in political rationale and the simultaneous cultivation of ethno-national particularism. Without them, one could hardly understand the simultaneous eradication of entire national elites and intelligentsias along with the persistent delineation of particularistic identities.<sup>131</sup> In this light, total excision in the Soviet polity was not necessarily exterminatory, nor did it operate by a racial-biological code. And this, in turn, shifts the focus of our discussion to another political arena within which the Soviet socio-ethnic body was delineated, that of commemorative politics of cataclysmic events.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM POINTS TO the establishment of the state of Israel and the unfolding Cold War as the primary causes for the deterioration in the status of the Jewish community within the Soviet polity. Indeed, the creation of the Israeli state transformed Soviet Jewry overnight into a diaspora nation with a highly active external homeland. In the 1930s, a similar situation cost Polish and German minorities in the Soviet Union dearly. Often glossed over, however, is the centrality of the living memory of the war and the Jewish genocide in shaping the course of Soviet-Jewish relations and providing them with a constant point of reference in the years following the war. Soviet officials were aware of this juncture. Years after the war, when the leading Israeli poet Avraham Shlonski visited the Soviet Union, he was told by Aleksei Surkov, the secretary of the Union of Writers, "There were times when we thought that the process of Jewish assimilation was being intensified by dint of the historical logic of Soviet conditions, and that the Jewish problem was being solved by itself. Then came the war with its horrors, then the aftermath. All of a sudden Jews began to seek one another out and to cling to one another."<sup>132</sup> If Surkov is to be forgiven for some self-righteousness, he was not off the mark. Ironically, none other than Vasilii Grossman pointed to memory as a key arena in

<sup>130</sup> Aron Naumovich Trainin, "Bor'ba s genotsidom kak mezhdunarodnym prestupleniem," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* 5 (May 1948): 4, 6. The official amendment offered by the Soviet delegation called for the extension of the definition of genocide to "national-cultural genocide," which included: "a) ban on or limitation of the use of national language in public and private life; ban on instruction in the national language in schools; b) the liquidation or ban on printing and distribution of books and other publications in national languages; c) the liquidation of historical or religious monuments, museums, libraries and other monuments and objects of national culture (or religious) cult." Trainin, 14.

<sup>131</sup> For a stimulating discussion of this duality in Soviet nationality policy, see Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53 (Summer 1994): 414–52.

<sup>132</sup> Yehoshua A. Gilboa, *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939–1953* (Boston, 1971), 88.

shaping the postwar quest for purity. As the driving force behind the failed projects of the *Black Book* and the *Red Book*, the works celebrating Jewish martyrdom and heroism, respectively, which were never published in the Soviet Union, Grossman offered keen insight into a new mechanism for engineering the Soviet body social. The postwar construction of ethnic hierarchies of heroism and the simultaneous leveling of suffering underlined the power of commemoration in the shaping of an ideal-type community. This mechanism was fateful in particular for the Jews.

The Jewish contribution at the front was exceptional, even though no other people experienced as much sorrow and misfortune as did the Jewish people, a group of Jewish veterans wrote Stalin and Lavrentii Beria in the fall of 1945. Nevertheless, protested the veterans, not a word had been printed in the Soviet media about the community.<sup>133</sup> Indeed, Soviet authorities fiercely resisted all attempts to carve a particularistic Jewish space within the all-encompassing myth of the war. "All of us hate the Germans! But I hate them doubly. Once because I am a Soviet man. Once because I am a Jew! I was filled with hate because I saw what the Germans had done to our people . . . I yearned to get to Germany. I got to Germany. I did my duty as a son of our motherland. I fought for all Soviet people. I fought for all Jewish people," exclaimed David Dragunskii, the two-time Hero of the Soviet Union in a speech before the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the summer of 1945.<sup>134</sup> "There is no need to mention the heroism of Jewish soldiers in the Red Army; this is bragging," Il'ia Ehrenburg was told by a Soviet official when he tried to push forward the delayed *Red Book*.<sup>135</sup>

In the same vein, the authorities viewed the annual gatherings of Jews commemorating the extermination of their brethren as a pretext for stirring up separatist nationalist sentiments. When a survivor fixed the Star of David on an obelisk erected atop a mass grave, the authorities threatened to bulldoze it unless it was replaced by the five-cornered Soviet star.<sup>136</sup> And when Grossman echoed the Nazi stand that "the fascists placed the Jew in opposition to all peoples inhabiting the world," Georgii Aleksandrov shot back in a letter to Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov that the

preface written by Grossman alleges that the destruction of the Jews was a particularistic, provocative policy and that the Germans established some kind of hierarchy in their destruction of the peoples of the Soviet Union. In fact, the idea of some imaginary hierarchy is in itself incorrect. The documents of the Extraordinary State Committee convincingly demonstrate that the Hitlerites destroyed at one and the same time Russians, Jews, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians and other peoples of the Soviet Union.<sup>137</sup>

"There are no Jews in Ukraine," lamented a horrified Grossman when he first encountered his liberated birthplace in 1943. "Nowhere—Poltava, Kharkov, Kremenchug, Borispol, Yagotin—in none of the cities, hundreds of towns, or thousands of villages will you see the black, tear-filled eyes of little girls; you will not hear the

<sup>133</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2366, l. 26.

<sup>134</sup> Raymond Arthur Davies, *Odyssey through Hell* (New York, 1946), 206–07.

<sup>135</sup> Il'ia Ehrenburg, *Sobranie sochineniia*, Vol. 9, *Liudi, Gody, Zhizn'* (Moscow, 1967), 377.

<sup>136</sup> PAVO, f. 136, op. 13, d. 105, ll. 16–17; Yad Vashem Archive, Jerusalem, no. 03–6401, pp. 15–16.

<sup>137</sup> Vasilii Grossman and Il'ia Ehrenburg, eds., *Hasefer Hashahor* (Tel Aviv, 1991) (Hebrew translation of the Russian text: *Chernaia kniga/The Black Book*), 17; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, r. 1442, d. 438, l. 216.

sad voices of an old woman: you will not see the dark face of a hungry baby. All is silence. Everything is still. A whole people have been brutally murdered.”<sup>138</sup> True, soon after this lament, the Ukrainian terrain was filled again with returning Jews, albeit in significantly lower numbers and concentrated in fewer places. But already in 1943, Grossman’s words rang true with regard to the future as well as to the recent past, and in a way he could not envision at the time. The invisibility of Jews in the Soviet Union in general, and in Ukraine in particular, was not bound to be a physical trait. The surviving Jews indeed returned but rather as a mythical antithesis and into political invisibility.

At first glance, this seemed to be nothing unusual in a polity whose official nationality policy envisioned at its final stage the merging (*sliianie*) of its various ethnic and national components into a single entity. The Jews, in this light, were leading the Soviet camp in terms of historical development. But there was an ironic twist in this instance. Whereas the means by which ethnic groups would merge passed through intense cultivation of ethnic particularism, the Jews, in the wake of the war, were to skip this stage. And since the date of the final merging remained as elusive as ever, the erasure of Jewish collective identity from the new legitimizing myth of the polity bore grave consequences. In October 1946, the Jewish community in the Soviet Ukrainian Republic joined the German and Polish minorities in political invisibility when Jewish national rural soviets were converted into Ukrainian soviets, side by side with growing official pressure for increased migration from Ukraine to Birobidzhan.<sup>139</sup>

Deeply rooted popular anti-Semitism coincided with similar sentiments among local and national leadership, but, more crucially, these attitudes were articulated within the powerful Soviet ethos of a simultaneous search for harmony and purity. And so thousands of decorated Jewish servicemen found themselves identified as Soviet individuals but not as the “loyal sons of the Jewish people,” as was the practice of all other Soviet nationalities. Jews, the fifth largest group of recipients of the title Hero of the Soviet Union, were erased as a distinct category from the official list of heroic nationalities.<sup>140</sup> A barrage of popular novels portrayed Jewish characters as draft dodgers who lived the war years in the safety of the rear—and on the blood of their Soviet compatriots. In one of these novels, Vsevolod Kochetov’s *Zhurbiny*, the beating of such a Jew was portrayed as nothing less than a cathartic moment of purification that transformed the inner being of one worthless womanizer into a proud Soviet citizen. The party organizer who looked into the matter concluded that of course such random violence was not commend-

<sup>138</sup> Vasilii Grossman, “Ukraina bez evreev,” in Shimon Markish, *Vasilii Grossman: Na evreiskie temy* (Jerusalem, 1985), 2: 333–40. Here, 334–35. This is a translation back to Russian of the Yiddish version that appeared in *Eynikayt*, November 25 and December 2, 1943. The original version in the Russian language was apparently rejected by *Krasnaia zvezda*.

<sup>139</sup> PAVO, f. 136, op. 13, d. 208, ll. 6–7, 10. On the migration to Birobidzhan, see GARF, f. 8114, op. 1, d. 8, l. 59; and Pinkus, *Soviet Government and the Jews*, 378.

<sup>140</sup> This trend had already been traced with General Iakov Kreizer, the first officer decorated as Hero of the Soviet Union on July 22, 1941. *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 23, 1941. Yet Kreizer’s Jewishness was mentioned only within the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, of which he was a member, and when Khrushchev paraded him as one of his best friends, staving off charges of Soviet anti-Semitism. François Fejto, *Judentum und Kommunismus: Anti-Semitismus in Osteuropa* (Vienna, 1967), 112. For the disappearance of Jews as a distinct ethnic group among the recipients of military awards, see S. M. Golikov, *Vydaushchie pobedy Sovetskoi armii v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine* (Moscow, 1952), 187.



able, but “as a man, [he] understands [that] such people deserve a slap in the face.”<sup>141</sup> In a polity that identified military service with local, national, and supranational Soviet identities, and sacrifice on the battlefield as a sign of true patriotism, exclusion from the myth of the war amounted to exclusion from the Soviet family. A similar outcome, if only through a different practice, emerged from the commemoration of wartime suffering. The mass murder of the Jews was never denied in Soviet representations of the war, but in the official accounts and artistic representations, memory of the Jewish catastrophe was submerged within the universal Soviet tragedy, erasing the very distinction at the core of the Nazi pursuit of racial purity.<sup>142</sup>

Such a policy certainly coincided with similar developments across the European continent. In the restored societies emerging from the Nazi occupation, memories of defeat and victimization were set aside in favor of intensive, state-sponsored cults of heroism and resistance. In the ravaged and humiliated societies burdened with the task of national revival, the mobilizing power of the myth of active heroism was undeniably greater than that of victimization anchored in the shame and guilt-ridden memory of defeat. Above all, memories of victimization bore the troublesome particularism associated with the Jewish minority. Jewish particularistic suffering was integrated into an all-national paradigm of victimization and in some cases transformed into one of triumphant heroism.<sup>143</sup> The universality of the activist-triumphant myth was underscored by its predominance in the new Israeli state, where Zionism helped to reconstruct a series of cataclysmic defeats in Jewish history as redemptive triumphs, starting with the rebellions against the Romans in the first two centuries AD and culminating with the Holocaust. In Israel, the official commemoration of the Holocaust had been incorporated into the epic struggle for an independent Jewish state. Jewish partisans took center stage in the Zionist representation of the catastrophe and assumed the role of forerunners of the Israeli army. Victims were often integrated into the family of fallen Israeli soldiers. The official day of remembrance was named “The Day of Holocaust and Heroism”; the national shrine was called “Yad Vashem Heroes’ and Martyrs’ Memorial.” The passive, fatalistic, and defenseless Diaspora Jew was converted into the fighting Israeli.<sup>144</sup>

Such a dilemma and solution were all too familiar to the Soviet scene, and for similarly compelling reasons. For one, the wave of pogroms that swept Ukrainian cities in 1944–1945 marked a new development: for the first time in the Soviet era, violent anti-Semitism exploded as an open, urban phenomenon. In such a volatile environment and with the war still raging, identification with the traditionally

<sup>141</sup> Vsevolod Kochetov, *Zhurbiny* (Leningrad, 1952), 329, 335.

<sup>142</sup> A good starting point is Zvi Gitelman, “Soviet Reactions to the Holocaust, 1945–1991,” in Lucjan Dobroszycki, et al., *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945* (New York, 1993), 3–27.

<sup>143</sup> See Pieter Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide and National Memory: Belgium, France and the Netherlands 1945–1965,” *Past and Present* 154 (February 1997): 191–222.

<sup>144</sup> Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust,” *AHR* 103 (June 1998): 771–816; Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York, 1993); James Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven, Conn., 1993), part 3; Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago, 1995).

resented minority was the last thing desired by the returning Soviet authorities.<sup>145</sup> Yet the wholesale deportations of alleged collaborationist minorities conveyed the message that the Soviet polity would not shy away from opening the Pandora's box of collaboration conceived in ethnic terms. This willingness directly to confront the ethnic face of wartime collaboration (in sharp contrast to other multi-ethnic polities), and the enduring denial of the particularistic Jewish fate under the Nazis long after the rest of Europe opted for such recognition, pointed to another motive, one that lay at the core of the revolutionary myth.<sup>146</sup>

The twentieth anniversary of the Great Patriotic War marked the transition from a living to a historical memory of this cataclysmic event and a determined attempt to develop a commemorative canon and a sense of closure. The last vestiges of the socially alien element—the few remaining kulaks—were released and rehabilitated. Ethnic Germans deported en masse during the war received an official apology from the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union,<sup>147</sup> and, most notably, all limitations on former leaders and members of nationalist underground movements, the last category to win rehabilitation (and among whom Ukrainian nationalists were the largest component), were removed.<sup>148</sup> The reinstatement of the largest, best organized, and most persistent of the anti-Soviet separatist movements into the legitimate Ukrainian body national only fifteen years after it was singled out for eternal exclusion was indeed the most visible marker of reconciliation. The permission to return to their native places of residence was a display of confidence in both the efficacy of the punitive system and in its redemptive power.

But no olive branch was extended to the Jewish community. On the contrary, Jews were branded as traitors to the war effort. The community was handed a mass-circulation historical novel, *Tuchi nad gorodom*, by Porfirii Gavrutto, which developed an earlier charge by Khrushchev about an alleged treason and collaboration of a certain Jew-Judas, “who betrayed the Kiev underground to the Germans, served as a translator for Field Marshal Paulus, cleaned his boots, helped interrogate Soviet prisoners of war and even shot at his own compatriots.” The readers were informed in the accompanying editorial note that the novel was actually a documentary.<sup>149</sup> The Jew was not merely out of the Soviet family. He was its living antithesis.

It was at this time that Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Allilueva, noted that already “with the expulsion of Trotsky and the extermination during the years of ‘purges’ of old Party members, many of whom were Jews, anti-Semitism was reborn on new

<sup>145</sup> For a comprehensive documentation of the postwar pogroms in Ukraine and the reactions of Soviet authorities and Jewish citizens, see TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, dd. 1363, 2366. It was about this time that Khrushchev was alleged to have burst out, “here is the Ukraine and it is not in our interest that the Ukrainians should associate the return of Soviet power with the return of the Jews.” Leon Leneman, *La tragedie des Juifs en U.R.S.S.* (Paris, 1959), 179.

<sup>146</sup> For the shift in the West European discourse on the Holocaust in the mid-1960s, see Lagrou, “Victims of Genocide and National Memory,” 215–20.

<sup>147</sup> For the decree of August 28, 1964, by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, see *Tak eto bylo*, 1: 246–47.

<sup>148</sup> The rehabilitation was enacted in two resolutions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, December 6, 1963, and April 29, 1964. GARF, f. 7523, op. 109, d. 195, ll. 38–39.

<sup>149</sup> Porfirii Gavrutto, *Tuchi nad gorodom* (Moscow, 1968), 165–66. For an extensive documentation of the affair, including Khrushchev's speech and the rebuttal by Moisei Kogan, the falsely accused Jew, see Pinkus, *Soviet Government and the Jews*, 76, 127–33, 493, nn. 113–14.

ground and first of all within the Party itself.”<sup>150</sup> Perhaps Allilueva got it right. The Bolshevik epic had to be purged of its association with the resented minority. By the eve of the war, popular identification of the revolution with the Jews had already found its echo inside the party ranks. In the early 1930s, violent peasant protests against forced collectivization in Ukraine were often directed against the “Jewish militia” and “communist kikes,”<sup>151</sup> and in the midst of the war, a rabid anti-Stalinist village poet could write:

O you, Stalin the flayer,  
What have you done to us now?  
You expelled Ukrainians from their huts,  
And Jews became the rulers,  
We spend the nights under fences,  
We have no father, we have no mothers,  
Because you, Stalin—a cruel beast,  
Drove them as far as to Siberia,  
And to the Jews you gave medals,  
so that they could torture us.<sup>152</sup>

When the party surveyed its rank and file throughout the pre-war years, it encountered the prevalent perception of Jews as the main beneficiaries of the October Revolution: holders of the best positions and jobs, owners of the apartments, and accomplished draft dodgers.<sup>153</sup> If the myth of the October Revolution was perceived as Judaized beyond repair, then the new myth of the Great Patriotic War would not suffer the same fate.

REFLECTING ON THE HORRIFIC SLAUGHTER consuming Europe at the time, Sigmund Freud observed in April 1915 that war was merely an instrument that stripped away illusions and layers of civility, “laying bare the primal man in each of us.” The key, then, to the total barbarization of warfare lay not with the states but with the community and its individual components, which “no longer raise objections . . . to the suppression of evil passions, and men perpetrate deeds of cruelty, fraud, treachery and barbarity so incompatible with their level of civilization that one would have thought them impossible.”<sup>154</sup> One could hardly deny the brutalization of public life triggered by the cataclysmic experience of the Great War, or any other

<sup>150</sup> Svetlana Allilueva, *Only One Year* (New York, 1969), 153. Ironically, this was also the view in Berlin in early 1937. “Again a show trial in Moscow,” Goebbels noted in his diary on January 25, 1937. “This time again exclusively against Jews. Radek, etc. The Führer still in doubt whether there isn’t after all a hidden anti-Semitic tendency. Maybe Stalin does want to smoke the Jews out. The military is also supposedly strongly anti-Semitic.” Cited in Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, 185–86.

<sup>151</sup> PAVO, f. 136, op. 3, d. 8, ll. 113–14; d. 131, ll. 1–2; Valerii Vasil’ev, “Krest’ianskie vosstaniia na Ukraine, 1929–1930 gody,” *Svobodnaia mysl’* 9 (1992): 74–75; Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (Oxford, 1996), 120–21.

<sup>152</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 57, op. 4, d. 356, ll. 86.

<sup>153</sup> Iurii Larin, *Evrei i antisemitizm v SSSR* (Moscow, 1929), 241–44; PAVO, f. 136, op. 1, d. 96, ll. 25–26, and op. 3, d. 219, l. 26.

<sup>154</sup> Sigmund Freud, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” in James Strachey, ed., *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London, 1957), 14: 275–300. Here, 280, 299.

mass, violent conflict for that matter. Categorization and treatment of enemies as undifferentiated, unreformable, irredeemable, and hence exterminable appear as a logical consequence from which even Marxist regimes, armed with a sociological paradigm premised on differentiation, reform, and redemption, could not escape.

Nor were the origins and technologies of Soviet violence divorced from those of other modern “gardening states.” The refusal of the Soviet party-state to recognize any self-imposed restrictions on its aspirations and practices certainly set it apart from liberal democracies. Yet this very refusal was rooted in the modern secular state’s assumption of responsibility for the spiritual, social, and physical well-being of its subjects. With the diminishing power of divine doctrines and their institutional incarnations, such as the Catholic church in the pre-modern era, which had often contained its violent schemes, the modern state was restrained by and accountable to none in its drive to remold society and individuals.<sup>155</sup>

Yet the endurance of Marxist state violence and its constant acceleration in peacetime pointed to an additional source. As communist regimes shifted gears in their pursuit of homogenized and harmonious societies, their belief in the malleability of human nature seemed to wane. In the Soviet Union, those marked by the party-state as internal enemies after the establishment of socialism were deemed irreducible, unreformable, and irredeemable elements; and in the heyday of the Cultural Revolution in China, the “blood pedigree theory” was practiced under the slogan: “If the father’s a hero, the son’s a good chap; If the father’s a reactionary, the son’s a bad egg.”<sup>156</sup> Did nurture finally succumb to nature? Not necessarily. Excision, even when totalized, did not emanate from a genocidal ideology and was not practiced through exterminatory institutions. Hence communists repeatedly turned their attention to groups and individuals they had already engaged previously, an inconceivable practice had these entities been stigmatized a priori as racially or biologically unfit. Purification did not engage collectives as such but rather the individuals who comprised them. As the ticking of the Soviet eschatological clock grew louder, they bore the brunt of an increasingly urgent quest for purity.

<sup>155</sup> On the processes leading to the all-embracing nature of the secular state, see Kedar, “Expulsion as an Issue of World History”; and Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 11–102.

<sup>156</sup> White, *Policies of Chaos*, 222.

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**Amir Weiner** is an assistant professor of history at Stanford University. His book, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution*, completed during his tenure as a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution, is forthcoming from Princeton University Press in 2000. Currently, Weiner is at work on a book-length study of the sovietization of the Western Borderlands, 1939–1989.

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*AHR Forum*  
**Bringing Regionalism Back to History**

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*Regionalism has once again emerged as a critical issue among historians. And thus so too have questions of meaning and method, which have always accompanied interest in regions as subjects of historical inquiry. Equally important if perhaps ironic, the new interest in the region has also underscored the persistent importance of the nation as a crucial unit of analysis and imagination. The essays by **Celia Applegate** and **Kären Wigen** contribute insightful assessments of recent substantive and theoretical work on Europe and East Asia to the emerging debate about regionalist history. Their essays also suggest some of the implications of this emerging scholarship for nation-state histories. **Michael O'Brien** and **Vicente L. Rafael** bring their struggles with regional history in other parts of the world to their comments. Their perspectives enlarge the discussion in a number of ways, most notably by arguing that the regionalist idea itself warrants closer scrutiny and that the agency of individual scholars must be examined as well. The essays and the comments offer historians a compelling means of understanding the resurgence of regionalism in historical scholarship.*



A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of  
Sub-National Places in Modern Times

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CELIA APPLGATE

EUROPE, SO WE READ WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY, has always been and remains “very much a continent of regional identities.”<sup>1</sup> This notion has insinuated itself into a wide range of debates on the future of Europe. Whether the context is an analysis of the final crisis of the nation-state or a description of the structure of committees in the European Community, recognition of the significant role that regions and regionalism play in Europe today has quietly, undramatically taken hold. In 1992, Tom Nairn wrote in the *New Statesman* that regions had become a “key part” of the discussion about European union.<sup>2</sup> Two years later, Rolf Lindner argued, in a collection devoted to the “return of the regional” that “quite obviously we are now confronted with a new regionalism.”<sup>3</sup> And in 1997, John Newhouse stated in *Foreign Affairs* that “regionalism, whether within or across national borders, is Europe’s current and future dynamic.”<sup>4</sup> Moreover, far from being a product of the post-Communist, post-Maastricht Treaty era in European affairs, this attention to a resurgent or a renewed or a reinvented or a rediscovered regionality in fact stretches back through several decades of Euro-punditry. In 1984, Hans Mommsen wrote, with somewhat more drama than is usual to these discussions, that “the nation is dead, long live the region.” In 1981, Rainer Elkar asked whether regional restlessness might not be the “new specter haunting Europe.” And in 1980, responding to a decade or more of regional unrest, Jochen Blaschke published a “handbook of European regional movements,” designed to guide the confused through a thicket of Basques, Slovenes, Sorbs, Serbs, Scots, Lapps, Walloons, Flemish, Bretons, Croats, Magyars, Cypriots, South Tiroleans, Madeiran Islanders, Catalans, Occitans, and others.<sup>5</sup>

I wish to thank James Retallack of the University of Toronto, whose generosity in sharing his knowledge of the new regional history of Central Europe and in commenting on a version of this essay has eased my way immeasurably.

<sup>1</sup> John Sallnow and Sarah Arlett, “Regionalism in Europe,” *Geographical Magazine* 61 (September 1989): 9.

<sup>2</sup> Tom Nairn, “Does Tomorrow Belong to the Bullets or the Bouquets?” *New Statesman* (June 19, 1992), Supplement: 30.

<sup>3</sup> Rolf Lindner, ed., *Die Wiederkehr des Regionalen: Über neue Formen kultureller Identität* (Frankfurt, 1994), 7.

<sup>4</sup> John Newhouse, “Europe’s Rising Regionalism,” *Foreign Affairs* 76 (January–February 1997): 68.

<sup>5</sup> Hans Mommsen, “Die Nation is tot: Es lebe die Region,” *Nation Deutschland?* Guido Knopp, Siegfried Quandt, and Herbert Scheffler, eds. (Munich, 1984), 35; Rainer S. Elkar, “Die Ausbreitung

Yet, as even this brief retrospective should indicate, the contemporary discussion of regions in Europe, or to use the phrase first coined by Denis de Rougemont, of a "Europe of the regions," includes little certainty and less consensus about such fundamental issues as what we mean by the term region and what, at the most basic level, we think is the nature of the European "dynamic" that regions have engendered. For some, regions are ethnic and cultural units, for others, economic ones or geographical ones, and for yet others, they are simply political subdivisions of the nation-state.<sup>6</sup> A magazine advertisement for the "European Regionalist Network" includes among its constituency "small nations," as well as "regions"—both of which are described as "close to the people," reflective of "cultural diversity," and "sensitive to regional ecologies."<sup>7</sup> Those who see a "Europe of the regions" as the great model for a future in which a tolerant cosmopolitanism and a warm, personal localism emerge gradually in stable complementarity confront a host of pessimists, realists, strategists, and separatists who anticipate increasing disparity, disruption, disintegration, and decline. Christopher Harvie, whose *Rise of Regional Europe* represents one of the few works of synthesis in this dispersed debate, has compared it to "a badly organised dinner party," at which the guests—here, an array of jostling disciplines—"somehow contrive to speak not to but *alongside* one another."<sup>8</sup> In Nairn's words, "'Europe of the regions' remains an astonishingly fluid notion— . . . [N]o map can capture its sense." "Is this," he asks, "a new order, or a new disorder?"<sup>9</sup>

And what precisely, one might ask further, is new about it? Punditry rarely pauses for historical reflection, but here we find ourselves in the midst of a discussion, the complexity and the persistence of which both point to deeper historical causes than the latest shift in EU directives. Yet surprisingly little sustained historical analysis of "regional Europe" nourishes the contemporary debate: in Harvie's words, "the history of the civic, regional and culture-nation entities in Europe and their ethos—which will obviously influence the history of Europe as it will come to be written if the movement is successful—remains obscure." Harvie went on to write a brief but remarkably comprehensive "interpretation of the recent European past" that emphasized the "regional theme" and connected its historical manifestations to its contemporary ones.<sup>10</sup> The purpose of this essay is somewhat different. Rather than suggest the outlines of an alternative synthesis or add to Harvie's, I shall draw attention to some of the ways that the paradigm of modernization, which in the period after 1945 did more to obscure our view of Europe's regions than any other conceptual model, has loosened its hold over our understanding of modern

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regionalistischer Bewegungen in Europa." *Europas Unruhige Regionen*, Elkar, ed. (Stuttgart, 1981), 10; Jochen Blaschke, *Handbuch der westeuropäische Regionalbewegungen* (Frankfurt, 1980), 5–7. See also Dirk Gerdes, ed., *Aufstand der Provinz: Regionalismus in Westeuropa* (Frankfurt, 1980), 25.

<sup>6</sup> Mark Dubrulle, ed., *Régionalisme, fédéralisme, écologisme: L'union de l'Europe sur de nouvelles bases économiques et culturelles; Un hommage à Denis de Rougemont* (Brussels, 1997), 3. For a discussion of efforts to define what a region is and doubts about whether the question is ultimately a useful one to ask, see below.

<sup>7</sup> *New Statesman* (June 19, 1992), Supplement: 17.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher Harvie, *The Rise of Regional Europe* (New York, 1994), x.

<sup>9</sup> Nairn, "Does Tomorrow," 30.

<sup>10</sup> Harvie, *Rise of Regional Europe*, 4, xi.

European development.<sup>11</sup> The challenges to and modifications of modernization theory have accompanied the gradual emergence of regions as key players in the European community. Challenges and modifications both have developed slowly and undramatically, with little of the academic fanfare that signals the arrival of paradigm shifts or revisionism-in-battle-gear.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, their accumulation amounts to a transformation of our understanding of the significance of regions in European history. What remains to be seen is whether this transformation points to some new synthesis—Harvie’s “history of Europe as it will come to be written”—or simply to a familiar postmodern holding pattern of fragmented wholes, provisional stances, and open endings.

MODERNIZATION THEORY, whatever its shortcomings, has not been the single cause of the obscurity of regional history in modern times. Before we turn to it and to the postwar period in general, we need to take stock, however briefly, of the consequences to regions and regional history of the great, hulking presence of nations on the European scene. The issue is not so much that nations have been bigger and stronger than the kinds of regions that concern us here but that the whole process by which the writing of history established itself as a profession in the modern era has been closely interwoven with the making and legitimating of nation-states. This is a familiar point but perhaps worth rehearsing once more from the less-than-familiar perspective of regional historiography. “Historians,” wrote Eugen Weber, “were the clerisy of the nineteenth century because it fell to them to rewrite foundation myths; and history was the theology of the nineteenth century because it provided societies cast loose from the moorings of custom and habit with new anchorage in a rediscovered—or reinvented—past.”<sup>13</sup> The import of Weber’s remarks extends, of course, beyond his France. Historians across Europe wrote about the founding of their nations, the past of their nations, the coherence and unity of their nations. Thomas Babington Macaulay is an obvious case in point. His *History of England from the Accession of James the Second* (1848–1855) is nothing if not “an invitation to national jubilation,” and the effect of its enormous influence was to rid English historical scholarship of both cosmopolitan and localist impulses for the better part of a century.<sup>14</sup> The German case is just as clear. Stefan Berger, in a recent warning against the return of what Jakob Burckhardt long ago called “German triumphalism,” wrote that “German historicism’s claim to objectivity only thinly veiled its tendency to legitimate the existing political conditions and

<sup>11</sup> The scope of the following discussion will be limited to the historiographies of Germany, France, and Great Britain, with only occasional attention to those of Spain, Italy, and Eastern Europe. The analytical and conceptual issues discussed below will, I hope, have relevance across Europe, but the specific experiences of regionality have varied enormously from place to place.

<sup>12</sup> The nature of the connection between the upsurge in regional movements in the 1970s and the reordering of regional historiography remains unspecified, although a number of historians seem to assume some loose connection, a kind of *Zeitgeist* effect. See, for instance, Jürgen Reulecke, “Von der Landesgeschichte zur Regionalgeschichte,” *Geschichte im Westen* 6 (1991): 202.

<sup>13</sup> Eugen Weber, *My France: Politics, Culture, Myth* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1991), 23.

<sup>14</sup> J. W. Burrow, *A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past* (New York, 1981), 3.

therefore to write the history of the victors . . . All wrote history not for history's sake but to allow the Germans to develop national identity."<sup>15</sup>

The devaluation of regions and their pasts in the nineteenth century thus emerged naturally alongside the triumph of the national historiographies. It drew on a rich vocabulary—common to all European bourgeois elites since the Enlightenment—stigmatizing the provincial, the particular, and the parochial. The study of regions, provinces, and local places did not disappear, but it became subordinate to the national history project and pursued mainly by little-regarded amateurs in local historical societies. To pursue local or regional history for its own sake was thus to reveal one's lack of serious learning or, particularly in France and Germany, one's dubious political allegiances. Robert Gildea has written about the difficulty of establishing any "political space for decentralization within the revolutionary and republican tradition" in France. The corollary to this was that regionalism and with it the study of regional history usually expressed reactionary or counter-revolutionary impulses, suspect longings for an invented prerevolutionary past of provincial freedoms and colorful regional diversities.<sup>16</sup> In Germany, the genre of *Landesgeschichte* (or provincial history) occupied a somewhat different but still uncomfortable position of resistance. The efforts of its practitioners to define the *Land* in terms of the smaller states partially digested in Bismarck's Reich expressed a desire to preserve some vestige of "individual state consciousness" within the new national state.<sup>17</sup> And even though not oppositional in the stark terms of the French debate, the *Landeshistoriker* asserted in vain their federal, small-statist vision of German unity against the dominant Prussian school.

The first three decades of the twentieth century saw significant innovations in the practice of history, all of which confirmed, albeit in imaginative new ways, the subordinate place of regions in the writing of national histories. In France, Marc Bloch became acquainted with the work of Vidal de la Blanche in "human geography," an ill-conceived but nevertheless important approach to the "geographic personality of France" through study of individual regions. Bloch himself tried using Vidal's regional framework: his first major publication was a monograph on the Ile de France that appeared in Lucien Berr's series "Les Régions de la France." Berr and Vidal both were unsympathetic to local history as such, but at the same time they were open to the claims of regional diversity in both a social and a geographical sense—what Berr call "historical individualities" on a small scale. Bloch, though arguably more respectful of the work of local historians than any of his colleagues in the Berr project, ended up rejecting "the idea of region as an

<sup>15</sup> Stefan Berger, "Historians and Nation-Building in Germany after Reunification," *Past and Present* 148 (August 1995): 188. Probably the earliest recognition of the crucial role that historians played in German nation-building was Lord Acton's "German Schools of History," *English Historical Review* 1 (1886): 7–42. The classic account is Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present* (Middletown, Conn., 1968).

<sup>16</sup> Robert Gildea, *The Past in French History* (New Haven, Conn., 1994), 166–213. On regionalism as a political and cultural movement in French history, see also Thiébaud Flory, *Le mouvement régionaliste français* (Paris, 1966); and Christian Gras and Georges Livet, *Régions et régionalisme en France du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle à nos jours* (Paris, 1977).

<sup>17</sup> For historical perspectives on *Landesgeschichte*, see Peter Steinbach, "Zur Diskussion über den Begriff der 'Region'—Eine Grundsatzfrage der modernen Landesgeschichte," *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte* 31 (1981): 185–210; and Reulecke, "Von der Landesgeschichte zur Regionalgeschichte," 202–08.

object of study or a real entity": too much local history, he concluded, "was useless for general history, that is to say, when all is said and done, for the only history that matters."<sup>18</sup> The publication in 1931 of his brilliant synthesis, *Les caractères originaux de l'histoire rurale française*, confirmed the place of local and regional studies as important but clearly subordinate aids to the treatment of general questions.<sup>19</sup> We must, Bloch wrote in the introduction, "be aware of the enormous efforts of painstaking inquiry which are quietly being carried on in our provinces." "All of us, the historians by profession," he continued, "generally dedicated to research on a larger scale, have a great need of these *défricheurs* [energetic gardeners]."<sup>20</sup> Thus the Annales school, as it developed after 1929 through the work of Bloch and many others, kept a firm hold on the national framework for historical studies, even as it introduced an extraordinary breadth of methodological and conceptual innovation in many other ways. Its emphasis on the material circumstances that shaped a people's activities, limited their choices, and thus gave a people its distinctive character added new weight to the nation, lending it the aspect less of a superstructure than a natural outcome of exceedingly long-term historical trends.<sup>21</sup>

Methodological innovation combined with a reassertion of the national also characterized, though with very different political colorations, the development of ethnic history, or *Volksgeschichte*, in Germany during the interwar years. There, historians such as Hermann Aubin and Rudolf Kötzschke, legatees of the losing side in the late nineteenth-century historians' quarrel known as the *Methodenstreit*, reinvigorated the regionalist tradition of *Landesgeschichte* through the introduction of new methodologies and comparative analysis.<sup>22</sup> Where the earlier *Landeshistoriker* had confronted the Prussian-led Germany with the histories of the other German states, the new practitioners of *Volksgeschichte* abandoned states and dynasties altogether in pursuit of the *Volk*, whose presence in border regions and ethnic enclaves, as well as in the post-Versailles nation-state of Germany, attested to the existence of a kind of Pan-Germania. And although regions and other local places could be privileged sites for the investigation of the *Volk*, the overarching framework was nationalist, and for some even racist.<sup>23</sup> In any case, the historical

<sup>18</sup> See the careful consideration of Bloch's engagement with the field of geography in the early twentieth century in Susan W. Friedman, *Marc Bloch, Sociology and Geography: Encountering Changing Disciplines* (New York, 1996), 65–69, 76–79, 176–77.

<sup>19</sup> Carole Fink, *Marc Bloch: A Life in History* (New York, 1989), 124–25, 142.

<sup>20</sup> One is reminded of Gibbon's description of Sébastien Le Nain de Tillemont as his "sure-footed mule." Marc Bloch, *Les caractères originaux de l'histoire rurale française*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1952, 1956), 2: xxxi. See also Jochen Hoock, "Regionalgeschichte als Methode: Das französische Beispiel," *Kultur und Staat in der Provinz: Perspektiven und Erträge der Regionalgeschichte*, Stefan Brakensiek, Axel Flügel, Werner Freitag, and Robert von Friedeburg, eds. (Bielefeld, 1992), 29–40.

<sup>21</sup> Jonathan Beecher makes a similar point in his review of Fernand Braudel, *The Identity of France*, in the *Journal of Modern History* 67 (June 1997): 426.

<sup>22</sup> On the central figure in the "struggle over methodologies" or *Methodenstreit*, Karl Lamprecht, and his distinctive style of cultural history, see Roger Chickering, *Karl Lamprecht: A German Academic Life (1856–1915)* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1993).

<sup>23</sup> There has been a good deal of attention to *Volksgeschichte* in recent years, as a neglected origin of the social-scientific history writing of the postwar era. See especially James Van Horn Melton, "From Folk History to Structural History: Otto Brunner (1898–1982) and the Radical-Conservative Roots of German Social History," *Paths of Continuity: Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s*, Hartmut Lehmann and Melton, eds. (New York, 1994), 263–92; Willi Oberkrome, *Volksgeschichte: Methodische Innovation und völkische Ideologisierung in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft, 1918–1945* (Göttingen, 1993); Steinbach, "Zur Diskussion über den Begriff der 'Region'"; G.



study of regions remained firmly fixed in the lesser status of, on the one hand, a respectable but not respected amateur pursuit and, on the other, a useful methodology by which, again in Bloch's words, "a question of general interest [is] posed to the documents furnished by a particular region."<sup>24</sup> For their part, professional historians continued in one way or another to give unquestioning priority to their representations of the nation.

And that brings us, finally, to the postwar period, in which one might expect some loosening of the hold of nations over the practice of history, some lightening of what James Retallack has poetically called the "twilight existence" of regional history.<sup>25</sup> To be sure, Gert Zang, one of the most imaginative innovators in postwar regional history, has written of a "growing precariousness [*Verunsicherung*]" of national historical consciousness after 1945, and it is a commonplace among German historians to characterize the decades after 1945 as a period of "denationalization [*Entnationalisierung*]."<sup>26</sup> Such terms may usefully identify a loss of faith in the nation-state. They should not, however, be taken to indicate a loss of interest in it, particularly within academic establishments. If anything, the end of Europe's second Thirty Years' War made issues of nationalism and nation-building seem more urgent subjects for scholarly investigation than ever.<sup>27</sup> Wave after wave of studies that explicitly took the nation-state, its origins, its developments, and its consequences as the object of critical historical scrutiny arrived on university library shelves. (The most recent wave, which excuses itself as a natural reaction to the seismic events of 1989 in Europe, may yet drown us all.) At least as significant, the professionalization of history only intensified, as did the tendency to dismiss local and regional history writing as the mark of the incorrigible amateur. The rapid expansion of graduate training, particularly in the United States, and, linked to it, the increasing use of professionally exclusive methodologies and theoretical frameworks, only widened the gap between those who wrote about "history that matters" and those who presumably did not.

The quintessential professionalized historical discourse of the first postwar

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Oestreich, "Die Fachhistorie und die Anfänge der sozialgeschichtlichen Forschung in Deutschland," *Strukturprobleme der frühen Neuzeit*, G. Oestreich, ed. (Berlin, 1980), 57–95; and Axel Flügel, "Der Ort der Regionalgeschichte in der neuzeitlichen Geschichte," in Brakensiek, *Kultur und Staat in der Provinz*, 1–28.

<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Friedman, *Marc Bloch, Sociology and Geography*, 79.

<sup>25</sup> James Retallack, "Election Campaigns and Franchise Struggles in Regional Perspective: A Conference Report," *German History* 13 (1995): 76.

<sup>26</sup> Gert Zang, *Die unaufhaltsame Annäherung an das Einzelne: Reflexionen über den theoretischen und praktischen Nutzen der Regional- und Alltagsgeschichte* (Konstanz, 1985), 20; and Konrad Jarausch, "Normalisierung oder Re-Nationalisierung? Zur Umdeutung der deutschen Vergangenheit," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 21 (October–December 1995): 571.

<sup>27</sup> In post-1945 Germany, not to write national history was to court the suspicion that one was avoiding writing national history, and, by inexorable moral extension, avoiding a necessary confrontation with the National Socialist past. The relentlessly national emphases of *Sozialgeschichte*, as it emerged in the 1960s among the non-Marxist Left (Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Jürgen Kocka, and others), reflected in part a reaction to what its practitioners considered to be the unacceptable politics of postwar regional history, with its often explicitly redemptive tone and its effort to find *another* past, one not sullied by the Nazis. See the important essay by Bernd Weisbrod, "Region und Zeitgeschichte: Das Beispiel Niedersachsen," *Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte* 68 (1996): 91–105; and Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990), 228–46.

decades was modernization theory.<sup>28</sup> This conceptual structure, which eventually incorporated a vast sprawl of historical topics, worked on a number of different levels to obscure and discount the role of regions in European development since the modern era began. The basic tendencies of modernization theory in regard to regions may perhaps be reduced to three, each of which described a kind of disappearance of the region—economically, politically, and culturally. First and fundamentally, regions were slated to disappear as economic entities, their distinctive economic strengths and weaknesses gradually attenuated when they became absorbed into nationally based markets, regulated by national economic institutions, and homogenized by the effects of labor and capital mobility. Second, classic modernization theory posited a normal process of political development in which the central institutions of a nation-state gathered more and more civic and governing functions to them, in which nationally based political parties dominated the legislative and electoral processes, and in which political divisions and disputes were more or less uniform across the geographical space of the nation. Third, modernization entailed the development of national cultures, expressed in a common language, disseminated through educational and artistic institutions, and represented in all manner of central monuments, rituals, and common experiences. Nationalism was the outcome of all these inputs, the means by which citizens identified themselves with the collective subject of the nation.

But beyond what modernization theorists actually said about the development of nations was their “almost axiomatic assumption,” as Sidney Pollard put it, “that countries within their political boundaries are the only units within which it is worthwhile to consider the process of industrialization”—and, I would add, almost every other socially construed process as well.<sup>29</sup> The heavy emphasis that social-science history (the German term *Sozialgeschichte* is apt here) of the postwar era placed on the national scale of analysis, seeing regions merely as data collection points, represented not so much a conscious effort to show how the territorial entity known as the nation was created but far more a privileging of what John Agnew and James Duncan have called the “sociological imagination” over the “geographical imagination.” The sociological imagination, they continue, “aspires to the explanation of human behavior and activities in terms of social process abstractly and, often, nationally construed.” The geographical, in contrast, focuses on places and “the actual links” between them.<sup>30</sup> If one accepts this distinction, then regions were

<sup>28</sup> This is a problematically vague term for a wide range of historically oriented social science that had its heyday in the 1950s and the 1960s in the Anglo-American academic world. Others, especially Hans-Ulrich Wehler, find the Anglo-American tradition simplistic and attribute the theory and methodology of the term to Max Weber. Wehler's multivolume *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte* represents a thoroughgoing historical realization of Weber's ideas about the structuring of historical change (*Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 3 vols. [Munich, 1987–96]). In any case, the present essay does not account for the origins and continuing influence of modernization theory in any of its guises, though such an essay would be useful. A good brief treatment is Geoff Eley, “German History and the Contradictions of Modernity: The Bourgeoisie, the State, and the Mastery of Reform,” in *Society, Culture and the State in Germany, 1870–1930*, Eley, ed. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), 67–103.

<sup>29</sup> Sidney Pollard, *Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialization of Europe 1760–1970* (New York, 1981), vii. Pollard referred here in particular to the work of Alexander Gerschenkron, W. W. Rostow, and Simon Kuznets.

<sup>30</sup> John Agnew and James Duncan, *The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imaginations* (Winchester, Mass., 1989), 1–3.

doubly damned within modernization frameworks, doomed to extinction in the historical changes such frameworks explained and reduced to social-science servitude—or worse, invisibility—in the methodologies they employed.

But modernization theories and the institutional arrangements that nurtured them in their original form have long since changed, if not beyond recognition. Historians no longer make the “axiomatic assumption” that countries or nations can be treated as the unproblematic givens of historical analysis, that cultures and politics will converge in industrialized countries, or that a normal and unitary path of modern development can be distinguished amidst the fits and starts of European life. Scholarship on nation-building, nationalism, and national identity now tends to emphasize multiplicity and fragmentation, diversities and contingencies, uneven diffusions and incomplete projections. These ways of conceiving of the nation and its properties invite even more attention to regions and regional identities than has so far been forthcoming.<sup>31</sup> At the same time, professionalization in the postwar era has gone hand in hand with a radical expansion of our collective understanding of what history really matters. After all, it does not take a great stretch of the imagination to conceive of regions within that same capacious category that includes women, minorities, workers, and natural environments—the victims of modernity, the ignored, the marginalized, and the left-behind.

Finally, added to these developments internal to the historical profession has been the powerful resurgence since the 1970s of regional unrest and regional self-assertion in a number of European nations, symptomatic of a new crisis of nationalism in Europe. The mixing together of all these factors in an often indiscriminate fashion has resulted in much crossing of purposes and other manifestations of confusion. On the one hand, Hans-Jürgen Puhle assures us that the differences between regionalism and nationalism can be seen as “a matter of semantics”; on the other, Stefan Berger, warning against a re-nationalization of historiography, suggests that “only a mixture of regionalism and pan-Europeanism can prevent destructive nationalism from raising its ugly head again.”<sup>32</sup> On the one hand, the director of a regional center for civic education rejoices that the old centralizing nation-states have lost their “holiness [*Heiligkeit*]” and that “older and deeper ties among people are again making their claims heard.” On the other, the *Oberbürgermeister* of Gelsenkirchen speculates that “in the future all national boundaries will fall, and there will emerge great regions, which will meet each other in free competition for investments and markets.”<sup>33</sup> In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars could not say enough about Bretons and Basques and Scottish Highlanders. In the 1990s, they seem mesmerized instead by the hyphenated regionalists, the Baden-Württembergers, the Rhône-Alpines, the Emilia-Romagnards. Finally, in as fine a summation I have found of the general muddle of it all, James G. Kellas writes that

<sup>31</sup> Justo G. Beramendi, Ramon Maiz, and Xosé M. Nunez, eds., “Introduction,” *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present*, 2 vols. (Santiago de Compostela, 1994), 1: 1.

<sup>32</sup> Hans-Jürgen Puhle, “Nation States, Nations, and Nationalism in Western and Southern Europe,” in Beramendi, *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present*, 2: 28; Berger, “Historians and Nation-Building in Germany,” 219.

<sup>33</sup> Wilhelm Ballon, preface to *Regionalismus: Phänomen; Planungsmittel; Herausforderung für Europa—Eine Einführung*, Fried Esterbauer, ed. (Munich, 1978), 5–6; and Kurt Bartlewski, preface to *Stadt und Region—Region und Stadt: Stadtgeschichte—Urbanisierungsgeschichte—Regionalgeschichte*, Heinz-Jürgen Priamus and Ralf Himmelmann, eds. (Essen, 1993), 9.

“the study of regionalism (‘Europe of the Regions’) intersects with the study of nationalism in a rather ambiguous way. Regionalism seems to be like nationalism, but without the much-disliked features of ethnic prejudice and secessionism. Of course, these distinctions often collapse when actual examples are looked at.”<sup>34</sup> In the rest of this essay, I cannot hope to illuminate the true nature of regions, whether as ethnic enclaves, economic powerhouses, or civic utopias. I will, however, discuss some of the promising new directions taken in recent writing about the history of Europe’s regions in the era of nation-states. I limit myself to three new directions. The first gives priority to the concept of society, the second to that of identity, and the third to that of territory. These are shorthand devices to gather together sometimes exceedingly disparate scholarly research. Nevertheless, the distinctions are useful; they point, I believe, to significantly different ways of rethinking regional history.

THE FIRST AND MOST FULLY REALIZED APPROACH in contemporary reconsideration of regional history has been influenced by both modernization theory (in its Weberian more than its American guise) and the historical sociology of such scholars as Immanuel Wallerstein, Michael Hechter, and Stein Rokkan.<sup>35</sup> It represents a sustained refutation of the stark opposition found in modernization theory between the traditional and the modern—between the backward-looking and doomed phenomena, among which one might include regions, and the forward-looking phenomena, chief among which was the nation-state.<sup>36</sup> Yet, at the same time, the work on regions I include within this approach retains a primary commitment to the study of society and social processes, and to that of the political and economic forces associated with them. We might call this the modernization of regions revisited or revised. Taken as a whole, this work demonstrates that the paradigm of modernization can still, in Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s words, “generate productive questions.”<sup>37</sup> To put it in another way, the new research on society and politics in Europe’s regions provides a specific instance of something that has long been evident in a general sense, that modernization theory is easy to criticize but hard to replace.

Nevertheless, it has taken some time and a series of modifications in what we understand to be the characteristics of modernization in order to reach a point where regional differentiation finally appeared as something other than an annoying exception to the prevailing model. Ironically, some of the earliest sustained attention to European regions came immediately in the wake of a wave of macro-historical theorizing about the structure of Europe that reached a kind of apogee of indifference to regions. The work of Barrington Moore, Perry Anderson,

<sup>34</sup> James Kellas, “The Study of Nationalism in Europe: The State of the Art,” in Beramendi, *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present*, 1: 55.

<sup>35</sup> For a defense of Weberian, as compared to American, modernization research, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte,” *Gegenwart als Geschichte*, rev. edn. (Göttingen, 1995)—an updated version of his *Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1975).

<sup>36</sup> For a stimulating critique of “teleological temporality,” see William H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, Terrence J. McDonald, ed. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), 247–54.

<sup>37</sup> Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “A Guide to Future Research on the Kaiserreich?” *Central European History* 29 (1996): 552.

William McNeill, and above all, Immanuel Wallerstein criticized modernization theory yet chose to replace it with even more ambitious and all-consuming master narratives.<sup>38</sup> The consequence of Wallerstein's controlling analogy of cosmology was, as William Sewell has argued so persuasively, to explain the local entirely in terms of the general: "global, systems-level causes," not local ones, determine "the fates of local communities."<sup>39</sup> The world-systems model, moreover, divided Europe into three large and analytically clunky regions: a dynamic north-west core and two stagnating and dependent peripheries to the south and east.

Perhaps not surprisingly, one response to Wallerstein's work has been to run with it, creating as one sprints along ever more complicated versions of the center-periphery model, in the hopes that a more "multidimensional grid of European variations" will eventually cover every eventuality.<sup>40</sup> The quantity of this work is great, and its coverage impressive, from accounts of the "cultural peripherization of Flanders" to considerations of peripheries in the periphery that is Norway.<sup>41</sup> The closely related work of Michael Hechter, on the persistence of regionalism in the British Isles, has proven equally reproducible in a variety of marginalized places. Here, the center-periphery model took on a distinctly sinister cast: Hechter's signature phrase, "internal colonialism," denoted a process, essential to industrialization and nation-building, of producing ever more intense regional inequalities within the nation-state. Hechter originally took issue with Karl Deutsch, whose *Nationalism and Social Communication* is one of the most readily identifiable works in the original modernization paradigm. Deutsch suggested that socio-cultural distinctions between the province and the metropole would disappear or at least diminish over time.<sup>42</sup> Hechter argued instead that certain regions—his original concern was with the "Celtic fringe" of Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland—were economically underdeveloped as a result of their integration within a national economic system, and that the retention in these regions of pre-modern forms of social identification represented not backwardness so much as a useful means of political mobilization against the oppressive center.<sup>43</sup> "Internal colonialism" subsequently became something of a battle cry for separatist and autonomist movements all across the European periphery; its scholarly usefulness seemed equally

<sup>38</sup> Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, 1966); Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1974); William H. McNeill, *The Shape of European History* (New York, 1974); and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York, 1974).

<sup>39</sup> Sewell, "Three Temporalities," 249–50.

<sup>40</sup> Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1983), 19.

<sup>41</sup> On Belgium, see André Frognier, Michel Quevit, and Marie Stenbock, "Regional Imbalances and Centre—Periphery Relationships in Belgium," in *The Politics of Territorial Identity*, Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, eds. (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1982), 251–78; on Norway, see Frank H. Aarebrot, "Norway: Centre and Periphery in a Peripheral State," in *Politics of Territorial Identity*, 75–112. For a more general appreciation of Stein Rokkan's work on centers and peripheries, see Per Torsvik, ed., *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building* (Oslo, 1981). For a theoretical exposition of the fully adumbrated model, see Rokkan and Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity*.

<sup>42</sup> Besides *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York, 1953), see Karl Deutsch's less technical version in *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (New York, 1969).

<sup>43</sup> Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (1975; New Brunswick, N.J., 1999); and "The Persistence of Regionalism in the British Isles, 1885–1966," *American Journal of Sociology* 79 (September 1973): 319–42.



demonstrated in a host of monographs and article collections dedicated to the dubious category of "underprivileged regions."<sup>44</sup>

The most important aspect of the energetic modeling of scholars like Rokkan and Hechter for historians has, so far as I can tell, less to do with the models themselves (which are more or less useful, depending on one's inclinations) than with the perfunctory quality of the historical analysis that invariably accompanied them. Reading a Rokkan-Urwin analysis of European territorial politics makes all the clearer the need for nuanced and event-filled historical accounts of the same subject. Stimulating though the center-periphery model may be, it tends to understand the nature of regionality as passive and reactive—and so represents only a slight improvement on fully nation-centered interpretations. Still, Rokkan and Hechter made it possible to see the work of the *Landeshistoriker*, as well as all the local savants, antiquarians, and *Heimat* enthusiasts, in a different light; even more, they may be given credit for pressing scholars to reengage with the local and regional level of historical experience as itself constitutive of the process of modernization. In 1979, Allan Mitchell wrote that particularism in Germany was "the subject that will not go away," and if we stretch the meaning of particularism beyond its reference to small-state dynasticism, then the remark has resonance across Europe.<sup>45</sup> What Bernd Weisbrod calls a "renewed engagement" with the historical category of the region has produced work that shakes off both the "musty odor of *Heimat* history" and the tendency, which has dogged center-periphery studies from Wallerstein on, to view local processes "as little more than the incidental outcomes of abstract wider forces."<sup>46</sup>

This "renewed engagement" began, logically enough, in economic history. The link between economic change and nation-states had always been the weakest in the chain of interacting developments that constituted modernization. Long before globalization and the four motors became the buzzwords of the European economy, the nation-centered representation of economic life had given way to Sidney Pollard's reconceptualization of industrialization along regional rather than national lines.<sup>47</sup> Pollard still told a big story, that of European industrialization in the sense of a single, gradually unfolding and expanding process, but he understood

<sup>44</sup> See, for example, Blaschke, *Handbuch der westeuropäische Regionalbewegungen*; Gerdes, *Aufstand der Provinz*; and Rainer S. Elkar, ed., *Europas unruhige Regionen: Geschichtsbewußtsein und europäischer Regionalismus* (Stuttgart, 1981); Dudley Seers and Kjell Öström, *The Crises of the European Regions* (New York, 1983); Wilhelm Ribhegge, *Europa—Nation—Region* (Darmstadt, 1991); and Günter Lottes, ed., *Region, Nation, Europa* (Heidelberg, 1992).

<sup>45</sup> Allan Mitchell, "A Real Foreign Country: Bavarian Particularism in Imperial Germany 1870–1918," *Francia* 7 (1979): 587.

<sup>46</sup> Weisbrod, "Region und Zeitgeschichte," 90; Dieter Langewiesche, "Liberalismus und Region," *Liberalismus und Region: Zur Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert*. Lothar Gall and Langewiesche, eds. (Munich, 1995), 1; Cris Shore and Annabel Black, "The European Communities and the Construction of Europe," *Anthropology Today* 8 (June 1992): 10. For a slightly fuller explanation of the contemporary anthropological critique of center-periphery studies, see Robert Ulin, "The Current Tide in American Europeanist Anthropology: From Margins to Centre?" *Anthropology Today* 7 (December 1991); and M. Kearney, "The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 547–65.

<sup>47</sup> This view may be found most fully developed in Pollard, *Peaceful Conquest*; see also Sidney Pollard, ed., *Region und Industrialisierung: Studien zur Rolle der Regionen in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte der letzten zwei Jahrhunderte* (Göttingen, 1980); Rainer Fremdling and Richard A. Tilly, eds., *Industrialisierung und Raum: Studien zur regionalen Differenzierung in Deutschland des 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1979); and Hubert Kiesewetter, *Industrialisierung und Landwirtschaft* (Cologne, 1988). A path-breaking

regions, not nations, to be the dynamic units within it, the sites of transformation and the geographical bases of its spread. Whether or not a particular region industrialized early or late depended on multiple factors—social, political, and technological—but, once regions industrialized, he suggested, the process of their transformation followed a certain limited set of patterns. In any case, Pollard stated at the outset that he was not going to focus on the consequences of industrialization but on the process itself. This approach, although it undoubtedly encouraged a great deal of more differentiated research on industrialization, did not entirely rule out the possibility that regions, even economically defined ones, might indeed be seen to diminish in importance as modernization moved forward. Pollard suggested that the nineteenth-century region differed from its eighteenth-century counterpart by a greater degree of differentiation among them, which was complemented by a greater density of linkages and interactions.<sup>48</sup> But those very linkages shifted the object of study, after initial industrialization, from the region to the system of linkages as a whole, whether the nation-state or some other entity like the “Mediterranean world” or indeed the world itself.<sup>49</sup>

Since Pollard, a number of studies have moved toward even more emphatically regional views of industrialization and political economy, using the regional perspective explicitly to challenge the way historians have represented “the history that matters.” In the case of the industrial revolution in England, Pat Hudson and her collaborators—many of whom came, significantly, from a Conference of Teachers of Regional and Local History—have reasserted the importance of regional histories of industrialization as a means to “capture that variety of experience and motivation which makes up the whole.” Hudson’s work represents the latest in a long tug of war between those who use national economic indicators and national social groups to track the movement of economic change and those who insist that such aggregates systematically “neglect the significant transformations going on just under the surface” of nationally construed experience.<sup>50</sup> The contemporary debate within economic history has an early twentieth-century counterpart in the first major outbreak of the standard-of-living controversy, which in the 1920s pitted J. L. and Barbara Hammond’s depiction of a catastrophic industrial revolution against J. H. Clapham’s more sedate “economic history” of “the early railway age.”<sup>51</sup> Clapham was certainly the better statistician and, ironically, an indefatigable compiler of county statistics. But in his formal rebuttal

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but undervalued work in this context is Frank Tipton, *Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany during the Nineteenth Century* (Middletown, Conn., 1976).

<sup>48</sup> Pollard, *Peaceful Conquest*, vi, 115.

<sup>49</sup> For a recent work that views geographical areas in terms of their links not with a nation but with a larger-than-national region, see Louis Bergeron, ed., *La croissance régionale dans l’Europe méditerranéenne 18<sup>e</sup>–20<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Paris, 1992).

<sup>50</sup> Pat Hudson, ed., *Regions and Industries: A Perspective on the Industrial Revolution in Britain* (New York, 1989), 1. A loosely similar use of the regional perspective to form alternative narratives of industrialization is Tessie P. Liu, *The Weaver’s Knot: The Contradictions of Class Struggle and Family Solidarity in Western France, 1750–1914* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994). Her emphasis is less, however, on the region as such than on ways of organizing production and responding to economic crisis that have been ignored in single-process narratives of industrialization.

<sup>51</sup> J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Town Labourer 1760–1832: The New Civilisation* (London, 1919); J. H. Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain*, Vol. 1: *The Early Railway Age 1820–1850* (Cambridge, 1926).

of January 1930, J. L. Hammond caught him out in the elementary statistical fallacy of concocting a national "average wage" out of an average of county averages. This ignored the number of workers in each respective county and thus conveniently concealed the fact, as Hammond calculated it, that 60 percent of England's workers fell below it.<sup>52</sup> What was at stake then, and again now in Hudson's objections to the macro-aggregators of the "New Economic History," is whether the experience of economic modernity should be understood as a gradual, barely discernible, and practically uneventful long-term change in forms of production (in David Cannadine's characterization of such a view—"less happened, less dramatically, than was once thought") or as something life-changing and at certain times and places dramatic, with discernible consequences on social and political identity.<sup>53</sup> Hudson presents a thoroughgoing and differentiated case for the latter. But the only way to reveal this history, she maintains, is to investigate not just the causes but also the shifting, variegated, uneven, sometimes non-self-sustaining consequences of economic change within the actual communities that were the regions.<sup>54</sup>

The full potential of regional history's capacity to reconfigure not only our sense of what matters but our overall understanding of what happened is realized with stunning effect in Gary Herrigel's *Industrial Constructions*.<sup>55</sup> Herrigel's work presents us with a history of German economic development that goes far beyond Sidney Pollard, Hubert Kiesewetter, or any other of the first-round revisers of nation-centered history in discarding not just the national unit of analysis but all the other emphases and assumptions that came with it. In the case of Germany, this means above all discarding an emphasis on particular forms of economic organization and governance, first suggested in the enormously influential writings of Alexander Gerschenkron.<sup>56</sup> The Gerschenkronian view was that industrialization in Germany developed toward a particular configuration of large, highly concentrated firms, which were technologically advanced, vertically integrated, allied with large banks, and supported by helping institutions associated with the national state. This view assumed, even where it did not demonstrate, a unitary social transformation that occurred in the places where industrialization took place. Thus industrialization in Germany, uneven in its geographical reach, was nevertheless seen to be uniform in its appearance, consequences, and trajectory. Waves of revision have by and large left this view intact; investigations into aspects of German economic

<sup>52</sup> J. L. Hammond, "Industrial Revolution and Discontent," *English Historical Review* 2 (1929–30): 215–28. A full account of the Clapham-Hammond confrontation may be found in Stewart A. Weaver, *The Hammonds: A Marriage in History* (Stanford, Calif., 1997), 182–209.

<sup>53</sup> David Cannadine, "British History: Past, Present—and Future?" *Past and Present* 116 (1987): 183; cited in Hudson, *Regions and Industries*, 1.

<sup>54</sup> A variation on the deceptive nature of national aggregates comes in Douglas Forsythe's review (*Journal of Modern History* 68 [June 1996]: 491) of Vera Zamagni, *Economic History of Italy, 1860–1990* (Oxford, 1993). He urges an even more "systematic discussion of regional variations in economic development" as a way to reveal that "Italy's place on the periphery of the economically developed world early in the century" was an "artifact of national aggregates." He also urges more attention to "light industry," an issue with regional implications as well.

<sup>55</sup> Gary Herrigel, *Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power* (New York, 1996).

<sup>56</sup> Herrigel refers especially to Gerschenkron's discussion of Germany in *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), and *Continuity in History and Other Essays* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); see Herrigel, *Industrial Constructions*, 3–14.

development that did not look or behave like the Gerschenkronian core have remained in the margins.

Herrigel argues for nothing less than a paradigm shift. Instead of seeing small and medium-sized industries in regions unfamiliar to the historians of “organized capitalism” as archaic backwaters or isolated niches, Herrigel gathers up all the exceptional cases, carefully analyzes their own distinctive forms of organization, institutionalization, and governance, places them in juxtaposition to the old model of development, and emerges with a wholly transformed representation of German economic development. His “alternative picture” is essentially regional where the previous accounts were only incidentally so. He argues for the existence of “two distinct, parallel, and internationally competitive systems of industrial organization and practice.” Both, in his view, are regional systems, and both have developed distinctive forms of governance, heterogenous even at the national level.<sup>57</sup> Herrigel calls the first regional system the “decentralized industrial order.” Since the beginnings of industrialization in the German-speaking lands, it has been characterized by specialized small-scale producers, who developed supporting institutions to “stimulate innovation, socialize risk, and foster adjustment.” The second regional system, which he calls the “autarkic industrial order,” looks very much like the Gerschenkronian core industries, but it is recontextualized as a regional, rather than an implicitly national, system. Herrigel’s contribution, then, is no mere plea for understanding diversity or resisting generalization. It is an enormously successful effort to show that the reason regions have never disappeared from view and indeed continue forcefully to assert their relevance in Europe today is that they, not nations (and not cities or small towns), were from the outset the essential building blocks of diverse systems of industrial development within and beyond Europe.<sup>58</sup>

Such thoroughgoing restructuring is unlikely to occur in the realm of more conventional political history, in part because local studies of national politics, and indeed of local politics, have long been a stock-in-trade of political historians. Indeed, to adopt a distinction from the previous paragraph, *incidentally* regional histories of national politics have been so common as to obscure the need for *essentially* regional histories of the political life of the nation.<sup>59</sup> Still, political historians who retain an emphasis on social processes and social-science modeling have felt the need to refurbish nationalizing concepts like political modernization—to explore “the analytical possibilities of the concept” and discard its normative ones.<sup>60</sup> These revisions, occurring within highly divergent national

<sup>57</sup> Herrigel, *Industrial Constructions*, 1.

<sup>58</sup> Herrigel, *Industrial Constructions*, 1–3. It is also worth noting that he understands regions in a loose and functional sense, not as received political territories but as smaller-than-national arenas of economic activity and governance. This understanding allows him to avoid any reification of the “regional economy,” which might prove just as stultifying as notions of the national economy. It also has a great deal in common with the fluid definitions of region now developing in historical geography, which I discuss below.

<sup>59</sup> Herrigel’s work has, of course, crucially important things to say about political history as well, and represents as much of a provocation to reconsideration there as in economic history—indeed, his subject, political economy, explicitly rejects even the (my) convenient pretense of an analytically sustainable separation between politics and economics.

<sup>60</sup> Peter Steinbach, “Einleitung,” in *Modernisierung und Region im wilhelminischen Deutschland*, Simone Lässig, Karl Heinrich Pohl, and James Retallack, eds. (Bielefeld, 1995), 12. Steinbach provides a fuller account of his understanding of regional political history as a “corrective,” not an end in itself,

historiographies, all reach for a fuller understanding of the regionality of modern nation-states. As with economic history, accomplishing this is harder than it might at first seem, because a term that seems at first so obvious in its meaning—regionality—has a distinctly paradoxical ring to it in the modern era. The most distinguished traditions of regional history writing (*Landesgeschichte*, the Annales school, the Victoria History of the Counties of England, and others) have overwhelmingly concerned themselves with the early modern period or even earlier, when regionality seems less a paradox than an incontrovertible feature of political organization. As Bernd Weisbrod has recently pointed out, it has been easier for the practitioners of urban history to contribute to contemporary history than those of regional history, because cities, not regions, have appeared to us as the quintessential sites of modernity—after all, urbanization, not regionalization (whatever that may mean), is what we associate with the process of modernization.<sup>61</sup> The reappearance of regional political movements in the 1970s and 1980s added to the difficulty of formulating an understanding of regionality in modern politics. The regionalist movements of the postwar era in effect created a gigantic red herring for historians—and one that many investigators of the center-periphery school have been following ever since.<sup>62</sup> Their example suggested that regionality in modern politics consisted exclusively of the impact of insurgent and unhappy regions, fundamentally at odds with the nation-state and hence in their own way witnesses to its premier status in the modern world. Much historical work on regionalism in European history has thus confined itself to the politics of autonomism and separatism—an important subject, to be sure, but not one that exhausts the possibilities of political regionality in the modern era. Regions should not be understood only as would-be nations; from that perspective, it takes only one small step to return to the notion that regionalism is therefore backward, archaic, and, above all, transitional.

Certainly, regional movements, whether autonomist, separatist, or otherwise, are

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in "Zur Diskussion über den Begriff 'Region,'" 194–208. His pursuit of this "corrective" has nevertheless in practice begun to constitute an end in itself, that is to say, a distinctively different approach to the political culture of modern Germany.

<sup>61</sup> Weisbrod, "Region und Zeitgeschichte," 99–100. This outstanding article, notable both for its provocative analyses and its remarkable succinctness, is unfortunately buried in a regional history journal, the *Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte*, that all but the largest research libraries in the United States would consider far too obscure to consider purchasing—just one more symptom of the overall problem. There are important ways that historians of a new regional history could learn from the more established methodologies and frameworks of urban history. Such historians as Jürgen Reulecke are outstanding practitioners of both, and the *Stadt und Bürgertum* project directed by Lothar Gall has liberated the actual urban histories of the nineteenth century from the preconceptions of modernization frameworks. An outstanding American example of such an approach is Jennifer Jenkins, "Provincial Modernity: Culture, Politics and Local Identity in Hamburg, 1885–1914" (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1997). But the modernization paradigm still has a strong hold on urban history. For instance, a recent article by Dieter K. Buse, "Urban and National Identity: Bremen, 1860–1920," *Journal of Social History* (Spring 1993): 521–38, charts the decline and disappearance of local distinctiveness—political and cultural—within a framework that confirms modernization assumptions, ironically in order to refute the notion of a special German path.

<sup>62</sup> The sole appearance to date of focused attention to regionalism in the prestigious journal *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* was an issue in 1994, devoted to "Nationalismen und Regionalismen in Westeuropa," in which the regions covered were the usual suspects—Catalonia, Northern Ireland, the Basque lands, and various peripheral regions in France.



an important element of the regionality of the modern nation-state, but they alone cannot provide us with a working definition of regionality, regionalization, regional identity, or regionalism. Instead, the most promising historical work is moving toward an understanding of regional politics that sees them everywhere, Saxony or Bavaria, Brittany or the Nord, as constitutive—not imitative—of the politics of the nation-state, in effect the infrastructure of the political process altogether. This is not to say that national politics had a local face to it, or could gaze at its reflection in the regional mirror. On the contrary: the very operations of national politics were dependent on regional political milieus, and each of these milieus constituted and reconstituted itself between and across the great junctures in political history. Each, in other words, was a site of change and modernization. Moreover, very real trends toward a nationalization of political issues, political parties, and political behavior were accompanied by contrary and complicating trends toward regional divergence and at times outright resistance.

This understanding of the regionality of modern nation-states insinuates itself more easily, perhaps, into the political history of a federal state such as modern Germany. Historians of Germany have in the past two decades undertaken a number of intensive collective projects on the modernization of regions, in order better to understand the modernization of Germany as a whole.<sup>63</sup> These projects have self-consciously broken with traditions of local and small-state history. They build instead on the more recent tradition of social-scientific history in the postwar Federal Republic and seek to complicate its analyses of national politics. Similar efforts to recapture and redefine local and regional history—in effect, to modernize it so that it can illuminate modernization—have brought about a whole new era in the history of political parties and constitutional change in Germany, as well as an unending spate of regionally based work on National Socialism.<sup>64</sup> It would be tedious to rehearse the accomplishments of so wide a range and so great a quantity of historical scholarship. Suffice it to say that all this careful examination of the regional infrastructure of politics has brought about neither a full-blown crisis nor a full-scale revision in our understanding of the German nation. But we should not, I think, expect either. Instead, this revisionism-by-regionality has yielded a slowly expanding set of new guiding concepts, which will both replace and correct such old tired ones as secondary integration, modernization-without-democratization, and even totalitarianism. For instance, Peter Steinbach has argued that a process of “re-regionalization” was intrinsic to political modernization in the German Kaiser-

<sup>63</sup> The grandfather of such projects was Martin Broszat's enormous “Bavaria in the Nazi Period,” which eventually resulted in six volumes: Martin Broszat, *et al.*, *Bayern in der NS-Zeit*, 6 vols. (Munich, 1977–83). A path-breaking work on the nineteenth century was Gert Zang, ed., *Provinzialisierung einer Region: Regionale Unterentwicklung und liberale Politik in der Stadt und im Kreis Konstanz im 19. Jahrhundert; Untersuchungen zur Entstehung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in der Provinz* (Frankfurt, 1978). For a guide to the Westphalian research project, see Matthias Frese, *et al.*, “Gesellschaft in Westfalen: Kontinuität und Wandel 1930–1960; Ein Forschungsprojekt des westfälischen Instituts für Regionalgeschichte,” *Westfälische Forschungen* 41 (1991): 444–67. On Saxony, see Simone Lässig and Karl Heinrich Pohl, eds., *Sachsen im Kaiserreich: Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Umbruch* (Dresden, 1997); and James Retallack, “Society and Politics in Saxony in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Reflections on Recent Research,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 38 (1998): 396–457.

<sup>64</sup> A recent sampling of this literature, to which American scholars have long made important contributions, is Horst Müller, Andreas Wirsching, and Walter Ziegler, eds., *Nationalsozialismus in der Region: Beiträge zur regionalen und lokalen Forschung und zum internationalen Vergleich* (Munich, 1996).

reich. Re-regionalization refers to the growing force of a kind of political conservatism associated with federalist and particularist traditions, but it also refers more broadly to the ways that regional political cultures were both strengthened and transformed in unexpected ways right alongside the growth of national political movements, the expansion of the imperial state, and the mobilization of a mass electorate.<sup>65</sup>

National political culture, insofar as the concept survives such revision, thus becomes a multifaceted thing, more a complex amalgam of criss-crossing movements toward integration and differentiation than a set of finite and quantitatively manifest characteristics or a collection of hegemonic and centralizing strategies. It was forever in process and never achieved—a perspective that, as in the case of Pat Hudson's industrialization, puts new value on representations of change, event, and the actions of individuals. Nationally extensive classes likewise begin to seem like unwarranted constructions to impose on a regionally differentiated reality of social cleavage. The political force of such social cleavages remains a primary emphasis, but revisionism-by-regionality suggests that the most accurate depictions of the intersection of social structure and political system, of social class and political opinion, will be achieved at the regional level. More than that, the new regional historians mainly reject the metaphorical notion, once so crucial to modern nation-builders, that many such small pictures can accumulate and mystically bond into a composite portrait of the nation.<sup>66</sup> New understandings of national political and social integration are without question emerging from this new research, but the textbook writers of the future who wish to take this research fully into account face daunting tasks of generalization.

A powerful emphasis on the essential regionality of modern politics has not been confined to the study of such obviously de-centered nations as the German one. Historians of highly centralized nations like France have also begun working toward a new interpretation of the place of regional diversity in national history. As in the case of Germany, new conceptualizations of regional history allow new interpretations. As long as one local history, that of Paris, was considered normative and all other local or regional histories interesting only insofar as they exhibited conformity to or deviance from Parisian developments, any study of regions was doomed to the status of case study and illustrative detail.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, as long as deviance was explicable only in terms of either backwardness or insurgency or both, then a conception of modernization as a unitary and unidirectional process was likely to remain unchallenged. To write a regionally weighted political history of France, it is not enough to acknowledge the diversity of political and cultural experience within French borders. One must also have a differentiated view of the means by which France became a modern nation-state, a process neither centered in Paris nor

<sup>65</sup> Peter Steinbach, "Einleitung," in Lässig, *Modernisierung und Region im wilhelminischen Deutschland*, 11. This excellent volume of essays contains a vast set of references to this body of scholarship. For an English-language offering, see Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ralf Rytlewski, eds., *Political Culture in Germany* (New York, 1993), especially the article by Hans-Georg Wehling, "The Significance of Regional Variations: The Case of Baden-Württemberg," 91–100.

<sup>66</sup> See especially James Retallack, "Politische Kultur, Wahlkultur. Regionalgeschichte," in Lässig, *Modernisierung und Region*, 32, 17.

<sup>67</sup> An excellent, brief analysis of the "conceptually underdeveloped" field of French provincial history may be found in W. D. Edmonds, "'Qu'est-ce que la Province?' Some Books in English on Provincial France during the Revolution," *European History Quarterly* 25 (1995): 117–27.

destructive of regional diversity, nor, indeed, particularly respectful of the regional categories of an earlier era. Thus Ted Margadant's *Urban Rivalries in the French Revolution* looks at the National Assembly's spatial reorganization of France as a dynamic political process at the local level where change was actually effected, a process of territorial redefinition with long-term consequences for the relations between regions and the state, for regional economies, even for regional demographic development.<sup>68</sup> His approach, while deeply rooted in the methods and emphases of nationally inflected social history, nevertheless constructs a new framework for understanding regionality.

A similarly deft de-centering of political history, this one focused on the Third rather than the First Republic, is Caroline Ford's recent study of the Breton *département* of Finistère. Even more explicitly than Margadant, Ford challenges the conventional view of the French nation as an essentially urban, French-speaking, industrial, and secular entity.<sup>69</sup> Her notion of what was new and indeed modern about politics in the Third Republic was the emergence of novel and highly effective syntheses of republicanism, social reform, religion, and regional identity. By going beyond a conception of national integration that pits region against nation, archaic against modern, "endless diversity" against increasing uniformity, she provides a satisfyingly complex account of the ways that modern regions have been places where centralizing policies were "both resisted and appropriated" and where "new political ideologies fashioned from local understanding" were voiced.<sup>70</sup> This account bears many similarities to Peter Steinbach's concept of "re-regionalization" in Imperial Germany. And while Ford's work, like that of most other practitioners of a new regional history, tells the history of one particular region, it successfully escapes the compartmentalizations so typical of case studies, providing instead a further contribution to Margadant's "social history of the parochial" and from there, to a genuine recasting of the national.<sup>71</sup>

MODERNIZATION THEORY DOES NOT LOOM SO LARGE, either as something to be challenged or to be revised, in a second set of approaches to European regional history. Regional identity has provided a conceptual focus for a number of historians and historically minded sociologists and anthropologists more directly concerned with the ontology of groupness than with the progress of modernity. Here, too, of course, there have been dragons to slay, chief among them the nineteenth-century discourse of group character. This discourse asserted the existence of various local, regional, and national traits as the embodied expression of centuries of accumulated historical experience and an essential groupness. It did

<sup>68</sup> Ted W. Margadant, *Urban Rivalries in the French Revolution* (Princeton, N.J., 1992).

<sup>69</sup> Caroline Ford, *Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany* (Princeton, N.J., 1993), 4–9.

<sup>70</sup> Ford, *Creating the Nation*, 9.

<sup>71</sup> Before concluding this section devoted to the revision of modernization theory, I should also mention William Brustein, *The Social Origins of Political Regionalism: France, 1849–1981* (Berkeley, Calif., 1988), which seeks to discard normative models of social change and construct instead a picture of society fully differentiated by contrasting regional modes of production. Brustein's work bears some similarities to Herrigel, in its emphasis on the essential regionality of social change.

not treat national groupness as more modern or progressive than regional and local groupness: all forms of group identity claimed primordial roots. Its twentieth-century social-scientific counterpart—or successor—is the assertion of what Rogers Brubaker has criticized as the “realism of the group,” in other words, groups understood as “real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring collectivities.”<sup>72</sup>

Much recent scholarly work on national and other collective identities has taken as its starting point the rejection of group “realism” in favor of an understanding of groupness that trades heavily in the language of contingency, instability, possibility, and practice. The notion that the group is a substantial, stable, and real entity becomes, from this altered perspective, something close to a collective illusion, and in any case, itself the product of historical processes—social, cultural, political—which the scholar should try to elucidate. A sense of nationhood, in Benedict Anderson’s celebrated formulation, was the result of collective imaginings of a particular sort. His work emphasized, however, the imagining itself, not its result.<sup>73</sup> Brubaker’s recent analysis of “nationalism reframed” in contemporary Europe likewise understands the nation as a category of practice, a cognitive arena of struggle, a set of “idioms, practices, and possibilities”—not, in other words, an entity at all about which one could ask “what is it?”<sup>74</sup> Following Pierre Bourdieu, Brubaker sees the nation as a “principle of vision and division” of the world, and, like Bourdieu, he wishes to emphasize the quasi-performative processes by which a nation is reified and how the more or less arbitrary divisions among groups of people come to seem natural to the actors involved.<sup>75</sup> The constructivist view of collective identities finds an even more emphatic formulation in the postmodernist-cum-globalist positions that such scholars as Arjun Appadurai and Khachig Tölölyan have articulated. In Appadurai’s account of “post-national locations,” any kind of territorial identity must be regarded as “relational and contextual,” not “scalar or spatial.”<sup>76</sup> Whereas Bourdieu talks of social and political performances of identity, Appadurai talks of their narration, as well as the work of the imagination in producing and sustaining localized senses of distinction. For his part, Tölölyan emphasizes the ways that nations are “fabulated, brought into being, made and unmade” by people at home and in exile.<sup>77</sup>

Yet while constructivism has become something of a reigning epistemology in current historical research into national identity and nationhood, its capacity to shape discussions of regional or local identity has developed only in fits and starts. Interestingly, this neglect is not a consequence (as was the case with studies of

<sup>72</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York, 1996), 13.

<sup>73</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. edn. (London, 1991).

<sup>74</sup> Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 15.

<sup>75</sup> See especially Pierre Bourdieu, “Identity and Representation: Critical Reflections on the Idea of Region,” *Language and Symbolic Power*, John B. Thompson, ed., Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 220–28; and Rogers Brubaker, “Rethinking Classical Theory: The Sociological Vision of Pierre Bourdieu,” *Theory and Society* 14 (1985): 745–75.

<sup>76</sup> Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, 1996), 178–79.

<sup>77</sup> Khachig Tölölyan, “The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface,” *Becoming National: A Reader*, Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds. (New York, 1996), 427.

modernization) of biases intrinsic to the original theory. All of the possible patrons of constructivism made sufficient room in their theoretical frameworks to accommodate a full range of human groups. Max Weber, for instance, asserted that “almost any kind of commonality and contrast of *Habitus* or custom can occasion the subjective belief that a deeply-rooted affinity or a disaffinity exists between groups that attract or repel each other.” He clearly meant to encompass all forms of “subjective commonality” (*geglaubte Gemeinsamkeit*), region and nation alike, in his observations.<sup>78</sup> Bourdieu first developed his thoughts on the “struggle over representations” in the context of a discussion of the rhetorical performances of regional autonomist movements in contemporary France. And Benedict Anderson wrote, in probably the single most influential book in this field of research, that “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.”<sup>79</sup> But the slowness to apply Weber’s or Bourdieu’s or Anderson’s insights to the phenomena of European regionalism continues to indicate the relative obscurity surrounding the role of regions in European development. Moreover, dissecting powerful nationalist mythologies allows for more flexing of scholarly muscle than does taking on the far weaker, less conspicuous mythologies that sustain regional identities in Europe. Murderous separatist movements aside, it is the rare observer of the European scene who regards contemporary manifestations of regional sentiment as anything but a healthy antidote to bellicose and exclusionary national ones.<sup>80</sup> Hence investigations into the practices and idioms of regional identification have often lacked the sense of urgency that informs many studies of nationalism.

Still, one can point to patterns in current studies of regional identity. Certainly, much work on it seeks simply to explore the full diversity of forms of group identity in modern Europe. For instance, the social anthropologist Sharon Macdonald believes that research on European identities at all territorial levels—national, regional, and local—must be pursued and might ultimately enable us “to map out a comprehensive picture of West European identities,” despite the current patchy distribution of ethnographic and historical accounts of groups.<sup>81</sup> For historians of modern Europe, on the other hand, the issues that seem most worth pursuing concern the interactions and intertwined developments of regional and national identities. What historical accounts we do have of the construction of regional identities suggest that to study it will provide us with a more nuanced understanding of the nation-ness of modern states as well. Adopting Anderson’s terms, to understand more fully how regions are imagined will complicate both our understanding of how nations are imagined and, just as important, under what circumstances they are unimagined, deconstructed, resisted, and collapsed. The practices

<sup>78</sup> Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 2 vols., 5th rev. edn. (Tübingen, 1976), 1: 237. The translation in the standard English edition somewhat obscures the issue—see *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, 2 vols. (Berkeley, Calif., 1978), 1: 388.

<sup>79</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.

<sup>80</sup> As I note below, the most murderous of regionalist movements, like the Basque one, claim to be nationalist movements, and thus fall into the twilight zone in which regions and nations blend indistinguishably into each other.

<sup>81</sup> Sharon Macdonald, “Identity Complexes in Western Europe: Social Anthropological Perspectives,” in Macdonald, ed., *Inside European Identities: Ethnography in Western Europe* (Providence, R.I., 1993), 2.



and idioms of regional identity have, in other words, allowed for both resistance to and accommodation of nationalizing forces, often in the same places but to varying degrees.<sup>82</sup>

The “accommodation” school of regional identity emphasizes that a modern re-invention of regional identities has been an essential part of nation-building in Europe.<sup>83</sup> In the case of Germany, the dominant understanding of nation-building was articulated in the complex notion of a *Sonderweg*, or special path, which posited a model of both failed modernization and dysfunctional nationalization. The historians of the *Sonderweg* were for the most part concerned with the overwhelming influence of Prussia. Its problems became Germany’s problems; its social and political maladjustments became Germany’s; its version of national identity imposed itself, through various processes of mass manipulation and social indoctrination, on all subjects of the Reich, leaving here and there remnants of resistance in the form of an equally regrettable backward-looking particularism. But as was the case with the studies of regional political and social milieus discussed in the previous section, studies of regional identity in Germany have worked against the idea of a single *Sonderweg*. They have drawn attention to the way in which a sense of Germanness, of collective belonging in the new nation, found authentic forms of expression in regional institutions and in regionally inflected histories, monuments, and collective practices. In the case of the Rhenish Palatinate, for instance, voluntary associations devoted to regional historical and natural-historical activities self-consciously mediated between levels of collective belonging: a consciousness of regional historical events, in the view of people active in such associations, reinforced both regional and national patriotism.<sup>84</sup> Likewise, a recent study of history textbooks in many different regions of Germany revealed a surprising variety of ways of encouraging national loyalty in schoolchildren, most commonly by emphasizing regional topics and appealing to regional folklore and custom.<sup>85</sup> In both cases, the region served as a category of perception, of “vision and division” of the world, just as capable of making sense of changes in collective life as was the nation—in fact, eminently capable of making sense of the nation itself. This perspective enables us to account for the specific forms that national identity has taken, which vary from place to place, and to open it up as an arena of conflict and negotiation, not coercion and manipulation.<sup>86</sup> At least in the case of Germany, region, nation, and indeed, locality, were not antagonistic and mutually exclusive but reinforcing and interdependent.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>82</sup> A neatly constructed demonstration of this dual role can be found in John R. Eidson, “German Local History as Metaphor and Sanction,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 66 (July 1993): 134–48.

<sup>83</sup> See the summarizing remarks by Stuart Woolf, in Beramendi, *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present*, 2: 616, 618, 620.

<sup>84</sup> Applegate, *Nation of Provincials*.

<sup>85</sup> Katharine D. Kennedy, “Regionalism and Nationalism in South German History Lessons, 1871–1914,” *German Studies Review* 12 (1989): 11–33.

<sup>86</sup> The literature on monuments, national and otherwise, has also been a context in which such a perspective is developed. See especially Reinhard Alings, *Monument und Nation: Das Bild vom Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal—Zum Verhältnis von Nation und Staat im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1918* (Berlin, 1996).

<sup>87</sup> Arno Mohr’s study of the “function of regional history” in postwar German *Länder* argues that a highly constructed regional historical consciousness for these new political entities served as a kind of prerequisite for renewed political participation in the Federal Republic of Germany: “The growing

Nor does Germany appear to be peculiar in its history of intertwined territorial identities. Charlotte Tacke, who has written a sustained comparative account of French and German national identity, argues that "the individual's identification with the nation rests . . . on a large variety of social ties, which simultaneously forge the links between the individual and the nation." The most important ties mediating that relationship she finds to have been constituted in the region, which serves in her analysis both as a constructed "cultural and social space" and as an "order" of "civic communication."<sup>88</sup> In both nations, France and Germany, a renewed, essentially updated regional identity emerged in the modern period through the cultural work of busy local bourgeoisies, consolidating their own social positions through precisely the kind of representational performances that Bourdieu has defined (in Tacke's case, the construction of monuments of the ancient heroes Hermann and Vercingetorix). Following Bourdieu, Tacke wishes to bring together social analysis with cultural analysis, compensating for the tendency of social analysis to ignore the play of symbols and norms, and of cultural analysis to ignore issues of diffusion and social effect. As she and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt have asserted, the unanswered questions in the study of national identity and nationalism have to do with the extent to which they erased lines of division in society, reinforced them, or simply redrew them. She finds very different answers to these questions in France and Germany, not by investigating national identity at some abstracted national level but by insisting on the "social, cultural and political reality" of regional areas in the construction of collective groupness.

Tacke's work understands the relation of regional and national identity as one of "negotiation," but this negotiation proceeded "seamlessly" in her telling.<sup>89</sup> Tension exists in her story along the lines of class divisions, which did not coincide with territorial ones. But as was the case with studies of regional politics, historians have been more frequently drawn to regions in Europe where people either never imagined themselves to be part of a national community or understood their participation in it to be fraught with conflict and inequality. Regional identity in such places did not accommodate the nation but contested it; its idioms expressed resistance, and its practices revealed discontent. The constructivist case has been equally, if not more, compelling in such places, because the struggle to control representations of the group has often been a highly politicized and self-conscious one: it has involved both "labors of imagination and political argument."<sup>90</sup> In Bourdieu's rather tortuous formulation, "regionalist discourse is a performative discourse which aims to impose as legitimate a new definition of the frontiers and

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sense of the territory's historicity became a measure of the maturing of political identity." See Mohr, "Politische Identität um jeden Preis? Zur Funktion der Landesgeschichtsschreibung in den Bundesländern," *Neue Politische Literatur* 35 (1990): 265.

<sup>88</sup> Charlotte Tacke, "The Nation in the Region: National Movements in Germany and France in the 19th Century," in Beramendi, *Nationalism in Europe: Past and Present*, 2: 691–92, 694; see also Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum: Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1995).

<sup>89</sup> Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Charlotte Tacke, "Die Kultur des Nationalen: Sozial- und kulturgeschichtliche Ansätze bei der Erforschung des europäischen Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," *Kulturgeschichte Heute*, Wolfgang Hardtwig and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, eds. (Göttingen, 1996), 255–83; Tacke, "Nation in the Region," 694.

<sup>90</sup> Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*, 323.

to get people to know and recognize the region that is thus delimited in opposition to the dominant definition."<sup>91</sup> Much of the recent work on such regions as the Basque lands and Brittany has further linked the construction of distinctive regional identities to the consequences of uneven social and economic development. Marianne Heiberg's study of the Basque "nation," for instance, argues that the creation of a national identity for the Basques was a work of re-invention, the translation of a backward regional enclave into an aspirant nation in order to meet certain political challenges and respond to pressing economic changes.<sup>92</sup> Likewise, Maryon McDonald's work on language and culture in Brittany depicts a Breton identity constructed in the course of Brittany's problematic incorporation into modern France.<sup>93</sup> For Winnie Lem, the construction of regional identity in Languedoc was a straightforward act of class resistance on the part of peasants against the "combined forces of capitalist development."<sup>94</sup> And among the Galicians studied by Heidi Kelley, regionalists revived and elaborated an already existing "myth of Galician matriarchy" because of "the aptness of feminine symbols" to express the marginalized and subaltern relationship of their region to the Spanish nation.<sup>95</sup>

Whether regional identity has entailed resistance or accommodation to the nation-state, the nation itself, at least from a constructivist perspective, appears to have been the controlling value system, the hegemonic concept.<sup>96</sup> Resistant regional identities have for the most part taken shape around a claim to nationhood, while accommodating ones have emphasized a distinctiveness that can reinforce national markers of difference—in effect, performing variations on a common national theme. For historians, the study of regional identity does not so much undermine the national histories as complicate them and, especially in the case of border regions, emphasize the ambiguities and instabilities of the nationalizing project. Looked at over time, regional identities have proven persistent, yes, but only by dint of constant adaptation to changes in national boundaries and systems of meaning. What the study of regional identities in history has yet to establish is what happens to them when nations fail or, indeed, what role they might play in the failure of nations. The cases of postwar western Germany and post-Communist Russia and eastern Germany suggest an unexplained capacity of regional forms of collective identification to come to the fore in times of crisis and collapse. A profitable direction for further research might be to investigate why.

<sup>91</sup> Bourdieu, "Identity and Representation," 223.

<sup>92</sup> Marianne Heiberg, *The Making of the Basque Nation* (New York, 1989); for a briefer exposition of her argument, see "Basques, Anti-Basques, and the Moral Community," in Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*, 325–36.

<sup>93</sup> Maryon McDonald, *"We Are Not French!": Language, Culture, and Identity in Brittany* (New York, 1989).

<sup>94</sup> Winnie Lem, "Identity and History: Class and Regional Consciousness in Rural Languedoc," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 8 (June 1995): 198–220.

<sup>95</sup> Heidi Kelley, "The Myth of Matriarchy: Symbols of Womanhood in Galician Regional Identity," *Anthropological Quarterly* 67 (April 1994): 71–80. The gendering of regionalist discourse is a theme that has not, to my knowledge, been much developed independent of the national framework in the historical literature on Europe.

<sup>96</sup> Rüdiger Gans and Detlef Briesen explicitly make this argument in "Das Siegerland zwischen ländlicher Beschränkung und nationaler Entgrenzung: Enge und Weite als Elemente regionaler Identität," in Lindner, *Die Wiederkehr des Regionalen*, 66–70.

THE THIRD AND FINAL WAY OF RE-THINKING REGIONAL HISTORY does not characterize an existing body of historical research but rather holds the promise of synthesizing past and contemporary forms of regional research. To return to Christopher Harvie's metaphor, it suggests a way to encourage the guests at the dinner party to talk to each other. Appadurai's formulation of the problem of "locality" posed "relational and contextual" understandings of it against "scalar or spatial" ones; he talks further of exploring links between "the sense of social immediacy, the technologies of interactivity, and the relativity of contexts."<sup>97</sup> But the very way in which he characterizes the "complex phenomenological quality" of locality suggests a need to incorporate considerations of space and scale, of the physicality of places, in our attempt to understand the role of regions in European history. A number of historians have already pointed out the problems inherent in studies of identity that leave out the painstakingly achieved findings of social and economic history—or worse, incorporate fairly crude social analyses that do little to mitigate an unexamined privileging of aesthetic and cultural categories.<sup>98</sup> But understandings of group identity or social change that do not work to illuminate the connections among people, geographical places, and historical change are equally inadequate. At its least satisfactory, engagement with as unstable a concept as identity opens up too much room for distinctions among region, nation, and locality to slip away, and we are left unable to speak with any conviction about the difference for human collective existence between large and small, weak and powerful, rural and urban. For Maryon McDonald, for instance, identity had to be regarded in the midst of its perpetual motion, with the act of slowing it down in order to describe it itself a source of distortion: "the very categories of 'French' and 'Breton' slip and slide," she writes, and "neither France nor Brittany (nor any other such category) exists in any tangible or objective form other than in the ideas which people have of it."<sup>99</sup> True though that may be, such categories do not slip and slide every which way, in all directions and across all boundaries. Perhaps with some modest exercise of our "geographical imagination," we can find ways to write about the limitations on identity that are posed not only by society but also by place.<sup>100</sup>

Pursuit of such a project forces one to consider an issue that up until now I have sidestepped, and that is just what precisely one means by the term region. The literature is strewn with attempts at definitions: Keith Stringer, for instance, suggests that there are five basic strata of "collective social groupings," the immediate, the local, the regional ("such as lordship, diocese, county, province"), the sovereign, and the supra-national.<sup>101</sup> Most of the historical work I have discussed understands regions in essentially political terms, areas of land that at one

<sup>97</sup> Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, 178.

<sup>98</sup> See especially Tacke and Haupt, "Die Kultur des Nationalen."

<sup>99</sup> McDonald, "*We Are Not French*," 22. Interestingly, Ellen Badone, another anthropologist working on Brittany, has argued that people's perceptions of cultural identity in Brittany make much finer and more fixed distinctions among localities within the region of Brittany than many anthropologists have allowed. See Badone, "Ethnicity, Folklore, and Local Identity in Rural Brittany," *Journal of American Folklore* 100 (April–June 1987): 161–90.

<sup>100</sup> Agnew and Duncan, *Power of Place*, 1.

<sup>101</sup> Keith Stringer, "Social and Political Communities in European History: Some Reflections on Recent Studies," *Nations, Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past*, Claus Bjørn, Alexander Grant, and Keith J. Stringer, eds. (Copenhagen, 1994), 9.

time or other have formed an administrative unit within a political system. But there is reason to think that the definitional gambit, as it is usually practiced, does little to further our understanding of the complex issues involved. Rogers Brubaker, rightly unimpressed with efforts to define the nation, persuasively argues that the question is the wrong one: a nation is not a thing, he says, but a set of practices, a cognitive structure. The same is certainly true of regions, but then again, perhaps we can profitably distinguish regions from nations by analyzing the distinctive practices of placeness—or to put it otherwise, the distinctive forms of geographical relations—that have kept some regions relevant to collective life long after their political significance has diminished. The dangers of such a line of investigation are legion: sentimentalism, essentialism, the Heideggerian trap of vitalizing the relation between place and being.<sup>102</sup> Yet avoiding an explicit confrontation with the role of geography, however we may ultimately define it, in modern experiences of regionality seems willfully obtuse, an unnecessary avoidance of complications that can only enrich our understanding of the region.

In any case, there exists a body of scholarly literature with which historians might usefully engage, and that is the field of historical geography. Such an interdisciplinary move is certainly not unprecedented; historians have gone through a number of phases of engagement and disenchantment with the discipline, a process most obvious in the development of the Annales school. But in recent years, the debate among geographers over a “reconstructed regional geography” has outlined a number of issues that ought to concern historians as well.<sup>103</sup> A great deal of what passes as “regional history” simply uses the regional framework, in the words of Alexander Murphy, as a “backdrop for a discussion of regional change, with little consideration given to why the region came to be a socially significant spatial unit in the first place, how the region is understood and viewed by its inhabitants, or how and why that understanding has changed over time.”<sup>104</sup> Murphy’s argument, that one should not take geographical frameworks for granted, suggests that we could regard the specificity of places as the outcome of social and cultural processes interacting with physical environments. Places are not automatic contexts for collective life but created, self-reproducing, and non-deterministic ones. They constitute a “configuration, which delimits actions”; they are “resources to be manipulated in the creation, recreation and restructuring of the contexts in which people are made”—or make themselves.<sup>105</sup>

Regions understood in such a way might not turn out to be Saxony or Burgundy

<sup>102</sup> Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 15. Of the many discussions of postmodernity and place, see especially David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford, 1989), 201–307.

<sup>103</sup> For useful summaries of the debate, see Mary Beth Pudur, “Arguments within Regional Geography,” *Progress in Human Geography* 12 (1988): 369–90; Anne Gilbert, “The New Regional Geography in English and French-Speaking Countries,” *Progress in Human Geography* 12 (1988): 208–28; and R. J. Johnston, *A Question of Place: Exploring the Practice of Human Geography* (Oxford, 1991), 38–68. For a somewhat recent and comprehensive account of the intersections of history and geography, see William Norton, *Historical Analysis in Geography* (New York, 1984).

<sup>104</sup> Alexander Murphy, “Regions as Social Constructs: The Gap between Theory and Practice,” *Progress in Human Geography* 15 (1991): 23. He is referring not to the work of historians but to that of conventional regional geographers, but the charge has surprising force in a historiographical context as well.

<sup>105</sup> A. Warde, “Recipes for a Pudding: A Comment on Locality,” *Antipode* 21 (1989): 279–80;



or Catalonia, or they might. Beatrice Ploch and Heinz Schilling took the area of Hesse as their starting point for a study of how regions exist and function but remained open to other boundaries that might emerge from their research. They concluded that regions were not constituted politically but were rather “landscapes of action, of meaning, and of experience” with only shifting relations to the historical and administrative boundaries.<sup>106</sup> Wolfgang Lipp’s project at the University of Würzburg on “regional cultures and industrial society” understood regions as “spatially embedded, historically developed social life-worlds” and sought to move beyond political categories to what in other contexts has been called the history of everyday life. His collaborator Karl Rohe, who investigated the status of the Ruhr region as a meaningful spatial/regional category, believes that “one may speak of a regional culture, when the habitual orientations of thought, feeling, and action have through a historical process so distributed themselves that significant cultural distinctions come to exist between a region and its surroundings, no matter how difficult it may be to demonstrate them empirically.”<sup>107</sup> The effort to do so nevertheless seems eminently worthwhile, even if the results can never be certain.

What is at stake, then, in all the work this article has discussed (and much else that it has neglected) is the extent to which a renewed engagement with the regional level of experience—an engagement sensitive to the interactions of society, identity, and place—can productively destabilize our perceptions of European history. So many prescriptions for new directions in historical scholarship turn out to be unrealizable lists for unachievable syntheses that one is reluctant to add to them. Moreover, regions represent one of the most ambiguous of historical categories, even in this moment that finds ambiguity in all things. We have long had mechanisms for recognizing the existence of nations, but below the national level, unstable and abstract though it is, we take regions and localities as we find them and as we need them. At present, the study of regions has helped in some acknowledged and many more hidden ways to sustain a long and productive period of deconstructing many heretofore-existing historical narratives, the modernization narrative chief among them. It remains to be seen how a focus on the regional level of experience can help us once again to think big.

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Johnston, *Question of Place*, 68; Nigel Thrift, “For a New Regional Geography, 2,” *Progress in Human Geography* 15 (1991): 456–65.

<sup>106</sup> Beatrice Ploch and Heinz Schilling, “Region als Handlungslandschaft: Überlokale Orientierung als Dispositiv und kulturelle Praxis—Hessen als Beispiel,” in Lindner, *Die Wiederkehr des Regionalen*, 122–57.

<sup>107</sup> Wolfgang Lipp, ed., *Industriegesellschaft und Regionalkultur* (Cologne, 1984), ix; Karl Rohe, “Regionalkultur, regionale Identität und Regionalismus im Ruhrgebiet: Empirische Sachverhalte und theoretische Überlegungen,” in Lipp, *Industriegesellschaft und Regionalkultur*, 123.

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**Celia Applegate** is an associate professor of history at the University of Rochester. She is the author of *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (1990) and articles on regionalism and provincialism in the development of modern Germany. Applegate received her doctorate in 1978 from Stanford University, where she studied with James Sheehan and Paul Robinson. She is currently working on the role of music in German society.

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*AHR Forum*  
Culture, Power, and Place:  
The New Landscapes of East Asian Regionalism

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KÄREN WIGEN

IN EURASIA'S FAR EAST AS IN ITS FAR WEST, the end of the Cold War has put regionalism back on the map. Anchored in a prophetic future if not always in a documented past, emergent regions are being proclaimed everywhere from inner Asia to the Pacific Rim. Hong Kong may be the only place where official borders have been redrawn, but the geography of power in the whole region is evidently in flux. Quickening ties between Taiwan and the mainland, assertiveness along the industrializing Chinese coast, and calls for a new economic bloc around the Sea of Japan—coinciding with ethnic confrontations in Tibet and Xinjiang, a resurgent pan-Islamic movement, and the growing intellectual and economic clout of the diaspora Chinese around the world—have served to rivet global attention on the problematic boundaries of Chinese statehood and nationhood.<sup>1</sup> But the recent South Korean elections have drawn attention to fierce local loyalties on the peninsula as well, while calls for greater regional autonomy in contemporary Japan have their scholarly counterpart in calls for more polycentric perspectives on the Japanese past.<sup>2</sup>

East Asian historians come to this topic with a mixed record. On the one hand,

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<sup>1</sup> Recent collections on identity and regionalism in China include David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., *China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism* (London, 1994); Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993); David Shambaugh, ed., *Greater China: The Next Superpower?* (New York, 1995); Tu Wei-ming, ed., *China in Transformation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993); Tu Wei-ming, ed., *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today* (Stanford, Calif., 1994); Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini, eds., *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism* (New York, 1997). For a thoughtful analysis of a geographical category that informs many of these collections, see Harry Harding, "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations and Reservations," *China Quarterly* 136 (December 1993): 660–84.

<sup>2</sup> For sociological analyses of regionalism in contemporary South Korea, see Eui-Young Yu, "Regionalism in the South Korean Power Structure," in Eui-Young Yu and Terry R. Kandal, eds., *The Korean Peninsula in the Changing World Order* (Los Angeles, 1993), 123–44; and Byong-Je Jon, "Regionalism and Regional Conflict in Korea," in Kim Kyong-Dong and Su-Hoon Lee, eds., *Asia in the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects* (Seoul, 1990), 182–95. For a sample of the new "off-center" perspectives in Japanese history, see Donald Denoon, et al., eds., *Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern* (Cambridge, 1996).

our fields have been dominated in the postwar period by the same nationalist biases, as well as the same comparative paradigms (notably, modernization theory and Marxism) that have prejudiced our European counterparts against provincial places. Within East Asia itself, moreover, attitudes toward the provinces have been complicated by Cold War geopolitics. A regional historiography that flourished in 1930s Japan under the rubric of native-place studies (*kyōdoshi*), for instance, was denounced after the war as not only unscientific and unmodern but undemocratic as well. The provincial history (*chihōshi*) that displaced native-place studies subordinated the local to the national, denigrating attachment to place and recasting regional developments as mere reflections of national themes.<sup>3</sup> In Korea, during the same decades, the searing division of the peninsula appears to have trumped most other concerns, rendering regional difference within South Korea a seemingly trivial subject for most of the postwar period.<sup>4</sup> And in China, the Maoist agenda bluntly subordinated place to class. To unify China's diverse population into one great peasant-worker alliance, the revolutionary regime (like its Nationalist predecessor) for a time discouraged even the study of regional difference.<sup>5</sup>

Nonetheless, local history has an impressive pedigree in the historiography of East Asia, and American scholars who work on this part of the world are heirs to two rich traditions of regional analysis. The first basically subdivides the landscape on the basis of discrete cultural traits. This so-called formal approach to regions is one that resonates deeply with indigenous East Asian geography. Given the enormous ethnic and ecological diversity subsumed within the historical Chinese Empire, mapping out zones of distinct language and lifeways had a clear political utility on the continent, and the gazetteers compiled by local officials attest eloquently to the evolution of both formal regional differences and formalist regional discourse over the centuries. Japanese geography exhibits similar conventions. Despite its smaller size (and correspondingly narrower range of cultural differentiation), Japan is home to its own venerable tradition of regionalization on the basis of dialect and customs; a myriad of local differences is readily organized around the foundational categories of east and west, seen as grounded in ecology and prehistory but blossoming in the lively landscapes of urban culture in the Kantō and Kansai, respectively.<sup>6</sup> In the modern period, the project of mapping those traits has been taken up primarily by students of archaeology, linguistics, and folklore, but an implicit notion of cultural regions has been an intrinsic part of the local historian's vocabulary as well.

Parallel to this ethnogeographical paradigm has run a more social-scientific

<sup>3</sup> Kimura Motoi, "Kyōdoshi, chihōshi, chiikishi kenkyū no rekishi to kadai," in Asao Naohiro, *et al.*, eds., *Nihon tsūshi, betsumaki 2, Chiikishi kenkyū no genjō to kadai* (Tokyo, 1994), 3–32.

<sup>4</sup> Despite recent interest among sociologists and political scientists in the regional preferences and prejudices that mark Korean voting and employment patterns, cultural homogeneity across the peninsula is often assumed, and sometimes flatly asserted. For a critical discussion of this tendency, see Roy Richard Grinker, "Mourning the Nation: Ruins of the North in Seoul," *positions: east asia cultures critique* 3 (Spring 1995): 192–223, esp. 197–98.

<sup>5</sup> For a fuller discussion and references, see notes 43 through 45 below.

<sup>6</sup> For recent discussions of the east/west division in Japan, see Fukuda Ajio, "Yashiki to ie," in Tsukamoto Manabu, ed., *Nihon no Kinsei*, Vol. 8, *Mura no seikatsu bunka* (Tokyo, 1992), 41–72; Aoki Michio, ed., *Nihon no Kinsei*, Vol. 17, *Higashi to nishi, Edo to kamigata* (Tokyo, 1994); and *Kokuritsu Minzokugaku Hakubutsukan Kenkyū Hōkoku* 52 (1993), a special issue on Japanese regional culture.

variant of regional historiography: one that subdivides national space into functional rather than formal regions, defined on the basis of complementary exchange rather than uniform traits. In this approach, regions are envisioned as spheres of social and economic interaction, linking prosperous, densely populated cores to their poorer, resource-supplying hinterlands. In a casual form, this kind of modeling is widespread in the literature on Japan. Tokugawa economic history in particular is rife with references to “advanced” and “backward” regions, although their boundaries are rarely mapped.<sup>7</sup> In the China field, by contrast, a prolonged engagement with regional-systems theory has brought functional regions into much sharper focus.

The first regional-systems maps for China were drawn in the 1970s by anthropologist G. William Skinner, who insisted that the meaningful units of Qing imperial space were those of social interaction, not cultural similarity or political fiat.<sup>8</sup> Skinner’s “macroregions” were essentially physiographic units, shaped by the economics of transport; cores were located in downstream agrarian valleys, while peripheries were traced along the mountain ridges that defined watershed boundaries.<sup>9</sup> But Skinner added to this skeletal model a series of corollary propositions: that smaller regions were “nested” inside larger ones in a seven-step hierarchy; that each such region was centered on a village, town, or city that took its place in a corresponding hierarchy of central places; and that standard marketing areas, the smallest cells of this spatial grid, also constituted culture-bearing units. In the 1980s, he developed a related theory of periodization, asserting that regional development could be charted in terms of nested cycles of time.<sup>10</sup> Having been tested, expanded, refined, and debated continually for a quarter-century, Skinner’s elaborate regional-systems model has created a powerful framework (and foil) for research across the China field.<sup>11</sup>

American historians thus bring a dual legacy to the current conversation about regionalism in East Asia. Yet both formal and functional approaches have come in for serious rethinking in the past decade, challenged by the foregrounding of new questions about identity, memory, and power. Like their counterparts elsewhere, a

<sup>7</sup> One early exception is Gilbert Rozman, *Urban Networks in Ch’ing China and Tokugawa Japan* (Princeton, N.J., 1973). For a more extensive discussion of core-periphery models in the Tokugawa field, see Kären Wigen, “The Geographical Imagination in Early Modern Japanese History: Retrospect and Prospect,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 51 (February 1992): 3–29.

<sup>8</sup> G. William Skinner, ed., *The City in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif., 1977).

<sup>9</sup> It is seldom noted that the resulting regional-systems model is conceptualized in more exclusively economic terms than is the central-place model that Skinner was developing at roughly the same time. Whereas China’s urban hierarchy is theorized as a joint product of administrative fiats and marketing functions, the former are seen as largely irrelevant to the shaping of the regional map, whose contours are thus purported to be both more natural and more durable.

<sup>10</sup> The periodization theory, as well as the most compact and comprehensive statement of the regional-systems model, may be found in G. William Skinner, “Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 44 (May 1985): 271–92. For a more recent iteration, see Skinner’s introduction to Sow-Theng Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and Their Neighbors*, Tim Wright, ed. (Stanford, Calif., 1997), 1–18.

<sup>11</sup> Although macroregional maps of the sort delineated by Skinner for China have never been published for Japan, Skinner himself convened a team of Japanese and American scholars to apply his framework to the Nōbi region in central Honshū. Skinner’s map of Nōbi is reprinted, and his regional model critiqued, in Iwahashi Masaru, “Chihō keizai kōzō no chirigaku—‘kōki Nōbi chihōhen’ no bunseki,” in Shinbō Hiroshi and Saitō Osamu, eds., *Iwanami Nihon Keizaishi*, Vol. 2, *Kindai seichō no taido* (Tokyo, 1989), 219–66.

sizable cohort of scholars in Asian studies has begun trying “to construct a historical account of the development of meaning and to show how the activities of symbol-making, interpretation, and imaginative projection continuously interlock with the political and material processes of social existence.”<sup>12</sup> This agenda has recast familiar sources on regional history in a very new light.

Schematically speaking, the new literature on East Asian regions may be said to manifest three main strategies of methodological innovation. One approach starts with the cultural vocabulary of formal regions but proceeds to interrogate their discursive and affective dimensions. Rather than seeking objective criteria of regional identification, research in this vein analyzes subjective expressions of regional belonging by insiders—as well as the equally subjective expressions of regional stereotyping by outsiders.<sup>13</sup> This means grappling not only with observable differences of dialect or house-types but also with the elusive geographies of identity and ideology, morality and taste. Work of this sort typically emphasizes the constructedness of regional categories. In the process, it also reveals that the geographical imaginaries of natives and newcomers, sojourners and scholars are frequently at odds.<sup>14</sup>

A second approach takes as its starting point the core-periphery model of functional analysis but explores the role of both agency and contingency in the patterning of regional exchange. In this view, peripheries are not given but made, and the metropole-hinterland relationship is both more fluid and more dynamic than regional-systems theory would suggest. Economic historians working in this new paradigm have questioned the determining role of topography, arguing that regional formations are in fact shot through with politics.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, cultural historians have questioned Skinner’s equation between marketing networks and culture-bearing units. New findings suggest that ethnic solidarities and religious networks do not always conform neatly to the contours of production and trade, and show that the political periphery has often been construed as a cultural “counter-core” in its own right.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (New York, 1992), 5. I am indebted to Louise Young for bringing this passage to my attention.

<sup>13</sup> Marcia Yonemoto, for instance, shows how even the driest depictions of the physical landscape of Tokugawa Japan—whether in maps, travel writing, or popular fiction—were deeply inscribed with cultural values, fusing local sentiments with a more placeless literati elitism. Yonemoto, “Mapping Culture in Eighteenth-Century Japan” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1995).

<sup>14</sup> Work in this genre is already extensive, and numerous examples are cited in the survey that follows. For one provocative meditation on this approach, see Emily Honig, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850–1980* (New Haven, Conn., 1992).

<sup>15</sup> Examples include Kenneth Pomerantz, *The Making of a Hinterland: State, Society, and Economy in Inland North China, 1853–1937* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993); and Kären Wigen, *The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750–1920* (Berkeley, 1995).

<sup>16</sup> Thus Jeffrey C. Kinkley, for instance, writes that “the frontier situation reveals both the genius and the limitations of Skinner’s seminal core/periphery dichotomy.” *The Odyssey of Shen Congwen* (Stanford, Calif., 1987), 290, n. 21. For related responses to Skinner’s regional-systems model, see Barbara E. Ward, “Regional Operas and Their Audiences: Evidence from Hong Kong,” in David Johnson, et al., eds., *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley, Calif., 1985); R. Keith Schoppa, “Contours of Revolutionary Change in a Chinese County, 1900–1950,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 51 (November 1992): 770–96; Schoppa, *Blood Road: The Mystery of Shen Dingyi in Revolutionary China* (Berkeley, 1995), 6; Helen F. Siu, “Recycling Tradition: Culture, History, and Political Economy in the Chrysanthemum Festivals of South China,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32 (October 1990): 765–94, esp. 786–90; Helen R. Chauncey, *Schoolhouse Politicians: Locality and State during the*



Building on these imaginative reworkings of the formal and functional models, a third strategy focuses on the role of regional identity as a social force. Questioning the assumption that local loyalty has historically impeded national unity (and otherwise interfered with the modernization agenda), researchers who adopt this approach are likely instead to emphasize its integrative potential. But whether it has been deployed for nationalist or secessionist purposes, and whether called upon to boost economic development or to resist it, native-place sentiment is construed here as a form of cultural capital. The key issue becomes, "What work does regionalism perform?"<sup>17</sup> Posing the question in these terms points a way toward transcending the formal/functional dichotomy entirely.

Together, I argue, these three strategies make up the key innovations behind recent scholarship on East Asian regional dynamics. Since many studies draw on a combination of the three, however, categorizing individual authors by approach would be misleading. The remainder of the present essay accordingly takes a different tack, surveying the landscape of East Asia in a roughly geographical and chronological progression. Examples are drawn mainly from works on nineteenth and twentieth-century China and Japan, with briefer forays into Taiwan and Hong Kong.

It should be noted at the outset that the terrain of this study skews its findings in a significant way. Compared to most countries in the late twentieth century, those discussed in this essay have relatively old, dense national formations. China, Korea, and Japan are among the most venerable nations in the world; although their boundaries have shifted over time, and the style of their imagining has been continually debated, the notion of nationhood has resonated long and deeply with the majority of each country's inhabitants. This produces a sense of region quite different from what might be encountered elsewhere in Eurasia or in Africa, where national space is often complicated to a greater degree by cross-cutting affiliations from a colonial or pre-colonial past.<sup>18</sup>

This caveat has two further implications. First, regionalism in contemporary East Asia is typically articulated in a localist rather than a nationalist vocabulary.<sup>19</sup> Political separatism is clearly at issue in the formerly independent Okinawa and in the non-Han areas of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Elsewhere, however, statehood is not generally at stake, and regionalism is expressed primarily in a cultural register. Secondly, it follows that East Asian regionalism has been relatively

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*Chinese Republic* (Honolulu, 1992), 28, 47; Wen-hsin Yeh, *Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism* (Berkeley, 1996), 262, n. 3; Jonathan N. Lipman, "Hyphenated Chinese: Sino-Muslim Identity in Modern China," in Gail Hershatter, et al., eds., *Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain* (Stanford, 1996), 97–112, 100; Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Comparing 'Incomparable' Cities: Postmodern L.A. and Old Shanghai," *Contention* 5 (Spring 1996): 69–90, 87; and Helen F. Siu and David Faure, "Conclusion: History and Anthropology," in Faure and Siu, eds., *Down to Earth: The Territorial Bond in South China* (Stanford, 1995), 209–24, esp. 217–18.

<sup>17</sup> I am indebted to Donald Nonini for this formulation. An extended case for this approach is made by Bryna Goodman in her recent book, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853–1937* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995). See also Emily Honig, *Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919–1949* (Stanford, Calif., 1986).

<sup>18</sup> I am indebted to an anonymous reader for this observation.

<sup>19</sup> David S. G. Goodman, "The Politics of Regionalism: Economic Development, Conflict and Negotiation," in Goodman and Segal, *China Deconstructs*, 1–20, 16.

conducive to commercialization. In Japan and Taiwan, and lately on the mainland as well, local color has proven to be a lucrative marketing tool, and regional identity today is increasingly manifested in commodified forms. This commercialization of place has antecedents, in Japan at least, that date to the early modern era. But in recent years, it has advanced rapidly throughout Pacific Asia, with the result that symbols of local distinctiveness are coming to function much like corporate logos. The resurgence of regionalism may be the outcome of multiple forces, but in this part of the world, the market is unquestionably one of the most important.

The end point of our survey is thus a landscape where regional identities seem to be converging in similar directions, appearing more often as a resource for both nationalist and capitalist interests than as a threat to either. But our starting point is another world altogether. For the localisms that are being deployed in similar ways from Shanghai to Tokyo today in fact have very different histories. If recent research tells us anything, it is that period and place have applied distinctive torques to regional dynamics across this heterogeneous terrain.

FOR THE QING ELITES, heirs to a vast and polyglot empire, regional difference is now understood to have been seen as both a civilizational process and a political problem. The spatial imaginary of the literati elites painted the imperial landscape in shades of moral virtue, with the most brilliant hues reserved for the lower Yangtze Valley. With its exemplary traditions of Confucian learning and filial piety, female footbinding and widow suicide, the wealthy Jiangnan region (or at least its "middle counties") maintained a conceit of moral centrality that neatly matched its position at the empire's economic core.<sup>20</sup> The Manchu rulers mapped the moral landscape differently, however. Criticizing the commercialized Yangtze Delta as decadent, effeminate, and courtesan-riddled, they located the favored virtues of warrior society—virility, honesty, and simplicity—in the Manchurian homeland.<sup>21</sup> Yet the two visions were in some ways more complementary than competitive. Both held that it was a basic obligation of the state to radiate a positive moral influence outward from the center, and both Manchu and Han elites (female as well as male) participated in the civilizing project of the Qing.<sup>22</sup>

But recent work argues that cultural interaction was not a one-way process of "Sinification." Despite an impressive degree of integration among the empire's literate elites,<sup>23</sup> local diversity under the Qing remained profound. Interaction with

<sup>20</sup> Susan Mann, *Precious Records: Women in China's Long Eighteenth Century* (Stanford, Calif., 1997), 221; Yeh, *Provincial Passages*, 47. On the fifteenth-century origins of this phenomenon, see Katherine Carlitz, "Shrines, Governing-Class Identity, and the Cult of Widow Fidelity in Mid-Ming Jiangnan," *Journal of Asian Studies* 56 (August 1997): 612–40.

<sup>21</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Manchus* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

<sup>22</sup> Mann, *Precious Records*, 44, 212–16. William T. Rowe, "Education and Empire in Southwest China: Ch'en Hung-mou in Yunnan, 1733–38," in Alexander Woodside and Benjamin A. Elman, eds., *Education and Society in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994), 417–57.

<sup>23</sup> Evelyn S. Rawski argues that late imperial China enjoyed greater cultural integration than did early modern France, due to greater diffusion of literacy skills, greater possibilities for upward mobility through education, and less separation between town and village. Rawski, "Problems and Prospects," in Johnson, *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China*, 399–417. See also Rawski, "A Historian's Approach to Chinese Death Ritual," in James L. Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski, eds., *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China* (Berkeley, Calif., 1988), 20–34.

new environments and peoples during the great southward push of the Han peoples continued to bring new ethnic enclaves inside "China proper" throughout the late imperial era.<sup>24</sup> Some scholars argue that the state deliberately maintained local differences among its subjects. In the view of John Fitzgerald, "the Empire tolerated variety among localities because it feared mass horizontal communication of the kind we now associate with political nationalism."<sup>25</sup> But even where provincial elites took pains to integrate their territories culturally into the empire, the effects could be paradoxical, sometimes protecting deviant practices under a patina of Confucian norms or imperial cults.<sup>26</sup> And while "civilizing the barbarians" may have been the only sanctioned cultural dynamic along the settlement frontier, indigenous ways are now known to have been readily assimilated by Chinese immigrants, altering everything from agriculture and diet to marriage practices and footbinding traditions.<sup>27</sup> When Hokkien men married aborigine women in eighteenth-century Taiwan, for instance, these in-marrying Chinese males often adopted aborigine customs, dress, and speech, even though their sons might later "re-sinify to claim the prestige and connections advantageous in a Han-dominated social environment."<sup>28</sup> Nor can the cultural dynamics of empire be reduced to a two-way flow between the Han and their neighbors. As is now becoming clear, the Qing frontiers were the site of multilateral intercourse among various non-Han peoples as well.<sup>29</sup>

The one universal principle of place-based identity that historians have documented across this vast and varied canvas was a profound intertwining of geography and genealogy. What mattered in imperial China was less one's place of residence than one's ancestral home; gazetteers would typically boast about the virtues of native daughters before mentioning the contributions of adoptive sons.<sup>30</sup> Native-place associations were prominent features of every commercial emporium in the nineteenth century, sustaining ancestral identities among the sojourning elite over generations—and creating a domestic counterpart to the "portable localisms" that are such a striking feature of the overseas diaspora today.<sup>31</sup> But the link between

<sup>24</sup> Stevan Harrell, ed., *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle, 1995); John E. Herman, "Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain System," *Journal of Asian Studies* 56 (February 1997): 47–74.

<sup>25</sup> John Fitzgerald, "'Reports of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated': The History of the Death of China," in Goodman and Segal, *China Deconstructs*, 21–58, 28.

<sup>26</sup> For conflicting views of this process, see James L. Watson, "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T'ien Hou ('Empress of Heaven') along the South China Coast, 960–1960," in Johnson, *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China*, 292–324; and Michael Szonyi, "The Illusion of Standardizing the Gods: The Cult of the Five Emperors in Late Imperial China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 56 (February 1997): 113–35. Prasenjit Duara analyzes a similar dynamic in "Superscribing Symbols: The Myth of Guandi, Chinese God of War," *Journal of Asian Studies* 47 (November 1988): 778–95.

<sup>27</sup> This process is brilliantly documented in Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History*, 31–40.

<sup>28</sup> John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600–1800* (Stanford, Calif., 1993), 386–87.

<sup>29</sup> Piper Rae Gaubatz, *Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), 23. For a fascinating study of multicultural frontier dynamics from the perspective of the earlier Tanguts, see Ruth W. Dunnell, *The Great State of White and High: Buddhism and State Formation in Eleventh-Century Xia* (Honolulu, 1996).

<sup>30</sup> Yeh, *Provincial Passages*, 46.

<sup>31</sup> For a critical overview of the literature on native-place networks, see Emily Honig, "Native Place and the Making of Chinese Ethnicity," in Hershatter, *Remapping China*, 143–55. See also Linda Cooke Johnson, ed., *Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China* (Albany, N.Y., 1993).

genealogy and geography took different forms in different places, depending in part on state policy. In the southern and coastal regions, where the indigenous populations had little status under the Qing, a plausible Han identity was indispensable to social mobility. As a result, virtually all powerful lineage groups claimed at least one ancestor (spurious or otherwise) from the north China heartland.<sup>32</sup> In the northern and western territories, by contrast, indigenous ethnic identities retained more prestige. Proud memories of past empires ruled by the Manchu, Mongol, Uighur, and Tibetan peoples were kept alive through what Eleanor Rawski calls the “deliberate multiculturalist policies” of the Qing, who codified the languages and cultivated the lineages of these formerly independent peoples in elaborating their own charter myth.<sup>33</sup>

In the waning decades of the empire, many of these ethnic-cum-regional identities became potential flashpoints for rebellion. New patterns of industrialization and trade disrupted the economic networks that had sustained the Qing economy, provoking new territorial solidarities that contributed to the empire’s disintegration. In the process, some historians now argue, the macroregions delineated by Skinner effectively broke down. Surging export markets for tea, silk, and cotton reached deep into the interior, prompting massive migrations, turning former centers of privilege into resentful backwaters, and summoning forth whole new regions centered on the booming treaty ports.<sup>34</sup> At the same time, local claims came to be brandished against the center. Opposition was galvanized not only along the empire’s frontier, where minority faiths sometimes fostered alternative political allegiances,<sup>35</sup> but even in areas of the Han heartland that now fell victim to what Kenneth Pomeranz calls “regional triage.”<sup>36</sup>

Yet, even in this explosive environment, regionalism could be a resource for national unity. Elizabeth Perry aptly characterizes the politics of place as “a two-edged sword that both opened possibilities and set boundaries to the development of collective action.”<sup>37</sup> In Shanghai, as Bryna Goodman has shown, immigrant merchants and mill workers alike rallied with co-regionalists for the nationalist cause, activating native-place ties toward such diverse ends as industrial investment

<sup>32</sup> Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History*, 40; Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy*, 526, n. 107; Helen F. Siu and David Faure, “Conclusion: History and Anthropology,” in Faure and Siu, *Down to Earth*, 209–24.

<sup>33</sup> Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 55 (November 1996): 829–50; Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley, Calif., 1998). For a trenchant rejoinder to the multiculturalist thesis, see Ping-Ti Ho, “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing,’” *Journal of Asian Studies* 57 (February 1998): 123–55.

<sup>34</sup> For instance, see Kwan-Man Bun, “Mapping the Hinterland: Treaty Ports and Regional Analysis in Modern China,” in Hershatter, *Remapping China*, 181–93; Antonia Finnane, “The Origins of Prejudice: The Malintegration of Subei in Late Imperial China,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (April 1993): 211–38; Yeh, *Provincial Passages*, 52–56.

<sup>35</sup> On the role of Christian missions and Islamic schools in fostering militant regional identities in southwestern China in the later 1800s, see Alexander Woodside and Benjamin A. Elman, “Afterword: The Expansion of Education in Ch’ing China,” in Woodside and Elman, *Education and Society in Late Imperial China*, 525–60; Siu-woo Cheung, “Millenarianism, Christian Movements, and Ethnic Change among the Miao in Southwest China,” in Harrell, *Cultural Encounters*, 217–47.

<sup>36</sup> Pomeranz, *Making of a Hinterland*, 15, 275.

<sup>37</sup> Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford, Calif., 1993), 30.

and famine relief, factory strikes and anti-Japanese boycotts.<sup>38</sup> Others have documented how the early revolutionary movement was nurtured in the fluid culture of the southern coast, with Guangdong and Shanghai serving as radical counter-cores to Beijing;<sup>39</sup> shown how intellectuals were propelled into political activism in part by profound disruptions to their learned sense of place;<sup>40</sup> and uncovered the key role of ethnic bonds among the highly dispersed and mobile Hakka population in the Communists' "Long March" from local to national power.<sup>41</sup> In fact, it is now clear that local loyalties and spatially organized solidarities informed the nation-building project at every step. The Chinese may not have been a "nation of provincials" in the German sense,<sup>42</sup> but the prolonged process of calling a modern, united China into being—in the imagination as well as on the ground—was advanced from particular provincial locations and drew deeply on local attachments.

For most of the twentieth century, however, the notion that local loyalties could contribute positively to the nationalist project has been deeply heretical. Since the warlord era of the 1920s, if not before, regionalism has been widely equated with feudalism.<sup>43</sup> To the Nationalists, even folklore studies was "a dangerous field, promoting local cultures in the face of the government's official view of a monolithic Chinese culture."<sup>44</sup> For the Communists, the issues were more complex. The early revolutionary movement celebrated minority and regional culture as an alternative to the authoritarian elitism of Beijing.<sup>45</sup> But once in power, the revolutionary regime embarked on a rigid containment of regional and ethnic difference. One of its first steps was to establish an inventory—and map—of recognized ethnic groups.<sup>46</sup> In practice, however, central oversight was more extensive in the newly designated minority districts than anywhere else. Moreover,

<sup>38</sup> Bryna Goodman, "The Locality as Microcosm of the Nation? Native Place Networks and Early Urban Nationalism in China," *Modern China* 21 (1995): 387–419; Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*.

<sup>39</sup> Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (Oxford, 1989), chap. 8; Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley, Calif., 1991), 14–18; Ming K. Chan, "A Turning Point in the Modern Chinese Revolution: The Historical Significance of the Canton Decade, 1917–27," in Hershatter, *Remapping China*, 224–41; Antonia Finnane, "A Place in the Nation: Yangzhou and the *Idle Talk* Controversy of 1934," *Journal of Asian Studies* 53 (November 1994): 1150–74; Yeh, *Provincial Passages*, 208.

<sup>40</sup> Yeh, *Provincial Passages*, 5.

<sup>41</sup> Mary S. Erbaugh, "The Secret History of the Hakkas: The Chinese Revolution as a Hakka Enterprise," *China Quarterly* 132 (December 1992): 937–68. See also Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History*, 85.

<sup>42</sup> The phrase is from Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990).

<sup>43</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, 1995), chap. 6; Arthur Waldron, "Warlordism versus Federalism: The Revival of a Debate?" *China Quarterly* 121 (March 1990): 116–28; Fitzgerald, "'Reports of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated,'" 21–58.

<sup>44</sup> Lucien Miller, "General Introduction," in Miller, ed., *South of the Clouds: Tales from Yunnan* (Seattle, 1994), 13.

<sup>45</sup> Chang-tai Hung, *Going to the People: Chinese Intellectuals and Folk Literature 1918–1937* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).

<sup>46</sup> On the process of reviewing claims to minority status under the early revolutionary regime, see the essays by Charles McKhann, Norma Diamond, and Shelley Rigger in Harrell, *Cultural Encounters*. See also Stevan Harrell, "Ethnicity, Local Interests, and the State: Yi Communities in Southwest China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32 (July 1990): 515–48.



it was not long before the regime went on the offensive against most kinds of inherited spatialities. Native-place associations were outlawed and even physically dismantled, and a cellular grid of production units displaced the organic geographies of neighborhood and village. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, the campaign for national conformity moved inside the household itself, as the young activists who fanned out across the countryside struggled to bring the most intimate practices of dress, speech, and ritual in line with Beijing norms.<sup>47</sup>

The economic reforms enacted since 1978 have in some ways reversed that momentum, fueling a resurgence of regional pride—as well as regional prejudice.<sup>48</sup> Recent visitors find local culture being revived (or invented) throughout the country, in everything from folklore revivals to radio shows, theme parks to beauty parlors.<sup>49</sup> Even minority religious beliefs are finding sanctioned outlets for public expression. Since 1990, Mongols from across China have made pilgrimages to the Chinggis Khan Mausoleum in Ordos.<sup>50</sup> And in both coastal Fujian and interior Yunnan, local forms of music, dance, and costume associated with Taoist ceremonies are being revived, albeit in some cases packaged in secular frameworks for marketing to tourists.<sup>51</sup>

A number of forces contribute to the new accent on local difference. Chinese artists and writers have turned to the poorer peripheries as a sort of counter-core, tapping the customs and consciousness of the non-Han peoples for a more authentic, more sensual, or simply more exotic sensibility.<sup>52</sup> At the same time, market practices have also encouraged a celebration of difference. As several scholars note, the spread of commerce has dramatically reconfigured the landscape of status in the Chinese world, turning regional color into a valuable commodity. In addition, the spectacle of wealth in the “special economic zones,” with their close links to the overseas Chinese (through popular culture as well as investment flows), has turned first Guangdong and now Shanghai into centers of cultural prestige that rival Beijing.<sup>53</sup> Finally, the Chinese state has its own reasons for promoting local

<sup>47</sup> Shih-chung Hsieh, “On the Dynamics of Tai/Dai-Lue Ethnicity,” in Harrell, *Cultural Encounters*, 301–28; Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).

<sup>48</sup> On the latter, see Emily Honig, “Invisible Inequalities: The Status of Subei People in Contemporary Shanghai,” *China Quarterly* 122 (June 1990): 273–92; and Elizabeth J. Perry, “Labor’s Battle for Political Space: The Role of Worker Associations in Contemporary China,” in Deborah S. Davis, et al., eds., *Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China* (Cambridge, 1995), 302–25.

<sup>49</sup> Dru Gladney, “Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference,” in William A. Joseph, ed., *China Briefing 1994* (Boulder, Colo., 1994), 171–92; David S. G. Goodman and Feng Chongyi, “Guangdong: Greater Hong Kong and the New Regionalist Future,” in Goodman and Segal, *China Deconstructs*, 177–201; Vivienne Shue, “State Sprawl: The Regulatory State and Social Life in a Small Chinese City,” in Davis, *Urban Spaces in Contemporary China*, 90–112, esp. 95.

<sup>50</sup> Almaz Khan, “Chinggis Khan, From Imperial Ancestor to Ethnic Hero,” in Harrell, *Cultural Encounters*, 248–77.

<sup>51</sup> Kenneth Dean, “Topologies of Power: Regional Ritual Systems in Southeast China,” *positions: east asia cultures critique* (forthcoming); Norma Diamond, “Defining the Miao,” in Harrell, *Cultural Encounters*, 92–116.

<sup>52</sup> On the continuing search for cultural “counter-cores” in the literature of China’s peripheries, see Kinkley, *Odyssey of Shen Congwen*, 16, 278; Kam Louie, ed., *Strange Tales from Strange Lands: Stories by Zheng Wanlong* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993); and Leo Ou-fan Lee, “On the Margins of the Chinese Discourse: Some Personal Thoughts on the Cultural Meaning of the Periphery,” in Tu, *Living Tree*, 221–43.

<sup>53</sup> On the contemporary reordering of the social meanings of space, see Helen F. Siu, “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Difference in South China,” in Tu, *China in Transformation*, 19–43; Mayfair

difference. According to culture critic Jing Wang, leisure consumption has been identified by the post-Deng regime as a crucial motor for the reformed Chinese economy, and state agencies now take an active role in marketing regional distinctions to entice tourist travel.<sup>54</sup> The result is a landscape where popular culture is saturated with contradictory political meanings. To flaunt the speech or style of the provinces may be a way of participating in state-sponsored consumption, yet it may also be a way of flouting Beijing's vision of what it means to be Chinese.

What the alternative vision might be is, of course, open to debate. Edward Freidman, who derides Maoism as the product of an impoverished, parochial, peasant north, hails the free-wheeling commercialism and multiculturalism of the south as the authentic heir of China's cosmopolitan traditions.<sup>55</sup> Harvard's Tu Wei-Ming advances a similar view, holding up the commercial and democratic ethos of the Chinese diaspora as a new model for Chinese national identity, articulated "from the periphery."<sup>56</sup> But Arif Dirlik—who wryly notes that Tu's "periphery" is now part of the global capitalist core—counters these visions with yet another map: one in which southern China's true legacy includes a long tradition of radical thought and activism.<sup>57</sup> Clearly, regional rhetoric in contemporary China is not just about regions; it is also a forum for debating the nation's past and for staking claims to its future.<sup>58</sup>

AT THE CRUX OF THIS DEBATE lie Taiwan and Hong Kong, two of the most peculiar anomalies of global geographic taxonomy. Taiwan is both more and less than a nation-state. While rhetorically laying claim to the entire territory of the former Qing empire, historically Taiwan is but one small region of China, upgraded to provincial status only in the nineteenth century. In Hong Kong, meanwhile, an odd combination of financial dominance and political dependence creates a different sort of paradox. Both islands support diverse immigrant populations, and in both places, decades of foreign rule have left a contradictory legacy of colonialism and cosmopolitanism.<sup>59</sup> Not surprisingly, scholars see the imagining of regional com-

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Mei-Hui Yang, "Mass Media and Transnational Subjectivity in Shanghai: Notes on (Re)cosmopolitanism in a Chinese Metropolis," in Ong and Nonini, *Ungrounded Empires*, 287–319; and Xin Liu, "Space, Mobility, and Flexibility: Chinese Villagers and Scholars Negotiate Power at Home and Abroad," in Ong and Nonini, *Ungrounded Empires*, 91–114.

<sup>54</sup> Jing Wang, "Public Culture and Popular Culture: Metropolitan China at the Turn of the Century," *positions: east asia cultures critique* (forthcoming). See also Stevan Harrell, "Jeeping against Maoism," *positions: east asia cultures critique* 2 (Fall 1994): 177–249.

<sup>55</sup> Edward Freidman, "A Failed Chinese Modernity," in Tu, *China in Transformation*, 1–18; Freidman, "Reconstructing China's National Identity: A Southern Alternative to Mao-Era Anti-imperialist Nationalism," *Journal of Asian Studies* 53 (February 1994): 67–91.

<sup>56</sup> Tu Wei-Ming, "Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center," in Tu, *Living Tree*, 1–34.

<sup>57</sup> Arif Dirlik, "Critical Reflections on 'Chinese Capitalism' as Paradigm," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 3 (January 1997): 303–30.

<sup>58</sup> For an account that explicitly links the two regional cultures with contrasting varieties of cosmopolitanism—a "northern model" that was authoritarian-hieratic, and a "southern model" that was democratic-populist—see Yi-Fu Tuan, *Cosmos and Hearth: A Cosmopolite's Viewpoint* (Minneapolis, 1996), 68.

<sup>59</sup> On the debate over whether or not to preserve the architecture of occupation in contemporary Taiwan, see Marshall Johnson, "Making Time: Historic Preservation and the Space of Nationality,"

munity in Taiwan and Hong Kong as both freighted and fraught. As of the late 1990s, both islands' sense of place appeared to be very much under construction.

One of the most provocative recent meditations on this process is Ackbar Abbas's *Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance*. If Hong Kong in the twentieth century has had a regional identity, Abbas argues, it is essentially a "floating" one. A postcolonial city without a pre-colonial past, and one whose population has always consisted mainly of expatriates and refugees, Hong Kong for Abbas is "not so much a place as a space of transit."<sup>60</sup> Only on the eve of its "disappearance" in 1997 did the culture of Hong Kong become the object of intense interest. Analyzing the recent rush to define Hong Kong, Abbas discerns three main "temptations," associated respectively with the local, the marginal, and the cosmopolitan. Against these, he advocates a transnational localism that frankly acknowledges the island's character as a hybrid and unstable place. Like the argot of the streets (and of the new Hong Kong cinema)—a pastiche of Cantonese and Mandarin, with elements of Japanese, Taiwanese, and English thrown in—that which is local in Hong Kong is also intrinsically international, and it "mutates right in front of our eyes."<sup>61</sup>

Taiwanese regionalism may seem stolid by comparison, but there, too, identities are mutating rapidly. Scholarship on Taiwanese social solidarities has historically emphasized the aggressive native-place loyalties that made the map of the mainland more salient than the island's own geography for most inhabitants' sense of place. Continual feuding between the different lineage groups from the mainland, and between Chinese immigrants and some ten different aboriginal peoples, kept Taiwanese society violently divided for over a century.<sup>62</sup> It has been pointed out that Japanese imperialism galvanized a sense of common interests among the islanders. But in their half-century of rule, the Japanese also systematically attacked Taiwanese culture, not least by enforcing the use of Japanese language in the schools. Moreover, liberation from the Japanese was quickly followed by the arrival of a new wave of mainlanders in 1949. Wealthy, well-educated, and profoundly conservative, the Nationalists who took over the Taiwanese government undertook to "re-Sinicize" the island's earlier immigrants, imposing Mandarin dialect and a classical education on an often resentful populace. Settling predominantly in and around the northern capital of Taipei, the newcomers also sowed the seeds of Taiwan's first truly *local* regionalism, pitting a Mandarin north against a "Taiwanese" south.<sup>63</sup>

To judge from recent accounts, southern Taiwan's vernacular culture is emerging as a medium for challenging the hegemony of the Nationalist regime. Flouting the

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positions: *east asia cultures critique* 2 (Fall 1994): 177–249; for similar debates in Hong Kong, see M. Ackbar Abbas, *Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance* (Minneapolis, 1997), chap. 4.

<sup>60</sup> Abbas, *Hong Kong*, 4. On the "composite" cultural identity of Hong Kong's Chinese community, see also Helen F. Siu, "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Difference in South China," in Tu, *China in Transformation*, 29.

<sup>61</sup> Abbas, *Hong Kong*, 28.

<sup>62</sup> Mark A. Allee, *Law and Local Society in Late Imperial China: Northern Taiwan in the Nineteenth Century* (Stanford, Calif., 1994).

<sup>63</sup> Stevan Harrell and Huang Chun-chieh, "Introduction: Change and Contention in Taiwan's Cultural Scene," in Stevan Harrell and Huang Chun-chieh, eds., *Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan* (Boulder, Colo., 1994), 1–18.

power and prestige of elite Taipei style, a new strain of pop culture revels in the dialects and folk beliefs of the island's southern residents. Yet the same region's songs and speech are also being appropriated as symbols of a more inclusive Taiwanese national identity.<sup>64</sup> Observers are of mixed minds about the political subtexts of the "new Taiwanese nativism." Philosopher Karl Ning of National Central University in Taipei, writing under the pseudonym A. Taiwaner, charges that the imagined community is being supplanted by an imaginary community. "The nativist spaces in the urban areas," he complains, "(whether it is the nativist section of a newspaper, television advertisements or programs, stores selling nativist wares, nativist snack shops, nativist bars, nativist publications, etc.) are all imagined, and are all fictitious products of a nativist consciousness."<sup>65</sup> Yet, whether they are condoned or condemned, the fact that mutations of regional identity are taking place under historians' very eyes has drawn attention not only to their changeability but also to the ideological and commercial processes implicated in their formation.<sup>66</sup>

The view from contemporary Japan is strikingly similar. There, too, local identities are marked and marketed throughout the archipelago today. Whether packaged as native or exotic, and whether deployed to promote train travel or prefectural pride, local color on the Japanese archipelago is constantly on display. And as in both Taiwan and the PRC, analysts have been quick to discern the hand of both the state and the market behind this process.<sup>67</sup> The main difference may be that Japanese regionalisms have a longer history of being exploited in this way. As Constantine Vaporis has shown, the infrastructure of official transport established in the seventeenth century by the Tokugawa rulers soon came to support a popular "culture of movement." Commoners typically took to the roads for pilgrimage, but their excursions came to sport all the trappings of modern tourism: route maps and guidebooks, souvenirs and brothels, landscape prints and literary works celebrating famous places.<sup>68</sup>

Travel and the literature of travel thus contributed to a hallmark of Japanese early modernity, national integration. Stimulated by the Pax Tokugawa (and particularly by the "alternate attendance" rule requiring local lords to commute semi-annually between their home fiefs and Edo), commodities, information, and people alike came to circulate throughout the archipelago in networks that grew

<sup>64</sup> Allen Chun, "From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and State Formation in Postwar Taiwan," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 31 (January 1994): 49–69; Thomas B. Gold, "Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity," in Harrell and Huang, *Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan*, 47–68.

<sup>65</sup> A. Taiwaner, "Pseudo-Taiwanese: Isle Margin Editorials," *positions: east asia cultures critique* 4 (Spring 1996): 165.

<sup>66</sup> Shih-chung Hsieh, "Tourism, Formulation of Cultural Tradition, and Ethnicity: A Study of the Daiyan Identity of the Wulai Atayal," in Harrell and Huang, *Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan*, 184–202; P. Steven Sangren, *History and Magical Power in a Chinese Community* (Stanford, Calif., 1987), 194–95.

<sup>67</sup> Jennifer Robertson, "It Takes a Village: Internationalization and Nostalgia in Postwar Japan," in Stephen Vlastos, ed., *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan* (Berkeley, Calif., 1998), 110–32; Marilyn Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan* (Chicago, 1995); Kären Wigen, "Politics and Piety in Japanese Native-Place Studies: The Rhetoric of Solidarity in Shinano," *positions: east asia cultures critique* (Winter 1996): 491–518.

<sup>68</sup> Constantine Nomikis Vaporis, *Breaking Barriers: Travel and the State in Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).

more extensive and more elaborate over time.<sup>69</sup> But as Mary Elizabeth Berry has pointed out, national integration had a paradoxical by-product in a growing awareness of sub-national distinctions.<sup>70</sup> Localities might be steadily incorporated into the larger realm, but a sense of local difference could be heightened in the process. Indeed, Luke Roberts argues that, until the Meiji era, the primary referent of the term “nation” (*kuni*) for most Japanese was the local domain or province—and the concept of “national prosperity” was first developed by merchants who sold domainal specialties on the Edo market. Only after 1868, Roberts insists, was the rhetoric of “national prosperity” and “national interest” that developed in this competitive inter-domainal arena transferred to the imperial realm as a whole.<sup>71</sup>

Recent work thus complicates an earlier modernization narrative that portrayed Meiji nationalism as a simple outgrowth of Tokugawa integration. We now know that the new regime invested considerable energy after 1868 in dismantling inherited spatial units (from the village on up) and redirecting territorial solidarities toward its own, rationalized administrative grid.<sup>72</sup> Yet neither can the making of a new social and political geography in the early Meiji years be seen as strictly a top-down project. On the one hand, the state was frequently frustrated by local resistance. Brian Platt shows how school-district boundaries were renegotiated on the ground as parents and teachers resisted nationally imposed norms.<sup>73</sup> On the other hand, where the new units did take hold, more credit was often due to local boosters than to central ideologues. Forced to compete with more distant localities for scarce public funds, regional elites frequently found their own interests served by mobilizing residents’ loyalties along the new prefectural lines.<sup>74</sup>

Indeed, competitive boosterism may have been one of the primary forces channeling modern Japanese regionalism in integrative rather than oppositional directions. In twentieth-century Japan, only Okinawan identity has sustained a consistent subversive charge; elsewhere, regional difference has been expressed essentially as variations on a national theme. If wartime propaganda played up native-place attachment as a form of patriotism, postwar ad campaigns promoting native-place nostalgia have bolstered national identity in a different way. One might say that, whereas the language of class unity was deployed to cover regional difference in Mao’s China, the dynamic in postwar Japan was reversed: there, regional identities served to mute disparities of class (as well as to cover or

<sup>69</sup> Moriya Katsuhisa, “Urban Networks and Information Networks,” Ronald P. Toby, trans., in Chie Nakane and Shinzaburō Ōishi, eds., *Tokugawa Japan: The Social and Economic Antecedents of Modern Japan* (Tokyo, 1990), 97–123.

<sup>70</sup> Mary Elizabeth Berry, “Was Early Modern Japan Culturally Integrated?” *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1997): 547–81.

<sup>71</sup> Luke S. Roberts, *Mercantilism in a Japanese Domain: The Merchant Origins of Economic Nationalism in 18th Century Tosa* (Cambridge, 1998).

<sup>72</sup> Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, N.J., 1985); Michio Umegaki, *After the Restoration: The Beginning of Japan’s Modern State* (New York, 1988); Umegaki, “From Domain to Prefecture,” in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, eds., *Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji* (Princeton, 1986), 91–110.

<sup>73</sup> Brian Platt, “School, Community, and State Integration in Nineteenth-Century Japan” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1998).

<sup>74</sup> Kären Wigen, “Constructing Shinano: The Invention of a Neo-traditional Region,” in Vlastos, *Mirror of Modernity*, 229–42.



compensate for the steady “cosmopolitanization” of lifeways across the archipelago).<sup>75</sup>

An ethnographic base-map of Japanese regions thus continues to have widespread salience, both in scholarship and in everyday life. As in the China field, however, the utility of this ethnographic map is being questioned. Recent work reveals that Japanese artists and writers have long inverted the received model of metropole and hinterland, seeking in the mountains of Kumano or the streets of Osaka the same kind of cultural “counter-cores” that their Chinese contemporaries have located among the Mongols or the Miao.<sup>76</sup> And intellectual historians and anthropologists have undertaken a sustained critique of folklore studies, showing its geographical categories to be as much ideological as anthropological in origin.<sup>77</sup> Meanwhile, a growing body of Japanese historians is busy recasting the early history of the archipelago in multicultural and polycentric terms. Inspired by medievalist Amino Yoshihiko, this group challenges the teleological narrative of “the rise of the Yamato state” by demonstrating that different parts of the Japanese islands maintained distinct centers of authority well into recent times.<sup>78</sup> We now know that these outlying centers were sustained in part by a highly decentralized or “translocal” geography of exchange, linking different parts of the Japanese island chain directly to their nearest neighbors abroad.<sup>79</sup>

Overall, research on the successively more centralized regimes from Tokugawa to Taisho thus echoes the same themes that we have encountered in the China field. The new vision of regional dynamics is one that acknowledges more initiative and innovation in the hinterlands,<sup>80</sup> that treats the core itself as a region,<sup>81</sup> that locates

<sup>75</sup> William Kelly, “Finding a Place in Metropolitan Japan: Ideology, Institutions, and Everyday Life,” in Andrew Gordon, ed., *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), 189–238.

<sup>76</sup> Nina Cornyetz, “Nakagami Kenji’s Mystic Writing Pad: or, Tracing Origins, Tales of the Snake, and the Land as Matrix,” *positions: east asia cultures critique* 3 (Spring 1995): 224–54; Oda Sakunosuke, *Stories of Osaka Life*, Burton Watson, trans. (New York, 1990). On Osaka as a refuge from Kantō cultural style for novelist Tanizaki Junichirō in the early twentieth century, see Masao Miyoshi, *Off Center: Power and Culture Relations between Japan and the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 134–35.

<sup>77</sup> The critique of folklore studies (*minzokugaku*) is advanced in J. Victor Koschmann, et al., eds., *International Perspectives on Yanagita Kunio and Japanese Folklore Studies* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985); Alan S. Christie, “The Making of Imperial Subjects in Okinawa,” *positions: east asia cultures critique* 1 (Winter 1993): 607–39; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “The Invention and Reinvention of ‘Japanese Culture,’” *Journal of Asian Studies* 54 (August 1995): 759–80; and Mariko Asano Tamanoi, “Gender, Nationalism, and Japanese Native Ethnology,” *positions: east asia cultures critique* 4 (Spring 1996): 59–86, among others.

<sup>78</sup> For summaries of this work in English, see Amino Yoshihiko, “Deconstructing Japan,” *East Asian History* 3 (June 1992): 121–42; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Reinventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (Armonk, N.Y., 1998); and Denoon, *Multicultural Japan*.

<sup>79</sup> Entry points into the now vast literature in Japanese on this topic include Arano Yasunori, et al., eds., *Ajia no naka no Nihonshi* (Tokyo, 1992); Asao Naohiro, et al., eds., *Nihon Tsūshi*, Vol. 2, *Chūikishi kenkyū no genjō to kadai* (Tokyo, 1994); and Kikuchi Isao, *Hoppōshi no naka no kinsei Nihon* (Tokyo, 1991). In English, see *Acta Asiatica* 67 (August 1994), a special issue on “Foreign Relations of Tokugawa Japan: Sakoku Reconsidered.” On the Japan Sea region and its links to the continent in the modern period, see Furushima Tadao, “‘Omote Ajia’ no ‘Ura Nihon,’” *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* 610 (September 1990): 50–52; Abe Tsunehisa, *Kindai Nihon chihō seitōshi ron—‘Ura Nihon’-ka no naka no Niigata-ken seitō undō* (Tokyo, 1996); Abe, “San’in chihō no ‘Ura Nihon’ ka ni tsuite no oboegaki,” *Shakai Kagaku Tōkyū* 42 (March 1997): 171–96.

<sup>80</sup> David L. Howell, *Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society, and the State in a Japanese Fishery* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995); Richard Torrance, “Literacy and Modern Literature in the Izumo Region, 1880–1930,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 22 (Summer 1996): 327–62.

<sup>81</sup> Henry D. Smith II, “The Floating World in Its Edo Locale, 1750–1850,” in Donald Jenkins, ed.,

the nation squarely in its Asian context,<sup>82</sup> and that puts politics back into the picture of regional identity.<sup>83</sup>

AS THIS BRIEF INVENTORY SUGGESTS, recent research on China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan reveals regional space to be more fluid than we had previously suspected. Understood increasingly as a process rather than a product, the regional map has been effectively set in motion. One consequence of this view is a looser conception of the ties between region and environment. Rather than being ecologically determined, both the uniform zones of ethnogeography and the functional spheres of regional systems appear now as more elastically linked to their ecological moorings, with economy, politics, and culture continuously reshaping the relationship between a region's inhabitants and their environment. Another consequence is a fundamental rethinking of the terms "core" and "periphery." A new recognition that cultural interaction at the frontiers has contributed to the making of core cultures themselves—and a new appreciation of the ways in which political margins can be turned into cultural counter-cores—turn up in every national literature reviewed here.

The challenge now, I believe, is to integrate this more fluid conception of the region into a broader geo-historical vision: one where regional dynamics are articulated to those of both larger and smaller social units. On the one hand, this means moving "outward," exploring the ways in which regions are embedded in national and transnational networks—and revisiting regional rhetoric for its cosmopolitan as well as its communitarian messages. By my reading, this kind of agenda is already informing the best new work in East Asian studies. Just as the subregions of Japan are increasingly conceptualized in terms of their distinctive overseas ties, so nation-building and class solidarity in China are increasingly conceived as rooted in native-place networks. But more has been done to link regions with nations than to bridge the sub-national with the transnational. We know little, for instance, about how such overarching geographical categories as Islam or Christendom, Asia or the Pacific, Greater China or Global Capitalism relate to more local solidarities. Yet here, too, there are promising starts. Research by Arif Dirlik, Prasenjit Duara, and Pekka Korhonen, among others, shows that even the grandest of geographical visions are voiced from particular locations, whose centrality and prosperity they are typically designed to enhance.<sup>84</sup> More work

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*The Floating World Revisited* (Honolulu, 1995), 25–46; Marcia Yonemoto, "Nihonbashi: Edo's Contested Center," *East Asian History*, forthcoming; Jinnai Hidenobu, *Tokyo: A Spatial Anthropology*, Kimiko Nishimura, trans. (Berkeley, Calif., 1995).

<sup>82</sup> David L. Howell, "Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of the Early Modern Japanese State," *Past and Present* 142 (1994): 69–93; Kären Wigen, "Bringing the World Back In: Meditations on the Space-Time of Japanese Early Modernity" (unpublished manuscript in author's possession).

<sup>83</sup> Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Creating the Frontier: Border, Identity, and History in Japan's Far North," *East Asian History* 7 (June 1994): 1–24; Brett Walker, "Matsumae Domain and the Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Tokugawa Expansionism, 1593–1799" (PhD dissertation, University of Oregon, 1997).

<sup>84</sup> Arif Dirlik and Rob Wilson, eds., *Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production* (Boulder, Colo., 1995); Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900–1945,"

on the different mental maps conveyed by pan-Asian or pan-Pacific rhetoric, and on the particular pathways through which this rhetoric is disseminated, would bring these dynamics into sharper focus.

On the other hand, the call for a fuller geo-historical vision also means moving “inward” to the local spaces of everyday life. At issue here is how regional identities are produced around the dinner table or on the shop floor—and, conversely, how regional dynamics help to produce particular domestic forms or workplace relationships. The work of exploring these dynamics has just begun, and we lack as yet the basis for comparative theoretical statements about the ways in which micro-level and meso-level social processes are yoked. But recent research suggests some promising places to look. Households in particular are attracting attention, as sites for the transmission of regional cultures but also as sites where regional identities can be fundamentally transformed. The East Asian literature points to at least three avenues through which these transformations can take shape: language acquisition, marriage practices, and domestic labor.

Instances of dialect change illuminate the role of language learning as a bridge between household dynamics and regional identity. One such case is the spread of samurai dialects from uptown Edo among the commoner classes during the Tokugawa period. Samurai speech (a key element of today’s standard Japanese) is said to have diffused among the city’s commoners only after well-to-do merchant girls came to be routinely placed in the service of warrior households during their adolescence. Returning to the merchant quarters to marry, these women would pass on the speech habits of their social superiors to their children, gradually transforming the vernacular of one status group into a cross-class regional dialect.<sup>85</sup> The household appears as a site for language change of a different kind in the Manchu banner communities of China. Despite considerable investment by the Qing in maintaining Manchu identity among the bannermen, who were scattered in urban enclaves around the empire, most lost their mother tongue after a few generations. Pamela Crossley tells us this is because girls were denied access to Manchu education. As unschooled females gradually assimilated the language of the Chinese neighborhoods in which they resided, and passed these dialects on to their children, local variants of Chinese effectively became the bannermen’s mother tongue.<sup>86</sup>

Marriage practices form another link between the household and the region, and an equally dynamic one. Consider the unusual marriage systems that evolved along the Taiwanese frontier and in the Pearl River Delta during the early twentieth century. On Taiwan, a perpetual surplus of male migrants created serious competition for wives. Well-to-do parents responded by adopting a future bride for their son while the two were still children—an anomalous practice whose main advantage may have been to give the mother-in-law a firm hand in her daughter-in-law’s

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*AHR* 102 (October 1997): 1030–51; Pekka Korhonen, *Japan and Asia Pacific Integration: Pacific Romances 1968–1996* (London, 1998).

<sup>85</sup> Nishiyama Matsunosuke, *Edo Culture: Daily Life and Diversions in Urban Japan, 1600–1868*, Gerald Groemer, trans. (Honolulu, 1997), 35–36.

<sup>86</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Manchu Education,” in Woodside and Elman, *Education and Society in Late Imperial China*, 340–77.

upbringing.<sup>87</sup> The Canton Delta, meanwhile, became notorious during the same decades for a diametrically opposed development: delayed marriage, and even non-marriage, among rural women. This equally unusual practice was made possible by a high demand for female labor in the silk thread factories, but may have been influenced by traditions of relative gender equality among the area's indigenous Tai populace as well.<sup>88</sup> In both cases, the new marriage practices had important implications for regional identity. Both the "child marriage" institution on Taiwan and the "marriage resistance" pattern in Guangdong have been central to the way American historians (and at least some indigenous observers) defined both areas as regions.<sup>89</sup>

A third nexus linking the region and the household is economic production. Textiles and foodstuffs, in particular, have historically served as mainstays of domestic economy and as symbols of regional identity throughout rural East Asia. Inevitably, this has meant that regional identities carry strong class connotations. Susan Mann documents how this worked in eighteenth-century China, where women's household handicrafts were conventionally ranked according to a "hierarchy of place." Rough materials, such as cotton, hemp, and straw, were identified both with poor women and with poor regions; elite women from the wealthy Yangtze Delta, by contrast, worked exclusively with silk, esteeming embroidery as the most refined handicraft of all.<sup>90</sup> Emily Honig discovers a different conflation of class and place in twentieth-century Shanghai, where immigrants from Subei—an impoverished region north of the Yangtze—were invariably relegated to the bottom of the occupational ladder, and "Subei swine" became the standard epithet hurled at anyone who was dirty or vulgar.<sup>91</sup> As this example reveals, the link between locality and labor is not confined to work carried out within the household. Tellingly, taxonomies of courtesans and prostitutes in China have also historically been organized on the principle of native place. According to Gail Hershatter, the venerable practice of ranking prostitutes by region—and of ranking regions according to the purported qualities of their sexual workers—remains alive and well in Shanghai today.<sup>92</sup>

These examples are essentially anecdotal, but together they offer three methodological pointers for future research. First is the importance of attending to the family as a locus for the transmission and transformation of regional identities. To be sure, we know little as yet about how regional identities are engaged at other local-level sites, such as the street, the workplace, or the school. All of these deserve further exploration. Yet my impression, at least, is that the household has been the

<sup>87</sup> Ying-Chang Chuang and Arthur P. Wolf, "Marriage in Taiwan, 1885–1905: An Example of Regional Diversity," *Journal of Asian Studies* 54 (August 1995): 781–95.

<sup>88</sup> Janice E. Stockard, *Daughters of the Canton Delta: Marriage Patterns and Economic Strategies in South China, 1860–1930* (Stanford, Calif., 1989).

<sup>89</sup> Agnes Smedley's escort in Canton, a young Lingnan Christian University professor who studied the silk industry, told her that the women of the Canton delta were "notorious throughout China as Lesbians." Smedley, *Portraits of Chinese Women in Revolution* (Old Westbury, N.Y., 1976), 105.

<sup>90</sup> Mann, *Precious Records*, 160.

<sup>91</sup> Honig, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity*.

<sup>92</sup> Gail Hershatter, *Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth-Century Shanghai* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997), 54, 347–48. For related observations, see Mann, *Precious Records*, chap. 5. On courtesans as regional icons in the past, see Wei Minghua, "The Thin Horses of Yangzhou." Antonia Finnane, trans., *East Asian History* 9 (June 1995): 47–66.

essential “capillary” of regional reproduction, the level at which distinctive patterns of speech, labor, and sociability have been both forged and lost. Further investigation on this front would surely be worthwhile. Related is the focus on intimate spaces, which points toward new ways to link the geographical vocabulary of regional analysis with such sociological abstractions as class, gender, and generation. Beyond simply mapping out the distribution of sex, age, or income differentials across space, historians increasingly want to analyze the processes by which these cross-cutting categories both enable and constrain regional history as a whole. Developing an appropriate analytical language for this task may occupy regional historians for another generation. Finally, these cases remind us that micro-level change does not merely represent the working-out of macro-level forces. If even the household, that most local of geographical spaces, is an arena of dynamism in its own right, then the linkage between regional history and biography is truly a two-way street. It follows that turning to such personal sources as fiction and memoirs may be another important avenue for supplementing our understanding of how regions are made, as well as how they are perceived.

In these and other ways, recent work in East Asian history opens up not only new views of the past but new horizons for the future as well. A generation of energetic scholarship has revolutionized the regional canvas, revealing a vibrant local landscape with complex ties to both larger and smaller social units, and giving rise to a host of new questions about geographical process. Whatever form the answers may take, continued research on the region seems certain to remain on the historical agenda for this part of the world for many years to come.

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**Kären Wigen**, who trained in geography at the University of California, Berkeley, is the Jack H. Neely Associate Professor of History at Duke University. After completing her first book, *The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750–1920* (1995), she co-authored a wide-ranging study of Western geographical constructs with Martin Lewis, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (1998). Her current project explores the geopolitics and geopoetics of regional rhetoric in Japan’s Nagano Prefecture from the 1890s to the 1990s.



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*AHR Forum*  
On Observing the Quicksand

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MICHAEL O'BRIEN

FORTY OR SO YEARS AGO, "the regional historian [was] likely to be oppressed by a sense of his unimportance" and to believe his moment was passing before the pressure of sweeping nationalisms.<sup>1</sup> Feeling unimportant is something of a character trait for Southerners in American culture, but this pessimism proved not to be prescient, although the vitality of the regionalist idea has remained conflicted and uneven. Of late, historians of the American West have grown more interested in the idea, and the Midwesterners show signs of life, but the New Englanders are mostly indifferent, and those in the "Middle States" long since gave up the ghost. As usual, the Southerners have been most eager, most endowed with regional organizations, study centers, periodicals, publishers, tourist pilgrimages, and bric-à-brac. Indeed, the South seems often to be looked to by other regions as a model of how to invent and sustain an identity, when the Western by comparison seems diffuse and the Midwestern etiolated.<sup>2</sup> So a historian of the American South comes to these articles on European and Asian regionalism with mixed feelings, greatly pleased to see such intelligent synthesis, but mildly puzzled at the notion that all this is news. In Mississippi, regionalism is not "a less-than-familiar perspective."

Professor Applegate skillfully rehearses the multifarious ways in which regionalism can be understood. Many echo how Southern history has been configured. Seeing locality as a safely subsidiary form of nationalism was the meaning of Henry Grady's "New South" and the "local-color" school of the late nineteenth century, while Howard Odum and his disciples around the 1930s published big, fat books on American and Southern regionalisms. Earlier, there had been Southerners, such as John C. Calhoun, who spoke of "Southern rights" but were Unionist, and who thought localism to be an underpinning of a federal nationality. There had been others, secessionists such as Jefferson Davis, who concluded that American nationalism had failed and who grounded a new state on a different landscape of localities. Abraham Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address described the South as the site of the reactionary and counter-revolutionary, and many Southerners have thought him right and watched their neighbors for the un-American thing. That national politics is an aggregation of particularist politics was something James

<sup>1</sup> "The Irony of Southern History" (1952), in C. Vann Woodward, *The Burden of Southern History*, rev. edn. (Baton Rouge, La., 1968), 187.

<sup>2</sup> For a brief overview, see Edward L. Ayers, Patricia Nelson Limerick, Stephen Nissenbaum, and Peter S. Onuf, *All over the Map: Rethinking American Regions* (Baltimore, Md., 1996).

Madison knew and V. O. Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* argued in 1949. C. Vann Woodward's *Origins of the New South, 1877–1913* (1951) contended that the South became a colonial economy of the North. William Faulkner grasped the problem of "multiplicity and fragmentation," and there is a whole literature on "the idea of the South," which might be described as "constructivist." Placing the South in the story of modernization has been going on for thirty years or more, as have books on the invention of nationality, tradition, and region, mostly before Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. Southerners have even had the concept of the "post-Southern" for about twenty years, and they begin to have an intimation of a connection between regionalism and multiculturalism. Black Southerners and white Southerners, in their differing but interconnected ways, know a little of regionality as victimhood, the latter having buried their dead at Shiloh, the former having cut down their strange fruit. As to the tension between professionalized scholars and local erudites, most Southernists have a file of letters from vigilant women in Vicksburg and annoyed men in Alabama, who are not slow to correct one's misunderstandings of General Sherman or Great-great-uncle Beauregard.<sup>3</sup>

So it is tempting to say that Southerners have been there, done that, and got lots of T-shirts, with images of Monticello, Appalachian springs, Robert Johnson, the Stars and Bars, and Delta weddings. In fact, they might be slightly dismayed to discover how trendy Southern understandings might be. They have found it energizing to be out of step; the opportunities for indignation are so many, remembering that regions die without a certain quota of misanthropy about the opinions held of them somewhere else. Indeed, this Southern habit of mind is now so old that it may be drifting into senescence. If Applegate is right that regionalism is all the rage in Europe (and I think her only half-right), it is a little tired in the American South, and the intellectual conviction of its pertinence is probably weaker now than a half-century ago; it may have become more subtle, analytically more sophisticated, but this may be the Owl of Minerva at dusk. My own recent experience is that it is hard to persuade people that region is a profitable way to structure American history, when race, class, and gender compete as useful categories of analysis, more firmly lodged in minds. Not unexpectedly, we do not

<sup>3</sup> Documenting all these standpoints would amount to a bibliography of modern Southern historical literature, but, by way of illustration, see, on Grady and local color, Wayne Mixon, *Southern Writers and the New South Movement, 1865–1913* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980); on Odum, as well as a Southern "constructivism," Michael O'Brien, *The Idea of the American South, 1920–1941* (Baltimore, Md., 1979); on Calhoun, Irving H. Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun: A Biography* (New York, 1993); on Davis and nationalism, Paul D. Escott, *After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism* (Baton Rouge, La., 1978); on Lincoln, Garry Wills, *Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America* (New York, 1992); on Madison, Lance Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995); on Key, Milton C. Cummings, ed., *V. O. Key, Jr., and the Study of American Politics* (Washington, D.C., 1988); on internal colonialism, Gavin Wright, *Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War* (New York, 1986); on Faulkner, Daniel J. Singal, *William Faulkner: The Making of a Modernist* (Chapel Hill, 1997); on modernization, Jack Temple Kirby, *Rural Worlds Lost: The American South, 1920–1960* (Baton Rouge, 1987); on inventing the South, Frank E. Vandiver, ed., *The Idea of the South: Pursuit of a Central Theme* (Chicago, 1964); on the postmodern, Lewis P. Simpson, "The Closure of History in a Postsouthern America," in *The Brazen Face of History: Studies in the Literary Consciousness in America* (Baton Rouge, 1980), 255–76; on multiculturalism, William L. Andrews, Minrose C. Gwin, Trudier Harris, and Fred Hobson, eds., *The Literature of the American South: A Norton Anthology* (New York, 1998).

now have Southern history, so much as we have (for example) women's history that happens to be located in the South. Identities have to be alert to survive.

One thing a Southern historian has learned is that, if one moves "region" from the realm of "objective" reality to what Professor Wigen calls the "subjective expressions of regional belonging," one has to give perception a history. It helps to interrogate how the idea of "region" has evolved.<sup>4</sup> As both authors suggest, it is a vague and flexible term, but its commodiousness runs deep. The word, after all, arises from the Latin *regere*, to rule, and early came to mean a place capable of being governed. But almost anything can be governed, from a cow to an empire. So "region" did not necessarily mean a political domain, and size was irrelevant, as it often was in pre-modern usages; a "continent" might once have meant something large like Asia but also something tiny, a spit of land. But bodies, too, had regions (arms, kidneys, the seats of humors), and so did the unearthly. John Milton's Satan asks in the Hall of Pandemonium, "Is this the Region, this the Soil, the Clime . . . That we must change for Heav'n[?]"<sup>5</sup>

All this persists until very late. If anything, the word tended to become vaguer, the further it drifted from its Latin root. One can see this in American usage in the nineteenth century, including that of the South. Thomas Dew, president of the College of William and Mary, wrote in 1841, "Perhaps the most royal road to woman's heart is through the region of the intellect."<sup>6</sup> Striking is that, of the many usages of the word, the scarcest is the one deployed in these essays. Historians casually refer to the South as a "region" before the Civil War, but the term is anachronistic and was not then deployed by Southerners to describe the whole South. It meant something smaller, the Piney Woods or the Blue Ridge Mountains or the city of Charleston. So George Frederick Holmes in 1849 spoke of "the tide-water region of Virginia," as we still might.<sup>7</sup> This usage was relational but had little implication of dependence; one might have regions without a whole, and parts might relate without one having sovereignty. With no core, there is no periphery. It had been the hope of the American political experiment to achieve union without centralization, and most antebellum Southerners understood the United States precisely as a collectivity of parts in which none, especially not the federal government, was dominant, but all were freely cooperative. It was the death of this political idea in the Civil War that made it possible to describe the South as a "region," for it reconfigured the United States as a nation-state, with subsidiary divisions. But even in the late nineteenth century, the usage of "region" was uncommon and did not become usual until after World War I.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> I confine myself to its usage in the English and American languages, even though clearly there are formidable problems in dealing, as these essays do, with other cultures, whose languages use other words to describe what is here translated into "region" and so necessarily mean different things.

<sup>5</sup> John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Book 1, lines 242–44.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas R. Dew to B. Franklin Dew, May 10, 1841, Dew Family MSS, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.

<sup>7</sup> George Frederick Holmes to William Campbell Preston, March 6, 1849, Preston Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.

<sup>8</sup> It is my impression that it was much used by newly national businesses, to categorize their divisional organizations. But also significant were the various scientific disciplines such as geology, which were concerned to map the American landscape; the U.S. Geological Survey divided the country into regions.

This chronology seems to accord with, at least, British usage. By imitation from the French, “regionalism” begins to appear in the 1880s, though infrequently and (as the *Edinburgh Review* put it) “inharmoniously.” The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives the first reference to Applegate’s primary meaning of region—“a relatively large subdivision of a country for economic, administrative or cultural purposes that frequently implies an alternative system to centralized organization”—in *The Future of Local Government* by G. D. H. Cole, the English socialist, in 1921.<sup>9</sup> Planning was important here; countries needed scientific management, and regions were rational units of governance, clever mediations between what a sensible planner might want and the inconvenient atavisms of awkward Bretons, Catalans, or Georgians. Howard Odum and Harry Estill Moore wrote in *American Regionalism* (1938) of “the new science of the region” and of “practical planning.”<sup>10</sup> But one could not have this sense of region until after the consolidation of the nation-state, which was the long work of the nineteenth century, continued in our own day. Nor could one have that other sense of region, which is relevant to its Asian usage, as a geographical aggregation of nations within a world system. Region came to radiate from the nation, upward and downward.<sup>11</sup>

All this suggests a caution. Applegate confines herself to the period after 1945, by which time “regions” and “regionalism” had become accepted, if disputed, categories. Yet many of her historical actors refuse the label, even now. Very few Scots would accept a description of Scotland as a “region,” including those who do not vote for the Scottish Nationalist Party. I am half-Scottish and would not, perhaps the more so as the other half is Cornish and remembers not only Culloden but also the rebellion of 1497, when the English and Henry VII defeated a Cornish army on Blackheath. (True, I had to look up the date, but grievances are the more forceful for being vague.) Wigen’s essay rightly speaks of very old historical identities in Asia, hard to fit into these newfangled categories, but it is scarcely less so in Europe. The trouble is that continuities are so mixed with instabilities, not especially but markedly in our own times. New nations appear only to disappear, enclaves raise flags, bombs explode. Asia has changed immensely in the last several generations; in Tibet, India, Vietnam, Hong Kong, the lineaments of political identities have shifted, and nationality itself has been invented. In Europe, the Soviet Union has come and gone, Italy develops fissures, the Balkans struggle into uncertain forms, the map of Central and Eastern Europe is almost unrecognizable from what it was a generation ago. Even in Britain, that Burkean place, it becomes doubtful that the United Kingdom will remain united for much longer; Ulster’s fate is uncertain, a Scottish parliament has reappeared, and the English do not know who they are; newspapers publish subtle articles about the legality of secession, just like in Canada, just like once in South Carolina.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, the European Union

<sup>9</sup> *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2d edn. (Oxford, 1989), 18: 510–12.

<sup>10</sup> Howard W. Odum and Harry Estill Moore, *American Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical Approach to National Integration* (1938; rpt. edn., Gloucester, Mass., 1966), 3.

<sup>11</sup> The invention of the region, in turn, mandated the invention of the “subregional.” On this, see Michael O’Brien, “Finding the Outfield: Subregionalism and the American South,” *Historical Journal* 38 (December 1995): 1047–56.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, “England, Whose England: It May Not Come Naturally, But Devolution Is Going to Force The English to Come to Terms with a Nebulous Sense of Identity,” *Financial Times* (September 30, 1998): 14.

reconfigures itself with complicated and little-understood swiftness and, at the very least, seems to have rendered the idea of national sovereignty moot, without quite establishing a greater European federal nationality, although its possibility tends to sanction conjectural talk of European parts as "regions."

Applegate and Wigen, of course, know all this, better than I do. Yet their analyses quieten it all, because the language of regionalism is a language of stability and limited volatilities. Those who use it tend to be saying, "Yes, we belong one to another, we connect, but let's discuss the terms of belonging." They admirably deal in the nuances of stability, what have been or ought to be the relationships between core and periphery, the nation-state and its regions, the strong and the weak, but they presume that there should be or has been a reciprocal relationship. Applegate more than Wigen flings this presumption into the far past, into times when the modern word "regionalism" would have been meaningless to those then living. Her tone is mildly irritated or amused with those who seek to upset matters. She smiles at "a thicket of Basques, Slovenes" etc., and frowns at "murderous separatist movements." But as we know, one man or woman's political murder is another's act of patriotism. Applegate is for the big picture and wants to "productively stabilize our perceptions of European history," which is hard to do, when the damn people keep rearranging Europe and do not agree on its structure, when *their* perceptions are unstable, quicksilver. She wants us to think big, when all the regionalists want to think small. There is a dissonance.

Perhaps part of the problem is that writing from within American culture about Europe and Asia tends to suggest a stabler world than anyone in Belfast, Split, Lhasa, Seoul, or St. Petersburg/Petrograd/Leningrad/St. Petersburg might be experiencing. The United States is one of the few places in the world where the nation-state seems incontestable. Hardly anywhere else on the planet has a polity over 200 years old and boundaries stable for more than a century. And this attitude is present, despite the fact that only about a third of the states of the U.S. are there by free consent. Perhaps one day, the Chicanos will want to expel the Americans from the lands seized from Mexico in the 1840s or the Inuits may rise up to claim the Alaska bought without their consent, just as Louisiana was purchased. There are, to be sure, fringe groups who want a Southern nation and do "not hesitate to advocate secession and self-rule for the Southern states."<sup>13</sup> At Civil War battle reenactments, there are booths that sell charming little images of Lincoln with a red bullet hole in his forehead, on which are emblazoned the ancient slogan, "Sic Semper Tyrannis." But, on the whole, the American republic has managed to turn empire into a stable, consensual polity. So, in the United States, region accepts the permanence of the nation-state, although even here the strength of regionalism is roughly in proportion to a history of a problematic relationship to the federal government. Hence this is, perhaps, a good place to conceptualize regionalism, but a poor place from which to imagine what region might mean elsewhere. Indeed, I suspect that the new availability of the language of regionalism in Europe and Asia may be partly due to the cultural influence of the United States, whose political language is now so broadly available and serves to reinforce the regionalist concept

<sup>13</sup> Michael Hill, "The Southern League Mission Statement," which can be read at the web site of the Southern League of Georgia at <http://www.mindspring.com/~slga/index.html>.



at the same moment that it has validated the efficiency of supermarkets. Applegate and Wigen are certainly discerning an indigenous movement in foreign cultures, but they may also be listening to an echo of American ideology.<sup>14</sup> For Americans seem to stand on solid ground, but most people in the world write about these matters as the quicksand approaches, recedes, or closes about them.

<sup>14</sup> A recent American article about England, for example, speaks of “the other regions that make up Britain—Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland”: Warren Hoge, “Has England Lost Its Identity? Or Just Its Clichés?” *New York Times* (October 14, 1998): A4. The *Financial Times* article cited above, however, nowhere applies the words “region” or “regionalism” to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—it speaks of “the smaller parts of the UK”—but only to a conjectural administrative division of England into “regions whose dimensions no one can agree upon.”

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**Michael O'Brien** is Phillip R. Shriver Professor of History at Miami University (Ohio) and, concurrently, the Senior Mellon Scholar in American History at the University of Cambridge. He has written extensively on the intellectual history of the American South: his books include *The Idea of the American South, 1920–1941* (1979), *A Character of Hugh Legaré* (1985), and *Rethinking the South: Essays in Intellectual History* (1988). O'Brien writes regularly for the *Times Literary Supplement*.

VICENTE L. RAFAEL

THERE IS “LITTLE CERTAINTY AND LESS CONSENSUS,” writes Celia Applegate, about the meaning of the word “region” where Europe is concerned, while in East Asia there is similarly a long and unsettled history of debating just what exactly counts as “regional,” observes Kären Wigen. The fundamental ambiguity of the regional in both areas owes something to its historical role as a social diacritic. It sets off and distinguishes one place or people from another from the point of view of a third, a setting off that also involves the deployment of such temporal markers as “classical,” “feudal,” or “modern.” As both essays make clear, the “region” is that which can alternately or simultaneously appear in various guises: politically as an administrative unit, culturally as an ethnic enclave or linguistic community, economically as zones of production and exchange. It is that which figures the local, the parochial, and the particular in contrast to the national, the cosmopolitan, and the general. As such, it has tended to be seen as backward if not reactionary from the vantage point of the nation-state and urban elites. Yet it has also been valorized as the locus of civilizational authenticity and nostalgic longings, the location of a desirable otherness rendered exotic and available for sacralization as well as commodification. The regional, then, has been neither just symbolic nor just material but both at the same time, circulating in the imagination as much as in the marketplace. For this reason, it has served in a prosthetic capacity as the essential supplement of post-Enlightenment and postcolonial modernity.

In any and all cases, the regional only comes into view comparatively: vertically related to that which seeks to maintain and subsume it, such as the empire, the nation-state, or the metropole; and horizontally in a relation of complementarity and conflict with other regions. Rather than think of regions as sovereign or autonomous entities, Applegate’s and Wigen’s essays suggest the historical persistence of regimes of regionalities: ways of making and unmaking the peripheral relative to the core, thus practices of locating and relocating the local that are constitutive of and never merely additive to the centers of power.

The practice of spacing implied by regionalisms, however, has also complicated the claims of powerful centers. The indefiniteness of its ontology, the porousness of its borders, and the mobility of its geographical location have made the regional ineluctably unstable and arguably destabilizing. Thus has it also furnished sites for surprising insurrections and recalcitrant alterities. For whatever else the local might seem in various discourses of regionalism, it acts to designate some other place,

indeed the very place (and displaceability) of otherness itself. It is in this sense an agent for anticipating the arrival of certain possibilities. Small wonder, then, that the local in all its particularities tends to be regarded by those outside it as the source of potential crisis. As both essays point out, regionalisms in whatever ideological register call out for the domestication of the regional and its conversion into resources, as Wigen says, for “nationalist and capitalist interests.” “What is at stake, then,” Applegate reminds us, in recent work on regionalism is a “renewed engagement with the regional level of experience . . . [that] can productively destabilize our perceptions of European history.” And, no doubt, the histories of other meta-regions as well.

It is in the spirit of seeking to “destabilize”—and thereby localize—the regionalisms of meta-regions that I offer the following reflections on one of the more important sites for the study of regions and regionalism in the United States: area studies. Having emerged in the midst of World War II and developed throughout the postwar period, area studies resonates with the contradictory impulses of the regionalisms detailed by Applegate and Wigen above. For example, the institutionalization of area studies was propelled by the canonization of modernization theory in American social sciences and policy circles as an instrument for the spread of U.S. hegemony. Yet area studies has also provided critical spaces for generating opposition to imperial interventions, especially in such places as Indonesia and Vietnam, and for calling into question the reification of disciplinary boundaries in American universities at a time when American society itself was undergoing radical changes in its economically peripheral and racially minoritized regions. While bits of modernization theory continue to inform some aspects of area studies (especially among those who call for its abolition in the name of grand theories of rational choice and free markets that see local differences as obstacles to be overcome), counter-currents have also existed analogous to those cited by Applegate and Wigen. Influenced by writers as diverse as Clifford Geertz, Ranajit Guha, and James Scott, for example, a growing number of area studies scholars have tended to shift their focus from the modernization of local differences to understanding the various strategies for localizing modernity. In this latter view, modernity is seen less as the future condition toward which everyone is headed than as a set of events whose coming to pass takes place in contingent, infinitely variable ways. Like the practices of mapping that Wigen and Applegate describe, the myriad translations and transformations of modernity into regional idioms come about as contested and open-ended processes whose outcomes are never entirely predictable.

The vernacularization of modernity in ways that elude the comprehension of any single global agency reopens the question of what it means to be “modern” in the wake of the Cold War, when nation-states are daily reconfigured by the pressures of a borderless marketplace on the one hand and the emergence of new political subjects on the other. Such conditions have made the work of area studies both problematic and promising. For example, it has been difficult over the last decade to study contemporary “Southeast Asia” without taking into consideration, as in the case of Europe, the emergence of new ethnic and religious identities alongside the renewed persecution of older ones; the urgency of travel and immigration among

certain social groups in search of work and status not only in neighboring countries but in nearly all parts of the globe; and the changing architecture of commodity fetishism in everyday life coupled with the uneven availability of new technologies of communication that result in intensifying unequal access to resources inside and outside of a people's locality. One result is that social identities, geographical locations, and national allegiances all tend to be out of sync, at least more so now than they ever were in the recent past. New ways of being Filipino, Bengali, or Korean emerge in such places as Southern California, Rome, and Singapore that have yet to be accounted for by academics and governments alike.

For to recognize such disjunctions would also entail redrawing regional maps into weird patterns of discontinuous and broken lines. It would mean acknowledging what tends to be obscured, namely the nature of mapping itself as a set of shifting and contested practices of addressing and remaking the world, one whose worldliness is always present, "a cognitive arena of struggle, a set of 'idioms, practices, possibilities'—not, in other words, an entity at all about which one could ask 'what is it?'" (Applegate and Rogers Brubaker). As Wigen and Applegate point out, regionalisms of all sorts rely on the arbitrary and power-laden practices of mapping, which in turn indicate something of the "fluid" nature of regional spaces. One might add that such fluid "practices of placeness," however distinctive they might be, arise in response to prior and recurring moments of displacement characteristic of modernity: the sense of never being quite at home, because home itself, permeated by the alien forces of history (colonialism, nationalism, big business, big science, spirits both known and unknown, war and memories of war, institutionalized injustice, unexpected betrayals, deaths and the failure to mourn them) feels like it is always another place, at once foreign and familiar. If maps change and are themselves the products of prior mappings, it is because the sites they map are never wholly themselves, never quite "there" in their "proper" places where they were thought or ought to be.

It is the uncanny quality of the regional that emerges when modernity is unmoored from theories of modernization. Area studies, like other regionalisms, has sought to come to grips with the dislocations of localities amid new globalizing forces. Spurred by severe criticism from a range of ideological and disciplinary quarters and urged on by funding agencies and budget cuts, area studies has been in what is now routinely described as a state of "crisis," besieged by calls to reinvent the institutional infrastructure and intellectual agendas for understanding different regions of the world at century's end.<sup>1</sup>

I have elsewhere addressed the institutional history, nationalist wishfulness, and the ambivalent roles of scholars and foundations in the rethinking of area studies in the United States.<sup>2</sup> Rather than rehearse those arguments, I want to bracket for

<sup>1</sup> One of the more instructive documents of this emergent anxiety about the place of area studies in a post-Cold War and postmodern world is the newsletter of the Social Science Research Council in New York, *Items*. See especially the issues 1994–1995. See also the essays in *What Is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea*, Arif Dirlik, ed. (Boulder, Colo., 1993); and the essays in *Southeast Asian Studies in the Balance*, Charles Keyes, ed. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1990). The locus classicus of area studies critique (though of course he would not refer to it as that) is still Edward Said's sprawling and obsessive *Orientalism* (New York, 1977).

<sup>2</sup> See Vicente L. Rafael, "The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States," *Social Text* 41 (Winter 1994): 91–112.

a moment the institutional and sociological dilemmas of area studies and take a detour from the path of assessing the state of the field, as it were, taken by Applegate and Wigen before rejoining their interests in the practices of regionalism at the end of this essay. I want instead to pick up the notion of crisis that is said to plague area studies and follow it along a somewhat different route along the relays of the accidental and the foreign, which escape even as they solicit practices of placement.

CRISIS CONNOTES EMERGENCY, the critical point at which a state of affairs reaches a moment of either turning around or turning into something other than what it had been. We might say that crisis is a moment of danger and thus the time of contingency: when things fall apart and the possibility of something new emerges. If area studies, like regionalism, can be said to have a culture that is now in crisis, it is because it forces us to think about its contingencies and accidents. We might be able to see the latter if we paused momentarily and considered area studies from the point of view not of its funding agencies, administrators, or meta-critics but rather from the particular histories of its practitioners. Is there something to learn from asking about the experience of area studies prior to its institutionalization, that is, at the point before it requires recognition and validation by someone from above? What is, to re-cite Applegate's citation of Arjun Appadurai (about whom there is more below), the "complex phenomenological quality" that attaches to the study of "others" prior to and beyond having to justify it to a graduate adviser, a grant agency, or a private foundation? How does a person living in one place come to have an interest in some other radically different place? What are the conditions necessary for one to invest considerable personal energy and intellectual resources in learning a language, traveling to a village or a city, poring over archival documents and inscriptions, risking one's personal health and safety, in order to pursue a set of questions to which there are potentially no definitive answers? How and why does one return to foreign sites, become attached to them, or, conversely, come to spurn them? What are the structures of feeling specific to engaging in the study of that which, in order to be studied at all, must remain forever alien, however intimate and proximate it may be to one? What are the dynamics of detachment and fixation that come into play when one studies the foreign? And what are the risks and rewards of identification or disidentification with "it" or "them"? Finally, is there a politics to these engagements, an ethics to weaving and unweaving such affective bonds with the otherness of the other?

What I am suggesting here is that alongside institutional histories we might also ask about the contingent and, for want of a better term, existentially particular and intimately local relationships that area studies practitioners form with their areas of study. In assembling these notes, I started by inquiring how area studies practitioners initially came to have an interest in the particular region or country they worked on.

For many Euro-American men, there were two major routes that led them to area studies—in this case, I will limit myself to Southeast Asian studies: their partici-



pation in war, either World War II or Vietnam; or in the Peace Corps. Both entailed travel, extended residence, and sustained contact, hostile as well as friendly, with the peoples of the region; opportunities to learn their languages and histories; and, not uncommonly, love affairs that often enough led to some sort of marriage, family, and for some, divorce. However, both modes of contact also entailed stepping into enormously unequal power relationships. The violence of wars and the authoritarian regimes they install invariably place white men in the position of colonizers vis-à-vis local populations. And the developmentalist altruism of the Peace Corps born in the midst of the Cold War endows the volunteer with considerable privilege backed by the entire apparatus of the American state. Indeed, the American state in both cases mediates the conditions that allow for such travel and contact, and the inequalities as well as mutual dependencies that these give rise to. Nonetheless, the state alone cannot determine the origins of such interests nor can it foreclose their futures. Somewhere along the line, there is always an accidental aspect to these contacts, a sense of things unseen and unexpected that results in one becoming drawn to this rather than that country or region or province.

Think, for example, of the path taken by George Kahin, who founded Southeast Asian Studies at Cornell University. Kahin's interest in Asia dates back to the beginning of the Pacific War when he helped campaign on behalf of interned Japanese Americans, urging those who owed the latter money to honor their debts. Joining the U.S. Army, he was trained in the Indonesian language and was supposed to be part of the Allied forces that would retake the islands. By some quirk of fate, he was at the last moment assigned to Italy. However, he continued to be interested in Indonesia, going there to do his field research in 1948 at the time that the revolution against the Dutch was breaking out. He thus had, for a Westerner, unparalleled access to the youthful Indonesian leaders and came to write the landmark study on that country's revolution notable for its deep sympathy with the nationalist cause.<sup>3</sup> Kahin has long been a passionate and committed critic of American imperialism in Southeast Asia, and early on he voiced opposition to the Vietnam War. Hence did his career prove antithetical to the late colonial and Cold War conditions from which it arose.<sup>4</sup>

For American women, the route to area studies is equally complex, often linked to generational differences. It was not uncommon for those who went to college and then graduate school in the 1950s and mid-1960s to come in contact with Manila or Bangkok primarily through the work of their husbands who may have been in the Peace Corps, the diplomatic service, or doing graduate research. Marriage and child-rearing set limits and so opened up different possibilities for earlier generations of women who, for example, may have started out being students of Western music but, finding themselves without a piano in Mandalay or Solo, may have proceeded to pick up the Burmese harp or play in a Javanese gamelan while their husbands completed their doctoral work in the field. Returning home, children now

<sup>3</sup> George Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1952).

<sup>4</sup> Kahin's story appears in Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London, 1998), 18–19. Indeed, thanks to examples set by founding figures such as Kahin and Harry Benda at Yale, Southeast Asian scholars for the most part have tended to be skeptical of if not militantly opposed to U.S. interventions in Southeast Asia.

grown and husband tenure-tracked, they may have decided to enter a PhD program within which to pursue an interest that had developed by a combination of chance and circumstance.<sup>5</sup> Later generations of women who came in the late 1960s through the 1980s and even the 1990s undoubtedly had different routes to area studies, some coming through the Peace Corps, others through political activism inspired by social movements such as feminism and civil rights, the opposition to the Vietnam War, the emergence of what we might think of as left-wing orientalism and its concomitant fascination with things “eastern” as alternatives to the oppressiveness of the West. Less encumbered by, and even resistant to, received notions of domesticity, they would have been able to travel without the baggage of husband and children, finding themselves both interested in others as well as the object of their intense interest, and turning such gendered predicaments into the texts and contexts of work that could now be more readily pursued (though not without continuing resistance) at American universities. In all cases, the social facts of race, gender, and domesticity, like the structures of the state, shaped but did not wholly determine the genesis of their interests and the paths that these led to.<sup>6</sup>

Given the specificity of their histories, there exist myriad reasons that led area studies practitioners to arrive at an interest in their particular area. Other colleagues, men as well as women, who were neither in wars nor the Peace Corps tell me that they were drawn into Southeast Asia because they had met by chance someone from there and become intrigued, or, by some stroke of luck, had sat in on a class or a lecture on the region being given by a particularly good teacher. Still others recall that hearing the gamelan, seeing the Javanese puppet theater, the *wayang*, or photographs of Angkor Wat had triggered a fascination with Southeast Asia for reasons that remain obscure and indeterminate. In other words, “Southeast Asia” or some aspect of it struck them when they did not expect it, like a stone hitting a windowpane. Surprised, they found themselves responding to this accidental intrusion, following the cracks that were traced around the hole left behind.

An accidental encounter brings with it a force of its own, sending one falling (for, after all, “accident” like the word “chance” is formed from the Latin *cadere*, to fall) into something unexpected and unknown that lies outside yet shapes the limits of what is known. To have an accident is to come in contact with the radically foreign, a kind of otherness that resists assimilation. It is only after the fact of such an encounter that one can look back and see the accident as the first in a series of events that lead to the present.

Here is an example. As a young boy growing up in upstate New York, one of my colleagues remembers meeting a very well-dressed and dignified-looking man who appeared by chance on his family’s doorstep asking to use their telephone. He was on his way to New York City and had been stranded by a winter storm that had blocked all the roads. The stranger turned out to be Filipino and stayed for breakfast until the storm blew over. Intrigued by the stranger, my colleague looked up all the information he could on the Philippines at his local library. Years later,

<sup>5</sup> This is the story told by Judith Becker, professor of ethnomusicology at the University of Michigan, about the genesis of her interest in Southeast Asian music.

<sup>6</sup> Here, I am thinking of such scholars as Anna Tsing, Gail Hershatter, Laurie Sears, Nancy Florida, Barbara Andaya, Ann Laura Stoler, and Peggy Choy, who were kind enough to relate their stories to me.

he signed up for the Peace Corps and asked to be sent to that country in part because of his memory of this stranger. He realized subsequently that this mysterious man was none other than Carlos P. Romulo, then the Philippine representative to the United Nations and a prominent politician in his home country.

A foreigner appears unexpectedly in one's home, interrupting the flow of one's domestic life, making such an impression that he leaves behind a memory. Picking up that memory, one follows its associations, hearing in it all kinds of other suggestions until finally, or rather retrospectively, one sees oneself being carried physically and imaginatively to the other's home, as if to repay the visit. Drawn to the other, one finds oneself an "other" in turn. It is as if, in meeting the foreigner, one hears a call whose message is discovered only after the fact of its transmission. Further, it is discovered to lie elsewhere, outside the limits of the familiar.

This discovery of deferred meaning shares in the structuring of a vocation. Years later, making sense of one's professional identity and the pressures that come with it, one reconstructs one's interest in a region as the response to a call whose significance at the time of its issuance had not yet been disclosed. Rather than approach the Philippines in the mode of an explorer seeking to conquer new territories or expand one's power, one instead imagines oneself as being summoned by the area itself crystallized in the memory of a stranger and the sense of something lying behind or beyond that figure. That one doesn't know what the message might mean brings with it the risk of misinterpretation and adds all the more to the urge of responding to that call. To think of area studies as a kind of vocation (from the Latin *vocatio*, derived from *vocare*, to call) is thus to imagine oneself elsewhere, in the place of the foreigner as a foreigner oneself and therefore as capable of the same power of transmitting messages whose meanings are deferred, lying at some other place in some other time.

It is not difficult to read an element of romanticism in the notion of area studies as a vocation. In the most banal terms, we say that one is drawn to study Japan or Thailand because one is in love with "it," whatever that "it" might be at different moments in one's life. And it is here in the realm of the romantic that sentiment and mystification become difficult to tell apart. Having fallen in love with the foreign, learning its language and reconstructing its history, one might then begin with some justification to consider oneself to be an authority who can speak for the place and its people to those at home. At the same time, one begins to feel a sense of responsibility, even missionizing zeal, about the beloved country's fate so that one begins to act like an authority among the foreigners themselves, diagnosing their problems, devising solutions, and even demanding adherence through force or persuasion, especially when one thinks that one has the backing of the state and other powerful interests at home. The romance of area studies can thus just as easily, or better yet uneasily, bring with it a kind of sentimental imperialism that the United States is only too famous for.

There is, then, a risk in construing the accidental encounter with the foreign retrospectively as a narrative of vocation, of thinking that falling into the zone of alienation was the first moment of hearing, then responding to, an alien call. Edward Said had warned us precisely about such risks when he referred to

orientalism as a “battery of desires and dreams” as much as it was a tendentious storehouse of knowledge about the Orient that secured the Occident’s positional superiority.<sup>7</sup> In a post-orientalist and postcolonial world—or at least in a world permeated with the desire for post-orientalism and postcolonialism—there are good reasons to be wary of such traps.

Thus might we understand the institutionalization of area studies as an attempt, always partial and uneven, to ensure against such orientalizing risks. It does so in at least two ways. First, institutionalization tends to repress and marginalize the element of the accidental, tending to see the contingency of foreign encounters as historically and structurally determined, and therefore as not contingent at all. From the standpoint of an area studies program, the accidental is merely so, an irregularity of no real consequence. Second, institutionalizing area studies means setting aside its vocational aspect, stressing instead the professional rationality, detached approaches, and practical effects of studying the other. Professionalizing area studies entails, among other things, placing the question of affect and imagination on hold. We see this in the stress on disciplinarity in the university that segregates forms of knowledge and their practitioners from one another. For example, the study of language and literature as a single pursuit has been systematically sundered in area studies programs, just as the study of theory and philosophy once joined to history, anthropology, and sociology is now routinely held apart. As a result, real interdisciplinarity, which, in my opinion, requires a relentless skepticism toward disciplinary divisions, becomes a difficult if not a suspect activity. Domesticating and regularizing the risks of foreign encounters, the institutionalization of area studies runs the risk of turning area studies into perennial servants of the disciplines and vulnerable clients of powerful corporate and government patrons. One result is that their usefulness will always come under interrogation in a way that disciplinary departments never would. Attempting to secure the place of area studies, programs ironically enough invite continued scrutiny and thus live on with a deep sense of insecurity as an irregular, supplementary, and therefore accidental formation in the university.

And yet it is precisely the accidental nature of area studies, or more precisely the accidental ways by which their practitioners stumble into studying specific areas, that makes them worthwhile as sites for encountering regions of otherness the disciplines tend to discount. In this sense, we can think of the putative weakness of area studies programs as their actual strength. They serve as terminals for the unlikeliest meetings among the most diverse groups and individuals, who because of some unforeseen occurrence or chance meeting at some point in the past were drawn to go “there,” wherever that might have been. What they or, better yet, we have in common is the fact that we not only study “otherness” but often find ourselves through our travels and our readings in foreign languages to be an “other.” Thus do practitioners of area studies feel themselves doubled: there is the “I” who comes home and writes about alien places, and another “I,” the alien who appears knocking on doors, asking to use telephones in the middle of storms,

<sup>7</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 78.

provoking curiosity, irritation, and suspicion at times, and commanding authority at other times from those he or she encounters.

This doubled identity whereby two “I’s” exist without one ever fully knowing much less controlling the other is not only present among American practitioners, whether male or female, of area studies. It applies with even greater force to immigrant scholars as well. For my last set of examples (and here, I rejoin Applegate and Wigen), I want to look briefly at two of the most respected practitioners of area studies—who are also two of its most imaginative critics—who happen to be immigrants to the United States: Benedict Anderson and Arjun Appadurai.

IN THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION to his collection of essays, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Benedict Anderson relates how he came to be involved with Southeast Asian studies.<sup>8</sup> It started with a blow to his face. While studying classical languages at Cambridge in 1956, he found himself wandering into a political demonstration held by a small group of South Asians and then trying to stop a fight initiated by a group of English students hurling racial insults at them. “My spectacles were smacked off my face, and so, by chance, I joined the column of the assaulted.”<sup>9</sup> The rest of Anderson’s account consists of tracing the cracks created by such a chance encounter, cracks that lead to more fortuitous meetings and unexpected events.

His interest in “Asia” stoked by the violent encounter, he decides to learn about Indonesia, which had been in the news. He had heard that there were only two places where Indonesia was being seriously studied, Yale and Cornell. Thanks to an “old friend,” he finds a teaching assistantship at the latter and there meets three of his most important mentors: George Kahin, John Echols, and Claire Holt. Aside from Kahin, it is Holt, an art historian, who has a profound effect on Anderson, in part because she mirrors his own predicament as an exile many times displaced and yet seeming to be at home everywhere. Anderson describes himself as “someone born in China, raised in three countries, speaking with an obsolete English accent, carrying an Irish passport, living in America, and devoted to Southeast Asia,” the author of an “odd book” on nationalism, *Imagined Communities*<sup>10</sup> “that could only be written from various exiles and with divided loyalties.”<sup>11</sup> Claire Holt was the daughter of a wealthy Jewish family from Riga, a dancer in Paris and New York, then the lover of the Dutch scholar William Stutterheim. She had lived in colonial Java in the 1930s, had translated for the U.S. military during the war, and fled the McCarthyism of Washington to Ithaca on the invitation of Kahin to teach courses in Indonesian culture. And it was precisely her lack of formal academic training that made her so valued by her students, particularly Anderson. Her interest in Javanese

<sup>8</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990), 1–15. See also the section entitled “Personal Vectors” in Anderson’s recent collection of essays, *Spectre of Comparisons*, 18–20.

<sup>9</sup> Anderson, *Language and Power*, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), rev. edn. 1991.

<sup>11</sup> Anderson, *Language and Power*, 10.



mythology, arrived at unintentionally through her wanderings and love affairs, encouraged Anderson to think about Indonesian politics differently through the lens of its cultural logics. The result, as many of those in Southeast Asian studies know, has been a series of theoretically rich and highly influential essays on the politics and culture of the Indonesian Revolution and its counter-revolutionary aftermath.<sup>12</sup>

While doing fieldwork in postrevolutionary Indonesia during the early 1960s, Anderson's interests were again guided by unexpected happenings. Jakarta then was adrift with possibilities, rumors, and contradictions, yet also awash in what appeared to be a genuinely egalitarian ethos. While there, he writes, "I was lucky enough to have two remarkable elderly Javanese teachers who were also brothers" to teach him about "traditional" Javanese culture while remaining "wholly sharp-eyed" about its delusions.<sup>13</sup> "Luck" in this case also foreshadowed catastrophe. The coup and subsequent massacres of 1965–1966, which were totally unexpected both in their extent and viciousness, led to Suharto's dictatorship and the subsequent banning of Anderson from Indonesia for having co-authored a report implicating the regime for its role in the killings.

But again as luck would have it, Anderson's exile from Indonesia coincided with the overthrow of the military dictatorship in Thailand in 1973 and the return to a more open society. Having cultivated close friendships with a number of Thai dissident intellectuals, Anderson was given another chance to pursue his interests in Southeast Asian revolutionary movements. And in an even more fortuitous spin of the wheel, his brother Perry Anderson had been editing the *New Left Review* and had authored important comparative works on the history of nation-state formation in Europe. Thanks to the accident of birth, Anderson finds his intellectual and political horizons shifting again toward more comparative directions. In the midst of repeated displacements and exiles, he finds himself "haunted" by unsettling questions about solidarity, difference, and imagination, and accompanied by a recurring object of love, the "imagined community."<sup>14</sup> The latter is alternately figured as the nation, the family in its most extended form, mentors, colleagues, students, and friends from various parts of the world linked by the generosity and affection of their regard.<sup>15</sup> The imagined community, born out of a series of violent mishaps and exiles, contingent meetings and ghostly questions, is also a community of sentiment.

It is this very notion of sentiment as the basis of community that Arjun Appadurai theorizes in his book of essays, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*.<sup>16</sup> Like Anderson, Appadurai is also an immigrant intellectual who writes, among other things, about his "own" country, India. But unlike nationalist scholars, indeed in sharp and self-conscious distinction from them, Appadurai is

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," "The Languages of Indonesian Politics," "Cartoons and Monuments: The Evolution of Political Communication under the New Order," all of which are in Anderson, *Language and Power*. See also the essays in *Spectre of Comparisons*.

<sup>13</sup> Anderson, *Language and Power*, 6.

<sup>14</sup> Anderson, *Language and Power*, 13.

<sup>15</sup> Anderson, *Language and Power*, 14. See also the dedication of *Spectre of Comparisons*.

<sup>16</sup> Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, 1996).

quick to tell us that his “India” is “not a reified social fact nor a crude nationalist reflex” but an “optic” from which to gauge the uneven effects of what has been termed “globalization.”<sup>17</sup> Appadurai in this sense finds himself in the situation of many immigrant scholars from the so-called third world working in area studies in the United States. On the one hand, there is the expectation that, unlike European immigrants, they can only study their “own” culture because that is what they are “naturally” interested in. On the other, there is the pervasive assumption that their work, like their country, will be parochial and of little consequence to the “serious” work of theory building and policy making.

However, Appadurai converts this dilemma into an advantage. He deflects suspicions of parochialism by turning to the question of the “local” and argues that it is really there that one sees the incarnation of the social science abstraction, “modernity.” What interests me, though, is how this theoretical turn is initiated by an autobiographical note. Whereas Anderson’s account tells of how he came to be interested in the nationalisms of Southeast Asia, Appadurai writes of how India, specifically Bombay, drew him out of the nation and into the world. Bombay is the setting of his earliest encounters with modernity, and there the modern is experienced in what he calls its “pretheoretical form”: as sensuous immediacy and seductive materiality. He writes of his desire for the modern:

I saw and smelled modernity reading *Life* [magazine] and American college catalogues at the United States Information Service Library, seeing B-grade movies (and some A-grade ones too) from Hollywood and Eros theaters five hundred yards from my apartment building. I begged my brother at Stanford (in the early 1960s) to bring me back blue jeans and smelled America in his Right Guard when he returned.<sup>18</sup>

In place of England, Appadurai discovers “America” as the site of the modern, or at least the most modern of the modern. “I did not know then that I was drifting from one sort of postcolonial subjectivity (Anglophone diction, fantasies of debates in the Oxford Union, borrowed peeks at *Encounter* . . . ) to another: the harsher, sexier, more addictive New World of Humphrey Bogart reruns, Harold Robbins, *Time*, and social science, American style.”<sup>19</sup>

“I did not know then,” which is to say he had no idea where he was going, only that he was moving, thanks to coming into contact with the shapes and smells of the “modern.” Here, it is not surprising that the modern should also have a foreign, specifically imperial origin: England, then later the United States. Through sudden and inexplicably pleasurable encounters with the objects of modernity, Appadurai comes to know that there is something he does not yet know. To come in contact with the modern in all its lush and sensuous materiality was to come into a fantasy about another “I” speaking a different language and in different accents, choosing among exotic items that seem to appear fortuitously in Bombay. Confronted by the foreignness that is the very stuff of modernity, both in its colonial and what he terms postcolonial versions, Appadurai becomes an agent of desire whose satisfaction is forever strung out into a potentially endless series of objects: books, movies, blue jeans, deodorants, American social science. Drawn to these objects, he heads out,

<sup>17</sup> Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, 18.

<sup>18</sup> Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, 1.

<sup>19</sup> Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, 2.

going from his neighborhood cinemas to the USIS library, to Brandeis University, and finally to the University of Chicago in the 1970s. Whereas Anderson begins with an unintended identification with South Asian students that leads him from England to the United States, then to the revolutions in Indonesia, Thailand, and lately the Philippines, Appadurai begins with an avid identification with commodities and their mysterious allure that leads him to follow their circuitous routes, first around Bombay, then to the "first world," looping back to India and then back again to the American Midwest, while zigging and zagging to other areas of the physical and virtual world.

Clearly, their projects have important differences. While Anderson sees in the nation the utopian possibilities of a post-Enlightenment community subsequently compromised if not violated by the state, Appadurai sees the nation-state as an exhausted form that can no longer respond to the demands of emergent communities. Anderson's interest in modernity is tied to his concern with the possibilities of nationalist revolutions and the loss of such possibilities in Asia, and he has spent considerable time examining the moral, historical, and political consequences of such a loss. Appadurai is far less interested in revolution as a medium of change and far more concerned with the technologies of migrations and mediations chained to capital flows that give rise to a variety of vernacular responses and strategies of local adaptations. Hence while Anderson thematizes the historical possibilities in nationalism and its promises that have yet to be met, Appadurai has signed off (at times too hastily, in my opinion) on the nation-state, bidding it good riddance while keenly anticipating other forms of association that will take its place.

However, despite the differences in the trajectory of their projects, they are also joined by their recurring fascination with the foreign. For both, the "foreign" is memorable, if not *the* point from which memories arise. Surprised by the foreign, they were provoked to follow its call, drawn into its communicative power. Because it appears accidentally, as their accounts show, the foreign insinuates a gap in their lives that they are compelled to cross imaginatively and physically. Contact thus leads to communication, or, more precisely, the fantasy of communication. Such a fantasy is enacted in the process of translation, or what Appadurai theorizes as "vernacularization," which entails substituting the foreign for the familiar and vice versa. But such translations, as they point out, are never complete. They are always lacking and are bound to be full of errors and mistakes, thereby making more translations necessary. They thus lead you out, to texts you did not think existed, to places you did not expect to go to, to encounters you did not foresee. In this way, you become a kind of exile, transformed into someone who is, we might say, periodically beside oneself. To the extent that encounters with alien presences compel Anderson and Appadurai to travel and translate, the alien becomes the source of the language with which to fashion their own identities as agents exiled from any fixed identity. Hence, when they speak of themselves, it is always in terms of two "I's," one that belongs to them and their disparate histories and the other that belongs to someone else who eludes them but to whom they are nonetheless attached.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The richly problematic notion of the first-person pronoun as inherently divided between the self that speaks and the language that is spoken owes its most compelling formulation to Emile Benveniste,

The unresolvable doubleness of their identity is, I suspect, prototypical of all other practitioners of area studies. A stranger to itself, it is an identity that, like the senses of the regional discussed by Applegate and Wigen above, is not only in motion but is always in translation. Such translations, which form the stuff of their—and perhaps I should say our—lives, are never complete because they are never exact. Working with foreign language sources, we know how words in one language never have their exact equivalent in another. What we have are always approximations. Part of us hopes that somehow these will be heard by others in ways we intended them to. But the other part of us, the other that is our double who resides in language, whether native or foreign, makes sure that this is never quite the case. Meanings remain elusive, and something always escapes only to emerge elsewhere in one guise or another. At times, we find them, or more often, they find us, confronting us in forms we did not anticipate. And if they do, and if we are surprised, or we mistake them for something else but feel compelled to live through that error and follow the traces it leaves behind, then we can be certain that our work, the work of area studies, the study of regions and the practices of placing what nonetheless eludes placement, would have already begun.

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especially his essay, "The Nature of Pronouns," in *Problems in General Linguistics*, Mary Elizabeth Meek, trans. (Coral Gables, Fla., 1971), 217–22. My understanding of this question has also benefited from the work of James T. Siegel, especially *Fetish, Revolution, Recognition* (Princeton, N.J., 1997).

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**Vicente L. Rafael** is an associate professor at the Department of Communication, University of California, San Diego. He is the author of *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Durham, N.C., 1993), and *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham, forthcoming). He has also recently edited *Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines and Colonial Vietnam* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999).

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*Forum Essay: Responses*  
**Borders and Borderlands**

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*These Forum Essay responses continue the discussion of “Borders and Borderlands” begun in the June issue of this journal. In that issue, **Jeremy Adelman** and **Stephen Aron** launched the discussion with their provocative essay “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History.” We invited readers to send in commentaries on the essay. As we had hoped, it provoked a number of responses. Three of the most compelling and instructive are published in the second and concluding part of the Forum. The comments by **Evan Haefeli**, **Christopher Ebert Schmidt-Nowara**, and **John R. Wunder** and **Pekka Hämmäläinen** extend the discussion by raising a number of substantive and methodological questions about the essay. Adelman and Aron conclude the discussion with a thoughtful reply that engages each commentator and some of the larger issues generated in the exchange. The two parts of this Forum clearly demonstrate both the need to place borders and borderlands in historical context and the challenges of doing so.*



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*Forum Essay: Responses*  
A Note on the Use of North American Borderlands

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EVAN HAEFELI

JEREMY ADELMAN AND STEPHEN ARON have made a welcome effort to bring some intellectual rigor and precision to the blossoming historiography of the frontier. They propose cutting a new slice in the theoretical cake by drawing a distinction between a frontier, “a meeting place of people in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined,” and borderlands as “the contested boundaries between colonial domains.”<sup>1</sup> The concept of borderland can thus link intercolonial and transatlantic imperial histories to localized intercultural histories. As such, it could provide a framework that reminds American historians that their accounts of Indian-colonist relations, be they in Missouri or New Mexico, are as dependent on events in distant Mexico City and Paris as on the actions of the agents, traders, and headmen on the ground.

I, for one, welcome such a sophisticated marriage of local and imperial perspectives. Yet, in reading through Adelman and Aron’s case studies, I was left a bit confused as to how they mean to accomplish this. Their essay regrettably fails to maintain a consistent distinction between frontier and borderland phenomena. To start with, it is doubtful whether the “middle ground” of the Great Lakes region was a borderland product. On the contrary, it seems to have been a frontier creation that borderlands repeatedly destabilized. The middle ground grew out of the unequal yet interdependent relationship between two groups from very different cultures in the decades before British traders entered the Great Lakes region. Once they did, the advent of borderland dynamics virtually destroyed the middle ground. Only the restoration of a frontier situation after the Seven Years’ War allowed the middle ground to resurface. The return of the borderland with the rise of the American republic, culminating in the War of 1812, only put the final nail in the coffin. Perhaps this is one reason that the Spanish in Missouri and the Southwest had such difficulty acting like the more diplomatically successful French. There, borderland conditions persistently undercut the fragile emergence of a Spanish middle ground.

The unanswered question at the root of Adelman and Aron’s thesis is: what do borderlands do that frontiers do not? They see borderlands as regions of excep-

The author would like to thank Marc Abrams and Ignacio Gallup-Diaz for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

<sup>1</sup> Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” *AHR* 104 (June 1999): 815–16.

tional accommodation, à la middle ground; places where the options of the natives are multiplied by having two (or more?) colonial powers to play off one another. But borderlands restrict natives' options at least as much as they increase them. Within a borderland, the choice is not between their way and our way but between the alliance of one or another empire. Trying to play one colonial power off of another only ups the ante of potential destruction to local autonomy. As the work of Daniel Richter shows, being caught in the Franco-British borderland of northern New York/southern New France put an extraordinary amount of stress on Iroquois communities. The end result of trying to balance French and British influences while maintaining peace with both was a steady increase in the amount of European influence in the Iroquois heartland.<sup>2</sup> The pressure of being stuck in a borderland threw the Choctaws, cited by Adelman and Aron, into a devastating civil war. One could argue that borderlands were actually *more* destructive and less accommodating than frontiers because they reduced the range of options while increasing the imperial presence.

If both borderlands and frontiers are seen as situations created by certain conditions, then their existence must rise and fall as those conditions change. Unfortunately, Adelman and Aron's use of terminology obscures this. How could borderland ways persist on the Missouri once France and Spain had been removed from the picture and it was incorporated into the United States? Does not the "mutual process of 'frontiering'" they see in the early national period belong to a frontier rather than a borderland experience?<sup>3</sup> Can a region not go from a frontier to a borderland and back again? Must the trajectory always be "from borderlands to borders"? Could one have a borderland without colonial powers? And finally, does the rise of the nation-state belong to the history of borderlands and frontiers, or is it simply the end to these essentially imperial phenomena wherever it appears? Adelman and Aron's essay raises more questions than it answers.

At the heart of my concern is the question of what, if anything, North American history and historiography can say to the rest of the world.<sup>4</sup> Adelman and Aron make no real effort to answer the question because their historiographical targets reside within the now firmly ensconced field of western (U.S.) history. Are they, then, making a genuine theoretical contribution to the study of frontier and imperial dynamics? Or are they just tweaking the familiar old story of American expansion? Recent frontier scholarship has rendered this tale more complicated and less biased, but the scholarly fascination with American frontier and western history retains much of the narcissism of Frederick Jackson Turner's celebratory thesis. Through all their criticism and revision, scholars have preserved Turner's obsession with the history of the United States rather than frontiers per se.<sup>5</sup> One has to wonder whether they have produced anything more than a colorful new overcoat to the old story of nation building. Ultimately, Adelman and Aron's

<sup>2</sup> Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992), chaps. 10–11.

<sup>3</sup> Adelman and Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders," 827.

<sup>4</sup> For a compelling discussion of the uniqueness of North America's frontier history, see John M. Murrin, "The Jeffersonian Triumph and American Exceptionalism," Presidential Address, Society for Historians of the Early American Republic, July 17, 1999.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, the admirable synthesis of recent work by Gregory H. Nobles, *American Frontiers: Cultural Encounters and Continental Conquest* (New York, 1997).

suggestions need to be considered in the context of frontiers and borderlands other than those of the early republic before they can be accepted as a genuine theoretical breakthrough. In terms of world history, North America's frontiers were remarkable for their instability and fluidity. Elsewhere, frontiers of powerful societies tended to form along ecological boundaries and last for centuries. Deserts, deep forests, and vast steppe lands halted the expansion of Mesoamerican, Andean, Roman, Middle Eastern, Egyptian, and Chinese civilizations. Their frontiers had little in common with the steady march of the American frontier across the continent. Even though these earlier civilizations built walls and fortresses to delimit and bolster their power, they were as liable to be conquered by as to conquer the "barbarians" on the other side. Nor did military conquest or even settlement always bring an end, or "closing," to the frontier. Until undermined by technology or dramatic political changes, frontiers always risked reestablishing themselves. In North America, on the other hand, forts, frontiers, and boundaries rose, fell, and shifted dramatically within the span of a single lifetime. At virtually no point after about 1640 did the colonizers risk being conquered or driven out by Amerindians (the Pueblo Revolt being a rare, and brief, exception in 1680). Once established on the North American continent, nothing short of well-defended forts and open warfare limited the expansion of Anglo-American agriculturalists across the highly compatible ecologies of the vast eastern woodlands into northern New England, Kentucky, or the Southeast. Technological innovation and a terrific mobilization of resources enabled their rapid expropriation of the more geographically challenging West, which had even less power to fight them off.

Only the long-enduring Spanish frontier in the Southwest, limited by the natural environment and the tenuousness of the Spanish presence, resembles anything beyond the North American experience. Here as elsewhere in Spanish America, the Spanish empire had difficulty penetrating beyond the spheres of influence of the settled indigenous societies it had supplanted. This may be a reason why North Americanists have had difficulty reconciling Anglo-American models of the frontier with the experience of the Southwest, and why scholars such as Patricia Nelson Limerick believe that a regional approach to western history is the best. Yet it is in their narrative of the Southwest that Adelman and Aron's borderlands concept seems best applied. Other parts of North America where it might work well are the Northeast, between New England and New France, and the colonial Southeast, where borderlands lasted continuously for nearly a century.

North American history has had a very distinct trajectory. At the same time, it has an exceptionally well-documented and studied frontier experience, one that, with care, could be of genuine interest to scholars of frontiers and borderlands around the globe. If the idea of a borderland is to have some substance, it needs to be differentiated more clearly from its close relative, the frontier. As a place where autonomous peoples of different cultures are bound together by a greater, multi-imperial context, it may be a concept of use to historians of other obvious borderlands, like the early modern Balkans and Central Asia, the northwest territories of the British Raj, or certain corners of the ancient Near East. Otherwise, it will remain a mere catch-phrase for the brief period of frenetic activity preceding the irresistible expansion of Anglo-America.

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**Evan Haefeli** is a fellow at the McNeil Center for Early American Studies, where he is completing his Princeton University dissertation on religion and politics in the middle colonies. His most recent publication is "Kieft's War and the Cultures of Violence in Colonial America," in Michael A. Belleisle, ed., *Lethal Imagination: Violence and Brutality in American History* (1999). He is also collaborating with Kevin Sweeney of Amherst College on a study that uses the 1704 attack on Deerfield as a lens onto New England's borderland history. Their *William and Mary Quarterly* article on the topic has been reprinted in Colin G. Calloway, ed., *After King Philip's War: Presence and Persistence in Indian New England* (1997).

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*Forum Essay: Responses*  
Borders and Borderlands of Interpretation

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CHRISTOPHER EBERT SCHMIDT-NOWARA

Barricades of ideas are worth more than barricades of stone.<sup>1</sup>

THE CUBAN NATIONALIST LEADER José Martí invoked “barricades of ideas” as a defense against the imperial pretensions of the United States. “Our America,” imagined by Martí, was Latin America, an America with a common history and culture that transcended borders while respecting national differences. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron simultaneously challenge and reinforce that vision of the Americas. Like Martí, they look beyond political borders at deeper connections and commonalities that borders often obscure. In contrast, Adelman and Aron cast their gaze beyond Latin America, including the United States and its origins in the clashes between rival empires and emerging nation-states on the North American continent.

The affinity with and distinction from Martí’s view of “Our America” raises two related questions. First, Martí wrote his essay more than one hundred years ago against the backdrop of numerous Cuban and Latin American essays and historical studies in a similar vein. His work suggests that English-speaking historians and intellectuals were not alone in theorizing the history of empire and cultural connections in the Americas; Herbert Bolton and Frederick Jackson Turner (and then William Cronon, Richard White, Patricia Nelson Limerick, and David J. Weber) are not the only sources of this historical project, even though the predominance of English-language social-science monographs in Adelman and Aron’s scholarly apparatus might inadvertently lead one to believe otherwise. Second, Martí’s perspective implies a relationship between historical vision and political sovereignty. What would Adelman and Aron’s model mean for historians in other American countries? In other words, how would a distinct political and institutional context alter the transnational model theorized by Adelman and Aron?

In this short response, I do not pretend to answer these questions. Rather, I raise them to ask how Adelman and Aron’s encompassing historical vision might also reflect on the broad history of interpretation intertwined with the events and processes it seeks to comprehend. Rivalries among empires, states, and peoples manifest themselves not only through trade and warfare but also through the interpretation of those struggles. Along with their counterparts in the United States

<sup>1</sup> José Martí, “Our America” [1891], in Martí, *Our America: Writings in Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence*, Elinor Randall, trans., Philip S. Foner, ed. (New York, 1977), 84.



(and often in dialogue with them), historians and intellectuals from Latin America have pondered the distinctive trajectories and moments of overlap between the different European empires and their interactions with subaltern groups. Such was the case in another territory caught between empires, Cuba in the nineteenth century. Briefly examining Cuban views of empire and the American past suggests that a North American history might be built on intellectual foundations inscribed with their own transnational historicity.

Cuban (and Spanish) intellectuals felt compelled to explain and interpret the persistence of three seemingly archaic institutions until the end of the nineteenth century: the slave trade to Cuba (abolished 1867), slavery (abolished 1886), and Spanish colonial rule (which lasted until the U.S. intervention in 1898). In doing so, they often resorted to the comparative history of American colonial empires, seeking both to throw their own situation into relief and to draw useful lessons from other colonialisms, especially British. Many of them were well informed of historical and theoretical trends in the English-speaking world.

Cuban intellectuals drew a firm distinction between the rationales and effects of Spanish and British colonialism: in their eyes, the former was distinguished by its religious motivations and racial intermixing (although economic motives and exploitation were not absent), the latter by its almost exclusive concern with commerce and its foundation in racial segregation. Political institutions were also distinctive: Spain sought to rule unilaterally over its colonies, while Great Britain permitted considerable self-rule.<sup>2</sup>

Reflecting on these contrasts, many Cubans perceived Spanish colonialism as superior. While based on forms of unfree labor, Spanish rule and customs nonetheless permitted the coexistence and intermixture of Africans, Indians, and Europeans. Foreshadowing Gilberto Freyre's arguments about the Portuguese in Brazil, the Cuban writer José del Perojo argued that the Spaniards' experience with colonialism and distinct racial and religious groups within Spain itself during the Middle Ages prefigured the development of Spanish-American societies.<sup>3</sup>

For their present situation, however, Cubans loyal to the colonial regime vastly preferred British models. The British had ended the slave trade and moved to abolish slavery in a gradual and compensated process. Moreover, British colonial subjects had an important voice in local budgets and trade policies and elected their own officials. Cuba, in contrast, was subject to exceptional military rule for most of the nineteenth century, its economy was highly regulated in favor of Spanish interests, and the survival and growth of slavery bred permanent social instability.

A variegated image of British colonialism, and especially of the United States, emerged from this interpretive process. For Cubans in favor of preserving the colonial bond in the later nineteenth century, the ideal colonial society was Canada because the metropolis had peacefully ceded virtual sovereignty to the colony. For

<sup>2</sup> See Antonio Angulo y Heredia, *Estudios sobre los Estados Unidos de América* (Madrid, 1865); José Antonio Saco, *Historia de la esclavitud de la raza africana en el Nuevo Mundo y en especial en los países americano-hispanos* (Barcelona, 1879); Antonio Bachiller y Morales, *Cuba primitiva* (Havana, 1883); and José del Perojo, *Ensayos de política colonial* (Madrid, 1885). The works of the Cuban-born Spaniard Rafael María de Labra on slavery and colonialisms in the Americas are also important. See *La abolición de la esclavitud en el orden económico* (Madrid, 1873); and *Política y sistemas coloniales* (Madrid, 1874).

<sup>3</sup> Perojo, *Ensayos de política colonial*.

those in favor of annexation to the United States, the vigorous economic growth and decentralized political institutions were attractive (as was the political weight of Southern slaveowners until the Civil War). For separatists, the most progressive and inclusive political actors in Cuba, the former British colonies were ambiguous at best: though democratic, they were nonetheless rent by violent racial strife and discrimination and expressed threatening ambitions in the Caribbean.

The fears of Cuban nationalists like José Martí were borne out in 1898 when the United States invaded Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, annexing the latter two and preserving the right of intervention in the former. U.S. motives were mixed. While many Americans supported the intervention to help Cuban forces defeat Spain, some political and military leaders saw the war between Cuba and Spain as a good moment to satisfy long-held territorial ambitions. In the subsequent century of explanation of the intervention, interpretive positions solidified: U.S. historians emphasized the selflessness of U.S. actions, unaware of the depth and sophistication of the Cuban nationalist movement, while Cuban historians argued that the United States acted to head off Cuban independence without regarding the democratic motives of some North American supporters. Ironically, an event that tightened U.S.-Cuban political, military, and economic bonds also created new intellectual and historiographical borders between them. As a leading historian has recently argued, that border has made the events of 1898 mutually incomprehensible.<sup>4</sup>

Adelman and Aron offer excellent conceptual tools for thinking across that historiographical divide by theorizing the linkages between imperial rivalries and state formation and how those processes are shaped by multiple axes of conflict. My only reservation is that the intellectual foundations of this project seem to lie too squarely in the English-speaking world, from Turner and Bolton to the current western historians. Historians from other parts of the Americas have thought about this interrelated and contentious history for reasons as diverse as those in the United States and Canada. In exploring the origins of contemporary political borders in the borderlands of the past, should historians of North America stop at the "barricades of ideas" that obscure borderlands of historical interpretation?

<sup>4</sup> See Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998); and Pérez, "Incurring a Debt of Gratitude: 1898 and the Moral Sources of United States Hegemony in Cuba," *AHR* 104 (April 1999): 356–98.

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**Christopher Ebert Schmidt-Nowara** received his PhD in 1995 from the University of Michigan, where he studied with Rebecca Scott, Geoff Eley, and Fred Cooper. He teaches Spanish and Latin American history in the Department of History, Fordham University, Lincoln Center. He has also taught in the History Department of Stanford University. In June 1999, the University of Pittsburgh Press published his first book, *Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874*. His articles concerning aspects of Antillean slavery, Spanish colonialism, and post-emancipation politics appeared in the *Hispanic American Historical Review* and *Illes i imperis* in 1998. He is also one of the authors of *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y el fin de siglo* (Madrid, 1998).

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## *Forum Essay: Responses* Of Lethal Places and Lethal Essays

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JOHN R. WUNDER and PEKKA HÄMÄLÄINEN

THE RECENT TWENTY-SEVEN-PAGE *AHR* ARTICLE by Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron purports to shape a new paradigm for understanding Indian and Euro-American relationships in pre-twentieth-century North America.<sup>1</sup> The borderlands in the work of the authors seem sanitized, morally neutral domains—eerie lethal places—where native populations “declined” by 50 percent, where the “relocation” of Indians is followed by intra-Indian “mayhem,” and where imperial warfare is a “watershed” succeeded by European reinforcement and reform over a “dark and bloody ground.”<sup>2</sup> Indeed, there are so many issues raised in this essay that space does not allow a full explanation. A brief discussion of four elements will have to suffice.

Adelman and Aron have devised what they claim to be a new way to understand the history of eighteenth and early nineteenth-century diplomacy and race relations in North America. This new concept revolves around time and several geopolitical words and their definitions: “empire,” “frontier,” “borderlands,” and “bordered land.” They evidently believe empires are European and lead to nation-states; empires are never indigenous, nor is there such an entity as an Indian nation. By definition, treaties are fictive or cynical tracts. Frontiers are ambiguous, borderless meeting places that involve cultural mixing. Borderlands are places of European imperial rivalry where Indians slyly seek micro-diplomatic openings. Once the rivalry is over, borderlands can become bordered land, where national borders are defined, and indigenous peoples are swallowed up by national cultures. To explicate the “new” principles derived from these definitions, three North American theaters are explored: the Great Lakes as a “middle ground” where “the patina of Indian autonomy” existed, the lower Missouri Valley as a dissolved “borderland accommodation,” and the Greater Rio Grande Valley (that is, the southern Great Plains) as a failure in “paternalistic pacification.”<sup>3</sup>

This is process history. It is Turnerian, and that is all fine and dandy, yet the authors seem uncomfortable with the baggage that the Turner thesis brings with it.

The authors are indebted to Susan A. Miller, of the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, for her discussion of the issues raised in the *Forum Essay*, her howling concepts, and her perspective on indigenous history.

<sup>1</sup> Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” *AHR* 104 (June 1999): 814–41.

<sup>2</sup> Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 818, 826, 833.

<sup>3</sup> Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 820–21, 825, 830.

There is a very selective historiographical murmuring. As a sample, Turner is directly praised for establishing temporal stages of frontier life—the boundaries of settlement.<sup>4</sup> Not mentioned is Turner's relegation of Native Americans to the historical scrap heap. Nameless, nationless, not humans but a passive part of the environment to conquer, these are the fundamental weaknesses of Turner's Indians in American history. They seem to be Adelman and Aron's as well.

Along the way, historiography is strangely adapted here and altered there. Patricia Nelson Limerick is scorned for "misleadingly" calling the history of the American West a place, not a process, with an unbroken past. The counterargument offered is that borderlands have historic turning points.<sup>5</sup> One might critique Limerick's ideas and methodologies—they are always challenging—but trying to fit Adelman and Aron's proffered distinctly "old" western history, though represented as a breakthrough, into the "new" western history, feels distinctly like a square peg-round hole exercise. Nowhere is history more attached to the unbroken past than in the history of American Indians in the American West. A huge list of books and articles since 1975 attests to this now-accepted concept among Native American historians throughout the regions of North America. To deny the unbroken past is to deny the fundamentals of indigenous history.<sup>6</sup> There are similar problems with Adelman and Aron's treatment of other influential figures in the literature of the North American West.<sup>7</sup>

The second fundamental problem with Adelman and Aron's model of intercultural relations is that it simplifies an enormously complex historical phenomenon. By emphasizing global colonial rivalries as a prerequisite for intercultural mixing and accommodation, the authors repeatedly lose sight of critical economic and

<sup>4</sup> Adelman and Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders," 815. See Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," American Historical Association, *Annual Report for 1893* (Washington, D.C., 1894), 199–227.

<sup>5</sup> Adelman and Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders," 816. See Patricia Nelson Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West* (New York, 1987), esp. 17–32 and 322–49.

<sup>6</sup> For example, check out the works and words of Vine Deloria, Jr., Philip Deloria, Robert A. Williams, Jr., Donald Fixico, Thomas R. Berger, Devon A. Mihesuah, Joe Starita, Susan A. Miller, and M. Annette Jaimes, among many, many others. By 1975, the astounding popularity with American readers of Dee Brown's *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (New York, 1970), though not an "Indian" history, had ignited an explosion of Native American history titles on the bookshelves of libraries and bookstores and in college campus catalogs. That interest continues unabated.

<sup>7</sup> Herbert E. Bolton, the founder of the Spanish borderlands field of study, explained the success of Spaniards in the American Southwest by their ability to mesh religious, military, political, and economic institutions. What seems cloudy in the Adelman-Aron essay is Bolton's recognition of the importance of understanding the political economies of the Spanish borderlands. Bolton, publishing his famous mission essay in 1917, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies," *AHR* 23 (October 1917): 42–61, and in his other numerous books and translations, indirectly anticipated the need to explore the complex intersection of diverse indigenous peoples of diverse national interests with diverse Spanish institutions. Adelman and Aron do not seem to recognize this dimension.

Similarly, the authors' explanation of Richard White's middle ground concept from White's book of the same name seems foggy. They use White's treatise from the last and least persuasive section of his book, when the United States enters the Great Lakes region. Basically, the United States seems a poor fit in White's middle ground. Is the United States an "imperial power" within the Adelman-Aron definition? Might the League of the Iroquois, which the authors explain "emerged among the previously conflict-ridden villagers of western New York" (p. 818), have had a foreign policy that impacted this middle ground? White does not separate political economies from diplomatic interests in his rendition, but Adelman and Aron do while they continue to adhere to White's paradigm. For them, imperial rivalries transcend all other factors.

environmental factors. They wish to deepen our understanding of the emergence of middle grounds but end up trivializing these inherently multifaceted phenomena as one-dimensional political-geostrategic processes.

While the authors recognize economy, particularly the fur trade, as a factor in Euro-American and Native American accommodation, they repeatedly downplay the significance of economic relations in politics. Perhaps because the economic history of the American West does not always fit into their model, the “economy” is separated from the “politics.” Indeed, even a quick glance at the fur trade literature reveals the infeasibility of Adelman and Aron’s paradigm. Patiently negotiating, teaching, and compromising, native peoples and Euro-American fur traders forged middle grounds all over the North American continent in such places as the northern Great Plains, the Rocky Mountains, and the Pacific Northwest, which became theaters of intercultural accommodation before they became sites of colonial competition. In many cases, such as Fort Astoria and the Columbia River Basin, geographical and environmental factors proved much more critical in shaping intercultural relations than the dynamics of colonial struggles.<sup>8</sup>

Perhaps the most astounding factor missing from their essay is Indian agency. There is no sense that Indians are participants in their own history. The authors occasionally mention a variety of Indian nations—that they point out are really not nations—and try to reconstruct a variety of diplomatic turning points and watersheds without understanding in the least that treaties require at least “two to tango” and the accommodation of varied national interests.<sup>9</sup> For example, Juan Sabeata, a Jumano leader of significance, had Jumano interests in mind when he opened economic and geopolitical negotiations with the Spanish in the 1750s. Carlana,

<sup>8</sup> See James P. Ronda, *Lewis and Clark among the Indians* (Lincoln, Neb., 1984); and *Astoria and Empire* (Lincoln, 1990). For a discussion of the fur trade in the Pacific Northwest, northern Great Plains, and the Rocky Mountains prior to international rivalries, do not miss David J. Wishart, *The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807–1840: A Geographical Synthesis* (Lincoln, 1979; rev. edn., 1992); Richard Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains: The British Fur Trade on the Pacific, 1793–1843* (Vancouver, 1997); Joseph Jablow, *The Cheyenne in Plains Indian Trade Relations, 1795–1840* (Lincoln, 1994); Jennifer S. H. Brown, *Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country* (Vancouver, 1980); Sylvia Van Kirk, *Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur Trade Society, 1670–1870* (Norman, Okla., 1980); Lewis O. Saum, *The Fur Trade and the Indian* (Seattle, 1965); and Dale Morgan, *Jedediah Smith and the Opening of the West* (Indianapolis, 1953).

<sup>9</sup> Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 840–41. In their conclusion, the authors state that indigenous peoples are presently minorities not distinguished by culture and tradition but by blood or language. According to the Adelman and Aron interpretation, self-determination, a federal policy since the Nixon administration, embraced by many Indian nations, is merely an “idiom” that lets borderlanders claim community sovereignty. The authors believe that these concepts are no less than fantasies, that indigenous peoples, “a century ago, cared little for states and less for nations” (841). Adelman and Aron cynically warn that lands reclaimed can only be obtained through national court decisions and have little relationship to Indian political institutions. Power and autonomy will never be restored.

These authors do not have the slightest concept of what the multiple layers of sovereignty mean under United States, indigenous, and international law, and what it meant for native peoples in the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, or means even beyond the millennium. Perhaps some words of the Supreme Court are in order. Justice William Douglas, in the majority opinion of *Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States* (1968), ruled that the Menominees were entitled to retain their fishing and hunting rights even after their reservation was abolished and their nation was terminated under federal statute. Treaty rights guaranteeing partial sovereignty for the Menominees sustained the furious statutory and legal attacks on them. “We find it difficult to believe that Congress, without explicit statement,” wrote Douglas, “would subject the United States to a claim for compensation by destroying property rights conferred by treaty.” 391 US 404 at 413 (1968).



leader of the El Cuartelejo Apaches in southeastern Colorado, balanced Spanish, French, Comanche, and Ute diplomatic negotiations in the early eighteenth century.<sup>10</sup>

Adelman and Aron focus on a game of imperial chess, and in this game intercultural accommodation and middle grounds emerge only during stalemates, opening opportunities for indigenous peoples to play off the rival colonial regimes. Although this conceptualization allows Native Americans a role in a kind of mediation, the approach is nevertheless reductionist and ethnocentric. Indigenous peoples only react and adapt; they do not create, machinate, initiate, or control. In many ways, Adelman and Aron's model marks a return to a Turnerian tradition in which native populations are objects rather than subjects, mere pawns in the great colonial board game. In the grand scheme of things, Indian aspirations and strategies are irrelevant to the evolution of intercultural relations. This kind of view not only ignores an enormous body of ethnohistorical and cultural studies but, ironically, is not supported by Adelman and Aron's own evidence. For example, the commercial-diplomatic alliance between the Osages and the Spanish at the end of the eighteenth century emerged without the context of imperial rivalry. As the authors note, it was Osage raids and attacks that coerced the Spanish to adopt the policy of borderland accommodation in the Missouri Country.<sup>11</sup> The Osages systematically coerced the Europeans into abandoning their imperialist, exclusivist policies, and did not need imperial rivalries to do so.

Then there is the Geronimo factor. Geronimo is the only indigenous leader save the mixed-blood Cherokee Richard Fields mentioned in their essay. We learn about Jeffrey Amherst, Thomas Jefferson—the originator of American ethnic cleansing concepts—Meriwether Lewis, Louis Juchereau de Saint-Denis, Jacobo de Ugarte, Bernardo de Gálvez, Manuel de Godoy, Napoleon, Ferdinand VII, Agustín de Iturbide, Moses Austin, and Charles Stillman; we do not learn about Iroquois, Huron, Osage, Apache, or Comanche leaders.

Not understanding Indian history on its own merits leads the authors to make fundamental mistakes, pertaining both to the Native American past and to imperial interpretation. For example, because the authors use an inaccurate secondary source, they believe that Comanches were forced from their new homelands on the Great Plains by French-armed Pawnees. But disease-weakened Pawnees who had a few obsolete French weapons were not a primary factor in Comanche migrations.<sup>12</sup> The authors further complicate their rendition of history with their interpretation

<sup>10</sup> See Nancy Parrott Hickerson, *The Jumanos: Hunters and Traders of the South Plains* (Austin, Tex., 1994); and Dianna Everett, *The Texas Cherokees: A People between Two Fires, 1819–1840* (Norman, Okla., 1990).

<sup>11</sup> Adelman and Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders," 824–28.

<sup>12</sup> On page 833, the following appears: "The focal point of conflict was the Apaches, pressed from behind by Comanches, who in turn had been driven out of their homelands on the Great Plains by French-armed Pawnees." This quote cites note 48, relying on Ramón A. Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846* (Stanford, Calif., 1991), 300–05, among several other works. Comanches are discussed on 298–300, and the authors accept as evidence a bizarre statement by Gutiérrez that French armament in the hands of other tribes forced the Comanches to leave their homelands in Illinois and move south into Apache country. Of course, Comanches were never forced out of Illinois or the central Plains, which does not include Illinois, by Pawnees or anyone else. Such a statement is an obscure point to a nonspecialist; to Plains people, to Comanches, or Plains Indian historians, it is laughable.

of Spanish-Indian relations on the southern Great Plains. By arguing that the Spanish “seem never to have understood the implications of Indian access to firearms and horses,” the authors ignore systematic official attempts to regulate the flow of these critical commodities to native communities.<sup>13</sup> Contending that Comanche migration was caused by European weaponry distribution makes key events of North American heartland history a mere by-product of Euro-American expansion. In fact, recent studies indicate that Comanche migration was motivated by a complex set of factors, including Sioux invasions of the northern and central Plains, the dynamics of horse and bison ecology, and the Comanche attraction to New Mexican markets. Another error, perhaps even more disturbing, the authors repeatedly lowercase the Puebloan peoples, relating, at the least, a poor understanding of tribal identities versus architecture.<sup>14</sup> Mistakes like this suggest a bias toward an ethnocentric historiographical tradition in which regular standards of accuracy and professionalism do not apply to Native American history.

Damaging to the essay’s central paradigm is the misrepresentation of a significant imperial event—Spain’s late eighteenth-century attempt to modify its Indian policies toward “the French model.” Adelman and Aron believe the change was done to pacify Apaches by luring them into Spain’s commercial orbit. In fact, this shift’s primary result was the 1786 Spanish-Comanche alliance, one object of which was to remove the Lipan Apaches from proximity to Spanish settlements. After the 1786 treaty, Comanches had steady access to New Mexican markets and guns, which allowed them to eliminate the Lipan threat. The 1786 Spanish-Comanche treaty was a virtual triumph of Indian diplomacy, Comanche that is. Bourbon reforms, economic needs, and the incorporation of skillful French officials into Spanish colonial government all played a part in this evolution, but, in the final analysis, it was Comanche initiative that brought this southwestern “middle ground” into existence.<sup>15</sup> To argue that true accommodation and middle grounds only exist under the cloak of imperial rivalry not only trivializes the cultural interaction that occurred but also marginalizes the indigenous peoples in a way that denies both their histories and their roles as rational, influential historical agents.

Thus the construction of a borderlands and bordered lands paradigm without proper reference to and understanding of recent historiography, the interplay of imperial and indigeneous political economies and environments, Indian agency, and basic native history is not very useful. Constructing an essay leaving out the very people whose homelands are invaded is to create a lethal essay.

<sup>13</sup> Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 833.

<sup>14</sup> Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 831, 839. See also the works of Joe S. Sando, Alfonso Ortiz, and Ward Alan Minge for recent treatments of Pueblo history.

<sup>15</sup> See Alfred Barnaby Thomas, ed. and trans., *After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696–1727* (Norman, Okla., 1935); Morris Foster, *Becoming Comanche: A Social History of an American Indian Community* (Tucson, Ariz., 1991); and Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Western Comanche Trade Center: Rethinking the Plains Indian Trade System,” *Western Historical Quarterly* 29 (Winter 1998): 485–513. See also Elizabeth A. H. John, *Storms Brewed in Other Men’s Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540–1795* (College Station, Tex., 1975), and her other essays and edited books; and the essays of Martha A. Works.

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**John R. Wunder** is a professor of history at the University of Nebraska,

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Lincoln. He is the author of numerous books and articles. His *"Retained by The People": A History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights* (1994) was a *Choice* Outstanding Academic Book in History for 1995 and won the Phi Alpha Theta best book by an established scholar award for 1995. Recently, with Frances W. Kaye and the late Vernon Carstensen, he has edited *Americans View Their Dust Bowl Experience* (1999).

**Pekka Hämäläinen** is a history doctoral candidate at the University of Helsinki. He is the author of "The Western Comanche Trade Center: Rethinking the Plains Indian Trade System," *Western Historical Quarterly* 29 (Winter 1998), the winner of the Bert M. Fireman Prize of the Western History Association. He recently was the assistant editor for the *Encyclopedia of the Great Plains* project sponsored by the Center for Great Plains Studies at the University of Nebraska. His dissertation concerns the history of the political economy of the southern Plains before and during the Spanish borderlands era.

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## *Forum Essay: Reply*

### Of Lively Exchanges and Larger Perspectives

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JEREMY ADELMAN and STEPHEN ARON

SCHOLARSHIP ON AMERICAN FRONTIERS, writes Evan Haefeli, “retains much of the narcissism of Frederick Jackson Turner’s celebratory thesis.” Our efforts to combine local and imperial perspectives and to distinguish between borderlands and frontiers, he fears, may have added nothing “more than a colorful new overcoat to the old [triumphalist] story of nation building.” Even more accusingly, John Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen condemn our “borderlands to borders” framework as “process history,” shot through with the imperialist and ethnocentric weaknesses of Turner’s thesis. Worse still, claim Wunder and Hämäläinen, we muffle our historiographic allegiance to Turner. Yet, like Turner, we fail to recognize the agency of Indian peoples, causing us to oversimplify a “complex historical phenomenon” and “deny the unbroken past” that is supposedly fundamental to Indian peoples.

We have no interest in turning this response into a refighting of battles over the ghost of Frederick Jackson Turner or a rehashing of skirmishes among historians of the American West over the advantages of “place” or “process” (which we think starts with a false dichotomy).<sup>1</sup> As we admit in the article, we stand with (and on) Turner in the concern for periodizing European expansionism. Our emphasis on the often unexpected mixings that frontiers and borderlands produced, however, seems anything but “sanitized.” Nor should our attempt to frame the history of colonialism in North America be seen as “celebratory.” Its purpose was to explain how the process of conquest moved across North America from various directions and to analyze some of the forces that altered assorted expansionist designs. Still, were we to lay our historiographic cards on the table, we might also have acknowledged our indebtedness to Turner’s vision of an American history that

<sup>1</sup> Although Patricia Nelson Limerick has led the charge for a “new western history” that champions “place” over “process,” her disavowal of frontier does not in itself amount to a rejection of process-oriented history. “Conquest,” after all, is also a process. True, Limerick sees conquest as ongoing, which she contrasts with “opened” and “closed” frontiers. In addition, Limerick urges western historians to focus their attentions on the current, if uncertainly defined, boundaries of the American West. But this sense of place reads regional boundaries backwards. We would argue that this brings an anachronistic perspective to the study of colonialism in North America and removes the process of border shifting and setting from the gaze of historians. For references to relevant works on these matters, see Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” *AHR* 104 (June 1999): 814 n. 1; to which should be added Kerwin Lee Klein, *Frontiers of Historical Imagination: Narrating the European Conquest of Native America, 1890–1990* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997).

embraces comparative frontier experiences. This debt, however, we felt was better paid to Herbert Bolton, whose "Epic of Greater America" inspires readers to ponder the common and divergent histories of Western Hemisphere states and societies.

In "Borderlands to Borders," we limited our case studies to North America, but we invited efforts to extend the conversation to include all American histories and historians. So, we particularly welcome Christopher Ebert Schmidt-Nowara's contribution to this *Forum*. He reminds us to avoid a too insular historiography, for Turner, Bolton, and other English-speaking historians were/are "not alone in theorizing the history of empire and cultural connections in the Americas." Undoubtedly, greater attention to the writings of Spanish-speaking intellectuals and social scientists is required if we are to escape from parochial historiographies. More important, they are essential if we are to grasp the multiple trajectories that American places experienced in the transition from Indian countries to European colonies and independent nation-states. Certainly, Schmidt-Nowara's discussion of Cuban intellectuals, including some who were Turner's contemporaries, suggests the similar and different ways that Caribbean and mainland writers conceived the legacy of European colonialism. At the same time, our approach (not the same as a paradigm) to North American histories is informed by historiographies of Canada and Mexico, which have for generations stressed the diversities of cross-cultural transformations. We take seriously Schmidt-Nowara's recommendation that any "greater epic" will require attention to non-U.S. historiographies and to how historical traditions are themselves the progeny of comparative myth-making.

In some respects, the bifurcated vision of British and Spanish colonialism articulated by Cubans in the late nineteenth century accords with what prevailed in North America. Here, however, the silence in our polycolonial and multinational historiography concealed not Turner or Bolton but Francis Parkman. Although Parkman's name did not appear in the text or notes of our article, he best expressed what nineteenth-century Anglo-Americans considered the basic differences between colonial regimes in the Americas. On most subjects, withering criticism has discredited Parkman's work, but his characterization of intercultural relations still survives in mutated form. That mutation, in our view, involves the assignment of essential and static features to colonial societies and their frontiers. Parkman, of course, was indebted to an even older myth—that of the "Black Legend"—and it should be clear that we are attempting to challenge this type of comparative history.<sup>2</sup>

One way to contest the Parkmanesque view is to stress the ways in which Indians shaped colonial ventures, thereby altering the political economy of imperialism. This, in turn, should highlight the contingencies in Atlantic history. Instead of the straightforward transmission of colonial projections, we maintained that the persistence of Indian peoples and imperial rivalries continuously transformed the plans of Europe's empire builders. That transformation, we argued, was most

<sup>2</sup> In the deceptively simple and unvarying formulation of Francis Parkman, "Spanish civilization crushed the Indian; English civilization scorned and neglected him; French civilization embraced and cherished him." See Parkman, "The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century," in *France and England in North America*, David Levin, ed., 2 vols. (New York, 1983), 1: 432.



conspicuous in borderlands, where the competing claims of expansionist powers lent Indian peoples an additional weapon in their struggles to protect homelands. With the eclipse of imperial competition and the emergence of new states in North America, however, we saw a weakening of the transformations and negotiations associated with borderlands. In the United States especially, the eviction of Indian inhabitants followed the establishment of bordered lands. Mexico and Canada embarked as well on their own versions of defining the meanings and hardening the boundaries of membership in emerging political communities. That did not mean that North American Indians stopped resisting their reduction to dispossession and dependency. To the contrary, the persistence of Indian peoples and their politics affirms the ultimate failure of exclusionary strategies—as the remarkable achievements in Chiapas and British Columbia exemplify. Contracted though today's "Indian countries" may be, the survival of Indians as peoples and nations nourishes their perception of continuity between anti-colonial struggles past and ongoing.

Persistence and perception, however, do not an unbroken past make. To be sure, that conception of history is fundamental to many Indians, and, to understand the perspective of Indians, past and present, an appreciation for the sense of an ongoing anti-colonial struggle is necessary. But to reconstruct the history of colonialism from all perspectives demands awareness of deep changes in the power relations between Indians and their neighbors. Or do historians Wunder and Hämäläinen really believe that the remappings of North America which brought steep reductions in the size of Indian countries registered no essential changes or watersheds in the history of intercultural relations?<sup>3</sup>

That said, we concede the shortcomings of our essay in giving adequate play to the full dimensions of Indian agency. In stressing imperial rivalries as a shaping factor in North American intercultural relations, we have unfairly limited the scope and space of Indian actions in fashioning the character of frontiers and forestalling the contraction of their countries. If Indians come across as nameless pawns in a grand chess game, then any "greater American" history is diminished. Adding the names of individual leaders might help, but a cosmetic sprinkling of these throughout the text would not alone redress the too reactive quality of Indian leadership in our telling.

Our essay did not presume to cover all facets of cross-cultural interaction. We did not mean to suggest that imperial competition was all that mattered, that only borderlands produced accommodationist frontiers. As Haefeli correctly observes, the classic example of intercultural conciliation, what Richard White has termed the "middle ground" between French and Algonquians in the Great Lakes, emerged long before British traders entered the area. In the larger perspective, the British presence in North America worried French administrators even then, but for French traders and their Algonquian partners the inter-imperial dimension was a distant concern. Likewise, in the lower Missouri Valley and across the Plains to the Rio Grande and beyond, as Wunder and Hämäläinen contend, inclusive

<sup>3</sup> As Robert Berkhofer has explained in an essay that grappled with this issue, "one can believe that others believe certain things as facts, but one need not accept those versions of the past as factual in one's own cognitive system, even if one extends moral sympathy and understanding." Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., "Cultural Pluralism versus Ethnocentrism in the New Indian History," in Calvin Martin, ed., *The American Indian and the Problem of History* (New York, 1987), 42.

frontiers were not exclusively produced by Indians' ability to manipulate borderland exigencies.

Indeed, although the issue is not raised in the published responses to our essay, we should underscore that inclusive frontiers were by no means synonymous with accommodation and conciliation. In borderlands, Indians extracted concessions that brought intercultural relations onto more common ground. But the extended cohabitations that characterized other inclusive frontiers could be as violent and exploitative as more exclusive ones. For Indians, inclusion often meant coerced sex and harsh labor.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, before and after Europeans invaded North America, Indians pursued expansions of their own. Any comprehensive study of North American transformations should probably begin with the pre-colonial spread and reverberations of the Aztec regime—south and north. In the period on which our essay focuses, the Lakotas' takeover of northern Plains lands furnishes an example of Indian migrations and conquests that had little to do with European rivalries. A more complete reckoning of intercultural relations must, then, heed the power of Indian peoples to set relations on their own terms (at least through the eighteenth century), as well as consider the particulars of demography, economy, and environment.

Europeans were not the only expansionist powers and their imperial rivalries were not the sole parent of accommodationist frontiers, but we maintain that borderland competition was significant to the preservation of the common ground found by Indians and Europeans in the Great Lakes, the lower Missouri Valley, and the Greater Rio Grande region. True, in Iroquoia, the rivalry between French and British sowed division within Indian villages. Elsewhere, too, factionalism undermined the efforts of Indian leaders to build consensus. Still, borderlands also constrained European powers and forced concessions. "It was the English," writes Richard White, who gave the Algonquians of the Great Lakes "the freedom to extort this hybrid exchange system from the French."<sup>5</sup> At those times when French authorities felt more secure, they abandoned the syncretic rituals of the middle ground and sought to impose their own terms of trade and diplomacy. British pressure *and* Algonquian resistance, however, restored the protocols of the middle ground. That was true of the British too, who, thinking themselves free of imperial rivals, treated Ohio Valley Indians as conquered people in the wake of the Seven Years' War. Once again, Indian defiance and the rise of the American republic brought the British back toward a middle ground that prevailed so long as imperial competition bolstered the position of Great Lakes Indians and checked U.S. expansionism. To the southwest, Wunder and Hämäläinen themselves illustrate very well how Spanish concerns about French, British, and later U.S. encroachments in northern New Spain contributed to the adoption of new kinds of arrangements with the Apaches and Comanches.

We wrap up this lively exchange with a clarification and a reiteration of the larger

<sup>4</sup> For an excellent exposition of the various forms that inclusive frontiers took, see Robert V. Hine and John Mack Faragher, *The American West: A New Interpretive History* (New Haven, Conn., 1999), esp. 39–99.

<sup>5</sup> Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York, 1991), 119.

perspective that informs our venture into “greater American” history: to acknowledge that Indians did not triumph in their struggle against Europeans is not to consign them to a history without agency. In North America, however, the political and economic passage from empires to nation-states and from colonial commerce to capitalist property altered the ground rules for the defense of the identities and livelihoods of the peoples-in-between. Indians, *métis*, and *mestizos* shaped these transformations, even though they—and we—might not have liked the outcomes.

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**Jeremy Adelman**, an associate professor of history and director of the Program in Latin American Studies at Princeton University, earned his doctorate from Oxford University. He is the author of *Frontier Development: Land, Labour, and Capital on the Wheatlands of Argentina and Canada, 1890–1914* (1994), and *Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World* (1999). Adelman is currently researching a book on Latin America since World War II. **Stephen Aron** received his PhD at the University of California, Berkeley, and is now an associate professor of history at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of *How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay* (1996) and is completing a book on the lower Missouri Valley frontier. Together, Adelman and Aron have edited a collection of essays entitled *Trading Cultures: The Worlds of Western Merchants* (forthcoming) and are collaborating with Natalie Zemon Davis, Steve Kotkin, Suzanne Marchand, Gyan Prakash, Robert Tignor, and Michael Tsin on a world history textbook to be published by W. W. Norton.

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*Review Essays*  
**Explaining European Dominance**

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*The 1998 publication of David S. Landes's **Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor** provided the rationale for these reviews. The essays are another installment in our periodic publication of multiple reviews of books that address issues of broad disciplinary concern as a means of sparking debate among historians of various times and places. In this case, Landes penned a vigorously argued account of the rise of European global dominance over the past two centuries. His Eurocentric argument places the issue in a broad, indeed sweeping, context of world and national histories and asserts the causal importance of seemingly distinctive European cultural characteristics in spurring economic growth and technological development. By addressing these important issues in such a bold and provocative manner, Landes compels us to examine the critical subject of European hegemony anew. Three reviewers have accepted this challenge. Drawn from different fields and forms of history, **Joel Mokyr**, **Donna J. Guy**, and **Charles Tilly** each approach the book and its subject in their own fashion. They unite to provide a broad analytical framework for evaluating Landes's book and the issue of European dominance.*

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## Review Essay

### Eurocentricity Triumphant

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JOEL MOKYR

THE QUESTION OF THE RISE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION to economic and technological domination continues to fascinate scholars and, judging from the huge publicity surrounding the publication of David S. Landes's new book, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (1998), the public at large. The current stock of books on the subject contains some classics such as Eric L. Jones's *The European Miracle* (1981), Mancur Olson's *Rise and Decline of Nations* (1982), and Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Birdzell's *How the West Grew Rich* (1986), as well as some newcomers, most notable among which are Charles Kindleberger's *World Economic Primacy* (1996), Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (1997), and Thomas Sowell's *Conquests and Cultures: An International History* (1998). Almost everything about the topic is in dispute, and because the rhetoric of this literature almost invariably turns on the "for example" variety, little persuasion has actually occurred. First, ideology gets in the way. If one believes in free markets, the West's commitments to them explains it all. If one is against free markets, one can either deny the historical fact of Western predominance altogether or condemn it squarely. Second, theory is of little help: economics, politics, sociology, psychology, and geography all play a role, but none produces a single consensus view of what matters most. Finally, while the historical record is rich and immense, it is far from clear if it will ever allow a sharp discrimination between alternative hypotheses.

Landes's contribution to this literature is first and foremost in raising the level and style of the debate. The book is just beautifully written, filled with bon mots and witty observations, speckled with devastating and at times irreverent dismissals of opposing views. Landes commands a seemingly endless arsenal of interesting and neat anecdotes and historical miniatures that are used in virtuoso fashion to illustrate a point. The width and depth of the historical knowledge at his disposal is simply so vast that even his most determined opponents will have to admit their respect for this work. Adjectives like magisterial and monumental have been widely used to describe this book in previous reviews, and rightly so. At times, his desire to summarize an entire society in one pithy sentence inevitably falls flat, but on the whole it makes this book a wonderful read for both specialists and general readers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Balkan economic history is summarized in the sentence "The Balkans remain poor today. In the absence of metics, they war on one another and blame their misery on exploitation by richer economies in western Europe. It feels better this way" (252). Nineteenth-century Scandinavian society is thus



What explains the great surge of the West? I will set aside the pseudo-scholarship that tries to deny the phenomenon altogether as a Eurocentric myth and the polemics that regard it as simply the result of some form of pillage and robbery.<sup>2</sup> To be sure, the old myths of a “backward” Orient and a “progressive” and “civilized” Europe have been discarded altogether, and Landes is as careful as anyone in recognizing the capabilities and achievements of non-Western cultures. Moreover, he recognizes that on the eve of the Industrial Revolution living standards in much of Europe (England and the United Provinces being the most notable exceptions) may not have been very different from China (southern Asia and Africa were another matter).<sup>3</sup> Yet, less than a century later, a tiny British expeditionary force humiliated the mighty and proud Chinese empire because it had gunboats and the Chinese did not.<sup>4</sup> Certainly, by the middle of the nineteenth century, Western Europe had achieved a power and a wealth uniformly recognized by contemporaries. Modern historians disagree on two big issues: when the divergence between West and East began in earnest, and how to explain it.

It is quite clear that, compared to China and the Middle East, early medieval Europe was a backward and poverty-stricken peripheral region. Yet it must have had something going for it, because by the middle of the sixteenth century Europeans had found the way to Asia and America, not the other way around. It may well be that the geographical discoveries and the scientific revolution did little right away to raise the living standards of most Europeans, but as a preparatory stage they clearly gave Europeans something nobody else had and in the end made the Industrial Revolution possible. It seems therefore silly to think of European dominance as a temporary blip, due to fortuitous forces. The fact that eminent scholars such as Fernand Braudel, Eric Jones, and Landes cannot precisely agree on the relative weight of each contributing factor does not relieve us from analyzing the historical record of economic growth. This historical record indicates without any doubt that European technology and institutions moved from Europe elsewhere, and that this spreading, coupled to continuing advance in the West, constitutes the central dynamic force of modern times. If left-leaning scholars who do not appreciate this message wish to call the messengers “Eurocentric” or “diffusionist” (in their lexicon, pejorative terms), so much the worse for them.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps the one argument everyone can agree on is that Europeans ended up

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described: “Property rights were secure; the peasantry was largely free; and life was a long stretch of somber hard work broken intermittently by huge bouts of drinking and seasonal sunshine” (248). *C’est pour rire?*

<sup>2</sup> Most recently, James M. Blaut, *The Colonizer’s Model: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History* (New York, 1993); Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley, Calif., 1998).

<sup>3</sup> Kenneth Pomeranz, “A New World of Growth: Markets, Ecology, Coercion and Industrialization in Global Perspective,” unpublished ms., University of California, Irvine, 1998.

<sup>4</sup> The *opus classicus* on this and similar phenomena remains Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1981).

<sup>5</sup> As Eurocentrists go, Landes sounds like a distinct moderate compared to Thomas Sowell. Sowell is more than just a Eurocentrist, he is also an Anglocentrist, attributing to the British nothing less than the invention of Freedom, which in his view is the key to the “cultural capital” that lies at the heart of all economic development. He also argues provocatively that the lighter the skin color of American blacks, the higher their scores on mental tests “and other social qualities.” This, he proclaims, is not a subjective perception or a stereotype but a fact. The explanation is that the lighter-skinned group had

knowing more than non-Europeans.<sup>6</sup> They did not invent everything they used, and arguments that attack Eurocentricity by showing that this or that technique was used elsewhere before are storming through an open door. But Europeans learned rather greedily, if there was something useful that non-Europeans knew and they did not, and then applied and added to this knowledge as fast as they could. Useful knowledge (the term is due to Simon Kuznets<sup>7</sup>) includes scientific and engineering knowledge as well as geography, botany, applied mathematics, natural history, medical knowledge, information management (such as accounting), and plain pragmatic knowledge—uncodified recipes of how to make steel, tan leather, build a chimney, breed better pigs, and grow potatoes. The existence of such knowledge does not guarantee that it will be used, or even that it will be preserved. But, as Landes points out in great detail, by 1600 Europeans knew better than anyone else how to sail the globe, make clocks, compute interest using logarithms, pump water from mines, and so on, and they were far better than any other society in disseminating the knowledge among themselves as well as transmitting it from generation to generation. They exploited this superiority mercilessly and often unscrupulously to their political advantage. A century before the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, other cultures still had a few techniques of their own, but Europeans learned quickly when they discovered this. Thus they copied the making of chinaware and transplanted maize to European soil, learned how to spin cotton and how to inoculate against smallpox. Yet this consensus begs the question: why did Europe (and Europeans overseas) become technologically creative, while the rest of the world either never managed to get there at all or, when they did (like China or early Islamic society), were unable to sustain the effort?

Landes's answers to this question are many, but in the final analysis they boil down to attitudes and culture. "If we learn anything from the history of economic development it is that culture makes all the difference . . . what counts is work, thrift, honesty, patience, tenacity" (pp. 516, 523). Coming from a technological historian whose previous magnum opus, *The Unbound Prometheus* (1969), was essentially a history of industrial technology since the Industrial Revolution, this is surprising not so much for what it contains as for what it does not contain. There is little direct discussion of the connection between culture and technological progress. "Culture" might include in addition such attitudes as willingness to challenge the natural environment, appropriate that which previously was the realm of the gods, rebel against ancient traditions of how to make things, emulate the customs and techniques of otherwise despised foreigners, and adopt a rational and mechanistic attitude toward the manipulation of natural forces we call "produc-

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"earlier and better access to higher levels of European culture." See Thomas Sowell, *Conquests and Cultures: An International History* (New York, 1998), 86, 97, 166.

<sup>6</sup> This does not mean that the average European knew more than the average Chinese. The distribution of knowledge follows the age-old principle of the division of labor. Europeans became more specialized in their knowledge and were able to establish mechanisms through which this knowledge could be accessed and communicated to whoever needed it. See my "Knowledge, Technology, and Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution," unpublished working paper, Northwestern University, revised version, September 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Simon Kuznets, *Economic Growth and Structure* (New York, 1965), 85–87.

tion.”<sup>8</sup> These features determine technological creativity, and surely they are part of “culture” no matter how defined. To be sure, Landes has read his Lynn White; he notes the tendencies in medieval religion in which nature is subordinate to man and remarks that, while the old legends remained to warn against “hubris” (cosmic insolence), “the doers were not paying attention” (p. 206). The European scientific revolution, which may not have had much of a direct effect on the first Industrial Revolution but surely helped create the pragmatic minds that made it possible, is the backbone of the critical chapter “Why Europe, Why Then?” discussing the Industrial Revolution. Three elements are singled out: the growing *autonomy* of science, the emergence of scientific *method*, and the *routinization* of research. We are not told, precisely, how these changes in the accumulation of useful knowledge brought about the Industrial Revolution. The scientific culture based on Baconian ideology that insisted that the function of scientific knowledge is to satisfy human material needs does not play much of a role in this book. Landes’s explanation of the Industrial Revolution is that “technology was not enough . . . the answer lies in conjuncture, in the relations of supply and demand, in prices and elasticities.” Economists will be scratching their heads. Non-European sources of scientific knowledge are not discussed but for a remark *pour épater les gauchistes* that non-Western science contributed just about nothing and was incapable of participating, so far had it fallen behind (p. 348).

Economists will find the emphasis on culture at the expense of institutions surprising. The two giants of reintroducing the idea of institutions into the story of modern economic growth, Mancur Olson and Douglass C. North, seem to have made little impact on Landes (the bibliography does not list North’s work, including *The Rise of the Western World*, 1973). In explaining Japan’s successes, Landes provides many telling examples of his conclusion that “people made all the difference” (p. 486), but he pays little attention to the fact that aggregations of people play by certain rules. It might well be that, as much as the people themselves, it was these rules that made all the difference. A careful reading of the book reveals that Landes of course realizes this, but the emphasis is elsewhere. In matters such as these, emphasis is everything.

This is not an oversight as much as a testimony to Landes’s lack of interest in anything that even hints at formal economics. On the whole, it works to his advantage. Most modern economics is exceedingly formal and rigorous and has thus little use for “culture.” (Some highly innovative work in economic history, however, has made a beginning at that venture.<sup>9</sup>) Landes’s main answers thus lie outside economics, in whatever it is that makes people industrious and honest. Yet this reviewer cannot avoid the impression that at times a bit more economic analysis might have helped him: Landes is somewhat hesitant about the costs of protection,

<sup>8</sup> Margaret C. Jacob, a leading historian of scientific culture, has recently stated that “there is such a thing as Western Culture. Its components differed from country to country at any given moment, yet by the mid eighteenth century there was one common element that would prove immensely germane to the mechanization of the manufacturing and transportation systems: the belief that science and technology could control nature and that creativity in both was desirable, a sign of Western industrial superiority.” Jacob, “The Cultural Foundations of Early Industrialization,” in Maxine Berg and Kristine Bruland, eds., *Technological Revolutions in Europe: Historical Perspectives* (Cheltenham, 1998), 80.

<sup>9</sup> See Peter Temin, “Is It Kosher to Talk about Culture?” *Journal of Economic History* (June 1997): 267–87.

and a firmer application of the economics of free trade might have avoided a few awkward spots. Thus Landes discusses Japanese protectionism and asks whether the Japanese don't understand that such policies constitute a deliberate impoverishment of their own population? Don't they understand comparative advantage? To these questions, they respond (and Landes seems to concur) that their goals are not low prices and economic welfare but market share, increased capacity, and industrial and military strength. "If people spend less now, they save more. Their children will have more and Japan will be stronger" (p. 474). Given how irresponsibly the Japanese have invested these savings overseas and in their unsound banking system and the "non-performing assets" that await these Japanese children, these policies have been a mixed blessing. Ten pages later, Landes contradicts this mercantilist fallacy: the Japanese, he explains, made a virtue out of handicaps. Since their home market was too small for mass production, they made up for it in quality, catering to special needs, and switching models as demand dictated (p. 484). Apparently, then, they were able to penetrate foreign markets without too much difficulty—so why did they need to protect their own by employing patently absurd arguments such as that French skis could not be imported because "Japanese snow was different"?

In addition to culture, there was geography. It is always logically tempting to rely on geography because by and large geography is truly exogenous. Culture, technology, trade, institutions, and government, all are determined by each other in a logically overdetermined system. But geography, climate, soil fertility, and accessibility are all largely given, and so they determine economic growth but are not determined by it. Landes begins his book by sighing wistfully that "geography has fallen on hard times" and makes an attempt to resurrect it as a long-neglected factor in economic growth. He points to the impact of climate on disease environment, on the ability of laborers to exert themselves, on the likelihood of catastrophes. Yet eventually, geography is brushed aside in favor of values and cultural beliefs. Although Landes has read Jared Diamond's work, he does not fully exhaust the importance of differences in the biological and climatic endowments of Eurasia and the rest of the world in determining how cultural differences came about.<sup>10</sup> Diamond's argument is that, compared to Africa, the Americas, and Australia, Eurasia was uniquely endowed with domesticable plants and animals, which led to higher productivity, thus higher population density and the development of density-dependent institutions such as bureaucracies and literate classes. Better property rights, literacy, and the study of nature led to the growth of science and technology and fed back into higher productivity. Such positive feedback mechanisms produced what economists call multiple equilibria, in which in some cases favorable conditions lead to more and more wealth, whereas in others

<sup>10</sup> Interestingly, Landes's most explicit attempt to connect geography with culture and institutions is his attempt to rehabilitate Karl Wittfogel's theory of hydraulic despotism, in which the large early empires of the river deltas in Asia were determined by the need to organize large irrigation and drainage work, which had to be carried out by powerful and well-organized states. Diamond, oddly enough, considers the Wittfogel theory but rejects it, preferring a cruder view relating state formation to population density. See Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York, 1997), 283.

societies get stuck in poverty “traps” in which poverty, ignorance, and disease feed on each other.

Such models go a long way toward explaining why some are so rich and some are so poor. They imply that fairly small differences in initial conditions might have led to cascading divergences. The work of biologists such as Stephen Jay Gould and economists such as Brian Arthur has placed increasing emphasis on the importance of contingency and relative minor events at critical junctures, which may lead to greatly divergent outcomes.<sup>11</sup> Cultural determinists such as Landes tend to believe that greatly different outcomes of tremendous historical moment must have deep historical causes. Yet the simple logic of positive feedback defeats that certainty. Much of the history of why some are so rich and others are poor could and will be written in terms of feedback loops: sometimes they are positive (“the rich get richer”), at other times negative feedback prevails and rich and successful economies decline (convergence). The role that culture, institutions, geography, and knowledge play in determining these mechanisms still remains to be analyzed further. Yet anyone wishing to understand this debate will have to read Landes’s book. Few will agree with everything it says—but everyone will be awed by its erudition and verve.

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Jay Gould, *Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History* (New York, 1989); W. Brian Arthur, *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1994).

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**Joel Mokyr** is the Robert H. Strotz Professor of Arts and Sciences, chair of the department, and a professor of history at Northwestern University. He specializes in economic history and the economics of technological change and population change. Mokyr is the author of *Why Ireland Starved: An Analytical and Quantitative Study of the Irish Economy* (1983), *The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress* (1990), *The British Industrial Revolution: An Economic Perspective* (1993), and over fifty articles and books in his field. His books have won a number of important prizes, including the Joseph Schumpeter memorial prize (1990). He served as the senior editor of the *Journal of Economic History* until July 1998 and is currently editor in chief of the *Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History* and the Princeton University Press *Economic History of the Western World*. Mokyr has an undergraduate degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a PhD from Yale University. He has taught at Northwestern since 1974, and has been a Visiting Professor at Harvard, the University of Chicago, Stanford, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the University of Tel Aviv, University College of Dublin, and the University of Manchester. His current research is an attempt to apply insights from evolutionary theory to long-run changes in technological knowledge.



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*Review Essay*  
The Morality of Economic History and the  
Immorality of Imperialism

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DONNA J. GUY

“Everything’s got a moral, if only you can find it.”

*Alice in Wonderland*, Chap. 9.

EVER SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, economists, historians, sociologists, and political scientists have pondered why some countries have benefited so much from the rise of capitalism, modern agriculture, and industrialization, while others have languished. Neat and messy theories of comparative advantage, industrialization cycles, cultural, religious, geographic explanations, Marxism, dependency, and world-systems theories have all been offered. Driven by ideologies, belief in the veracity of particular types of data, and usually preaching to the converted, these theories have been both praised and scorned, particularly by historians who have a great penchant for finding the exceptions to all models, and who tend to tolerate their own evidence better than documentation offered by others.

If historians cannot accept the theories of others, then supposedly they should create their own. This is a difficult task because it implies knowledge of more than one country or region and reliance on the conclusions of other specialists, a hazardous proposition. It can also lead to historians searching for evidence to support a vision of one society that is then superimposed on others. David S. Landes confronts the thorny and contentious fields of national histories and macroeconomic theory in an extraordinarily ambitious study of nations across time and region to find out why some are more successful than others in the struggle for economic survival, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (1998). His theory of moral and cultural capitalism is based on the empirical evidence found in the many monographs and articles listed in his bibliography. While this method has its own hazards, it is far more satisfying to the empirical demands of historical documentation, and it is easier to present the premises and the evidence than it is in ideological or model-based studies. Indeed, the bibliography, though not complete, is excellent. The question remains how the author utilized the information.

Since the basic premises as well as the conclusions are designed to promote specific and rigid Eurocentric prejudices that serve more to create controversy than to persuade the reader, it is evident that Landes searched the bibliography for information to confirm, rather than challenge, his moral and cultural perspective.

An eminent and insightful economic historian of Europe and Egypt, he has produced a historical tour de force that broaches with wit, intelligence, and more than a hint of impatience topics that in recent years have been highly controversial. Relying on an enormous understanding of historical processes and the complex fabric of human interaction, as well as a strong belief in the positive contributions Europe has played in the international economic world, Landes is a modern Don Quixote ready to defend his ideas and ideals in a hostile world. In many ways, he succeeds in an impressive fashion, and poses confident challenges to many recent historical perspectives, but his moralizing leads to pitfalls and weakens not only his discussion of historical immorality but also his analysis of historical processes in countries outside Europe and North America. This particular review will focus on his perceptions of Latin America.

Unafraid of historical fashions, Landes argues forcefully for geographic and cultural determinism as major factors in economic history. He contemplates hundreds of years of history from Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the New World. Rather than focus simply on an issue such as climate, he brilliantly explores the demographics of infant mortality, epidemic disease, and the ownership and control of water resources. These realities lead to the conclusion that people who live in the tropics simply cannot work as hard or efficiently as those in more temperate climates. It also places temperate Europe and North America in an advantageous position further benefited by the presence of appropriate natural resources. Forget about the role of air conditioning and the advances of modern public health since the 1950s, what held true in the nineteenth century for Landes still holds true today, and the conquest of smallpox, polio, and other epidemic diseases has been replaced by the presence of endemic diseases: Chagas' Disease, leprosy, and malaria (p. 10).

Supposedly free from the infestations of the tropics, Europe and North America were also endowed with populations of European origins that believed in Protestantism. Harking back to once-popular beliefs in religious links to the industrial revolution, Landes reexplores religion as a stimulus to creativity and progress. A firm believer in Max Weber: "it is fair to say that most historians today would look upon the Weber thesis as implausible and unacceptable . . . I do not agree" (p. 177), Landes argues that Protestants, particularly Calvinists, were at the forefront of industrial creativity and development when compared to Catholics, Jews, and Muslims. This highly complex issue, one that needs to focus as much on nonconformist Protestants such as Quakers, and the diversity of approaches to Judaism, Catholicism, Islam, and other religions, and even more on the issue of religious nonconformism generally, underpins much of Landes's Eurocentric approach. According to him, where there were Calvinists, there was progress, because mothers needed to be literate and Protestants tended to be at the forefront of the invention of clocks and concepts of time. Religion and temperament fomented creativity and gave a "big boost to literacy, spawned dissents and heresies, and promoted the skepticism and refusal of authority that is at the heart of the scientific endeavor. The Catholic countries . . . responded by closure and censure" (p. 179). As with all generalizations, there are many exceptions to this pattern, and what seems logical on a world scale can often fall apart at the micro level.

Imperialism is another topic used to validate Europe's key role in the advancement of capitalism and modernity, and Landes again refuses to give in to political correctness, the logic of subaltern resistance, or any theory that advocates Europeans' inability to grasp the nuances of non-Western culture: "In recent years, anticolonialist critics have made much of the alleged misdeeds of Western curiosity, putting scholars, spies, and diplomatic agents in the same knaves' basket . . . Insofar as the critique holds that only insiders can know the truth of their societies, it is wrong. Insofar as one uses this claim to discredit the work of intellectual adversaries, it is polemical and antiscientific" (p. 164). If it were true that no one can understand another culture, historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and literary critics would be out of work. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is unimportant to examine how culture intervenes in the interpretation of the past and of other cultures. And to accuse such approaches of being unscientific is as oversimplified as the claim utilized by some postmodernists that historians are positivistic because of their reliance on documentation. Historians have always acknowledged the existence and significance of multiple viewpoints, and this reviewer hopes that tradition will continue.

Imperialism is a major concern for economic historians, because colonialism led both to the rise and the fall of imperialist nations throughout the world. At the same time, it stimulated capitalism, industrial commerce, and trade. Once again, Landes offers his own perspective on the matter by pondering the relevance of morality to the imperial mission. He sharply criticizes nations he believed relied on torture and extreme exploitation, and has little sympathy for historical currents that argue that these terrible events need to be placed into a perspective that avoids confronting solely the moral dilemmas they posed. Here, Landes belligerently critiques those who question the immorality of the Spanish conquest of the New World.

The Black Legend is a version of the Spanish conquest of the New World that argues that the Spanish were far more violent and oppressive than other European conquerors. It began in Elizabethan England and has never quite disappeared from scholarship. This point of view became fashionable in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and was fueled each time a new English translation of contemporary critiques appeared, particularly of works by Bernal Díaz del Castillo (who accompanied Hernán Cortés to Mexico) and Father Bartolomé de Las Casas (who criticized Spanish atrocities in sixteenth-century Latin America). The Black Legend has been the subject of scholarly debate among Latin Americanists since the late 1940s. While historians such as William Maltby, Benjamin Keen, Edmundo O'Gorman, and Lewis Hanke devoted an enormous effort to the task of separating anti-British sentiment from the documentation of Spanish cruelty toward the indigenous of the New World, Landes has little patience for such nuances.<sup>1</sup> To him, the British were clearly more humane in their treatment

<sup>1</sup> William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England: The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558-1660* (Durham, N.C., 1971); Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia, 1949); Edmundo O'Gorman, "Lewis Hanke on the Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 29 (November 1949): 563-71; Hanke, "More Heat and Some Light on the Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 4 (August 1964), 293-340; Hanke, *Bartolomé de Las Casas, Bookman, Scholar and Propagandist* (Philadelphia, 1952); Benjamin Keen, "The Black Legend

of the indigenous, and this was in keeping with their morally superior nature. Indeed, Landes argues that, if confronted with the prospects of torture by either the British or the Spanish, he would have preferred to have been tortured by the British: "Dead is dead, but that way I might go to my death swiftly and reasonably whole" (p. 77n). This faith in British torture technique probably would be unappreciated by the remnants of the Pequot Indian nation attacked by British militiamen and their Indian allies in 1637. During the attack, "men, women and children burned or were speared to death. Pequot captives were beheaded or sent into slavery," and the massacre decimated this group.<sup>2</sup> Torture is torture. No one has the moral high ground in such atrocities, yet Landes has absolutely no patience for any historian who questions either the cruelty of the Spanish or the good intentions of the British.

This desire to take the moral high ground and the unwillingness to nuance Latin American and other non-European regions is also clear from Landes's discussions of why Latin American countries have had difficulties meeting the demands of industrialization. One of the Latin American countries examined in greatest detail is Argentina. This temperate country has more in common climatically with Europe than with most of Latin America, although Landes does not mention it. Argentines think of themselves as Europeans rather than as Latin Americans, due to the impact of massive European immigration there in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet, to Landes, Argentina is just another Latin American country, one in which modern industries arrived too late to be of use. Like the rest of South America, "natural and social circumstances were unfavorable. Fuel and materials cost more than in Europe or the United States, and skills were wanting. It was all very rational: comparative advantage made it easier and cheaper to buy abroad" (p. 315). This interpretation in its own way is also very rational but not exactly accurate.

Let's examine the textile industry. The desire to produce textiles in Argentina was hampered by a series of factors: the female labor force familiar with textile activities was located in the Argentine interior rather than in industrializing Buenos Aires; the cotton grown in Argentina could not be adapted to cotton gins until intensive agricultural experiments took place in the 1920s, and the political climate discouraged those who tried to find solutions because leaders were afraid that major trading partners such as the British would retaliate against the growing Argentine beef and cereal trade. Furthermore, the textile industry linked agriculture to industries in ways not evident in England, supporting Tom Kemp's thesis that the British model of industrialization is not the only paradigm. Rather than creating new technology and machines, textiles in Argentina promoted land settlement and the integration of rural activities with urban industrialization.<sup>3</sup> Steel, another sinew of European progress, was not inhibited by the lack of entrepreneurial cleverness

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Revisited: Assumptions and Realities," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 49 (November 1969): 703-19.

<sup>2</sup> *New York Times* (July 26, 1998): 31.

<sup>3</sup> Tom Kemp, *Historical Patterns of Industrialization* (London, 1978); Donna J. Guy, "Women, Peonage and Industrialization: Argentina, 1810-1914," *Latin American Research Review* 16 (Fall 1981): 65-89; Guy, "Oro Blanco: Cotton, Technology, and Family Labor in Nineteenth-Century Argentina," *The Americas* 49 (April 1993): 457-78.

or inventiveness. Efforts to promote steel production were thwarted first by the location of the iron ore in the mountainous north, second by the failure to find coal deposits until the 1930s, and finally and most importantly by efforts of the U.S. government to prevent the sale of steel manufacturing plants to Argentina in the 1940s.<sup>4</sup>

Economic history is not the sum total of cultural factors. Politics, natural resources, and the need to apply more sophisticated technologies than those utilized by England and Germany were also vital to the history of Argentine industrialization. Consider the fact that harnessing water power to feed the factories of Buenos Aires was impossible until electricity could be transported over long distances and Argentina could get diplomatic agreements with its neighbors to use the rivers that led into the Rio de la Plata estuary.

Landes blames Argentina's dominant Spanish and Italian population for the slowness of Argentine industrialization, but he fails to consider that British immigrants to that country also frustrated industrialization. In fact, British entrepreneurs usually invested in land or banking, and British investors chose to promote railroads rather than industries. Argentine industries were developed by entrepreneurs of German, French, Italian, and Argentine origin, with only British and U.S. meat-packing firms as a major exception. And those who developed industries, contrary to Landes's view, were clearly aware of existing technology and labor reforms. Indeed, many problems confronted by industrialists related to their over-investment in new technology that created excess capacity in the limited markets of Argentina, rather than technological inefficiency.<sup>5</sup> It simply is not true that "industry [was] in a time warp of backwardness" (p. 326), and a number of works cited in Landes's bibliography have very different conclusions.

And how is one to explain the recent successes of Argentine economic reform in the 1980s? Has Calvinism intruded into the Argentine religious landscape, or, have President Carlos Menem and his advisers taken political hints about how to rethink Argentine economics? Instead of Protestant Europe, they turned to the model forged by Spain's Felipe González, whose position as the leader of the worker-supported Socialist Party enabled him to impose neo-liberal free market policies and spur an economic recovery hardly imagined by those who thought that Catholic Spain and Catholic Argentina could never modernize. Landes understands that

<sup>4</sup> Paul H. Lewis, like Landes and Carlos Díaz Alejandro, blames the lagging Argentine steel industry on political strategies of Juan Perón after 1946. Landes relies on these two authors. Díaz Alejandro, an economist, is used as the basis of the discussion of industrialization for Lewis, and Lewis is cited by Landes on 326–27, nn. 30 and 31; Lewis, *The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1990). Neither Díaz Alejandro nor Lewis did primary research that would have revealed the role of the United States. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 835.6511/9–1944, Letter from the Department of State to ARA (ARMCO ARGENTINA), September 19, 1944, outlined U.S. opposition to investments in a steel factory in Argentina. These included U.S. support of the steel industry in Chile and Brazil. As part of these commitments, the United States intended that Chile supply steel to Argentina. The government was also concerned that the Brazilian steel factory would experience unfavorable competition from an Argentine source. These files are filled with documentation on U.S. efforts to prevent the growth of the Argentine steel industry.

<sup>5</sup> H. S. Ferns, *Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1960). The problems of limited markets could also be detected in the Argentine textile, food, and shoe industries. Many factories produced a wide variety of products to overcome the limited sales of one particular item. This can be seen by an examination of early twentieth-century reports on Argentina industry conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce.



culture cannot stand alone as an explanation for economic development, but he clearly believes that some cultures have more moral will to impose change than others, and this, I believe, represents the same prejudice that led him to dismiss any positive efforts by Latin Americans and other non-Protestant groups to promote modern economic policies.

Landes concludes his praise of European culture by noting that historians have great difficulty accepting cultural explanation: "It has a sulfuric odor of race and inheritance, an air of immutability . . . But applauding or deploring implies the passivity of the viewer—an inability to use knowledge to shape people and things" (p. 516). I believe those historians wary of cultural explanations are not passive, simply more cautious. Landes himself tempers his reliance on culture and morality in his final words. His conclusions offer no panaceas, no predictions, and no real way to tie together this ambitious project in a meaningful fashion except to urge nations to keep trying. It is a shame that such an ambitious, well-crafted, but flawed study should leave the reader with the impression that historians do much better analyzing what they know than trying to prove what they would like to believe.

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**Donna J. Guy** is a professor of history at the University of Arizona. A specialist in both the economic and gender history of Argentina, she has published four books, *Argentine Sugar Politics: Tucumán and the Generation of Eighty* (1980), *Sex and Danger in Buenos Aires: Prostitution, Family, and Nation in Argentina* (1991), *Sex and Sexuality in Latin America* (1997, co-edited with Daniel Balderston), and *Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire* (1998, co-edited with Thomas E. Sheridan), as well as many articles. Currently, she is working on a book about street children in Argentina.

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*Review Essay*  
A Grand Tour of Exotic Landes

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CHARLES TILLY

DAVID LANDES'S LUCID, LEARNED, OPINIONATED, BREEZY, and often pugnacious *Wealth and Poverty of Nations* challenges historians at three levels: meta-historical, world-historical, and national-historical. Meta-historically, Landes forces us to think whether and how, in principle and in practice, anyone could ever establish and explain a historical phenomenon so complex as the relatively rapid increase of per capita wealth in Europe and its extensions over the last two centuries as a whole. Have we any hope of identifying coherent phenomena at that scale, much less explaining them?

World-historically, Landes requires us to weigh competing explanations of European advantage during those same centuries, as well as possible grounding of that advantage in earlier historical experiences. Once we have properly established the extent, character, and timing of European distinctiveness in regard to wealth and productivity, does one line of explanation offer a more credible account than others? Do Landes's own arguments coalesce into a viable vision of economic change at the world scale?

National-historically, Landes summons us to assess his description and explanation of differing trajectories over the last millennium among regions that have figured as distinct countries in our own time, including Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, England, India, China, and Japan—but most of which have fluctuated sharply in identities and boundaries over the millennium. Do his repeated comparisons of England with China or India, for example, hold up to historical scrutiny? Do they identify valid principles of country-to-country variation?

At each level, Landes energetically defends an account centering on interactions between culture and technology against attacks from two flanks: on one side from economic modelers who regard market connections and resource endowments as the critical determinants of economic success or failure, on the other from relativists and political economists who regard any such analysis of Western superiority as an exercise in neo-imperialism. He defends his analysis from the first attack by insisting that others such as the Chinese failed to take advantage of opportunities similar to those seized by Europeans. He rebuffs the second criticism by urging recognition of long-term Western dominance as a hard fact demanding explanation rather than obfuscation or contrition. "As for me," he declares, "I prefer truth to goodthink. I feel surer of my ground" (p. xxi).

Landes also pursues a number of secondary battles. He engages intermittent

campaigns against leftists who pivot their explanations of advantage on exploitation and coercion. Since my own work falls into this category and since his tongue is sharp, I find myself more relieved than miffed that he spares me his attention. In compensation, much of Landes's narrative—as distinct from his conclusions—confirms the centrality of firepower and predation to European success.

Another series of skirmishes attacks “practitioners of the self-proclaimed New Economic History” (p. 193) who doubt the occurrence of an Industrial Revolution. At them, Landes aims not new numbers concerning growth rates but a summary of the technological changes he analyzed so acutely in his admirable *Unbound Prometheus* (1969). More exactly, he deploys statistics when they suit his arguments but overrules them when they do not. Landes begins Chapter 19, for instance, by comparing per capita product figures for Mexico, Barbados, and the territory of the contemporary United States in 1700, 1800, and 1989, only to warn in a footnote that such figures are “figments.” Despite the warning, he then assures his readers that the United States really did grow much more rapidly than Mexico and Barbados (p. 548).

Landes opens his third front against other economic historians whose statistics of income and production show little or no European lead before around 1800. There, however, he typically dismisses his opponents as credulous instead of confronting their analyses directly. Thus he rejects contrary econometric work with two small footnotes (one of them brushing off estimates by the same Paul Bairoch who receives thanks in the preface) and the following passage:

A few have even asserted—on the strength of estimates of food intake—that the Indian *ryot* lived better than the English farm laborer. Such calorimetric cliometrics seem to me implausible in the light of the gulf between European and Asian techniques. Nor am I persuaded by efforts to project twentieth-century comparative income estimates back to the eighteenth century. The opportunities to distort the result are endless, and the leverage of even a small mistake extended over two hundred years is enormous [p. 165].

Thus the presence or absence of the productive technologies that marked the English industrial revolution—especially, it finally turns out, transformation of textile manufacturing—becomes at once cause, effect, and evidence of eighteenth-century European mastery. No one who is looking for an even-handed, evidence-based assessment of competing theses concerning world economic history should seek it here. Landes offers us a lively, polemical, aphoristic, and anecdotal journey through an immense historical territory.

At a meta-historical scale, Landes joins many other comparative historians in supposing that a) causes of distinctive historical trajectories lie in similarly distinctive, durable attributes of the units displaying those trajectories (rather than, for example, varying relations to some large historical structure or process), b) the crucial attributes constitute both necessary and sufficient conditions of those trajectories, and therefore c) properly conducted yes/no comparisons (in the form: what did Europe have that China lacked?) will identify the causes in question. John Stuart Mill, often cited as the patron saint of large yes/no comparisons, followed the explication of his four basic experimental methods with strenuous warnings against any such misapplications of the methods to human affairs; for Mill, the main hope

lay in fitting major human experiences into general evolutionary patterns. For us, there is another alternative: identifying causal mechanisms of sufficiently general scope that, when rightly concatenated and placed in sequence, will reproduce the varied trajectories in question.

Landes eschews evolutionary theories. But he actually gestures toward a mechanism-centered strategy in his many obiter dicta on the importance of force in economic affairs, as when he describes the seventeenth-century Indian Ocean: "Everyone in these Eastern waters was half bandit, including the local sea jackals who ambushed the small boats and still in our time prey on defenseless refugees. But the English were the big guns, the pirates' pirates. No vessel too big for the taking. Not a bad strategy: if you can't make money in business, you grab from those who do" (p. 141). An unwary reader might expect such remarks to culminate in a theory of forcible expropriation. But when Landes stands back to consider why over the last few centuries some peoples have grown much richer than others, he turns away from violent encounters between those peoples and their neighbors to durable attributes of those peoples: curiosity, record-keeping, free markets, property rights, technological ingenuity, enthusiasm for work, and the Protestant Ethic or its equivalent, culture: "If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes all the difference" (p. 516). In short, he opts for necessary and sufficient conditions, to be established by means of yes/no comparisons across the world as a whole during the last millennium. Those necessary and sufficient conditions center on achievement-oriented culture.

Such conclusions move us to the world-historical scale. There, Landes gives priority to geographic over temporal variation. He provides no systematic, general answer to one obvious question: why did capital-intensive industrialization and its inequality-generating effects begin in the eighteenth century rather than earlier or later? Instead, he concentrates on why England came first, why nearby Continental powers followed closely, and why since then, on the whole, areas of Western European influence and emigration have prevailed. This makes it easier for him to assert in the face of evidence for considerable prosperity in eighteenth-century India or China that European superiority and dominance were visible long before 1800: "As the historical record shows, for the last thousand years, Europe (the West) has been the prime mover of development and modernity" (p. xxi).

To defend that thesis would require a far different book from the one Landes has written. It would entail either minimizing the widespread evidence of Asian prosperity and sophistication conceded throughout the book or demonstrating that Asian advances resulted from interactions with Europe. While making occasional efforts to minimize Asian accomplishments during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Landes offers no sustained account of Asian backwardness before then and no evidence that Europe had profound effects on the Indian Ocean's dynamic political and economic systems before the massive European incursions of the sixteenth century and after.

Landes settles for a weaker and more conventional case: that European gunboats, privateers, mercenaries, and traders—he says little of missionaries—forced their ways into Asia and the Americas, and the subsequent struggles transformed all parties permanently. The only odd thing about the account is how much coercion

informs the details and how little coercion appears in such summaries as the following comment on businessmen: "They sometimes make big mistakes. In spite of the greatest care and forethought, not every investment pays off. But this has not stopped businessmen and investors from trying again. It is not want of money that holds back development. The biggest impediment is social, cultural, and technological unreadiness—want of knowledge and know-how. In other words, want of the ability to use money" (p. 269). In short, inadequate cultures explain the lack of economic growth, superior culture the West's triumph.

At a national-historical level, Landes alternates remarkably between command of detail and risk-taking where detail escapes him. When he tells stories, they generally contain accurate and telling information. (To be sure, on page 138 he mistakenly places Spain's Charles V in the seventeenth century, but all of us make occasional slips of this kind.) Landes's incomparable knowledge of British, French, and German economic history between 1750 and 1950 sustains sparkling discussions of innovations in cotton textile production, competition within the chemical industry, and the place of clocks in economic innovation. He extends the account knowledgeably to the Americas as well as other European regions before moving more contestably (but no less assertively) to China, Japan, India, and the Ottoman Empire.

Landes repeatedly (and, to my mind, rightly) stresses the significance of such "metics" as Greeks, Jews, and Armenians in connections between poor agrarian regions and richer industrial areas. Yet he cannot resist stretching the argument, then scolding those who resist it: "The Balkans remain poor today. In the absence of metics, they war on one another and blame their misery on exploitation by richer economies in western Europe. It feels better that way." "Leftist political economists and economic historians like such explanations. They think in terms of core and periphery: the rich center vs. the surrounding dependencies. But that is not the relevant metaphor or image: Europe's development gradient ran from west to east and north to south, from educated to illiterate populations, from representative to despotic institutions, from equality to hierarchy, and so on" (p. 252). Again, deficient culture and social structure explain backwardness.

Landes stresses cultural differences with stubborn consistency. Confronting the fact of relatively slow Dutch industrialization and economic growth after the Low Countries' spectacular performance during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, he cites eighteenth-century cultural decay among a wealthy people, only to identify another cultural shift as the Dutch industrialized during the nineteenth century (pp. 444–48). Disconcertingly, he immediately follows the discussion of Holland's decline and rise with vigorous denials that economic historians can speak meaningfully of late Victorian British decline or recent American decline.

Consistent with his main line, Landes portrays Chinese rejection of European science and technology as evidence of cultural incapacity for growth, while seeing in Japan the cultural equivalent of a Protestant Ethic (p. 363) and opining that Japan (perhaps alone in the non-European world) had propensities that could well have produced growth independent of European influence (p. 368). Nevertheless, his analyses of China and Japan have a teleological tone. If it is not clear that European per capita wealth passed that of China before the eighteenth or



nineteenth century, how can evidence of Chinese culture from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries establish that culture causes or inhibits economic growth? The argument assumes precisely what is to be proven.

Again, given the many obstacles to markets and enterprise set by Japan's Tokugawa regime and well described by Landes himself, what proves that the Japanese equivalent of a Protestant Ethic, rather than a hundred other elements of Japanese experience, explains the country's twentieth-century leap to economic heights? Culture makes a difference, agreed. The historian's job, however, is to show how, when, and why.

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**Charles Tilly**, a specialist in modern European history, teaches social sciences at Columbia University. His most recent books are *Work under Capitalism* (with Chris Tilly, 1998), *Roads from Past to Future* (1998), and *Durable Inequality* (1998). Many years ago, he and David Landes co-authored and co-edited *History as Social Science* (1971).

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## Reviews of Books

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### METHODS/THEORY

KATHLEEN BIDDICK. *The Shock of Medievalism*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 315. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$17.95.

According to Kathleen Biddick, medieval studies is in dire need of therapy. The “shock” to which her book’s title refers is the “abiding trauma” (p. 11) of the popular medievalism of the nineteenth century that was rejected so that academic medieval studies could gain intellectual respectability. This “disciplinary wound” remains untreated, with the result that medieval studies is now “based in expulsion and abjection and bound in rigid alterity” (p. 16), sunk in melancholy because it refuses to perform the work of mourning these “unrecognized losses” (p. 10) require, an unreflectively conservative institution that refuses to acknowledge its “shocking history of silencing” (p. 5). As therapist, Biddick marshals for her “ghostbusting” (p. 96) the feminist, queer, and postcolonialist theories needed to allow the patient to “articulate” its complicity with a guilty past.

After laying out this framework in the introduction, Biddick provides five essays of explication. With verve and enthusiasm, she dissects the English Gothic revival and its reappearance in what she calls “the Gothic peasant” of Steven Justice’s *Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381* (1994); the “obsession” with Robin Hood in the journal *Past and Present* (she means five articles published between 1958 and 1961) and its presumed connection to the British withdrawal from India in 1947; the insufficiently critical use of Clifford Geertz’s famous (and, for Biddick, outrageously masculinist) essay on Balinese cock-fighting by Gabrielle Spiegel and Allen Frantzen and then the complicity of the nineteenth-century English Early Text Society (EETS) with British imperialism; Carlo Ginzburg’s ignoring of homosexuals and Jews in *Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches’ Sabbath* (1989); and Caroline Walker Bynum’s essentializing of woman-as-mother in *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (1987). In two final essays, she meditates on the way science fiction and speculations on artificial life challenge the imperialist, racist, and generally deadening practices of “humanist history.”

Although Biddick declines to describe in any detail either which historians or what kind of history she admires, one gathers that she is after three things. One is the familiar injunction to give “voice to the forgotten of history, to the oppressed, to the marginal” (p. 167, citing Michael Taussig, *The Nervous System* [1992]), by which she means above all Jews, gay people, and the racially disadvantaged: we must “cry for those expelled who await our mourning” (p. 127). Of course, if one broadens one’s sense of the marginal, then Justice’s (and *Past and Present*’s) work on peasants and Ginzburg’s and Bynum’s work on women—not to speak of the championing of disregarded vernacular texts by the EETS—would seem to qualify. But these qualifications are insufficient for Biddick, for she also wants “a nonfoundational medieval studies that articulates rather than re-presents the Middle Ages as a historical category” (p. 85). This means that the correct task of the historian is to historicize categories of analysis rather than simply use them: the object of study should not be peoples of color, or gay people, or women but the means by which race, sodomy, and gender come into being. Finally, since Biddick believes that “history writing disfigures since it can never leave a record in the same condition it finds it,” she wants “a critical history writing [that] reflects on its own disfigurement in the act of disfiguration” (p. 187).

While none of these requirements is novel, Biddick declines to deal with the well-known objections. If one requires a history “that will write ‘Slavery was here,’ ‘The Holocaust was here,’ ‘Homophobia was here,’” (p. 187), then this threatens to become a history that is not only impoverished in the range of subjects it allows itself but one that has determined its conclusions before it begins. Nor is it self-evident that understanding the construction of cultural categories is by definition a better kind of history than one that uses these categories to understand the lives of those who lived them. And while no one would argue for an unreflective history, neither can the historian begin at the Cartesian *cogito* and rebuild her mental world every time she tries to understand the past.

But apart from these concerns, there are other, deeper problems with the book. One is comprehensibility. The following passage is typical of Biddick’s prose, both in its fashionably rebarbative diction and its

use of "thus" to stand in for logic: "The space of the Inquisitorial text, its grid of anecdotes, becomes a cartography through which the nomadic ethnos can be mapped. Thus, the space of orality generated by this interpolation of 'expert testimony' is an engendered space founded on the burned bodies of female witches. It becomes an Inquisitorial cartography in which the inquisitor himself eats the first person of the located narrative in order to set himself in this place. An engendered cartography is thus cannibalized in order to produce the Inquisitor as the guarantee of a mapping exercise that defies meaning" (p. 113). If one wishes to appeal to context as an explanatory factor, it turns out, for this reader, to be *ignotum per ignotius*. Even after repeated readings, many passages remain impervious to understanding.

More seriously problematic is Biddick's way with her specimens of historiographical malfeasance. For someone concerned with silencing, she ought to summarize fully the arguments of her targets. Instead we get the prosecutor's account of the defendant's crimes while the defendant is allowed only incriminating statements. In virtually every case, Biddick's critiques seem to me not just misguided but unfair. Space does not allow me fully to untangle even one of these misrepresentations, but the account of Justice's *Writing and Rebellion* is typical. There is much outrage expressed over Justice's use of J. L. Austin's term "performative," with Biddick presenting an irrelevant account of Jacques Derrida's critique of Austin (a critique to which Justice himself refers); Justice is then criticized for declining to consider "questions of gender and sexuality in the ideology of the rebels," although Biddick never mentions what evidence Justice—along with every other historian of the Rising—has ignored; and finally Justice is criticized for presenting a "'merry England' picture of village community" (p. 52), a criticism that relies on a citation where Justice is in fact presenting not his own views but those of the fourteenth-century poet William Langland. As an alternative, Biddick counters the "mostly breathtakingly misogynistic Chaucerian criticism" (p. 49) currently on offer by providing her own interpretation of the Wife of Bath. Like many of the critics who wish to celebrate the Wife's defiance of her masculinist world, Biddick seems to forget that the Wife is not a historical person but a literary fabrication, and one fabricated, moreover, by a man. Nor is Biddick's interpretation either new or penetrating—or even modestly accurate: of the eleven lines of the Chaucerian text she cites, seven are inaccurately transcribed, some to the point of nonsense. This performance hardly gives one confidence in Biddick's conception of a new kind of medieval studies.

Despite its admirably wide-ranging materials and its transgression of boundaries, the impression left by this book is actually one of a constriction of intellectual range rather than expansion. In part, this is an effect of the book's relentless ferreting out of thought crimes, so that all intellectual activity is placed under moral

surveillance. But more decisive is its refusal to engage in its own scholarly activity with the persistence and care that marks history writing at its best. No topic is given its due as Biddick rushes off in quest of another target. "'What is truth?' asked jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer." No doubt the arch-empiricist Francis Bacon is not an authority that the poststructuralist Biddick would recognize, but she must know that the lessons of the past are often found in unfashionable places.

LEE PATTERSON  
Yale University

DOMINIQUE POULOT. *"Surveiller et s'instruire": La Révolution française et l'intelligence de l'héritage historique.* (Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, number 344.) Oxford: Voltaire Foundation. 1997. Pp. xi, 591.

The aim of this study is to offer a "history of the form and structure of the patrimony [*la morphologie patrimoniale*], understood as discipline and representation" (p. 1). As a description, "genealogy" might be a better term than "history," since Dominique Poulot focuses on the period of the French Revolution, broadly construed, as the moment at which material expressions of the French past—heterogeneous artifacts inherited from the *ancien régime*, as varied in their origins as in their cultural meanings—were reconceived ("represented") and administratively integrated ("disciplined") as a national patrimony subject to the "preoccupations of the state and the tastes of civil society" (p. 1). Poulot sees three processes as crucial: "revolutionary vandalism, événement-monstre, and traumatism of the collective memory; the mythic construction, in the museums, of a reasonable and moral history that also recalls the principles of nature; the place finally made for the remains of the past as indices or signals officially 'lodged' in the present by the administration" (p. 1).

Despite the directness with which the goal of the work is announced, the route toward this goal is lengthy and laborious and the terrain traversed is often congested. The reader must work hard to keep the principal themes of the book in view. The first of its two main parts, devoted to "Logics of Appropriation," begins by taking up several strands in the cultural history of the *ancien régime*: on the one hand, the development of what might be called an artistic public sphere, the movement toward opening princely and private collections to the public, and the germs of a policy of cultural administration; and, on the other hand, the elaboration of notions of a rational and moral history that would also be the story of the development of society and civilization. After 1789, once "the founding alienation" of the revolution throws up a mass of cultural materials through the dispossession of the monarchy, the church, and the nobility, these strands will be rewoven into a conceptual apparatus that will purify and colligate the dis-

jected members of a tainted past into the "national patrimony." In order for this to be accomplished, however, revolutionary vandalism must be overcome, objects bearing the stigma of monarchy and feudalism depoliticized, Rousseauian distrust of the arts countered, and the legacy of the *ancien régime* reconfigured as the cultural achievement of the nation. Successive commissions and committees of the revolutionary assemblies carry out this work—at once intellectual, administrative, and material—transforming the Louvre into a museum fit to house the (now) national collections. Revolutionary and imperial armies in their turn enrich these collections through the spoliation of Europe, turning the national into the universal—and the French into conservators on behalf of all humankind.

The second part of the book, "From the Idols of the Past to the Allegory of Patriotism," takes up many disparate themes. A chapter on "Classifications and Declassifications," for example, touches on revolutionary iconoclasm, the physical reuse or conceptual revalorization of objects, the triage between those objects that could be declared still useful and those that were held to be mere monuments to pride and superstition (there is fascinating brief discussion of this issue in relation to feudal and royal archives), their redeployment in new collections, and the construction of a new "French" history that provided a matrix in which the remnants of the past could be restored to the nation as its proper legacy. A chapter on "The Administration of Immortality," in its turn, deals largely with the significance of an antivandalism discourse (best expressed, of course, by the Abbé Grégoire) in fashioning the notion of a national patrimony, offers examples of the practices of vandalism, and suggests the importance of the idea of the patrimony in democratizing culture in the new political space opened up by the revolution. (This chapter says very little, though, about immortality or its administration.) The most interesting section of the second part of the book, to my mind, is made up of chapters devoted to museum culture in the period between 1795 and 1820. After a survey of the organization of provincial museums during these years, Poulot offers a fascinating discussion—based on a reading of guidebooks and travellers' accounts—of the way visitors (whether tourists, amateurs, or artists) approached the museums of the capital as temples of beauty and genius and of the tastes they expressed as they did so. Visitors' mixed reactions to the exhibition of the art treasures resulting from Napoleon's plunder of Europe strike notes all too familiar to the modern reader!

This thoroughly researched and documented book is also remarkably eclectic in its range of references to works that have stimulated the author's thinking. It suffers, in my estimation, from a lack of effective organization and from its dense pointilism. Topics that recur fragmentarily in a number of chapters might have been better treated in a more sustained single discussion of them. Nevertheless, there is much in this

study that will be of interest to historians of the French Revolution and to others concerned with the history of museums more generally. It will be a valuable work of reference and should inspire others to use the guidebooks and travellers' accounts of the period to illuminate the culture of the first two decades of the nineteenth century.

KEITH MICHAEL BAKER  
Stanford University

ALON CONFINO. *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Pp. xiii, 280.

Germany has long been a land of distinct regions, as a quick glance at a historical atlas will show. Yet the exact place of these diverse localities in German nationalism is only now being explored. The publication of Alon Confino's stimulating study, based on Württemberg in Germany's southwest, follows Celia Applegate's fine work on the western Palatinate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (1990), and greatly enriches our understanding of this complex relationship.

Confino's concern is to explore the way Württembergers came to relate ideas about their own specific region to wider concepts of Germany after Otto von Bismarck's forcible creation of a single nation-state between 1866 and 1871. Like Applegate, Confino traces connections among the intimate space of the local community, that of the province or region, and the larger, more abstract, but no less real national sphere. The preservation of partially autonomous states like Württemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony, each of which retained its own ruling dynasty, political system, and administration after 1871, institutionalized regional diversity within the new German Empire. These states provided intermediate focal points for a host of lesser localities, all of which had a distinct sense of their own identity. As Confino argues, however, there was no simple, linear progression from the local to the national, nor from the tangible to the abstract. Instead, the local and national were interwoven in a shifting pattern that eventually merged local, regional, and national identities in a single representation of the nation by the time of World War I.

Just as Württemberg is used to explore this process for Germany as a whole, the question of German identity is used to reflect on the wider interpretation of nationalism. Confino rejects the modernization theory of nationalism as the product of economic development and industrialization, as well as the more recent cultural analysis of it as the creation of social engineering and invention. Instead, nationalism is regarded as emerging neither "from below" nor "from above" but as an irregular "process by which people from all walks of life redefine concepts of space, time and kin" (p. 4). This leads Confino to join those, like David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, who have challenged the post-

1945 interpretation of imperial Germany as deviating from a European "norm" along a dangerous militaristic "special path" (*Sonderweg*). What did make German nationality distinctive, however, was its incorporation of numerous regional identities within a single whole, whereby the nation-state was defined as a composite of these distinct yet related other identities.

Confino supports his arguments with two extended case studies, both of which draw on an extensive and diverse body of evidence ranging from the records of local history societies and museums, through newspapers and dictionaries, to posters and postcards. The first examines the role of "Sedan Day," Germany's unofficial national day, which was celebrated in Württemberg, as elsewhere, between 1873 and 1918. Although locality provided a context through which an ideal of the nation could be understood, that ideal derived largely from national rather than local concerns and was driven by the Deutsche Partei, the Württemberg branch of the German national liberal movement that had embodied Bismarck's solution to the German Question. The liberals' desire to exclude those who opposed their interpretation of the nation ultimately helped to frustrate their intention of fostering a common sense of nationality and led to the decline of Sedan Day as a genuinely popular festival by the 1880s.

The second, more extended case study considers the ambiguous notion of *Heimat* and its place in the wider nation. *Heimat* encompassed selective and romanticized attitudes not only to the past but also to the landscape and its inhabitants. Confino explores the creation and transformation of *Heimat* as it developed from the familiar neighborhood of the 1850s to embrace a sense of national belonging as well by the 1880s. As in the case of the celebrations of Sedan Day, he convincingly contests the accepted view of these beliefs as imposed from above, indicating that both were thoroughly bourgeois phenomena. Although he perhaps overstates his case when playing down the significance of reactionary elements in the *Heimat* ideal, his argument that it was primarily antisocialist rather than antimodern is worthy of further exploration. Altogether, this study gives new insight into the culture of imperial Germany as well as the wider interpretation of European nationalism.

PETER H. WILSON  
University of Sunderland

ROD EDMOND. *Representing the South Pacific: Colonial Discourse from Cook to Gauguin*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xii. 307. \$59.95.

This is, in many ways, a very fine book. Clearly written, effectively organized, and thematically consistent, Rod Edmond's text examines the ways in which the Pacific Islands were represented by explorers, missionaries, travellers, writers, and artists in the period from 1767 to 1914. Edmond's ultimate purpose is to argue for the historicization of contemporary colonial discourse the-

ory. Many critical theorists assume the character of colonialism in the Pacific to have been monolithic. In their rush to explain the establishment of Western hegemony, these distant critics have tended to view the region as a single, simple, and peripheral theater for the play of global capitalism. The histories of cross-cultural encounters and engagements with colonialism are more complicated than this, however.

In examining Western depictions of the islands for the period under study, Edmond discovers complications, ruptures, and insights hitherto unnoticed, neglected, or ignored. Herman Melville's *Typee* (1846), for example, is far more than a highly romanticized account of beachcombing in the Marquesas Islands. In exploring the limits to outsiders' crossings of Pacific beaches, Melville's narrative exposes and dispels its own motivating romanticism. Missionary writings can be read as something other than evangelical propaganda. Edmond finds in William Ellis's *Polynesian Researches* (1829) a valuable text that does more than essentialize or denigrate its native subjects. What is ultimately revealed in this and other more private missionary manuscripts is the authors' unsettling recognition of the relativity of their own cultural norms and values.

Edmond's readings of nineteenth-century novels, travel accounts, and children's adventure literature are equally nuanced. Harriet Martineau's *Dawn Island* (1845) is an interesting, at times insightful, and sympathetic portrait of island ways that nonetheless cannot escape its own ethnocentric belief in the logic and desirability of Western commercial practices. Robert Ballantyne's *The Coral Island* (1858) offered its public school audience stories in which bourgeois chivalry explained, justified, and promoted British colonialism. If imperial ideology was not remade, it was nonetheless disguised nicely for a new, emerging class of young gentlemanly entrepreneurs. Other writers challenged the scientific racialism used to solidify colonial hierarchies in the late nineteenth century. Robert Louis Stevenson came to understand that he was as much the observed as the observer. Jack London abandoned the disease, death, and decay themes of his earliest Pacific writings in favor of the possibilities of a cultural revival for Polynesia.

As in his examination of largely British writings, Edmond uncovers not unanimity in French representations of Pacific Islanders but varying degrees of delight, dismay, unease, and skepticism. There is the early nineteenth-century explorer J. S. C. Dumont d'Urville's combination of fact and fiction to construct an indigenous point of view, albeit from an evolutionary theory of social development. This more inclusive approach faded as later French writings, such as *The Marriage of Loti* (1880), become more narcissistic and introspective, with the Pacific rendered as a silent, melancholy, and dying place. The exception to this trend of the latter nineteenth century is Paul Gauguin. Taking issue with orientalist and feminist critiques that describe the French artist as an ultimately imperial and



heterosexual predator, Edmond, much like Stephen Eisenman, sees Gauguin as far more complex and conflicted. In his writings and paintings, ideas and feelings about lust, androgyny, cultural purity, role reversal, and religious syncretism mix uneasily. Aware of the irony that underlay his own attempts to become "savage," Gauguin acknowledged the illusive otherness of Tahitians.

Edmond's caution against dehistoricized analyses of literary and artistic discourses on the Pacific is an important one. Still, there are problems with the book. Despite the acknowledged distinction between textuality and actuality (or history), Edmond often substitutes one for the other. The "postcolonial" debate between Marshall Sahlins and Gananath Obeyesekere over the death of Captain James Cook, missionary misunderstandings of Islander behaviors, and the standing of the young *Bounty* mutineer Peter Heywood among Tahitians are all resolved, not by returning to historical and ethnographic documents but by rereadings of the published texts under review. There is also the unfortunate division of Pacific Islands scholarship into *primitivist and fatal impact camps*; the current state of Pacific histories and ethnographies is far more advanced than this. Disappointing, too, is Edmond's all-too-brief consideration of contemporary Islander writers. Greater attention to this indigenous literature would have shown the Pacific Islands to be something more than a space for European dreams and desires. The vibrancy of these local writings undermines Edmond's use of the word "precarious" (p. 265) to describe the existence of Pacific peoples today. In a sense, then, scholarship continues to follow old colonial flags. Writing against colonialism and the totalizing nature of colonial discourse theory still privileges Euro-American representations of the region. The unintended consequence of such an approach is the continued drowning out of Pacific voices.

DAVID HANLON  
University of Hawai'i,  
Manoa

ANTOINETTE BURTON. *At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late-Victorian Britain*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 278. \$55.00.

In her prolific and diverse writings on the cultural interactions between Britain and India in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Antoinette Burton has established herself as a major scholar of British imperialism. With her deep knowledge of both British and Indian sources and of the burgeoning recent scholarship on imperialism, her grounding in feminist and deconstructionist theoretical frameworks, and her sharp analysis of the nuances of imperial rhetoric, Burton has succeeded in revising conventional historical assumptions about the workings of imperialism.

What makes Burton's examinations of imperialism of particular note is that she has located her studies "at

the heart of the empire," in Britain and not in the colonies. Challenging the conventional binary view of Britain as separate from "the empire," she supports the recent interpretations of British domestic history as fundamentally shaped by and integral to the colonial world. In *The Burdens of History: British Feminism, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915* (1994), for example, she showed how intertwined with and exploitative of campaigns to "improve" the status of Indian women the British women's suffrage movement was. In her new study, she makes the argument of the inseparability of British domestic and imperial history all the more explicit and convincing.

Reversing traditional geographies of imperial history by examining colonial encounters as they took place in Britain itself, Burton focuses on the experiences of three late nineteenth-century Indians, two females and one male, who visited Britain and who recorded in letters and published writings accounts of their interactions with their British associates. These accounts, written by Indians who were generally anglophilic and who welcomed the opportunities that their stay in Britain offered to them, nevertheless reveal how permeated the British were with a colonial mentality of superiority, of control, and of objectivization of the "natives," a mentality that, Burton shows, the three Indians resisted with varying strategies.

The first of her travelers is Pandita Ramabai, well known in India for her scholarly achievements, who went to Britain to train as a physician. Although Ramabai converted to Christianity and became a critic of the status and condition of Hindu women, she also came into conflict with the Anglican nuns who had facilitated her stay in Britain. The nuns convinced her to train as a teacher, so that she could administer their school in India, but she successfully resisted their efforts to make her an evangelical missionary as well. The nuns interpreted her resistance as willfulness and childishness, which they attributed to that fact that she was Indian. Nevertheless, Ramabai, as Burton points out, "like other 'native' women who encountered the coercive power of British imperial rule . . . was determined not to be the 'experiment' upon which the success of colonial Christianity was tested" (p. 102).

Cornelia Sorabji's experiences were somewhat different in that she was born into a Parsi Christian family and was therefore separate from the majority Indian Hindu population. In Britain, however, she was always seen through the undifferentiating gaze of the colonist as "the Indian woman," an image that she used to enhance her own sense of specialness as a law student at Oxford. Like Ramabai, however, Sorabji resisted the efforts of British reformers to define and exploit who she was and how she was represented. Similarly, Behramji Malabari, another Parsi, deflected "the colonial gaze" by identifying himself with the British civilizing mission in his attempts to reform Hindu marriage customs.

Burton's analysis of these colonial encounters, rich with insights into the diverse strategies used by subject

peoples to resist imperial hegemonic control, is somewhat weakened by occasional overinterpretation of expressions to make them fit the argument of the book. The text is also very heavily laden with theoretical terminology that verges on jargon, as if all the current buzz words have to be included. But Burton handles the theoretical concepts so skillfully that they do effectively illuminate, even as they burden, the flow of her arguments. This study meets the criteria of what Burton defines as critically engaged historical scholarship, which "aims to trouble conventional narratives and exhilarates in the shifting ground of historical production itself" (p. 14).

NANCY FIX ANDERSON  
*Loyola University New Orleans*

SUSAN SCOTT and CHRISTOPHER J. DUNCAN, *Human Demography and Disease*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xvi, 354. \$74.95.

This daunting, unique book reflects the combined efforts of a historical demographer and a computer matrix modeler of biological systems to apply the statistical technique of time-series analysis to a range of different data to provide an original integrated approach to the study of the interaction of population cycles and lethal infectious diseases in England from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The result is an exceedingly complex statistical and quantitative work that is based on the analysis of parish registers, bills of mortality, grain price series, and meteorological readings to produce computer-generated, mathematical models of the dynamics of such devastating epidemic diseases as smallpox, measles, whooping cough, scarlet fever, and diphtheria and their effects on population cycles over some ten generations.

Many of the techniques of family reconstitution are mated with time-series analysis to examine in depth population oscillations primarily in the northwestern counties of Cumberland and Westmorland and to correlate demographic experience, particularly mortality, with such variables as climate, weather, and commodity prices. To broaden the applicability of their techniques for the construction of what Susan Scott and Christopher J. Duncan hope will become a new field of "metapopulation" studies, they also examine comparatively the interaction of disease and demographic cycles in other selected areas of the country, including London and York. Much of the book is taken up with an explanation of the statistical methodology and mathematical formulas employed and reflected in dozens of tables and figures depicting the results of computer modeling.

For the great majority of social historians who are likely to be attracted by the absorbing subject of the interaction between human demography and disease, a substantial portion of the work will likely be incomprehensible. This is unfortunate, because many of the cross correlations the authors discover and the conclusions they reach are intriguing and important, even if

they have to be teased out of the charts, graphs, and brief textual summaries that are designed, with mixed success, to help the reader understand the fifteen chapters and 140 subsections into which the book is organized. The first half of the work introduces the methodological tools for the study of demography and epidemiology and then focuses upon population oscillations in the agriculturally marginal, often impoverished areas of northwest England. A series of case studies in which the market town of Penrith figures prominently are offered to complement Scott and Duncan's central and repeated argument that the fluctuation in grain prices and seasonal climatological conditions traced through regression analysis created cycles of malnutrition that triggered and reinforced periodic outbreaks of disease that in turn had a profound effect on population dynamics. Indeed, in their detailed concentration on Penrith the authors are offering what they describe as "the first fully integrated, quantitative study of population dynamics in a human community" (p. 142).

The second half of the book concentrates on the modeling of infectious diseases, tracing their patterns of first appearance, recurrence, periodicity, and lethality in London, several rural areas, and then in all of England and Wales. What the reader extracts from the data is a multigenerational picture of the population of individual communities stricken from the sixteenth century on by regular epidemics of a variety of lethal illnesses. Scott and Duncan insist that the epidemiology of lethal infectious diseases can really only be understood by modeling the epidemics along the lines they follow in their work. The key finding emerging from the application of time-series analysis to multiple variables is the importance of fluctuating wheat prices and malnutrition for the biology of infectious diseases. The authors contend that changes in nutritional levels can have far-reaching impact in a population, affecting directly immigration, susceptibility to disease, life expectancy, and infant mortality, and, consequently population density and size.

In arguing that the time-series analysis demonstrated in this book is a valuable technique for historical demographers examining population cycles and the epidemiology of disease, Scott and Duncan envision their work as an important theoretical and methodological step towards a metapopulation study. Such a study of what ecologists describe as a "population of populations" would provide a demographic description of the dynamics of an identifiable region over time by assembling and studying the interactions between the communities in a geographical region. The authors have, as they claim, laid the foundation for a larger metapopulation survey of northwest England, but it is unlikely that many historians will acquire any time soon the formidable mathematical and computer skills necessary to build on that foundation or, perhaps, even understand it. But the demographic and epidemiological history that is at the core of this unyieldingly quantitative book is nevertheless compelling, even

fascinating, when its salient points and conclusions are extracted from its rather forbidding methodological surroundings.

RICHARD A. SOLOWAY  
*University of North Carolina,  
 Chapel Hill*

ANDREW CLIFF, PETER HAGGETT, and MATTHEW SMALLMAN-RAYNOR. *Deciphering Global Epidemics: Analytical Approaches to the Disease Records of World Cities, 1888–1912*. (Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography, number 26.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xxiii, 469. Cloth \$74.95, paper \$29.95.

This highly statistical study by Andrew Cliff, Peter Haggett, and Matthew Smallman-Raynor, three geographers who are attempting to discern how infectious diseases operated around the globe between 1888 and 1912, is a yeoman effort, but one that sometimes misses the mark. Using an impressive host of primary and secondary sources that deal with mortality in one hundred global cities, the authors' avowed aim is to stress "the various analytical methods now available for drawing out patterns from [the data], 'deciphering' epidemics." They do succeed in analyzing the death-dealing impact of six diseases (diphtheria, enteric fevers, measles, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, and whooping cough) in spatial and statistical terms. Meanwhile, however, they virtually ignore the critical historical context and basic biological considerations. One can say this is an important contribution to the still thin area of historical epidemiology; it is also an incomplete effort.

Both the research and conclusions reached by this study are predicated on an exhaustive analysis of the mortality records for one hundred world cities. Most of the information forming the foundation of this investigation was meticulously gathered from a series of documents known as the *Weekly Abstract of Sanitary Reports*. The *Weekly Abstract*, listing the prevalence of diseases in other countries and deaths therefrom in urban areas, was compiled by American consular officials. This form of international surveillance existed because the U.S. was fearful that such diseases could be imported. Methodologically, however, the accuracy of such information can be thrown into some doubt. Anyone working consistently in historical epidemiology usually winds up realizing that such records can be compromised by misdiagnoses and by a rather persistent under-registration. Smith, Haggett, and Smallman-Raynor are not seriously deterred by these misgivings, insisting that "the absolute completeness of a disease dataset is less important than its ability to describe a serial form of epidemic events" (p. 77). Ironically enough, they are probably correct. But their faith in numbers is stronger by several degrees than it would be for others.

Because of the sometimes doubtful nature of death records in history, the authors here have judiciously decided to include for their six targeted diseases only

those cities with reasonably reliable data. Forty-eight of them are European, twenty are American, with Africa represented by four urban areas and Latin America and Asia, combined, by thirteen. This, of course, tilts this pioneering study away from a truly global perspective. This apart, the toxic diseases chosen were wisely selected because they all had, as is said correctly, collective symptoms so ostentatious that they clearly distinguished one from another. Here, these three social scientists might have mentioned the reliability of symptomatic evidence. But they do not do so in a volume that devotes less than a dozen solid pages to biological considerations. After fighting through these methodological problems, which occupy a significant portion of the book, the authors go on to a strenuous statistical analysis of the impact of these diseases at "global," regional, and individual urban levels. Given the advanced statistical knowledge of these authors, the reader of this tome must, of necessity, credit the numerous tables, graphs and charts that are included with significant didactic importance.

The last part of this book presents a variety of statistical conclusions. Some are obvious from the numbers compiled, and some are more subtle. But they all could have been more telling if the social history and biological knowledge of the period had been included. To give an illustration, the book comes to the justifiable conclusion that the larger cities were indeed associated with higher mortality rates. What is not mentioned is that the urban areas of Europe and America were receiving a huge influx of peasant immigrants. They were often poorly nourished and brought their diseases with them, particularly tuberculosis. Biologically weak, they were clearly susceptible in the crowded and unsanitary parts of metropolitan areas. The authors further speak of the long-term decline in mortality, as their numbers show, from infectious diseases. It certainly was not evolutionary in the case of tuberculosis in Europe. Quite to the contrary, the decline was precipitous in cities, according to later League of Nations statistics. And this was so biologically because of rapidly rising levels of immunity, a vital factor since tuberculosis is a deficiency disease. Further there is a strained attempt, again through numbers, to demonstrate that there was a spatial and statistical connection between epidemics originating in large cities and their perceived diffusion to smaller towns. In the world of medicine, it would be hard to make such a case. Mutating toxic microorganisms are random phenomena and are not yet susceptible to any consistent arithmetic, geometric, or statistical analysis. Statistics may be an orderly science, but it has thus far fallen short as a means of explaining the rather arbitrary and actual movement of diseases.

This volume partially adds to our knowledge of historical diseases and is welcome. The book also has inherent problems however. And what is perplexing about this study, based on so many worthwhile sources, is why the research team gathered to do it was not broadened. Such an intrinsically valuable investigation

as this one certainly warranted the inclusion of a social historian and a biologist versed in infectious diseases. Their expert knowledge would have tamed some of the purely statistical conclusions here and would have made this book what it empirically needed to be, an interdisciplinary effort.

VINCENT J. KNAPP

State University of New York College,  
Potsdam

MATHEW THOMSON, *The Problem of Mental Deficiency: Eugenics, Democracy, and Social Policy in Britain c. 1870–1959*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University, 1998. Pp. ix, 351. \$90.00.

Mathew Thomson's careful study of the handling of mental deficiency in Britain contributes significantly to our understanding of British social policy and at the same time explores how a sociomedical issue is shaped by demographic, economic, and cultural factors. He concentrates on the events that led to the passage of the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 and carries the story up to the 1959 Mental Health Act. Historians have generally considered the history of mental deficiency as an episode in the history of eugenics, but Thomson's monograph convincingly argues that this narrow treatment overlooks its value in understanding the history of psychiatry and, more important, the history of social policy and its political dimension. The multi-leveled study raises a number of important questions about the biases in historical accounts in the history of medicine that focus more on the history of curing than caring and on the attention paid to individual institutions at the expense of examining the interaction of public and volunteer efforts. In a refreshingly intelligent move, Thomson takes his subject past the sterile epistemological impasse occasioned by debates over the "construction" of mental deficiency by noting that "any social problem is necessarily socially, politically, ideologically, and linguistically constituted, yet also that there is a social reality of individuals within society who have special needs and different abilities" (p. 9).

Thomson traces the emergence of the "problem" of mental deficiency to the introduction of universal elementary education in 1870, which uncovered the extent of the number of children who were not sufficiently handicapped to be classed as idiots but who were not capable of being educated in standard schools. These concerns combined with shifts in attitudes toward criminals from that of punishment in the hope of reform to the view that a portion of the criminal population consisted of individuals who, due to "weak-mindedness," could not restrain themselves from criminal activity. Also, the associated matter of how to regulate the moral behavior of feeble-minded women, who had no restraint over their sexual desires and were therefore easy targets of abuse by men, deepened concern over the social and moral significance of mental deficiency. These different but related

concerns alarmed early twentieth-century eugenicists and, combined with broader reforms of the welfare system, led the British legislature to pass the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913.

Although the act guided policy until the 1950s, considerable conflict resulted. Thomson skillfully untangles the various factors—class, party, gender, religion, politics—that played into the debates. He argues that, to understand the problem of mental deficiency, we need to consider it in the context of the major political issue at the time: the process of adjusting to democracy. Confining mental deficient to institutions raised concerns about the right of the community to curtail individual freedoms, the role of government to coerce rather than encourage, and the need of "experts" to carry out policy. Thomson examines the complex workings of the Board of Control, which administered all mental health care after 1913, and the political and economic conflicts surrounding it. He goes on to describe various "solutions" to the problem of mental deficiency that were tried or discussed: decentralized, rural "colonies" (opposed to large central institutions); voluntary organizations and community care; and, the most controversial, sterilization, which was heatedly debated but, unlike in the United States, not adopted.

Thomson concludes his study by considering the effect of the welfare state on the care of mental deficiency. He notes how centralized mental health service took power from a variety of voluntary and disparate pressure groups who had often worked at cross purposes, but he points out that the result was a mixed one for the mentally deficient because of their inability to defend their interests and because the assumed social responsibility of the welfare state placed them in the position of being second-class citizens.

This book should be of interest to a wide range of readers. Thomson includes comparative material that takes the study beyond the confines of the British Isles, and his multi-leveled analysis holds value for historiography as an example of how the history of a medical/mental issue can be fruitfully examined in a broad social and political context.

PAUL LAWRENCE FARBER  
Oregon State University

ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, *Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii, 268. \$35.00.

It was bound to happen. Cultural historians and historians of science in recent years have focused a great deal of attention on what was once taken more or less as given: the ways in which sexual identities are constructed. It was easiest to see this with women, who vocally contested naturalized definitions of womanhood. Then manhood and masculinity began to be interrogated, and what had formerly seemed most stable now appeared problematic. Alice Domurat Dre-



ger extends this line of inquiry to those persons of "doubtful sex" known as hermaphrodites. With sensitivity and wit, she has studied the medical management, in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century France and Britain, of individuals who seemed to be neither wholly male nor wholly female but somewhere in between. The subject is anything but esoteric, for, as the author notes, once we discern abnormality in a set of bodies, we are led to ask "what exactly it is—if anything—that makes the rest of us unquestionable" (p. 6). What does it mean to be a "normal" male or female? Do not expect to conclude this book with an answer, or at least not with a categorical answer, for Dreger posits as one of the lessons of her study that definitions of maleness and femaleness are specific to time and place.

When confronted with instances of "doubtful sex," nineteenth-century scientists and medical men, in accord with the dictum "one body, one sex," searched for the true evidence of sex. Was it to be found in an individual's appearance, behavior, or external or internal sex organs? The consensus (though with allowance for certain exceptions) by about 1890 was that sex determination rested with the gonads: if the individual possessed ovaries, she was female; if testes, he was male. Genital organs might be ambiguous, but the gonads trumped even external organs that might appear to contradict the gonadally assigned sex.

Constantly engaged with the broader dimensions of her topic, the author points out that sex assignment was not just a scientific but a social imperative. The possible existence of persons of indeterminate sex threatened to destabilize further the already imperiled sexual and social systems of the late nineteenth century. As Dreger writes, "For a medical man to admit a living, doubtful subject to true hermaphroditism would have been potentially to add to the threat of social sex confusion fomented by people like feminists and homosexuals" (p. 153).

An epilogue, in which modern intersexuals (the preferred term for hermaphrodites today) tell their stories, makes clear the author's perspective on her previous narrative. In the encounter between medical men and their patients, she is on the side of the patients. Though granting that those who treated persons of doubtful sex in the nineteenth century often had good intentions, she makes clear that the results of their determination to make hermaphrodites "normal" could result in great confusion and suffering. This was certainly the case when a person brought up as a member of one sex (on the basis of the appearance of the genital organs) was told as an adult that she or he was actually a member of the opposite sex (on the basis of gonadal tissue). How far have we come in improving our understanding and treatment of intersexuals today? Not far enough, in her opinion, and she quotes Michel Foucault's term for us moderns, "other Victorians," to support her belief that "In terms of sex, we have much in common with the Victorians. We still

worry a great deal about sex and about order, and about ordering sex" (p. 198).

Dreger would have the rigid categories that classify humans as definitively male or female loosened. In other words, she favors getting rid of the "one body, one sex" rule. Given the harrowing story of nineteenth-century sex assignment, and her plea for acceptance of intersexuality, one might expect that she would also argue against gender assignment in babies born intersexed, but she does not. Such babies, she asserts, will be neither genderless nor gendered "intersexed" but "can still be assigned the gender of 'girl' or 'boy' like all other children" (p. 199). Perhaps. But it is also possible that we have not exhausted the varieties of sexual and gender identification, and that they may flourish in patterns not yet entirely visible.

CYNTHIA RUSSETT  
Yale University

PETER N. STEARNS and JAN LEWIS, editors. *An Emotional History of the United States*. (The History of Emotions Series.) New York: New York University Press. 1998. Pp. ix, 476. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$22.50.

Peter N. Stearns and Jan Lewis introduce this volume with a question: "Do emotions have a history?" Their answer is a simple, and resounding, "Of course" (p. 1). That two-word sentence is the last simple answer the editors provide, for this collection of essays is, above all else, an investigation of the current state of the field of the history of emotion. In their lucid introduction, editors Stearns and Lewis offer a concise history of the field and a frank and thoughtful discussion of the methodological problems and possibilities historians face in studying the "shifting sands" (p. 12) of human emotion.

Historians' reluctance to include emotion as a factor in their analyses, Stearns and Lewis argue, is rooted in the history of the profession itself. From the era of disciplinary formation in the late nineteenth century until quite recently, the historical profession claimed the mantle of objectivity and rationality. Historians' dominant understanding of the nature of knowledge and how knowledge is best acquired worked to create a related set of assumptions about the nature of human behavior. Historians constructed their histories through the lens of rationality, thus choosing topics and methods that generally reproduced their assumptions that "the past is more or less knowable in rational terms" (p. 1).

In contrast, Stearns and Lewis argue here that (irrational) emotions have played a critical role in human history. It is not simply—though this is an important point—that history was "felt," that men and women in the past experienced their lives in and through emotions. Emotion also had a causal role in history, as people acting upon their feelings helped to bring about a wide variety of interpersonal and institutional changes in American life.

Emotion, of course, is an elusive object of study.



Direct and unambiguous evidence is rare; even private letters and diaries are not unmediated and transparent reflections of emotional "reality." Love and anger may have felt different to people in the past, or may have been defined or experienced differently by different groups. The words "jealousy" or "sorrow" may not refer to a stable set of feelings over decades or centuries of otherwise dramatic changes in human culture and social organization. That is the point: emotions have a history. This understanding presents critical limitations to the study of emotion, yet when it comes to the transparency and transferability of historical evidence, few fields of inquiry are immune from such limits. In the case of the history of emotions, at least, such questions are foundational; the self-consciousness with which most of the essays in this volume approach them can serve as an example for practitioners in other fields.

The book is big, sprawling, and ambitious. Stearns and Lewis have collected twenty-two essays that range in time from the American Revolution to the mid-twentieth century; in subject from politics to romance to consumption; and in method from fairly traditional social history to discursive analysis, psychologically informed argument, and medical science. Although the editors posit a general outline of emotional transformations in American history, the essays' attention to factors of gender, race and ethnicity, religion, class, and other specificities of historical positioning prevent the creation of totalizing narratives.

Many of the essays in this collection fall roughly into the category of "emotionology." The term was coined by Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns in a pathbreaking essay that proposed the study of emotional "standards," or the "emotional culture," of a society ("Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," *AHR* 90:4 [1985]: 813–36). Acknowledging that prescriptions for how people *ought* to behave or feel did not directly correspond to behavior or experience, they nonetheless rejected a total split between precept and experience. The study of prescription or emotional culture was valuable not because it described experience but because prescription helped to create the meaning of experience. As Stearns and Lewis explain, individuals "negotiat[ed] between experience and precept, in the process giving history its distinctive, human contours" (p. 2). And while experience rarely meshed fully with the prescriptive emotional standards of a culture or group, those standards of appropriateness and acceptability powerfully influenced law (i.e. no-fault divorce), public policy decisions, and interpersonal relationships. A related branch of emotionology examines historical attempts by various groups to manage emotions—to encourage some and suppress others—to specific cultural, social, or political ends (i.e. to consolidate the dominance of the white middle class or to serve the needs of a consumer economy). More recent work, well represented in this volume, investigates resistance

to such efforts or analyzes the emotional standards of groups outside the dominant culture.

There are many excellent essays in this collection, which begins with a substantial methodological essay on the "marriage" of history and psychology, subtitled "Three Weddings and a Future," by psychologist Kenneth J. Gergen and concludes with Bertram Wyatt-Brown's elegant and empathetic essay on the role of depression in the lives and art of some of America's most powerful twentieth-century writers. I was especially impressed by some of the essays that considered the relationship of emotion to the nation's public life. Lewis interrogates the meaning of "affection" in democratic politics of the revolutionary era; she shows how those who were creating American politics "imagined private life as the reverse image of the despised world of politics" (p. 53) and so left a powerful legacy for the new nation's collective political life. Dolores Janiewski illuminates the issue of white supremacy in 1890s North Carolina through her analysis of competing emotional styles in the political contest between white supremacists and progressives. Michael Barton's essay on "Journalistic Gore" is a careful and fascinating analysis of the "emotional discourse" of disaster coverage in the *New York Times* from the Civil War through World War II. Susan J. Matt and Stearns each offer provocative discussions of emotion in relation to the creation and consolidation of American consumer culture. Those interested in the emotional history of the family and "private" life, or of specific groups, such as Pentecostal women, slaves, or the elderly, will also find compelling work.

Ultimately, however, this volume is most interesting as a commentary on the historical study of emotion. The essays here are not coherent in approach or subject matter, and so each works to critique its neighbors, raising through proximity fruitful questions about evidence and methodology and the proper limits of analytic claims. The essays demonstrate that the field of emotions history has reached sufficient maturity to take stock of itself and to be sanguine about its prospects for the future.

BETH BAILEY  
*University of New Mexico*

JOEL PFISTER and NANCY SCHNOG, editors. *Inventing the Psychological: Toward a Cultural History of Emotional Life in America*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 329. Cloth \$40.00, paper \$18.00.

Joel Pfister and Nancy Schnog argue that psychological self-definitions and concepts "gain cultural authority and lose explanatory power at particular historical moments" (p. 3). They argue specifically against the idea that psychological theories extract insights into "timeless human nature" and position themselves against what they consider the more limited approach of psychohistory, defined as "the study of the past through Freudian theory" (pp. 3, 9, 17). The contributors to this edited collection recognize that there are

inevitably a variety of approaches to a cultural history of the psychological in modern life, but all share assumptions about the emotions as "historically contingent, socially specific, and politically situated" (p. 8).

There are many strengths to the book. Pfister, while long-winded, details the key ideas and concepts of what he considers a new field. John Demos republishes here his excellent and long-ignored piece, "Oedipus and America." Franny Nudelman makes a number of valuable points about "listening to female testimony" in contemporary talk shows. And Jill Morawski and Catherine Lutz both write of cultural meanings of the psychological in ways that directly apply the theoretical categories established by the editors. There is no question the culture has lost its bearings in relation to the psychological. Perhaps only historians are in a position to provide some perspective on the matter and revive a healthy skepticism toward psychological matters in humanistic scholarship.

The book has its weaknesses, however, aside from the inevitable unevenness in any such collection (Robert Walser writes interestingly of "Deep Jazz," but it is difficult to grasp its relevance for this book, and Richard S. Lowry, in "Domestic Interiors," writes a perfectly good but time-worn essay in literary criticism). The main problem is that by overselling its originality, one would imagine that Pfister and Schnog invented the idea that historical forces shape the psychological, which in turn changes the way we think about subjectivity and self.

The editors and authors of this book for the most part (with only Demos, interestingly, dissenting in a contemporary postscript to his 1978 essay) take the radical idea that the psychological is entirely a social construct. Perhaps such contextualism is true, although this book hardly proves the case. Peter Gay's *Freud for Historians* (1985) becomes the editors' red herring. But Gay's scholarship extends much farther and deeper than his polemical essay on psychohistory. His massive, five-volume study of Victorian life, for example, is really an argument that nineteenth-century culture and family life were objectively formed along oedipal lines; Sigmund Freud's contribution was to name the new psychological reality. Freud's theory came out of historical changes in the family, to put it in somewhat different terms. It is true that Gay would almost certainly argue that oedipal yearnings occupy a special and immutable place within the self; he is surely that much of a Freudian. But his main project of the last two decades moves along the lines of the assumptions behind this book. Gay's principal contribution has been to contextualize Freud historically. Heinz Kohut, to take another example from within psychoanalysis, felt that self-experience is almost infinitely malleable in the crucible of history. Even basic sexual and aggressive urges can alter as history creates new opportunities (and closes off others) for self-expression. He argued, for example, that it has been the fragmentation of family life in the twentieth century

that has created the prevalence of depression in the psychiatric clinic, and that a crowded planet may well privilege homosexuality not only as a legitimate but as a preferred mode of desire in the self. To give other examples of those who have argued extensively and passionately for what the editors call a "cultural history of emotional life" would make this review exceedingly long.

There are, of course, lots of fatuous psychological thinkers who argue for the timeless truths of Freud, or C. G. Jung, or Alfred Adler, or whomever. Many swallow such ideology whole and see their task as simply the application of a new idea (or more often a seemingly new idea) to some figure or episode in the past. But postmodernism can become its own totalistic ideology. The book argues assertively for the historical in what we think of as the psychological. It is a valid project, and only naive if oversold. Demos wisely argues for the "double-sided thrust of a truly psychosocial perspective." There is something biological that grounds the psychological, he feels, even if we cannot yet adequately describe it. The "psycho," as he puts it, "is rooted in the still deeper substrate of anatomy and neurology; hence the appropriate terminology should finally be 'bio-psychosocial.'"

Let's hope for a better term but at the same time applaud the sentiment.

CHARLES B. STROZIER  
John Jay College,  
City University of New York

#### COMPARATIVE/WORLD

PETER COATES. *Nature: Western Attitudes since Ancient Times*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. Pp. viii, 246. \$29.95.

Scholars who teach undergraduates in the Anglo-Saxon world are apt to complain that their students are ignorant of a great deal of history and know even less when it comes to philosophy. When they give courses in matters of "the environment," they cannot ignore the whole history of ideas that accompanies the empirical chronicle, but they are aware that their audience of would-be biologists, environmental scientists, political science majors, and those whose basic interest is really the grammar of Old High Ruritanian is lacking some basic notions. So they look for a text that will not take much for granted, be reasonably comprehensive (for Western thought at least), and be comprehensible to students with a wide variety of backgrounds. Until recently, such teachers will have been hard put to find something suitable, for although a number of books include a potted history of environmental thought, they also include a great deal else that is useless to introduce at this point. Other texts, by contrast, are much too detailed to form part of a reading schedule for undergraduate students, whose lives may encompass a great deal beside the learning process to which they are ostensibly committed. There is excellent news,

however. Peter Coates's book deals exactly with what its subtitle promises: Western attitudes since ancient times, where "attitudes" means the mixture of philosophy, politics, and life as it was.

Coates starts with Greece and Rome but comes right up to date with, for example, paragraphs on postmodernism and on the "new" ecology. In between, we are taken through the Middle Ages, the advent of modernity, nature as landscape, the assessments made by Romantics and ecologists, the diversity of political attitudes (wittily entitled "The Disunited Colours of Nature") and the future of nature, which deals among other things with biotechnology. Although much of the thinking and the examples come from various parts of Europe, the New World is not omitted, and potential users in the U.S. will be glad to know that there are many references to the kind of ideas and places that will anchor the book for their students. The various flirtations with Asian modes of thought are examined with a cool eye, and indeed the whole book is pervaded with a kind of no-nonsense approach to historical events and processes, some of which may worry any reader without much sense of irony or indeed humor.

I strongly commend this book to teachers in any environmental field with an ideas content: let your history of agriculture and water in the southwest, for example, be informed by ideas of nationalism and nostalgia as well as rainfall and aquifer depth. There is, too, an audience beyond the beginning student: the graduate who wants to make up ground and to make use of the excellent notes (with full acknowledgement of the many North American writers on the environment), and indeed some scholars who could do with a reminder of the outward connections in both space and time of whatever it is that constitutes their particular interest. If I had been an editorial adviser for the University of California Press (which has, as so often, produced an elegant artefact), I think I would have wanted more on the ideas explosion of the last twenty-five years, possibly at the expense of the material on capitalism, socialism and other earlier twentieth-century "isms." I would add to that a paragraph or two on the continuity of some of the older ideas right through into today: the revival of the Stoics is being aided, it seems, by the Internet. There is, too, the unusual explosion of environmental philosophy, which is centered in Australia. But there is a ritual element to such calls, and they should not deter even the mildly curious from making good use of this welcome book.

I. G. SIMMONS  
University of Durham

MARYANNE CLINE HOROWITZ. *Seeds of Virtue and Knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 373. \$49.50.

This work is a fine study of the historical value of the use of metaphor in Western tradition; it is a masterful presentation of the function and role of language and art in shaping all traditions. Maryanne Cline Horowitz

has given us a valuable gift, one that will be important for the general reader as well as for historians of ideas. Horowitz displays an encyclopedic knowledge of her subject and an extraordinary sensitivity to the nuances implicit in it. The reader comes away with an increased awareness of the ways in which the human acquisition of language transformed our capacities for cognitive advance.

Horowitz illustrates the continuity of "a common belief that the human mind is predisposed to develop certain notions" (p. 7) and the universality of one source of powerful symbols: the basic function of nature, seeds, growth, and the ultimate result, life. The phrase "seeds of virtue and knowledge" and its visual associations with botanical and biological life have the metaphorical power to evoke the iconographic meanings of vegetative symbols in art and religion. The author refers to "a broad cultural continuum that resonates in language, religion, art, gardening, and herbal remedies" (p. 11).

Horowitz uses not only plant metaphors but animal and human ones as well. "The divine implanting of seeds of virtue and knowledge, or sparks, in the human soul, as in the Stoic *logos spermaticos*, may invoke a gendered, organic, developmental image as an explanatory metaphor for the human grasp of concepts" (p. 6). "The English word *conception*, derived from the Latin *conceptio*, appropriately connotes the *double entendre* of the explanatory metaphor of mental conception molded on the biological conception of an embryo: the emergence of a mental picture or understanding of an idea has resemblances to the emergence in an inseminated female womb of the first stage of embryonic development" (p. 6). The examination of these metaphors in history makes us realize the importance of the ongoing use of metaphor to understanding of the human condition. Communication, whether by language or art, depends heavily on symbols and metaphors. These deepen the emotional aspect of all human communication, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the message being sent. We also use language and the arts as tools for thinking. Through color, design, and composition, the artist conveys information with great power to influence our thinking and actions.

Horowitz has written an enchanting account of the history of ideas concerning human moral and intellectual development and their transmission via metaphorical expression in Western art and thought. Drawing especially on the Stoic writers, she traces a path through the Middle Ages, Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment. This scholarly work is richly illustrated by well-chosen examples from the arts.

TINA STIEFEL  
Institute for Historical Research,  
London

JACKSON TURNER MAIN. *Inherited or Achieved? The Social Origins of the World's Leaders: 2000 B.C. to A.D.*

1850. St. James, N.Y.: Brandywine Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 375.

The empirical core and also the origin of this book lie in a detailed biographical study of community leaders in both "old" and newly settled counties in the British colonies of North America. Jackson Turner Main found that, especially in the "new" counties, they were far more likely to be "new men"—not just commoners but persons of somewhat obscure origin—than their counterparts in contemporary Britain. He then wondered how the American colonials would compare to leaders in other historical societies. The result is an astonishing tour through the scholarly literature available on leaders across the entire world during the immense time-span indicated by his title. Why does he eventually stop at 1850 and not carry on for the next short stretch of time? Because, Main engagingly tells us, he was getting tired: "since my bibliography has already reached one thousand items I thought other students might like to carry on" (p. xviii).

The book has three principal virtues. At the very minimum, it is an invaluable resource for comparative history, conveniently detailing what is known about the origins of leaders in history, listing one thousand bibliographic references for others to consult further. We might not have labored so hard ourselves on such a task, but we can gratefully appropriate the results!

Second, Main shows that the large majority of these societies recruited their top leaders from hereditary elite groups. This is not so of early egalitarian communities or of their successors, usually described by anthropologists as "rank" societies (i.e. those with unequal but only temporary gradations of authority), but it is true of the "stratified" societies of recorded history (i.e. those having permanent authority positions). In coming to this conclusion, Main shows suitable methodological caution. He conveys to us the sense of whether scholars have provided precise numbers, numeric estimates, or merely rough (and sometimes distinctly vague) estimates. This results unavoidably in a methodologically uneven work consisting of some tables, some figures, and a lot of "many," "most," or "perhaps about two-thirds" types of statement. Main copes as well as he can with the methodological bane of such research, the perennial "silence of the archives" when persons of unknown origin might be of relatively humble origins. He does not assume that they all are but makes estimates varying around the (presumably not wildly inaccurate) assumption that half of them are.

Third, Main gives us further food for thought. This is not a very theoretically complex book, but it does encourage further speculation. The argument is focused throughout on the single task of showing how many persons may be presumed to have inherited their position versus all others, whom he calls "achievers." Nonetheless, some further regularities can be detected in his data. It seems throughout that there are more "achievers" with positions of economic power (mer-

chants and businessmen) than political power positions. Presumably this is because market opportunities allow for luck, while hereditary lordship shelters incompetence. But it seems to be conquest and especially communal migration that most favor achievement. This is where the American colonists might fit in best, along with the Spanish conquerors of Peru, and especially the Vikings, many of whom (like the American colonists) were actually fleeing from the hereditary principle of kingship; in Iceland, they even rotated offices so that kingship would not reappear. I wish the author had not tired before investigating such comparative hypotheses himself, since he knows the data better than I do.

For these reasons we are in Main's debt. But I also have two criticisms. First, for most societies, Main only provides information on the very top leaders: chiefs, baronial councils, and the like. Yet his American data concern lower, more local levels of leadership. Curiously, he does not present an American sample that would have been directly comparable to the chiefs and barons. Had he examined, for example, the top revolutionaries in 1776 (the "signers"), he would not have found nobles, but he would have found men overwhelmingly drawn from the richest families of the colonies (of course, his comparisons with Britain and the few other well-documented cases of mid-level leaders remain valid). Second, the category of "achievement" seems too broad and simple. Inheritance does not only concern the legitimate son or daughter but also the bastard, the wife's side, the distant cousin, all potential participants in enormous networks of advancement through kinship. The word for this is, of course, "connections," so dominant in Jane Austen novels, so important in the upward mobility of the highest-achieving colonial of all, Alexander Hamilton. Connections are still important in much of the world today. What would Pol Pot have been able to accomplish but for his education, secured by his father's lowly position at the Cambodian court and his elder sister's position as a court dancer? We would also be in debt to Main (or anyone else) who might follow this book up with further research on the "connections" that link together the principles of achievement and inheritance, as in the cases of Hamilton and Pol Pot, both poor yet also well-connected young men who became world leaders.

MICHAEL MANN  
University of California,  
Los Angeles

KRIS E. LANE. *Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500–1750*. (Latin American Realities.) Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 1998. Pp. xxiv, 237. Cloth \$58.95, paper \$19.95.

Kris E. Lane knows that reckless adventure and amoral abandon have kept pirates in the public eye for centuries. Freethinking, rum-swilling, sexually rebellious cutthroats cannot avoid attention. Lane has a



knack for good prose and a novelist's eye for detail: sordid, heroic, and ineffectual characters stalk his pages. But Lane is also a first-rate historian.

This imaginative and impressive synthesis is actually a world history approach to piracy. Written largely from the perspective of Spanish-American victims, the book contextualizes four waves of attacks on Spanish colonies from 1500 to 1750. French corsairs, English privateers, and Dutch pirates were all sanctioned to some degree by their respective nation-states. The book ends with freebooters like Captain Edward Teach (a. k. a. "Blackbeard"), who operated as private sea-robbers, attacking any likely prey and dodging all authorities. As Lane points out regarding this last group, "the freebooters' principal enemies were their own former masters, not the Iberian 'papists' of centuries past, and . . . it was primarily English property law rather than Spanish defensive resolve that finally wiped out the pirates" (p. 165). Spanish defenses generally remained ineffectual.

Lane's approach is refreshingly distinctive for several reasons. To begin with, he was trained as a historian of early Latin America, and he is concerned as much with the Spanish response as with the pirates' attacks. Seeking context rather than sensationalism, his inquiry is driven by questions: "How did over two centuries of piracy in the Americas affect colonial settlements on the Caribbean and Pacific islands and coasts? How severely did piracy disrupt trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific shipping? How effective were the various defensive measures employed over the years by Spain and its colonial subjects?" (p. 7).

Every chapter is securely anchored by explanations of significant turning points and engagement with historiographical debates. For instance, much has been made recently in other scholarly accounts of pirates' egalitarianism. According to that analysis, pirates, like Robin Hood's men, redistributed the ill-gotten wealth of an unjust economic system. Lane's contribution to that debate is to examine the extent of equality among pirate crews from 1500 to 1750. The theme reappears in several chapters. It turns out that although some of the early eighteenth-century freebooters were more egalitarian than most hierarchical ships' crews, many earlier pirates—such as those commanded by Sir Francis Drake or Joris van Speilbergen—lived under dictatorial conditions. Piet Heyn's men did not sail on shares. Henry Morgan thoroughly cheated his men after sacking Panama in 1671.

Lane argues effectively that seventeenth-century pirates had a significant and deleterious effect on the development of the Pacific "South Sea" coast from Panama to Patagonia. Strapped as they were for money and men, the Spanish, he suggests, should have seized control of the offshore islands like Juan Fernandez. That would have deprived buccaneers of the bases necessary to pillage the empire.

While many of the arguments that Lane advances are not new, his historiographical reach is long. He manages to weave together insights from classic works

such as Charles R. Boxer's *The Dutch Seaborne Empire* (1965), monographs like Peter T. Bradley's *The Lure of Peru: Maritime Intrusion into the South Sea, 1598–1701* (1989), and primary accounts like Lionel Wafer's *A New Voyage and Description of the Isthmus of America* (1699). The result is a book that illuminates early Latin American history, Atlantic history, and maritime history from the perspectives of the others—no small accomplishment.

The book is well produced, with a glossary for landlubbers and/or English-speakers, a fine bibliography, and a nice selection of period illustrations and maps.

At its heart, this is an event-oriented narrative history. Sacrificing cultural analysis for geopolitics and storytelling, Lane often falls back on the strategy of writing from the perspective of "the English," or "the Spanish," an assumption that may provoke criticism from some social historians. He compensates to an extent with a few forays into cultural analysis, including a brief meditation on the culture of cruelty during the 1680s. He also has six mini-essays in boxes. They include "Early Modern Money," "Shipbuilding in the Seventeenth Century," "Early Modern Shipwreck Salvage," and what will become some undergraduates' favorite: "Sea Food, or the Pirate Diet," including a recipe for Rum Flip.

The bottom line is that a 200-page text covering 250 years simply cannot present as much ethnographic detail as a narrowly bounded monograph. Readers will have to approach the book for what it is, recognizing its limitations and considerable strengths. Students and specialists alike may see piracy in a new light.

W. JEFFREY BOLSTER

*University of New Hampshire*

THOMAS K. McCRAW, editor. *Creating Modern Capitalism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and Countries Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 711. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$29.95.

Joseph Schumpeter casts a long shadow. Although an influential economist and historian in his own lifetime, the impact of his thought is now perhaps even more pervasive than at the time of his death in 1950, and perhaps nowhere is his influence greater than at Harvard, where he spent the last eighteen years of his active life. Certainly, Schumpeter's notion of the "creative destruction" of capitalism—an incessant, market-driven process whereby new, superior products, processes, and organizations replace old ones—has struck a responsive chord there. This book, the product of a three-year collaboration centered on the Harvard Business School, is a consequence of its continuing resonance. Its fourteen chapters, written by a total of eight different authors under the editorial direction of the distinguished business historian Thomas K. McCraw, have been "field tested" on the entire Harvard MBA cohort that commenced study in January 1996.



The book's organization clearly reflects its case-study origins. Four countries have been chosen to illustrate the wide varieties of successful capitalistic development since the middle of the eighteenth century: Britain, Germany, the United States, and Japan. Each country provides two business case studies, which have been selected to exemplify distinctive national characteristics that have endured through time, indeed through three "Industrial Revolutions," from steam technology to the "information economy." For Britain, the studies are of Wedgwood and Bentley, potters, and Rolls-Royce, engineers; for Germany, Thyssen, steel and engineering, and Deutsche Bank; for America, Ford and General Motors in automobiles and IBM in data processing; for Japan, Toyota Motors in automobiles and 7-Eleven in retailing. The overarching Schumpeterian insight that links these disparate studies together is that, no matter how different the technological and economic environments might be, growth comes from an entrepreneur spotting opportunities and finding the means to realize his vision. (All the main protagonists in these case studies are male, although female family members often played a non-trivial business role. Indeed, given the sizes of the companies involved, it is remarkable how many remained dominated by the founders' families for up to a century or more: Wedgwood, Thyssen, Ford, IBM, and Toyota.) Further thematic linkage is provided by long-term overviews of the development of each of the four countries and by introductory and concluding chapters by McCraw.

Much care and thought has gone into the preparation of the book. The key Schumpeterian themes are constantly in view. However diverse the case studies are in terms of period, industry, technology, and markets, entrepreneurial opportunities and problems dominate. As one would expect of a book covering so many industries in so many countries over such a long time span, there are extensive, up-to-date guides to further reading, making the volume a valuable introduction to a large slice of modern economic history. The narratives flow smoothly, speeding the reader almost effortlessly over nearly 600 pages of text (including substantive footnotes). These achievements are not without costs, however. A trade-off, perhaps inevitably, has had to be made between detailed analysis and broad coverage. This is not always a disadvantage, provided the reader is prepared to seek out among the copious references the details highlighted by the broad-brush surveys. But those seeking concrete understanding within the confines of this single volume are likely to be frequently disappointed.

A tight focus makes the most revealing case studies those of Wedgwood and Bentley, by Nancy Koehn, and 7-Eleven in America and Japan, by Jeffrey Bernstein. Although the Wedgwood firm exists to this day as a recognizable descendent of the original entrepreneurial creation of Josiah Wedgwood (1730–1795), Koehn sensibly focuses on the activities of the founder, confining the long, gentle decline of the business after his

death to a mere three paragraphs that admirably capture the surviving family's entrepreneurial shortcomings. This concentration allows Koehn to deal with the founder's key business decisions—especially marketing—in a comprehensive, gratifying manner. She has the space to give sufficient details of opportunities, problems, and solutions so that the reader gains insight into both the period and Wedgwood's particular entrepreneurial achievements. Bernstein achieves similar results from his detailed study of post-1945 retailing, a business in which the Japanese are often believed (incorrectly in this case) to be backward.

These studies might be contrasted with Jeffrey Fear's account of August Thyssen and the steel and engineering enterprise that bears his name to this day. Because the Thyssen family has been intimately involved with the enterprise for 120 years without suffering comprehensive competitive eclipse, the narrative truncation strategy of Koehn and Bernstein is perhaps not so readily available to Fear. But the result nevertheless brings his narrative perilously close to superficiality. For example, Fear properly notes Thyssen's involvement in the various cartels that regulated the German steel industry after 1879. He also notes, albeit only in passing, that there were strong incentives within the cartels to keep costs low. But he has nothing to say about how these incentives actually operated or how Thyssen actually achieved his coveted place as low-cost producer within Germany. Thyssen's intriguing and controversial relationship with German banks receives similarly cursory treatment. Thyssen's entrepreneurial feats were truly impressive, but, in contrast to the analyses of Wedgwood and of 7-Eleven, they emerge as if by magic. The reader gains too little appreciation of how they were in fact accomplished.

To some degree, Fear's difficulties are shared by the other case studies. Bernstein's account of the extraordinary rise of Toyota is similarly short on the vital details of key decisions. Again, triumphs unfold as if by magic. For IBM, Rowena Olegario partially avoids the problem by shaping her narrative to give detailed attention to the key decision taken in the early 1960s to attempt a technological leap with the introduction of the System/360. Here one gains a feel for how the company then went for broke, without a back-up. Had the System/360 flopped, IBM would today be as familiar as, say, Remington Rand. Unfortunately, IBM's seriously flawed response to the introduction in the late 1970s of the personal computer gets much less attention, leaving the account highly unbalanced. An intriguing possibility emerges from Olegario's narrative, a hint that companies can become too big, too bureaucratic, to pioneer new technology successfully. But this historical question, which should surely be prominent in every MBA program, fades from view largely unexplored.

The country overviews also vary in their effectiveness. One feels that McCraw is very much on home ground in his survey of American capitalism. It is admirably succinct, hitting the major themes in the

literature—resource abundance, hospitality to entrepreneurs, finance and regulation—in a coherent manner. Fear's survey of German capitalism is similarly succinct, although the complex traumas of German history in the twentieth century put his word limit under a strain that McCraw did not face. Bernstein uses artfully chosen examples to illuminate Japanese development. Peter Botticelli's survey of British capitalism, however, proceeds less deftly. More must be retrieved from the references, with less guidance. The subtleties of British competition, particularly the consequences arising from a financial system oddly split between bank aloofness and stock exchange precocity, seem to elude him.

A final general point: although the authors used secondary sources well and frequently reinforced them with archival material, surprisingly little use was made of readily available financial data in the form of security price evolution and dividend payments, information that MBAs for good reason are endlessly drilled to observe and interpret in detail. Only Bernstein, in his study of 7-Eleven, uses market capitalization to delineate company performance, but even here the treatment is regrettably fragmentary. This is unfortunate, because the narratives, like managers themselves, would often have been more focused and effective under a market spotlight. To note but one obvious example, the analysis of IBM's performance, especially its investment decisions, would have been much more telling had IBM's share price been plotted against the Standard and Poor 500 benchmark. The timing and magnitude of the market's comparative assessment of managerial initiatives (or inaction) might have led Olegario to a more objectively structured and balanced account of the company than is possible using secondary and archival sources alone. The same points hold, perhaps even more forcefully, for the four automobile companies during the period of competitive upheaval after 1960.

In the end, however, the blemishes are outweighed by the virtues of this big book. Those looking for an understanding of the common elements of capitalist systems will be hard pressed to find a better place to start. Given the great breadth of the subject, it should come as no surprise that the task far exceeds the bounds of a single volume. It is enough that the appetite be whetted to explore further.

WILLIAM P. KENNEDY  
*London School of Economics*

S. N. BROADBERRY, *The Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in International Perspective, 1850–1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xxv, 451. \$74.95.

This book presents a magisterial survey of the record of manufacturing productivity in Britain since the mid-nineteenth century, set against American and German experience. The methodological structure is provided by comparative benchmark levels of labor

productivity for the three countries at a highly disaggregated level. Thus, for the period since 1907, seventy-seven industries are covered at regular intervals. The benchmarks are based on value added converted at purchasing power parity adjusted price ratios for the postwar years combined with physical indicators for the period to 1939. On the basis of productivity levels in individual industries, S. N. Broadberry is then able to construct benchmark estimates for the manufacturing sector as a whole coinciding with census of production years. The resulting analysis is consistent with the broad conclusion that although British labor productivity has declined relatively and substantially at the level of the whole economy since the mid-nineteenth century, comparative productivity in the manufacturing sector has remained stable. Whilst U.S. manufacturing productivity has generally run at double the British level, the German productivity record has been broadly in conformity with that in Britain. One major implication of this is that explanations of Britain's relative economic decline cannot be laid at the door of comparative labor productivity in manufacturing. The explanation, therefore, must lie in other sectoral trends in combination with long-term structural change.

At a more detailed level, Broadberry's analysis of manufacturing productivity in particular sectors is divided into three historical periods—1850–1914, 1914–1950, and 1950–1990. In the years before World War I, British industry was forced to adjust to the onset of American and German competition, especially in those sectors that proved vulnerable in the face of high throughput mass production on the U.S. model. Nevertheless, three groups of industry surmounted the American challenge: first, those that utilized craft-based flexible production methods, such as cotton, linen, jute, and woollens; second, those sectors to which mass production techniques were as yet ill-suited, such as shipbuilding; and third, those sectors where there was no obvious British lag in moving to mass production. In industries such as seedcrushing, coke, sugar, and tobacco, demand conditions within the United Kingdom were conducive to the production of relatively homogeneous products. Indeed, in marked contrast to Germany, Britain conformed very closely to U.S. productivity levels in food, drink, and tobacco before World War I.

The period from 1914 to 1950 was afflicted by major macroeconomic shocks, including the collapse of the international economy. In Britain, the response to this situation at the level of manufacturing industry was characterized by increased dependence on empire markets against a background of protectionism and cartelization. At a time when productivity advance in the U.S. was being facilitated by innovations arising from the Second Industrial Revolution, effective industrial rationalization was preempted both in Britain and Germany by an upsurge in imperfect competition. This was reflected in a further widening of the Anglo-American productivity gap. The period from 1950 to

1990 is usefully subdivided before and beyond 1979. In the earlier sub-period, Britain's record in manufacturing productivity was inferior not only to the U.S. and Germany but also to most other industrialized countries. Although there was some attempt to apply U.S.-style mass production techniques, the impact was grossly uneven; at the same time, it provoked trade union hostility. On the demand side, British adjustment to the reintegration of the world economy was delayed by the slowly declining dependence on empire markets, while internal rationalization was hampered by the interwar legacy of producers' associations, reinforced by governmental reluctance to apply vigorous pro-competition policies. As for the sub-period after 1979, dramatic shifts in technology began to work in Britain's favor, insofar as the information technology revolution encouraged a reversion to customized products using skilled labor. The industrial relations climate improved markedly, but because of underinvestment in training provision for intermediate skill levels during the three postwar decades, British industry was unable to respond as rapidly as that of Germany and other European countries to the need for flexible production technology. In these circumstances, manufacturing employment continued to decline, although, by the end of the 1980s, the share of the labor force in British manufacturing remained substantially higher than in the U.S. In addition, a combination of heightened competition and effective rationalization ensured that, by 1990, British manufacturing productivity was very close to the German and European norm.

As a contribution to historical knowledge, Broadberry's study sheds further light on the debate on British and U.S. technology in the nineteenth century and on more recent controversies surrounding the universal applicability of U.S.-style corporate structures. Thus, in relation to the H. J. Habakkuk thesis, the book reinforces the importance of demand-side factors and resource endowments in determining technological trajectories. On the subject of the "corporatist" interpretations of Bernard Elbaum, William Lazonick, and Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Broadberry takes issue with their view that British competitive advantage in the twentieth century would have been enhanced by the earlier substitution of the "visible hand" of market coordination for the "invisible hand" of the self-regulating market. As the studies of individual industries demonstrate, what was needed in British manufacturing was less corporatism and more competition in order to reduce the productivity-limiting effects of excessive industrial concentration, collusion, and protectionism.

MAURICE KIRBY  
Lancaster University

ANDRE GUNDER FRANK. *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1998. Pp. xxix, 416. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$19.95.

This stunning synthesis by a veteran world historian looks sure to land in reading guides, figure in seminars, and be the subject of conferences. It is written with verve and enthusiasm in a conviction of novelty that reaches prophetic fervor. Some may find its language strident, repetitive, and provocative, but it is the overall argument that should be addressed.

Andre Gunder Frank is an extremist in the subdiscipline of world history founded by William McNeill, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Joseph Fletcher. Indeed, he would deny that world history is a subdiscipline. Rather, it is the queen of the social sciences, almost the whole of history, since the parts are only fully intelligible in relation to a totality that exceeds their sum. Frank's global economy reminds me of an Idealist Absolute or some inflationary models of the universe. It is virtually timeless, extending back to 3000 B.C. Self-constituted by commerce, it is exclusively economic in character, monochrome in a bullionist hue. Frank's universe might be described as a mercantilist pantheonism. Uncaused, it is the cause of everything else. Frank so pushes Fletcher's call for horizontally integrative history as almost to eliminate vertically separate history. Consequently, events, such as the rise of the West, do not have deep roots. Conjuncture is always more important than structure. All forms of exceptionalism are rejected as violations of this canon of holism. Like the Absolute, Frank's global economy has little history and less contingency. It has only pulsations, governed by fifty and 500-year Kondratieff cycles, each with an expansive and contractive phase, though over time the world increases in wealth. It is the contractive phase of the most recent super-Kondratieff that accounts for the temporary ascendancy of the West. Today, this is being reversed by the onset of a new expansive cycle, which, like all the rest, will be centered on Asia, with China, as always, in a position of particular privilege. In the period 1400–1800, China's privilege consisted in the fact that, with a perpetually favorable balance of trade, it became the ultimate sink of world silver movements, which it absorbed without inflation to stimulate production, productivity, and demography.

Few students will accept Frank's synthesis in its entirety. Philosophy, facts, arguments, conclusions present a broad target. Rather than anticipate these criticisms, which will be various, let me instead indicate some agreements from the standpoint of my own forays into world history via China, Central Asia, and consumerism. First, it may be accepted that the ages of isolation were never absolute. The human phylum always had its unities and, as Teilhard de Chardin argued, there are no true races. Interconnection always existed, and Frank provides a framework for assimilating new evidence, such as the Urumchi mummies and their textiles recently studied by Victor Mair and Elizabeth Wayland Barber. Second, while I see the world order as more than economic, as an accumulation of global institutions initiated by the Mongolian explosion, I agree both that the explosion took place in

a context of the sort described by Janet Abu-Lughod and that Central Asia and China played a predominant part in the genesis of at least five out of the nine major world institutions. I welcome Frank's emphasis on the continued prosperity and creativity of China at least until 1800. Indeed, I would go farther and wonder whether the supposed decline after that date is not another Eurocentric illusion. This is not Frank's view: the recognition of the nineteenth century as a successful period of Chinese history is overdue. Third, although I see the relationship between whole and parts as more reticular than catenary and regard exceptionalism as only a Leibnizian recognition that a thing is itself and not another thing, Frank's attempt to implement Fletcher's program of horizontally integrative history is to be applauded. In particular, even though we disagree about the centrality of Seville, I am grateful for Frank's support in my extrapolation of Pierre Chaunu's theory to China, although Chinese monetary pull must now be added to Western balance of payments push. Nevertheless, in spite of these and other points of agreement and the greatest admiration for his boldness, I remain unconvinced by Frank's overall thesis. Right about many things, he is wrong about everything: the constituents, age, perpetuity, range, and alignments of the world order.

S. A. M. ADSHEAD  
University of Canterbury,  
New Zealand

#### ASIA

CAROL BENEDICT. *Bubonic Plague in Nineteenth-Century China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1996. Pp. xx, 256. \$39.50.

This volume claims to be the "first work in English on the history of disease in China," which may come as a bit of a surprise to researchers in the field. Notwithstanding this editorial faux pas, it is an ambitious study, based on Carol Benedict's Ph.D. dissertation, tracing the origins and diffusion of bubonic plague in nineteenth-century China, as well as the social and political consequences of amelioration and control in Guangzhou and Hong Kong.

Benedict approaches the history of bubonic plague from two directions. The first, a "regional systems approach," draws on the core-periphery regional analysis developed by G. William Skinner, who first developed his theory by examining market structure and urbanization in Chengdu, Sichuan, in 1949–1950. China is described as having eight macro-regional cores based on demographic data and economic resource patterns derived from late nineteenth-century documents. For Skinner, the macro-region can be defined as an autonomous and highly integrated socio-economic system with minimal interaction outside the core-periphery area; it does not correspond to the political administrative divisions of the Chinese state.

Benedict adopts this spatial-economic approach to

track the origins and diffusion of bubonic plague (probable but not clearly identified in the sources) in the "Yungui macro-region" in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and then its resurgence and spread to the "Lingnan macro-region" in the 1860s. The author agrees with the major authorities on plague that this was primarily due to the Muslim Rebellion (1856–1873), which coincided with a major outbreak in the region, but also due to an increase in interregional trading (particularly opium, mostly by mule train) between Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong provinces.

Chapter three, a geographical analysis of suspected plague patterns in the "Southeast Coast macro-region," argues that "[C]ontrary to much of the literature on the history of plague in other areas of the world, which holds that diffusion was erratic and unpredictable . . . patterns of plague diffusion are discernable when the proper units of spatial analysis are chosen" (p. 72). This hypothesis relies heavily on the two-volume work *Zhongguo shuyi luxingshi* [The history of the spread of plague in China] compiled and published in Beijing in 1982. Benedict candidly admits to the limitations of using this study to prove the general utility of her thesis because: (a) "the kind of information used to analyse plague diffusion in the Southeast Coast region is simply not available for the Lingnan and Yungui regions, and therefore such comparisons are not possible," and (b) the argument that a "mixed pattern of urban-hierarchical and contact diffusion should be present in the regional core . . . is not possible with the available data" (p. 97). In sum, we are told that the patterns of plague diffusion are those that make "most sense" to the author based on what "[I] know of the human geography of the region" (p. 199, n. 9). Thus, the model cannot be tested.

This last point underscores the problematics of using economic and demographic data to express diffusion of a disease that is vectored primarily by specific infected flea-carrying rats (urban and sylvatic rodents), which are the necessary enzootic reservoir, thoroughly discussed first by R. Pollitzer (among others) in his classic study, *Plague* (1954). Benedict devotes only four pages (pp. 4–7) to the epidemiology, ecology, and zoonosis of bubonic plague. Only by accident do humans become hosts in the natural cycle of plague (when bitten by infected fleas), and they play no role in maintaining plague in nature. Human to human transmission occurs only rarely during epidemics of pneumonic plague (a rapidly fatal complication of bubonic plague), or again, very rarely do humans contract the disease through the handling (or ingestion) of infected animal tissues. The intramural spread and diffusion of bubonic plague epidemics relies almost entirely on the ecology and size of rodent populations, herd immunity, the population size and distribution of vector fleas, virulence of *Y. pestis*, even climate and temperature—complex factors that continue to support the conclusion that diffusion is erratic and unpredictable. Considering the short incubation period and high pre-



antibiotic mortality of plague in humans, it is difficult to sustain an argument for diffusion by overland interregional trading of non-foodstuffs via mule train. It is ironic that the model used by Benedict would have better supported the diffusion of other pandemic diseases such as cholera.

The second approach, in chapters three to six, shifts from diffusion to a discussion of the political and social aspects of bubonic plague control focusing on the outbreak of an epidemic in Guangzhou and Hong Kong in 1894 (most likely by sea via Beihai). Of course, it was in Hong Kong that Alexandre Yersin (the bacillus bears his name) and Kitasato Shibasaburo independently discovered the plague bacillus, a controversial story that receives only passing mention in this book. The account of plague control in these two cities does not do justice to the complexity of this contentious subject, and it appears that the author has not read through the copious documentation (Hong Kong government archives, Foreign Office files, local medical reports, and so on) or seriously mined the documentation on Guangzhou. Readers might like to consult Mollie Sutphen, Tom Solomon, and Carney Fisher on plague in Hong Kong and China. Benedict argues that this epidemic (which was the advent of a third pandemic) prompted the Qing government, during the years 1900–1911, to adopt a German and (Japanese) “police-directed model of public health” (p. 151). Yet, from 1842, in their treaty port settlements (including Hong Kong), British and French concepts of state medicine and practice were introduced in major Chinese cities to cope with other epidemic diseases, particularly pandernic cholera and venereal diseases. May we simply ignore these well-documented examples in any discussion of the influence of these activities on late Qing reform policies?

Overall, historians and others interested in the history of disease may find this book of interest. It will certainly contribute to the continuing debates over the origins of plague, its diffusion, and the most useful and verifiable approaches to the history of disease in China, but it will not be a substitute for epidemiology.

KERRIE L. MACPHERSON  
University of Hong Kong

J. Y. WONG. *Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism, and the Arrow War (1856–1860) in China*. (Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xxx. 542. \$69.95.

Suggestive of little beyond horrors of an uncertain sort, this book's title may at first bewilder the reader. The subtitle, on the other hand, may be useful, for it soon becomes apparent that an incident involving the ship *Arrow*, off Canton on October 8, 1856, precipitated a war of some scale. As the book proceeds, the reader encounters the *Arrow* again and again and again; it is the key to this formidable work of well over 500 pages.

“What caused the war? Imperialism, many would simply say,” begins J. Y. Wong “But what is imperialism?” (p. 1). His table of contents answers for him; the eighteen chapters that compose the text are distributed among seven sections, each of which trumpets the magic term. “The Confusion of Imperialism,” reads the first, “The Pretext for Imperialism,” the second, and so on. Imperialism undefined is scattered generously all about the book, on the implicit assumption that in this day and age we accept as given that the term denotes the West's behavior toward Others, unconscionable, unforgivable, and uniform. Imperialism is what the book is about. It is to be approached through the key just mentioned, and that key dismisses narrative. “Let us go back to the time of the *Arrow* incident to begin our analysis” [italics mine] (p. 70).

The incident and its consequences were as follows. On an October morning in 1856, Chinese marines boarded a lorch (a sailing vessel with a Western-type hull and a junk's rigging) and seized the crew on suspicion that the ship contained pirates. The lorch was Chinese-built and owned, sailed Chinese waters, and had a Chinese crew. Only its name, *Arrow*, and its young Irish skipper were not Chinese, and the skipper's duties were nominal: on that morning, he was off breakfasting somewhere. But there was a British connection. The Chinese owner lived at Hong Kong. His ship was registered there, and it flew the British flag. So the skipper, when he returned, was angry. He let British Consul Harry Parkes know, adding the marines had torn down the flag although in fact it had already, its registration exhausted, been lowered. Parkes saw an opportunity to make the indignity of the flag a lever to compel China to open and admit foreigners at large, something that the Opium War of 1840–1842 had failed to do. But the Chinese were sure to demur, and many of Parkes's compatriots were eager to use force. So force was used, first at Canton, which was shelled and stormed; later at Tientsin, where treaties were actually negotiated; and later still at Beijing, where, ratification delayed, the Summer Palace was sacked and burned. By the time the war had ended, the West (for the French, the Russians, and the Americans were also participants) was well on the way to riddling China through and through.

Thimble-sized as this summary is, it will supply the uninformed reader with a base from which to venture into the complications and densities of Wong's extraordinary volume. From years of patient inquiry and research in the archives and other print sources of half a dozen countries besides China, buttressed by bibliographical material of staggering extent, Wong has constructed an edifice that no one interested in Western relations with China between 1840 and 1860 can afford to bypass. The economic, in particular opium-trade, side of his inquiries might alone justify a monograph. But he is less than reasonable when it comes to that narrative minimum without which analysis cannot function. For the *Arrow* incident, Wong tosses out only scraps (pp. 3–8, 11–12, 22–24, 26, 43–46, 62–66, and



87–88); so tiresome would be their collection and arrangement that for the paragraph above I went directly to a textbook. And there is worse. Again and again, one gets the impression, strengthened often enough by the printed phrase, that under the deluding umbrella of “imperialism” Wong is searching for the one motive, and with it the one plan and the one decision, that prompted Britain’s armed onslaught on China. His pursuit of the “truth” in the end fastens tunnel vision on his endeavors. He does not see that British men in positions of power and authority—and outside of them as well—had and still have multiple ambitions and concerns; that, indeed, there was and is no such thing as “Britain.” Space does not allow me to amplify or justify these misgivings, but they are there.

PETER WARD FAY

*California Institute of Technology*

TIMOTHY CHEEK, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia*. (Studies on Contemporary China.) New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University, 1997. Pp. ix, 390. \$85.00.

This multilayered biography of Deng Tuo, a leading propagandist for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from the 1930s until his death by suicide in 1966, offers a wealth of new insight into the complicated and ultimately tragic world of intellectual service in Mao Zedong’s China. Reflective of a growing interest in the role of “establishment intellectuals” in the Chinese Communist movement, the book takes issue with studies that posit an essential divergence of interests between intellectuals and the party-state. Timothy Cheek asks three questions: why was Maoism attractive to some intellectuals? What was service to Maoism like when it worked? What went wrong in that service to bring its demise? By Maoism, Cheek means “the whole system under the CCP, its ideology and organization” (p. 7). To serve this system as Deng Tuo did, as a media propagandist, was to participate in a set of institutional structures at the heart of the Chinese party-state. For Deng, propaganda was not a pejorative term but an enlightened effort to “transform the masses through education” (*jiaohua*) (p. 309).

The Confucian underpinnings of this conception of propaganda and culture are central to Cheek’s attempt to locate Deng Tuo in the universe of Chinese Communist officialdom. The son of a Qing dynasty district magistrate from the southeastern coastal province of Fujian, Deng’s elite scholastic heritage was inculcated at an early age, creating a lifelong interest and commitment to the traditional Chinese scholarly arts of poetry, calligraphy, painting, and knowledge of Chinese history. Significantly, Deng’s conversion to Marxism at a young age did not lead him to reject either his family background or his inherited values: there was no Levensonian tension between “history and value” evident in Deng’s embrace of Marxism-Leninism as a solution to China’s problems. Instead his service to the party reflected a “neo-traditional mix of ancient schol-

ar-official attitudes of loyalty and personal superiority of the educated elite and new ideas of nationalism, revolution, and obedience by cadres to Leninist democratic centralism” (p. 26). He viewed himself both as a culture-bearing literatus (*wenren*) and as a Leninist cadre (*ganbu*).

Deng was able to combine these roles for more than two decades. A CCP member since 1930, he became a party journalist in North China during the Anti-Japanese War, where his skills as a propagandist soon put him at the center of the party’s effort to forge a new Maoist orthodoxy. Deng edited the first two editions of Mao’s *Selected Works* and, in 1949, became founding editor of the *People’s Daily*, the official organ of the Central Committee. In 1957, Mao labeled him a “pedant editor” and had him fired, to which Deng responded with veiled but loyal criticism of Mao’s rulership, couched in the traditional terms of a remonstrating official. Unlike the Confucian bureaucrats in whose image he acted, however, Deng “did not have an identity separate from the regime” (p. 310) and thus in the end could neither reject Mao completely nor shield himself from the chairman’s awesome power. Deng’s suicide in early 1966 represented his tragic final protest as the loyal official unjustly accused.

Cheek relates this story with empathy and layered complexity, seeing in Deng’s life not just the tragedy of personal loss and of a revolution that consumed its own makers but a key to understanding the seismic rift that split the party in the 1960s. For Cheek, Deng’s story is also the story of the dissolution of Maoist orthodoxy into what he calls “faith Maoism” and “bureaucratic Maoism.” An unstable mix of charismatic and routine authority patterns had characterized Maoist orthodoxy from its inception in the 1940s, Cheek argues, but the amalgam became weakened after 1949 as administrative routine supplanted the charismatic authority of the ruler. Like previous emperors, Mao could maintain his authority over the bureaucracy only through dramatic assertions of his personal power, such as the Great Leap Forward, which left 30 million dead. In 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to force a confrontation between “faith” and “bureaucratic” Maoists, and Deng, the loyal official who had sought to embrace both, became one of its first victims.

The challenge facing all biographers is to achieve a balance between subject and the historical context in which he/she developed. Cheek provides a compelling and nuanced understanding of both. The only real weakness of this book is the little that is revealed about Deng as an individual. Although Cheek has relied upon a wealth of historical materials made available since 1981 and on discussions with Deng’s surviving family and friends, the author was never allowed access to two critical sources: Deng’s personal diaries and his long suicide letter. One hopes that eventually these will be made available to researchers. Until then, this book will remain the most sophisticated attempt to

discern the meaning of Deng Tuo's life of intellectual service to the party that eventually destroyed him.

GLEN PETERSON  
University of British Columbia

LUKE S. ROBERTS. *Mercantilism in a Japanese Domain: The Merchant Origins of Economic Nationalism in Eighteenth-Century Tosa*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 251. \$59.95.

For several decades, local history and the history of ideas have been among the most exciting specialties in Japanese historiography, and so it is particularly apt that Luke S. Roberts has produced a superbly researched and well-written study situated at the intersection of these approaches. Although Roberts does not exactly accomplish all the claims he makes for his study, he fulfills a sufficient number to make his analysis of the origins of mercantilist thought a landmark study of early modern Japan.

The subject of Roberts's study is the domain of Tosa on the island of Shikoku, the smallest of Japan's major islands. Tosa was among the larger of the over two hundred domains comprising Japan during the Edo or Tokugawa period (1600–1868), and it was Marius Jansen, Roberts's principal mentor, who pioneered studies of Tosa—as well as the modernization thesis that Roberts embraces—in English. Roberts describes how, during the seventeenth century, Japanese society and economy were structured along essentially Confucian notions of service to one's lord in a hierarchy that culminated in the shogun in Edo. Seventeenth-century economic activity throughout Japan centered on the great metropolises of Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo, and Roberts demonstrates how Tosa domainal merchants as well as their lords often preferred to market their wares in Osaka, even when better prices might be obtained within the domain, in order to obtain extra-domainal income useful for discharging commercial loans and other forms of indebtedness.

Like other domains, Tosa was obligated to provide labor service to the shogun's government or *bakufu*, but the Yamanouchi lords of Tosa negotiated an agreement with the *bakufu* to provide lumber from their forests rather than actual labor. In this way, the domain became overly dependent on the export of lumber to service both its corvée obligations and the extravagant spending of the Yamanouchi, both in Edo and back at home. The ecological shortcomings of this policy of deforestation were exacerbated by a population boom that saw the commoner population of Tosa nearly triple during the period 1600–1720. The domain sought a solution to this population explosion by bringing more land under cultivation through extensive irrigation development in low-lying areas, but this reclaimed land proved particularly vulnerable to flooding from occasional heavy rains. Further, the domainal policy of exporting rice to Osaka proved disastrous when a succession of famines occurred in the eighteenth century, and peasant cultivators from overpop-

ulated Tosa began absconding to other less densely populated domains. The domain then sought to address its deteriorating finances by increasing the tax burden.

This, Roberts argues, was the context in Tosa for a shift during the eighteenth century away from economic policies supported by an ethic of service to one's lord toward mercantilist and protectionist economic strategies generated, for the most part, by commoners engaged in commercial activities. Whereas, during most of the seventeenth century, the well-being of the domain's lord or *daimyo* was virtually synonymous with the well-being of the domain itself, during the eighteenth century these new monetary and trade policies were justified on the basis of what was believed to be best for Tosa, now no longer signifying the domain's lord but rather, to varying degrees, its people. Roberts finds his evidence for this shift in the 149 petitions submitted by individuals from all walks of life (though likely all male) to the Tosa remonstrance box from its creation in 1759 until its discontinuation in 1873. That this represents the amplification of a public sphere with relevance to the creation of a more civil society in Japan is perhaps obvious but not central to Roberts's thesis.

It is the creation of this context of overpopulation, deforestation, ill-considered irrigation and attendant famine, and the new notions of state and country generated by the economic strategies that emerged from this context, which represent the strength of Roberts's study. Playing on the ambiguity of the word *kuni*, which during the Edo period enjoyed a number of meanings ranging from large domain to Japan as a whole, Roberts represents the competitive interactions of these "domainal countries" as akin to that of states within an international order, but his reasoning could apply just as well to even smaller territorial or societal units than Tosa. Roberts also sees similarities between the domainal protectionism or *kokueki* of a large domain like Tosa and the economic nationalism that informed Japan's modernization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and he suggests that a genesis for the latter may be found in the former, though he does not pursue this argument in meaningful detail. These quibbles notwithstanding, what is clear is that Roberts has produced a wonderfully stimulating piece of research and analysis that will prove of interest and significance to economic, political, social, and intellectual historians of Japan for decades to come.

PETER NOSCO  
University of Southern California

WILLIAM M. TSUTSUI. *Manufacturing Ideology: Scientific Management in Twentieth-Century Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 279. \$29.95.

More than most mechanical engineers, the American Frederick Winslow Taylor created a stir. His influence on American and European industrial management

and workplace organization has been studied in considerable depth. The impact of Taylorite scientific management on Japan, however, has been less fully considered. It is common to suggest that although Taylor's ideas were known in Japan, to have implemented them would have required practices contrary to local labor conditions, social behavior, and cultural values. As a consequence, according to this point of view, from early in this century Japanese managers ignored scientific management or altered it in distinctive ways to bring Taylorite prescriptions in line with domestic cultural needs. This new book by William M. Tsutsui, the first full-length treatment of scientific management in Japan, argues the reverse. From 1911, the author claims, Taylorite scientific management had been "a potent ideological template in Japan" (p. 11).

The book's six chapters can be divided neatly into two parts. The first includes three chapters that trace chronologically the evolution of scientific management in Japan between 1911 and 1945. They show that, from their introduction in 1911, Taylor's ideas about rationalizing the industrial workplace were widely embraced by business writers and practicing managers. Tsutsui suggests that this enthusiasm has been obscured by the pervasive rhetoric extolling what were identified as the virtues of traditionalist paternalism in the workplace. Rather than being mutually exclusive, however, he argues that there was substantial "complementarity" between Taylorism and Japanese industrial paternalism since the latter prescribed no model of production management and the former largely ignored welfare and cultural issues. Japanese businessmen, therefore, were revising scientific management to include the "human element" in management practice. This revision, far from being a unique Japanese concern or approach, paralleled Western business attempts at humanizing scientific management. From the late 1920s through World War II, revised Taylorism persisted, and, more significantly, many business writers and managers began to conceive of this revision as a distinctive form of "Japanese-style management." Indeed, during the wartime years from 1937 to 1945, according to Tsutsui, nativist rhetoric and fascist economic models effectively cloaked the American origins of production controls and scientific shopfloor organization.

The book's second part includes three chapters that examine key themes of scientific management being played out during the period 1945 to 1973. Chapter four argues that prewar "revised" Taylorism continued to provide the ideological grounding for the push toward productivity growth following wartime devastation. Even prototypical Japanese management innovations, most prominently Toyota's system of "lean production," began as attempts to adapt Taylorite ideas to postwar structural and financial conditions. Finally, Tsutsui shows how Japan's approach to quality control (QC) and the emergence of QC circles were themselves efforts to "humanize" the shopfloor and were a continuing legacy of the longstanding attempt to "re-

vise" the harshness of Taylorite prescriptions. That is, he says, QC circles "could promote Scientific Management while denying the premises of Taylorism . . . and could be portrayed as unique outgrowths of Japanese tradition" (p. 235) rather than reflections of American management thought.

Tsutsui is not the first to try to historicize Japan's ostensible humanistic industrial ideology. Others have also examined the ironies of the vaunted QC circles. None, however, have done more to situate Japanese industrial ideology and practice within the contemporary global discussion on management behavior and practice. Numerous scholars have analyzed the international dimensions of scientific management and thought, but Tsutsui is the first to locate Japan's place in that community of activity. His efforts to link Japan to widely discussed ideas about scientific management were made somewhat easier, however, by the use of a rather imprecise, open-ended definition of scientific management. In "Japan as in the West," he says, "Scientific Management was perceived by its advocates in terms of broad methodological imperatives and distinctive ideological proclivities" (p. 76). In practice, he seems to imply that just about any effort at rationalized production and systematized shopfloor behavior constituted a species of scientific management. Although the sequence of events and ideas Tsutsui delineates suggest Taylorite influence, identifying all post-1911 forms of industrial rationalization as one variety or another of "revised Taylorism" is not wholly convincing. Nevertheless, the suggestiveness of this new book demands attention. It is an important study that should be of wide interest.

W. DEAN KINZLEY  
*University of South Carolina*

RICHARD FOLTZ, *Mughal India and Central Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xxx, 190. \$13.00.

The tension between transregional bonds and regional diversities has informed much of the history of South, Central, and West Asia. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Muslim elites in the Mughal, Uzbek, and Safavid empires clashed, mixed, and collaborated within a largely shared high culture that was quite distinct from the cultures of many of the people they ruled. In a work of careful scholarship, Richard Foltz describes the ways that Uzbek and Mughal court cultures comprised "one world" (p. xxiv). His fine book further reveals how the disintegration of the Soviet Union has opened up new possibilities both for reconceptualizing transnational cultural regions and for bringing together scholarship from across what were Cold War boundaries.

Foltz's meticulous research focuses on the immigration patterns of Central Asians to the Mughal imperial court and also on the high Persio-Islamic cultural influences that paralleled these movements. He leaves to other scholars analysis of the more well-docu-

mented and more extensive movements and influences from Safavid Iran into India. Nevertheless, he asserts that the Persian literary and Uzbek court cultures formed the major bonds among Central Asian elites living in their homeland and those in India. Due to the nature of the literary source material, which Foltz has used extensively, we learn little about most individuals (aside from royalty). Chapter six, which analyzes the travel narratives of Mahmud bin Amir Wali and Mutribi al-Asamm Samarqandi, thus stands as particularly revealing of the individual motivations and responses of Central Asians in India.

Foltz convincingly argues that Central Asians regarded India as an uncongenial backwater but continued reluctantly to move or visit there because of its "awesome reputation" for "fabulous wealth" (p. 111), dwarfing anything their homeland offered. Foltz asserts that the most successful of these Central Asian emigrants, members of the Mughal imperial dynasty, continued to consider themselves as exiles from their homeland and were determined to prove themselves to the people they had left behind. He thus explains otherwise irrationally persistent Mughal policies of involvement with Central Asia in psychological terms as based on an "entirely sentimental," "deeply-instilled hereditary obsession, a burning emotional factor" (pp. 116, 153).

At times, Foltz overextends his argument from the Muslim elite to "Muslims in India" (p. 155) generally. Although Foltz uses the term Islamic, he largely means not theology or Arabic-centered scholarship but rather high culture held by Central Asian people who were Muslims. The major religious influence he documents was that of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order, which rooted itself in Central Asia but had strong branches in India. The idea of South Asian Muslims as inherently part of a unified world of Islam, a world shared with Central Asians, may be particularly attractive to many Muslims, especially to those in Pakistan who wish to participate in the new economic opportunities available in the former Soviet states. This transregional Islamic unity, however, tends to be less attractive to many other Muslims, especially to those in India and Bangladesh who recognize their deep roots in the Indian subcontinent. These tensions between transregional and local identities also come out in Foltz's repeated critique of John Richards (especially of Richards's *The Mughal Empire* [1993]), whom he characterizes as having "an overly Indo-centric view" of the Mughal Empire (pp. 3, 154).

In addition to Foltz's detailed knowledge of the primary Persian-language literary texts of the period, one of this book's particular strengths is the author's extensive control over Russian and Turkic-language scholarship from the former Soviet Union. Intellectual exchanges among scholars in these former Soviet states and those in South Asia have been far more limited by the Cold War than Foltz demonstrates was true of their premodern predecessors, who had no notion of such national boundaries. Foltz thus does a

special service by making the fruits of scholarship from these several regions available to Anglophone scholars.

Foltz has previously published much of this book in individual articles. Although his argument is consistent throughout, he has not removed all of the repetitions and slight discrepancies from what had earlier been separate articles. For example, he gives at least six separate references to the indigenous terminology for Transoxiana region (pp. xxi, xxv, 13, 51, 55, 61) but transliterates this term inconsistently as *Ma wara an-nahr*; *Ma-wara-e-nahr*; *Ma wara' an-nahr*; and *Mawarannahr*. These occasional infelicities aside, Foltz has laid out a clear and telling argument for commonalities within premodern elite Muslim culture in Central and South Asia. Scholars of Islamic and Asian history will find much of value in this volume.

MICHAEL H. FISHER  
Oberlin College

AUDREY BURTON. *The Bukharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History, 1550–1702*. New York: St. Martin's. 1997. Pp. xx, 664. \$59.95.

Audrey Burton's book is a very impressive achievement but also a major lost opportunity. The English-language literature on Central Asia has expanded manifold since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most of this literature has dealt with the present and future rather than the past of this region, which is all but unknown to the serious reading public and even to historians working in other fields. The history of the khanate of Bukhara is intertwined with those of its Ottoman, Iranian, and Indian neighbors in the period before its conquest by Russia in the 1860s. A scholarly study of this history addressed to a serious audience would be a most useful contribution. Unfortunately, the book under review will be of use only to specialists in the region and in the period it covers; others will find it virtually unreadable.

Burton has produced an extremely detailed political and diplomatic history and an exhaustive treatment of Bukhara's foreign trade, to which are appended thirty-one annotated pages of dynastic family trees and lists of rulers and forty-one pages of bibliography. Burton has trouble recognizing when to stop. Six of the eighteen pages of lists of rulers, for example, are devoted to Ottoman sultans, Mughal emperors, shahs of Iran, and tsars of Muscovy—information readily available in many other places—and the bibliography includes even such general reference works as the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*.

The amount of data contained in the book on dynastic struggles, military campaigns, diplomatic correspondence and embassies, trade commodities and routes is enormous. It is the product of extensive research in published and unpublished sources in Persian, Turkish, Russian, French, Italian, German, and Spanish. All the more pity that Burton has made no attempt to digest, analyze, and draw out the



significance of her mountain of facts. Her political and diplomatic narrative is more a chronicle of events, year by year and sometimes month by month, than a work of creative scholarship. For specialists in the area, however, there is much that is useful, and they will appreciate Burton's detailed index as an indispensable aid to ferreting out the nuggets of information on the many interesting themes that are lost in the minute details of the book.

Burton offers no discussion of her sources. Such a discussion would be interesting and useful to readers who will not recognize such authors as Abul-Ghazi and Sharaf al-Din, both referred to without indication of who they were and when they wrote (p. 75). In such cases, which are numerous, the unannotated bibliography is of no assistance (unless, in the instance cited above, Abul-Ghazi is the mid-seventeenth-century khan of Khwarazm of the same name—but that is a question the reader is left to resolve for her/himself).

The book is presumably based on the author's 1986 doctoral dissertation with a very similar title. I say presumably because the dissertation is listed in the bibliography as the work, along with two published articles, of "J. A. Burton"; five other published articles are listed as the work of "A. Burton." The reader must guess whether one Burton or two is responsible for this corpus of work.

The author has assembled a prodigious amount of factual information but has offered it up to the reading public in a form that will appeal only to those already deeply involved in the study of this region. The crossroads of Eurasia, it is a region that has played an important role in the past and has recently assumed a new importance. It is regrettable that Burton has failed to employ the fruits of her considerable research to acquaint a broader audience of historians and other serious readers with a vital part of the history of Central Asia.

SEYMOUR BECKER  
Rutgers University,  
New Brunswick

LATA MANI, *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. Pp. xiv, 246. Cloth \$47.00, paper \$18.00.

Scholars of India, Indian women, and postcolonialism who have been engaging with Lata Mani's work since her essay "Contentious Traditions" was published in Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid's collection, *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History* (1989), will greet this book with the kind of enthusiasm reserved for an old friend who reappears in transformed, if recognizable, guise. Those unfamiliar with the trajectory of her thesis will recognize it as an example of colonial discourse analysis at its most self-declaratory, sophisticated, and accomplished. Using debates about *sati* in colonial India as her point of departure, Mani makes a series of arguments not simply about the role

that discourses of modernity and tradition played in early nineteenth-century India but also about the long ideological shadow those debates have cast over colonial and nationalist historiographies. In doing so, she stakes a claim for an anti-imperialist, feminist history: one that acknowledges the dialectic relationship between past and present and that takes discourse seriously as a site of knowledge, an archive where the "socio-economic and political relations of colonial domination" (p. 4) can be both historicized and contested.

The practice of *sati* (widow immolation, carried out chiefly by upper-caste Hindu women) preoccupied British colonial officials, Brahmin pundits, and the Bengali *bhadralok* ("the classic comprador class" [p. 44])—all of whom wrote extensively about it in the first six decades of British rule. Women figured not as "subjects" in these debates, nor even as representatives of the "oriental" female lot. The *sati* (literally, "good wife") was, rather, the symbolic and material ground upon which competing versions of modernity were fought over by indigenous and colonizing male elites. Expanding the horizons of her previous analysis, Mani moves from the highly textualized debates about *sati*'s scriptural precedents to discussions of how Indian middle-class men invoked *sati* in various print media—pamphlets and newspapers—in order to demonstrate that their arguments were not derivative of colonial ideology. Nor were they, in the end, bound up with convictions about the essentially religious nature of the practice. For the vernacular press tended to treat *sati* as "an everyday event in the life-cycle of upper-caste Hindus" (p. 69). In the process, "native" men displayed their determination to offer an alternative to the post-Enlightenment rationality insisted upon by British anti-*sati* commentators.

The most innovative chapters in the book are those that focus on Baptist missionary discourse in India. Through careful textual analysis that is always located in the material conditions of production, Mani is able deftly to recreate the historical circumstances of evangelical itinerancy and the culture of liberal religious discourse that prevailed in Bengal at the time of the *sati* controversies. In addition to providing a clear sense of how bound up missionary representations were with the ideological work of conversion and the financial burden of fund-raising, she gives us a glimpse of mission men's encounters with the common people of India. Their responses to intrusive queries about *sati* and other "religious" issues (refracted though they may be through the highly stylized narratives of William Carey and his brethren) reveal at once a knowledge of Hindu traditions and a healthy irreverence toward their British interlocutors on the part of the men in the street. This stands in marked contrast to the aspirations to modernity evidenced by contemporary *bhadralok* discourse. Mani is under no illusions about her capacity to make the subaltern speak in this instance, yet rarely have the structural conditions of



subalternity been recovered so skillfully or persuasively.

Driving the book as a whole is the vexed question of what we can know about the historical experience of the widow given the virtual impossibility of access to her testimony. The last chapter is therefore devoted to a reading of eyewitness accounts of *sati* that highlights their quest for authenticity and, predictably, their sensationalism. Here Mani enables her texts to "yield their historicity" (p. 125) with admirable surety. But even the most appreciative reviewer is perhaps in danger of reproducing such sensationalism by dwelling disproportionately on this section of the project. Let it suffice to say that Mani combines a sensibility about the coercive technologies of widow immolation—the drugging, the physical restraint, the familial and community pressure—with an equally keen sensitivity to the traces of Hindu women's subjectivity that can be found in the accounts of Western observers. What she offers, in short, is a vigorous and rigorous counter-narrative to the "violent fiction of *sati* as a dutiful act of religious volition" (p. 196).

ANTOINETTE BURTON  
University of Illinois,  
Urbana-Champaign

RAJNARAYAN CHANDAVARKAR. *Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance, and the State in India, c. 1850–1950*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 388. Cloth \$54.95, paper \$24.95.

In this book, as in his earlier *Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Business Strategies and the Working Classes in Bombay, 1900–1940* (1994), Rajnarayan Chandavarkar writes his own, distinctive version of working-class history. *Origins* was the first book in Indian labor history to stress the importance of neighborhood social organizations and the larger urban context in understanding working-class lives and politics. The essays in this book continue that line of investigation. Although much of the empirical focus remains on the city of Bombay (Mumbai), the book expands to encompass topics such as the nature of imperial rule in India and its nationalist opposition. An abiding theme is how the imperial need to maintain public order, and the vagaries of Indian nationalism and world capitalism, determined the nature of the political options available to the urban poor in colonial India. There are essays, for example, on the histories of industrialization and colonial policing in India, on political relations in the mill districts of Bombay, on official and popular reactions to the plague in Bombay in the late 1890s, on Gandhian nationalism and the working classes, and on the overall nature of South Asian capitalism. The use of official archives and reports in this book is meticulous and intelligent. These essays confirm the productive nature of the innovative analytical move that Chandavarkar made in enlarging the scope of Indian labor history to include the politics of the neighborhood and the city.

What detracts from the quality of the book, however, is Chandavarkar's excessively polemical style. It is reminiscent of old British public school debates in which ridiculing one's opponents by caricaturing their arguments was more important than any form of genuine intellectual engagement. His sharpest rapier thrusts are reserved for historians of the *Subaltern Studies* collective, whom he consigns to "an interpretative Dark Age in the historiography of Indian nationalism" (p. 269). Overall, the book is motivated by a barely concealed animus against anthropologically inclined historians. This animosity is taken to an absurd length in the discussion of rumors about the behavior of British soldiers in Bombay during the plague epidemic of 1898. Chandavarkar acknowledges that these rumors may have indeed reflected popular resentment at military "invasion and violation" of particular areas such as the ritually pure spaces of "god-rooms and kitchens" in Hindu households. And yet, he insists that these rumors "need not be understood" at all in "culturally specific" terms (pp. 252–53). Chandavarkar writes as though no meaningful intellectual traffic between anthropologists and historians is possible in the field of labor studies. His own framework may be described as a soft (i.e. non-mathematical) version of rational choice theory. The political, as he imagines it, has nothing of the cultural about it. He writes that "the terrain upon which the Indian working class, perhaps any working class, fought its battles was determined by its opponents and, therefore, their forms of action reflected not their level of consciousness, but the range of options available to them inside a particular economic and political conjuncture" (p. 75).

But if the workers behaved according to the "range of options available to them," how did they come to know these options? Did such knowing entail any "interpretations" by the workers? Was their imagination involved in this? On such questions, Chandavarkar is not only silent; he denies their very validity.

Such an extremist theory has a rather unfortunate and ironic consequence for the book. Hostile to studying "cultural practices," Chandavarkar ends up continuing the time-honored English practice of writing Indian history without using or probing any Indian-language sources. His use of the one or two Indian-language books he cites is extremely superficial. Perhaps historians who mistrust culture can afford to know India through English alone! An ironic result of this method is that only the employers and the officials come across as possessing anything like feelings and emotional states. They have a "discourse" (Chandavarkar's word) that constantly misrepresents the workers and leaves the ruling classes with a precarious hold on reality. The elites therefore suffer from "perennial anxieties," panic attacks, and even "the psychology of guilt and terror" (pp. 157, 195, 212, 216, 242, 243). The workers, in contrast, have no psychology, feelings, or imagination. They retain their rural connections, but this only gives them greater holding power at times of

strikes. At the end of the book, one still wonders what social worlds of meanings the workers themselves inhabited. But Chandavarkar would argue, I suppose, that one does not need to ask this question in analyzing "popular politics."

DIPESH CHAKRABARTY  
University of Chicago

SHAIL MAYARAM. *Resisting Regimes: Myth, Memory and the Shaping of a Muslim Identity*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 298.

To the Mughals, the Mewatis were "rebels." To British ethnographers, they were "criminal tribes." To two modernizing princely rulers of eastern Rajasthan in the first half of the twentieth century, embracing Hindu nationalism, they were "Muslim." Finally, to the Islamicizing, pietist movement, Tablighi Jama'at, which has flourished in Mewat since partition, the Mewatis were the *jahiliyya* of pre-Islamic Arabia, in urgent need of reform. In this important and welcome contribution, Shail Mayaram tells the story of the princely and Tabligh regimes as well as the story of Mewati resistance she finds throughout. She makes a valuable contribution to understanding how a particular group comes to be identified by others, and to identify itself, as "Muslim"—an identity contingently produced and profoundly modern, the product, not the opposite, of nationalism (p. 7).

Alwar and Bharatpur were home to about two-thirds of the Meo, who comprised in 1941 some sixty percent of the population's 330,620 Muslims. At partition, Mayaram discovered, contrary to her expectations, there was an explicit state policy of "cleansing," characterized by forced conversion, capture of women (who "do not have any religion" [p. 191]), and genocide of Muslims with an estimated 82,000 killed. After partition, Meos lost land to Hindu and Sikh refugees. An informant told Mayaram his own story: he fled; returned because of Congress promises that he would retain his property; discovered his houses burnt and animals gone; and received back only sixty of his original 600 *bighas* of land. "Tabligh came to our village after this," he concluded (pp. 205–06).

Mayaram makes three major revisionist arguments. First, she shows that the princes, far from the feudal rulers they imagined themselves to be, were aggressively modernizing in their attempts to control resources and the bodies of individual subjects and in their links to India-wide Hindu revivalist movements that changed public sociability and domestic culture. As early as 1910, the Alwar ruler banned Urdu in the schools, demolished mosques, forbade beards, and abolished the newly formed Muslim *anjuman*.

Mayaram also challenges other historians of the rural revolt of the early 1930s who claim that Islamicizing movements had already linked the Meo to Muslim movements in British India, an argument made by both Hindu and Muslim movements at the time. In contrast, Mayaram shows these protests to

have been agrarian and largely caste-specific, Meo and Jat, neither agriculturalist generally nor Muslim. She may overstate the lack of involvement of Meo with the British India movements. Still, she is surely right that too often historians have assumed that rural populations, like the Meo, were simply passive recipients of outside influence. The Muslim movements in this case took advantage of rural unrest but were not responsible for it.

The Meos' own narratives claim shared Kshatriya descent with other landed castes (as against the tyrant's assertion that they are Shudra); venerate the Ram and Krishna of legend; and identify themselves as Muslim. Indeed, one of the narratives includes the story of a 1932 riot in Alwar city, a parallel struggle against the state and evidence of an emergent Muslim consciousness (pp. 142–43). That consciousness crystallized after 1947 and what Mayaram describes as the four-fold assault on the Meo: by the state, other social groups, sections of the press that systematically denounced them, and finally the postcolonial state bureaucracy that continued to marginalize them and wink at anti-Muslim violence.

Mayaram's final revisionist point is to describe the Tabligh movement as a further assault, a strategy by sections of the Congress and Muslim elites together "of control over the masses of Indian Muslims" (p. 248). In contrast to other scholars of Tablighi Jama'at, she documents Mewati resistance in the continuation of many local customs related to devotional practices, music, seclusion, inheritance, marriage partners, and gifting relations, as well as in some explicit opposition to Tabligh teachings. She fails to articulate, however, how embracing Tabligh is also a form of resistance, both to the dominant culture of consumerism and to pressures to participate in activist politics. Mewati participants, moreover, also resist Tabligh's own characterization of them as originally ignorant or "half-Hindu" in favor of documentation of long Mewati traditions of Islamic scholarship and piety. Mayaram concludes on a note of irony that now Mewatis, supporting the Tabligh movement across the globe, themselves "comprise regimes reworking the body, social and corporeal" (p. 281). But a further irony, surely, is Mayaram's own stance, based in her appreciation of the distinctiveness of Mewati Muslim practice, which denies them the agency in supporting Tablighi Jama'at she granted them in the agrarian movement.

BARBARA D. METCALF  
University of California,  
Davis

#### OCEANIA/PACIFIC ISLANDS

TIM ROWSE. *White Flour, White Power: From Rations to Citizenship in Central Australia*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 255. \$64.95.

In Australia in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, the issue and distribution of "rations" was used as a means of colonial control of the indigenous population. Tim Rowse deconstructs the meanings attributed to rationing in central Australia in this book. By rationing, Rowse refers to "the non-Aboriginal practice—whether based on custom or on policy—of providing food, clothing and other goods (such as blankets and tobacco) to Indigenous people" (p. 3). He uses an analysis of rationing as a device to reassess the government policies that dominated Aboriginal people's lives in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely protection, assimilation, and, most recently, self-determination.

Australian governments did not negotiate treaties with indigenous Australians or recognize their pre-existing rights to land and sovereignty through establishment of reservations. In remote areas such as central Australia, Aboriginal peoples continued their association with their lands by maintaining their presence on the land, working as stock workers and domestics on pastoral properties (ranches) or living off the land. As naturally occurring foods became increasingly scarce, the government supplied rations to supplement them. Rations were distributed by pastoralists (ranch owners/managers), missionaries, and the police. Rations did not merely prevent starvation but were used as a means of controlling the indigenous population.

Using written documentation generated by the suppliers and distributors of rations, Rowse investigates what meanings they attached to this activity and how they used it as an instrument of policy implementation. He does not attempt to present an indigenous perspective on rationing, although he does indicate the impact various rationing regimes had on Aboriginal communities. An underlying argument in Rowse's discussion is that while rationing brought colonizer and colonized into physical and structural proximity, it did not result in mutual understanding or communication. Rationing, therefore, failed as an assimilative tool because it failed to induct the receivers of rations into the colonizers' world view. Rowse's evidence indicates that rationing did act as a means of spatial control. The government and Christian missions set up ration depots away from urban areas to keep Aboriginal people in the hinterland and to discourage them from moving into towns.

Until the latter part of the twentieth century, rations were also used in lieu of payment for work. The rationale for this policy was that Aboriginal people could not manage money, nor did they understand its value. Rowse's discussion of the change from rations to the cash economy in the late 1960s and 1970s challenges previous interpretations of this process. Aboriginal people were introduced to the cash economy through the award of equal pay (with other stock workers) in the mid-1960s and through access to social security payments such as unemployment benefits and maternity allowances. The award of equal pay coin-

cided with mass unemployment among Aboriginal stock workers, and the enforced movement of Aboriginal people off pastoral stations (ranches) and onto government and mission-managed settlements. Rowse argues that equal wages did not initiate this change but only hastened it.

Rowse's use of rationing as metonym for social, economic, and cultural manipulation of colonized peoples brings new understandings and perceptions to the study of policies and their impact on indigenous peoples. But this focus also glosses over some of the complexities of interactions between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in central Australia. The discussion of Aboriginal evangelists at the Lutheran mission at Hermannsburg and its outposts highlights their role as cultural brokers, but the focus on rationing as a means of control ignores other aspects of religious and cultural change. In his discussion of segregationist strategies to keep Aboriginal people out of the town of Alice Springs, Rowse observes without comment the "irrepressible tendency for Indigenous people to be attracted to the colonists' goods" (p. 102), an observation that raises questions rather than furthering understanding of colonial relationships.

This book assumes a knowledge of central Australian history and government policies toward Aboriginal peoples. Readers without this knowledge might struggle to understand the rationing regimes and their political contexts. Those readers looking for a fresh and nuanced reading of indigenous/non-indigenous relations in outback Australia in the twentieth century will find this book a welcome addition to the literature on the subject.

PEGGY BROCK  
Edith Cowan University

#### CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

JOHN N. JACKSON. *The Welland Canals and Their Communities: Engineering, Industrial, and Urban Transformation*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1997. PP. xvi, 535. \$70.00.

Near the tourist magnet of the Niagara Falls, several massive engineering achievements function with little fanfare, until something goes wrong. These projects include Ontario and New York power generating stations and the Welland Canal. On the Niagara peninsula of Ontario, a borderland region with enduring ties to New York state, a progression of four canals was built to link Lake Erie and Ontario. The First Canal opened in 1829 and served a double purpose: to carry goods around the falls and to furnish power for mill sites. Unlike the Erie Canal, which it was supposed to rival, this canal carried sailing vessels and not mere canal barges.

A commitment to lake vessels had consequences for communities along the canal routes and for the political economy of the region. Shipping interests incessantly appealed for improvements to handle ever

larger vessels. Therefore, the history of the Welland canals is a tale of construction projects chasing technological headway in shipping; it is also a tale of changes explained to the public by a rhetoric of progress. The Second Canal (1840–1845), for example, included the replacement of wooden locks by deeper stonework ones. Construction of the Third Canal (1871–1881) involved such quantities of material that, ironically, it benefitted from railways on the peninsula. The Fourth Canal (1913–1932) terminated at its north end in three locks with an unprecedented total lift of 139.5 feet (42.5 m); siphon culverts carried the Welland River beneath this canal. In 1959, the Welland Canal became a segment in the St. Lawrence Seaway, an international scheme to open the Great Lakes to ocean-going vessels and to generate electric power. A history of the Welland canals, therefore, should have a great deal to say about international regions, transportation technology, and the politics of development. John N. Jackson's narrative provides the raw material for a discussion of these and other themes.

Abundant details, however, are no substitute for sustained analysis. For example, the fact that the government of Canada operated the Welland canals as public works from 1840 should have recommended an assessment of public ownership by Jackson. He occasionally faults the canal planners for ignoring the communities they disrupted with new routes, but he did not inquire systematically into the government's record as planner, land developer, and employer. Readers are generally left to shift for themselves. They are left to imagine how visions of economic progress and of subduing the environment, which began locally before the 1820s, had migrated to a broader level of political authority within a few decades. This shift affected the region, because colonial and national governments had the resources to build in ways unavailable to early private companies. The impact of government action remains visible today. Crossing a survey grid dating from the late eighteenth century, the Third and Fourth Canals and highways have promoted a dispiriting landscape of flow-through artifacts that clash with the peninsula's noteworthy heritage sites, like Niagara-on-the-Lake.

Additional shaping arguments can be pulled from the narrative. For example, the construction projects attracted navy camps and immigrant communities that challenged the local social order. It is not that Jackson wholly ignored significant material, for he describes episodes that bear on many large questions. What truly is lacking is the verve that accompanies a crisp definition of organizing themes. In this book, important matters mingle with the trivial. Jackson assembled too many details without conspicuous purpose, and an excess of tangential facts, in a long book, will confound doughty local readers and academics alike. In fairness, Jackson maintains a point of view and imposes a structure on the material, for the book presents a discussion in four sections (1820s–1850s;

1850s–1910s; 1914–1960s; post-1960s). Within each, he describes shipping practices, geological constraints, engineering procedures, construction methods, and the canals' impact on communities; however, he does not analyze this material. As for his particular perspective, Jackson has been an advocate of heritage projects in the canal communities. It is impossible to fault this advocacy because the built environments of the peninsula can only benefit from well-chosen heritage landmarks. Perhaps fascinated by the Welland canals and their potential for a heritage trail, Jackson attempted to write an encyclopedic book "for the record."

A book that deals with transportation routes, freight handling, water flows, and industrial sites could have compressed information in graphs and maps. Instead, there are unimportant tables and largely unhelpful maps. When a manuscript attempts too many things and takes some of them too lightly, the publisher usually has recourse to critical readers' reports and enforces editorial judgment for the benefit of all. The University of Toronto Press and its review process share responsibility for a bulky, flawed book.

JOHN C. WEAVER  
McMaster University

LINDA KEALEY. *Enlisting Women for the Cause: Women, Labour, and the Left in Canada, 1890–1920*. (Studies in Gender and History, number 8.) Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1998. Pp. x, 335. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

This book examines the actions of women workers at a critical time in the formation of Canada as a modern economy and state. Between 1890 and 1920, women worked for pay in jobs that were mainly sexually segregated under conditions worse than those of male workers. Some sectors of the economy that employed a lot of women, such as domestic service and agriculture, do not figure prominently in this study, which concentrates on the women employed in larger workplaces and factories. Linda Kealey uses a wide range of evidence to explore women's experience, and she is particularly interested in their resistance to capitalist exploitation.

The book is impressive in its archival base, in its sensitivity to regional specifics, and in its recognition of ethnic fractures among working women. Noting that any historical study is shaped by the nature of available sources, Kealey has utilized newspaper reportage, especially in the labor and left-wing press, to good effect. Not many working women left personal papers behind, and key organizational records are not systematically available, but Kealey has used the few that have survived. Government-generated records have proved particularly helpful. The *Labour Gazette*, a publication of the Department of Labour, provided extensive information, as did the reports of federal and provincial royal commissions. Department of Labour Strikes and Lockout files were significant, but the files



of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that might have been useful were selectively destroyed, along with the files of lesser-known activists, such as women trade union organizers, who were considered dispensable.

Kealey has been alert to regional differences. Her decision not to concentrate only on Ontario and Quebec but also to examine the Maritimes, the prairies, and British Columbia has resulted in a book that is national in its scope and comprehensive in its vision. She has noted internal divisions within working-class ranks, most obviously anti-Semitism, and the benefits that employers, for example in the garment trade, could derive from these.

The book includes an analysis of social attitudes about working women, but Kealey's focus is always on the behavior and expectations of the women themselves. She identifies Christian socialism, rather than Marxism, as an inspiration of many activists and shows how few challenged the maternalist insistence on protection for women workers. While documenting carefully women's unionism and strike action across the country, Kealey also explores the participation of women in men's union auxiliaries and in the sort of informal but highly effective gendered intimidation of male and female scab workers. Through a detailed case study of women's involvement in the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919, she illustrates her insistence that women, as well as men, contributed to the labor cause.

Together with Janice Newton's *The Feminist Challenge to the Canadian Left: 1900-1918* (1995) and Joan Sangster's two books, *Dreams of Equality: Women on the Canadian Left, 1920-50* (1989) and *Earning Respect: The Lives of Working Women in Small-Town Ontario, 1920-1960* (1995), this book provides readers with an increasingly comprehensive view of left-leaning working women in the early twentieth century.

MARY KINNEAR  
University of Manitoba

IRA BERLIN. *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 497. \$29.95.

Despite the many generalizations made about "slavery in America," as opposed, say, to slavery in Latin America or in ancient Greece or Rome, the "peculiar institution" was neither peculiar, static, nor in any way uniform. Although the past forty-odd years have brought us shelves of excellent books on North American slavery, historians have tended to concentrate on the last thirty-five years of the institution while giving little attention to racial slavery in the North, Canada, Spanish Florida, and French and Spanish Louisiana. Even more misleading, as Ira Berlin pointed out in a groundbreaking article nearly twenty years ago, the standard accounts of American slavery have tended to ignore the revolutionary changes that kept shaping and reshaping the institution during the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, even prior to the massive movement of slave labor from the eastern coast and piedmont to the Black Belt, Louisiana, and Texas (see "Time, Space, and the Evolution of Afro-American Slavery on British Mainland North America," *AHR* 85:1 [1980]: 44-78). In this book, Berlin has produced a masterly synthesis of the vast body of research hundreds of scholars have done on the first two centuries of slavery in British, French, and Spanish North America, a portrait of highly fortuitous change that should leave a telltale stamp on all future treatments of New World slavery.

In the Chesapeake colonies, as in the North and even in South Carolina for a much shorter period, few of the early generations of slaves came directly from Africa. Berlin labels these "charter" generations "Atlantic creoles," since they sailed in from the West Indies or various parts of the Atlantic littoral and often bore Hispanic or mixed names like Juan Rodrigues or Domingo Mathews (in contrast to later eighteenth-century comic, animal-like names like Cato, Jumper, or Hercules). The Atlantic creole slaves were often multilingual, cosmopolitan, and Christian. Some of them, like the *lançados* who for centuries had served as merchants and intermediaries along the West African coast, were of mixed African and European ancestry.

These enslaved Atlantic creoles, appearing in seventeenth-century New Netherland and New England as well as in the Chesapeake and Carolina, symbolized a black Atlantic continuity that led back to African slaves who began arriving in Portugal in the 1440s, who later made up ten percent of Lisbon's population, and who were cultivating sugar in Madeira and São Tomé well before Columbus sailed for America or took the first sugar cane to the New World. Although Berlin briefly stresses this long-term continuity of sugar, plantation agriculture, and African slaves, he then shows how slavery and race took highly divergent paths of mutation and development in the Chesapeake, the North, Louisiana, and the southern lowcountry including Florida. The two momentous variables were the timing of "the plantation revolution," which converted some "societies with slaves" into genuine "slave societies"; and the disparate impact of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions.

Because Berlin focuses so clearly on the very diverse details of the slave-master interaction in four distinct regions, it would be easy for a teacher sponsored by the Sons of Confederate Veterans to select (ignoring context) scores of examples and passages from the book to show that southern slaves were reasonably well-treated and presumably happy, given their range of opportunities. We read of slaves in seventeenth-century Virginia who purchased or otherwise gained their freedom, became landholders, and even owners of white indentured servants. Others, when baptizing their children, selected godparents from white leaders of the colony. For some fifty years, whites in South Carolina relied on armed slaves in their militias to repulse every attack from Spaniards and Indians.



Slaves not only served as agents to deal with Indians but had much freedom of movement and developed their own economies, selling their produce or renting out their time.

In 1706, some white petitioners in South Carolina complained that "at this last election, Jews, Strangers, Sailors, Servants, Negroes, & almost every French Man in Craven & Berkly County came down to elect, & their votes were taken" (p. 70). In many parts of the South, it was customary for slaves to hunt and fish on their own, and many males had the opportunity to develop their skills as carpenters, blacksmiths, shoemakers, masons, wheelwrights, coopers, saddlers, hairdressers, and even architects. Even when South Carolina moved toward highly systemized rice production (aided by West African knowledge and experience) and began importing large numbers of slaves directly from Africa, slaves worked with little white supervision; a "task system" assured them control over a portion of their time. As late as 1806, one observer in Georgia reported that once a slave had completed his assigned task, "his master feels no right to call on him," leaving the slave to spend "the remainder of the day at work in his own corn field."

Berlin counteracts such a possible misinterpretation in two ways. First, he demonstrates that the slaves' conditions worsened considerably as large planters sought to systematize and maximize production (it would have helped if he had added more on the kind of punishments reserved for slaves). Second, his major theme centers on slave resistance and negotiation, ranging from maronage and outright rebellion to theft and bargaining. Thus, like many other recent historians, he credits the slaves themselves with winning most of their apparent "freedoms." Although there is much to be said for this now fashionable recognition of slave agency, no one has yet reconciled that theme with the undeniable success and productivity of the slave system.

DAVID BRION DAVIS  
Yale University

MICHAEL SCHUDSON. *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life*. New York: Free Press, 1998. Pp. 390. \$27.50.

Perhaps in an earlier period of civic life—most likely during the Progressive period, when an informed citizenry was the American ideal—good citizenship would have demanded the reading of Michael Schudson's excellent book. But not, as Schudson makes clear, in our television age when newspaper reading is steadily declining and only a third of Americans consider keeping up with political affairs to be an important objective. Yet Americans beyond the academy of specialists would profit from reading this comprehensive effort to understand just what good citizenship means and has meant for Americans from the colonial period to the millennium. For Schudson, citizenship goes beyond the familiar legal definitions of who is or

who is not a citizen and whether citizenship guarantees the right to vote. Moreover, active partisanship is not the only benchmark of good citizenship. Interested in a Habermasian public sphere that trenches beyond political behavior and attitudes, Schudson takes this for his arena in a book about the practices, ideals, and obligations that have comprised civic America throughout its history.

Schudson is original and convincing on the press as a part of public culture, and, unlike most historians, who seem to consider inclusion of any contemporary comparisons as journalistic simplicities, he spends a good deal of time probing our current understandings of citizenship. Although his analysis is largely a synthesis of previous scholarship, he is innovative, perceptive, and—especially on today's culture—controversial.

In addition to the press, which he emphasizes, the culture of citizenship exists in areas independent of government, in "verbal give-and-take at a tavern, in a public square, on the courthouse steps—or in the pages of a newspaper or pamphlet" (p. 12). Ultimately, in his contrarian argument against those who bewail today's declining interest in public affairs, Schudson argues that civic participation takes place everywhere. In such an expansive interpretation, based on his identification of a rights-regarding model of good citizenship, any woman or member of a minority group in a position of authority or any citizen wearing a "thank you for not smoking" button is "doing politics" (p. 299).

Schudson concentrates on "what the character and civic practices are of a person who admirably carries out the responsibility of citizenship," "the good citizen" of the book's title (p. 315). Usually historians and political scientists are content to drag small evidential fields for answers relevant to well-defined time periods. But Schudson energetically undertakes a survey that permits comparisons of the deficits and benefits—a kind of cost-benefit analysis—of different historical citizenship cultures.

First comes the colonial notion of good citizenship, which was based on social hierarchy and deference to acknowledged leaders with commitments to public service. In this early period, "gentlemen" ruled with a personal authority sufficient to guarantee deference from the citizenry. Then, after "the constitutional moment" of nation-creating, came the development of representative government and the subsequent flowering of American democracy. In the period from 1801 to 1865, the rule of majorities replaced the rule by gentlemen as mass male participation in electoral politics and identification with political parties became the engine of public life and the sign of good citizenship. This model, based on voting and serving the party, was replaced at the end of the century by the paradigm of informed citizens, zealous reformers, and well-trained experts full of civic obligation and arranged into interest groups such as the American Tariff Association and Municipal Leagues. Public life

now moved indoors and lost its intimacy; good citizens were informed rather than intense.

Finally, in the period after the civil rights movement, according to Schudson, a new ideal citizen emerged dedicated to the protection and expansion of individual rights. This characteristic, of course, marks our contemporary "fretful political culture" in which everybody owns public life, and a rights revolution that figuratively began with Rosa Parks on a Montgomery bus has spiraled onward to an increasingly judicially monitored citizenship (p. 239). Today, asserts Schudson, we inhabit a playing field for citizenship in which joining an exercise club and talking to fellow bike riders about our sore knees and our incompetent HMOs is a measure of public life in the United States.

Schudson eschews any attempt to draw progressive or retrogressive interpretations from his historical evidence. With a sociologist's eye, he carefully develops the contexts in which these different models developed. For our times, he offers the consolation that public citizenship is not dead; how could it be in a political society in which rights-bearing individuals demand equality, the press is better than it ever was, and even neighborhood watch associations are examples of public life? To paraphrase Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in Schudson's view we still have citizens; they simply manifest their civic virtue in new ways.

JEAN HARVEY BAKER  
Goucher College

JAMES L. HUSTON. *Securing the Fruits of Labor: The American Concept of Wealth Distribution, 1765–1900*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1998. PP. xxiv, 482. \$65.00.

This is an ambitious, well-constructed, and ultimately provocative study of the American concept of wealth distribution, a neglected area of investigation that James L. Huston uses to illuminate the requisites of a democratic polity. Rooting this concept in what he finds to be widely held axioms of eighteenth-century republicanism, Huston theorizes that the revolutionary generation prescribed a foundation for political discourse concerning the proper form of government, wealth distribution, and economic development that lasted for over a century. The subtext of his discussion is the continuities in political philosophy and economic processes that defined an integrated historical period: the age of the American Revolution, 1765–1880. Through much of the nineteenth century, American politics and ideology (themselves embodying the continuity of two moderately opposing forces, which Huston places on the Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian political axes) were devoted to working out the implications and premises of the Revolution. This historical stage was abruptly and harshly terminated, during the years 1880–1900, by the rise of a consolidated industrial economic and social order that destroyed a property system based on individual competence and opportunity and rendered the axioms of republican political

economy irrelevant. Huston's interpretation, including his selection of axioms and, perhaps more important, his characterization of the pre-Civil War economy, is controversial; given the clarity of his theoretical framework, his candid probing of the ambiguities in republicanism, and his strong documentation affecting commonly contested points, it certainly merits serious consideration.

Huston's primary concern is to delineate the axioms and demonstrate their longevity in political discourse. This is intellectual history written from the perspective of political philosophy and economic theory. Huston's first, and central, axiom is "the labor theory of property/value," which signifies the laborer's entitlement to "the fruits of labor" (perhaps the key phrase in republican political economy). The conjunctive "property/value," however, which he uses throughout the study, raises problems that the author does not adequately address. Although he cites, and draws on, the standard literature of republicanism, he ignores C. B. Macpherson's seminal work on the imbrication of property and freedom (particularly as manifested in the Levellers' concept of suffrage restriction), and hence his conjunctive possibly obscures the existence of contradictory elements—that is, two distinct labor theories, one legitimating property, the other the fruits of labor specific to the laborer. Even in a commercial agrarian republic, nonpropertied social forces, urban and rural, have striven for an equitable reward for their labor. The difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of the term "equitable" (with reference to wealth distribution) in the discourse of revolutionists, Jacksonians, and abolitionists, among others, despite Huston's scrupulous attempt to detect shades of meaning, reveals the restrictive cast imparted to the phrase "fruits of labor" under the auspices of republicanism. Nevertheless, this is not a fatal flaw in his analysis, for he is prepared to accept the consanguinity between republicanism and liberal capitalism. To this extent, the labor theory of property/value remains serviceable as a persisting theme for later decades: as Huston shows, it formed the basis for the free labor ideology and constituted an effective critique of the slave system.

There are three additional axioms. Huston emphasizes the point, first given analytical status by Louis Hartz, that American exceptionalism was achieved through the inversion of Europe in political consciousness. His second axiom, then, "the political economy of aristocracy," refers to the form of government that is directly antithetical to a republic and that must never be emulated in any of its particulars—high taxation, bureaucracy, monopoly, established church, all expressly created to transfer wealth from lower social groups to the privileged and wealthy—if the American republic was to survive and preserve its democratic institutions. America was democratic because it was not aristocratic. Huston has no trouble documenting this theme in the public arena, including its implied animus toward government (because it is through

control of the state, possible only in hierarchical forms of government, that upper groups could expropriate the wealth of the lower). Anti-aristocratic thought had an affinity with *laissez-faire*. The third axiom, abolition of the laws of primogeniture and entail, seemingly an old chestnut of American historiography, has been at least partially rehabilitated in this volume. Huston views it as crucial to the vision of republican equality, and whatever its material consequences (or lack thereof), he shows, to a surprising degree, the recurrent expression of this theme during the first half of the nineteenth century. He is to be commended for restoring the importance of inheritance laws to historical and political inquiry.

Finally, the fourth axiom deals with population increase, the familiar person-to-land ratio that, as Huston brings out, so animated the thinking of James Madison. The axiom, of course, is laced with fear and anxiety (in coexistence with a faith in democratic progress) because increased pressure on the availability of land would have a negative effect on the distribution of wealth and lead to a rise in social tensions. Indeed, this axiom embodies significant aspects of the other three—labor theory, anti-aristocracy, democratic land system—to provide an excellent rationale for territorial expansion (Manifest Destiny), along with, as Huston makes clear, its attendant ethnocentrism: the mistreatment of Native Americans.

In his account of the cultural diffusion of these axioms in the nineteenth century, Huston offers numerous intriguing points—helped on by a discussion of “transatlantic discourse” and references to English industrial conditions and writings on political economy—about the American political and economic systems. Notably, he argues that in the first half (in fact, three-quarters) of the nineteenth century, the scope of industrialization and its impact on the political culture have been greatly exaggerated by scholars. There was a near-perfect fit between republican discourse and economic processes because the society remained predominantly agricultural: business organization retained its nonhierarchical, small-scale, quasi-artisanal character; and economic activity, reflecting horizontal rather than vertical development, maintained its commercial character. Huston presses the point with the assistance of eight tables, presents a somewhat tortured definition of the term “transformation,” by sleight of hand shifts the period’s extensive railroad construction and investment from the industrial to the commercial column, and states that, in comparison with the commercial revolution (“the nineteenth century was the Age of Commerce”), the industrial revolution “was minuscule” (p. 100).

Huston’s exploration of other economic matters is far more convincing. He provides an excellent discussion of David Ricardo’s writings—although, somewhat unfairly, he attempts to saddle American *laissez-faire* doctrine with Ricardo’s views on the inevitability of subsistence wages. (This partly explains his apparent bias against free traders in their ideological dialogue

with protectionists, the putative champions of “economic growth.”) Huston also provides a useful corrective to republican political economy by indicating its failure to create mechanisms implementing equitable wealth distribution. And he continues, in two appendices, with a scathing attack on marginal productivity theory as the essence of the hierarchical structuring of corporate capitalism that demolished republican societal and economic values. Huston’s own theory of redistribution, eloquently put, is based on the maximization of a civilized life; that is, “life in a civil polity” (p. 396), which is perhaps a modern adaptation of republicanism (and damning indictment of efficiency).

NORMAN POILACK

East Lansing, Michigan

KAREN HALTTUNEN, *Murder Most Foul: The Killer and the American Gothic Imagination*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 322. \$29.95.

In this book, Karen Halttunen wonders how people understand evil. Is evil the work of Satan or of nature? Is evil heritable? inevitable? eradicable? These are big questions, perhaps the biggest any historian, or even any philosopher, can ask. All too often, historians contemplating such weighty questions leave careful historical scholarship behind to wander into a world of woefully ahistorical moral speculation. Fortunately, Halttunen’s assiduous, elegant study keeps well clear of that terrain. The result is both a deeply rewarding investigation of ideas about evil and, at the same time, a very fine read.

The book examines how Americans across the centuries have reconciled themselves to a specific kind of evil, murder, by relying a particular means of reconciliation, reading. “Murder,” Halttunen writes, “demands that a community come to terms with the crime—confront what has happened and endeavor to explain it, in an effort to restore order to the world. In literate societies, the cultural work of coming to terms with this violent transgression takes crucial form in the crafting and reading of written narratives of the murder, the chief purpose of which is to assign meaning to the incident” (pp. 1–2). Having established this neatly defined corpus of material—the murder narrative—as the object of her study, Halttunen traces the evolution of writing about murder from the seventeenth-century New England Puritan execution sermon to the nineteenth-century trial account. (An epilogue deals briefly with dominant late twentieth-century murder narratives: true-crime television and horror films.)

According to Halttunen, early execution sermons were intended more to exhort their readers to refrain from sin than to condemn the criminal being executed. And so, for example, at the execution of Rebekah Chamblitt for infanticide in 1733, the Reverend Thomas Foxcroft preached, “the sorrowful Spectacle before us should make us all reflect most seriously on *our own vile Nature*” (p. 14). As Halttunen puts it, “Compassion, not hatred or contempt, was the appropriate

response to the condemned murderer" (p. 16). Evil, in the world of execution sermons, was everywhere, and a murderer, far from being a monster, differed from his neighbors only in the degree of his all too common depravity.

Although the execution sermon survived as a popular genre into the early nineteenth century, it was gradually replaced by more secular published writing about murder: court transcripts, autobiographical confessions, true-crime "reporting," and, of course, detective fiction, inaugurated in 1841 with Edgar Allan Poe's "Murders in the Rue Morgue." Yet, however varied their forms, all of these nineteenth-century writings shared common, key elements entirely missing from execution sermons, including minute details about the act of murder itself (the wounds inflicted and weapons used, the disposal of the body, the time and place of death) and extensive biographical and psychological information about the alleged murderer. Moreover, the tone in which this information was conveyed was now consistently one of moral outrage, physical repulsion and, ultimately, horror. "Around mid-century," Halttunen argues, "the popular literature of murder in America began a major reconstruction of the murderer, from common sinner into moral alien, in response to the new understanding of human nature provoked by the Enlightenment. To impress upon readers the vast moral gulf separating them from the exceptionally vile transgressor before them, that new murder literature shaped a recognizably modern, Gothic sense of horror" (p. 35). This Gothic understanding of murder depended, in turn, on the notion that all murders are essentially mysterious, since the ways of murderers, so foreign from everyday experience, are, finally, unknowable. More than any other element of the Gothic imagination, this notion marks the most profound break with the understanding of murder conveyed in execution sermons, in which murder is so obviously an extension of common sinfulness as to be utterly transparent and unmysterious.

The evidence that Halttunen marshals to support her history of ideas about murder, murderers, and the nature of evil consists principally of the printed murder narratives themselves. Halttunen has served her time in the archives, examining one grisly tale after another, from homicide to infanticide, from serial murders to crimes of passion. Yet the power of her analysis derives from her connecting this evidence both to broad cultural developments, such as Enlightenment thought and the "civilizing process," and to pivotal societal forces, including the emergence of professional police and the improved status of lawyers in the early republic.

Halttunen offers many valuable contributions to cultural history in this important work. Perhaps the book's greatest contribution, however, is its revelation of the artifice of narrative conventions that have become so commonplace as to be taken for granted, in particular, the conventions by which modern Americans view murder as inherently mysterious and horri-

fying. Our fascination with bloody footprints, it turns out, has a rich history.

JILL LEPORE  
Boston University

CHRISTIE ANNE FARNHAM, editor. *Women of the American South: A Multicultural Reader*. New York: New York University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 319. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$18.95.

JANET L. CORYELL *et al.*, editors. *Beyond Image and Convention: Explorations in Southern Women's History*. (Southern Women.) Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1998. Pp. x, 224. Cloth \$37.50, paper \$16.95.

Conventions of regional womanhood may have been rigidly and rigorously defined throughout the history of the American South, but southern women—white, black, Native American, and ethnic—have been singularly adept at countering, undermining, and using those conventions to their own advantage. That is the collective lesson taught by these two excellent collections of essays, edited by Christie Anne Farnham and by Janet L. Coryell, Martha H. Swain, Sandra Gioia Treadway, and Elizabeth Hayes Turner. Both make a dramatic case for the breadth of identities women were able to define for themselves in a culture all too often concerned with reinforcing gender, race, and class boundaries and for the vociferous agency with which women of a wide range of backgrounds challenged, often with surprising success, the conventions purporting to tell them who and what they were. Not incidentally, these two volumes also demonstrate the benefits of writing southern women's history more inclusively: their chorus of female voices ranges far beyond the narrow confines of white southern belles and black domestics.

The chief strength, in fact, of Farnham's collection is its striking breadth; it does indeed move, as Farnham argues in her preface, "beyond a biracial focus on the region's past" (p. ix). Consisting of seventeen essays, only one of which (Anne Firor Scott's useful "Writing the History of Southern Women") has been previously published, this volume includes portraits of Choctaw and Cherokee women serving as cultural innovators and opponents of removal, devout Jewish women adapting and revising the ideology of Republican motherhood, Moravian Single Sisters achieving economic and personal autonomy, elite white women who helped reconstruct white southern manhood with their commemoration activities, wives and daughters of Appalachian coal miners, "race women" whose private lives contradicted their public teachings of conventionality, African-American clubwomen setting the stage for the Montgomery Bus Boycott, grass-roots members of Marcus Garvey's numerous United Negro Improvement Association divisions, New Deal administrators determined to provide women with worthwhile work, lesbians often forgotten or shunted aside in women's histories, and second-wave white and black feminists



whose failure to construct a genuinely interracial feminist movement underscores the need to rethink feminist histories. These essays do a service by unearthing previously untouched primary sources and pointing the way toward new directions in researching southern women's history, from an examination of charities and social control over white nonelite women in Savannah to connections to be made between 1970s feminism and early African-American pioneers like educator Anna Julia Cooper.

If Farnham's volume offers breadth, the one edited by Coryell *et al.* offers in-depth glimpses of southern women by focusing largely on individual portraits of rebellion and nonconformity: on women, the introduction says, who felt compelled "to defy the norm" (p. 8). Including nine essays originally presented at the Third Southern Conference on Women's History, held at Rice University in 1994 under the auspices of the Southern Association for Women Historians, this collection sets its sights on sexually adventurous women in colonial North Carolina, uppity housekeepers who subtly challenged the authority of their exasperated mistresses, eighteenth-century Methodist women empowered to speak out and to lead by virtue of their religious enthusiasm, slaves who managed to test the limits of white control and extend their own sense of authority, an African-American woman who challenged white definitions of freedom and slavery in the courts, African-American sorority women whose volunteer work in public health led them to offer economic critiques of the Mississippi status quo, and white elite activists who used their social status to challenge the racism of their communities.

To be sure, the essays in both collections demonstrate a keen awareness of the political, social, economic, and legal forces opposing and often thwarting these examples of rebellion and resistance. In Farnham's volume, both James Taylor Carson and Alice Taylor-Colbert, in their portraits of Choctaw and Cherokee women, respectively, make persuasive arguments for the erosion of the economic and social autonomy of Native American women in encounters with Anglo-American men (and their culture), who had little time or patience for alternative gender arrangements. Timothy J. Lockley, in turn, demonstrates how nonelite white women in lowcountry Georgia found their lives and their identities restricted by the elites who offered them charity and, by implication, extended control over them. In an examination of 102 wills written by male planters over a forty-year period, Joan Cashin illuminates the power that last wills and testaments had in "binding white women to powerful men" (p. 109), and in a survey of popular northern stereotypes of the rebel girl, Nina Silber forcefully argues that northern military men and politicians used southern white women as symbols of political disorder requiring drastic measures on the battlefield and in legislative halls. Jane Sherron De Hart rounds out the volume with a thoughtful discussion of the fears and anxieties fueling resistance to

second-wave feminism and passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in southern states and a penetrating analysis of the failures of white mainstream feminism to meet the challenge of combining forces with black feminists.

In the essays included in Coryell *et al.*, the forces arrayed against female rebellion and nonconformity are just as recalcitrant, but they also appear highly contested. Kirsten Fischer, for example, argues that sexual misconduct by colonial white women "highlighted the limits of elite control" and often required legal authorities "to respond with a display of state power" (pp. 14, 12). Anya Jabour's witty survey of Elizabeth Wirt's servant problems reveals a constant series of negotiations and battles between a mistress anxious about her status and determined to exert her authority and hired housekeepers equally determined to define the limits of that authority. A similar anxiety appears to fuel charges of insanity leveled against eighteenth-century Methodist women as analyzed by Cynthia Lynn Lyerly, for as Lyerly points out, opponents of demonstrative Methodism were "overwhelmingly men" who implicitly recognized that their own authority was in competition with that of Methodist women who publicly expressed their religious fervor, freely criticized the unconverted among family and friends, and actively proselytized for the faith (p. 68). In a like vein, Norma Taylor Mitchell shows in her account of a slave family in Abingdon, Virginia, how the family's members were able to achieve a certain degree of autonomy precisely because their owners became increasingly dependent on their care and initiative. A lone slave woman named Eda Hickam, whose story is excavated in Kimberly Schreck's essay, was able to carve out a similar autonomous space for herself in four lawsuits against the white family she argued had kept her in ignorance of emancipation until 1889. Finally, Joanna Bowen Gillespie and Marcia G. Synnott show how two early white civil rights activists, Sarah Patton Boyle and Alice Norwood Spearman Wright, slyly manipulated their identities as white elite women to demand a hearing for their critiques of segregation from resistant white communities.

These volumes, in short, will be valuable for both historians and literary scholars drawn to the ongoing project of unearthing women's histories and narratives in a region that often had a critical stake, as both books show, in marginalizing and even ignoring alternative voices and stories. Farnham's collection should prove particularly useful in courses in women's history and literature, not just because of the high quality of the essays but also because of the general historical framework in which the essays are placed, thanks to the headnotes introducing each of the essays. These headnotes briefly reconstruct the broad cultural contexts defining the arguments in each essay and thereby bring attention to the larger issues implicated in all of the essays. Admittedly, these headnotes are sometimes a bit too broad in nature, especially in the case of Farnham's discussion of nineteenth-century "separate



spheres," which seems to overlook Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's argument against using this paradigm in the antebellum South in *Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women of the Old South* (1988) and even Linda Kerber's cautionary advice ten years ago about relying too heavily on the paradigm of "separate spheres" ("Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History," *Journal of American History* 75: 1 [July 1988]: 9–39). Nonetheless, Farnham offers us the broadest and most inclusive portrait yet of women's identities and stories in the region, and the collection as a whole represents a considerable achievement, as does that of Coryell *et al.* These are two volumes not to be ignored by any student of women in the South.

SUSAN V. DONALDSON  
*College of William and Mary*

CARL J. EKBERG. *French Roots in the Illinois Country: The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 359. \$44.95.

This study of French colonial society and culture in the Illinois country of the eighteenth century is based on prodigious research in printed records and manuscript archives in France, Canada, and the United States. In a series of chapters that read like separate essays, Carl J. Ekberg provides a detailed and learned discussion of village life, demography, agricultural practice, landscape, and *mentalité* in Vincennes, Cahokia, Kaskaskia, Ste. Genevieve, and St. Louis. His earlier book on the Illinois French, *Colonial Ste. Genevieve: An Adventure on the Mississippi Frontier* (1985), was intended for a popular audience. This study will have a more restricted readership, but it is a scholar's delight.

Ekberg is the first historian to call attention to the unique pattern of French colonial settlement in Illinois. Historical geographers have long noted the distinctive French colonial pattern of "longlots": land surveyed and parceled out in narrow plots stretching back from the watercourses. From Canada to Louisiana, longlots are the distinctive mark of French settlement. But only in Illinois, Ekberg demonstrates, did French settlers live in compact villages and practice a system of open-field agriculture. He shows that every aspect of that communal European tradition (as delineated in the scholarship of historians Marc Bloch, Joan Thirsk, and Richard C. Hoffman) was present in Illinois. Plowlands were communally owned and managed, although each head of household held customary rights to particular arable strips. Assemblies of residents met seasonally to make common decisions about the schedule of planting, cultivating, harvesting, and the release of livestock into the fields for winter grazing. Surely there were community conflicts, yet the cooperative culture of the Illinois villages presents a remarkable contrast with the individualism of the British colonies. This open-field system was introduced with the first settlements in the early eighteenth cen-

tury and continued until the influx of American settlers after the Revolution.

French creoles of the Mississippi Valley, Ekberg writes, "were replicating, mutatis mutandis, a traditional French system of village governance" (p. 240). It was what he calls "bastard manorialism," a world of *habitants* but no *seigneurs*. "I expect nothing from the settlers," one aspiring colonial landlord noted in a remarkable letter of 1737; "they are all lords and masters" (p. 38). Ekberg argues that these rural traditions were "deeply embedded in the mental structures" of the settlers. The evidence here, however, is not completely persuasive. Ekberg's acknowledgement that Canadians did not practice this system suggests that local conditions might have been the more determinative factor. The need for defensive villages in the Illinois, where Indians remained the majority, may have been most salient. But if so, it encouraged French creoles to revive portions of their manorial heritage.

One of the most interesting parts of Ekberg's study is his discussion of the cultural clash between French residents and the arriving Americans of the late century, who had great difficulty mustering sympathy for local customs. "Their attachment to their old habits is such that the idea of living in the woods, that is to say on a farm, excites in them as much abhorrence as if they were dropped here from the middle of Paris," one American wrote from Kaskaskia in 1806. "They live cooped up in this village (the only place in America to which that name applies with the meaning it has in Europe)" (p. 254). Americans preferred a dispersed pattern of living. Ekberg quotes Thomas Jefferson, who made similar comments on a tour of France in 1787. "Certain it is," he wrote, "that they are less happy and less virtuous in villages than they would be insulated with their families on the grounds they cultivate" (p. 263). Citing statistics on the low levels of violence and disorder in the French villages of Illinois, Ekberg challenges Jefferson as well as the American observers in the American heartland. The French creoles, he argues, were "more rather than less virtuous, if part of virtue consists in respecting the lives and limbs of one's neighbors" (p. 263).

JOHN MACK FARAGHER  
*Yale University*

ANTHONY W. PARKER. *Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia: The Recruitment, Emigration, and Settlement at Darien, 1735–1748*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 182. \$35.00.

The settlement of Highland Scots in colonial Georgia is one of the more obscure stories of early American settlement. Hailed for their military valor, several hundred Highlanders were recruited for the colony by James Oglethorpe during the Trustee period of Georgia's history in an effort to defend the fledgling settlement against an attack from Spanish Floridians seeking to push back British encroachment upon the disputed territory between the colonies. The Scots,

centered at Darien, suffered considerably in the confrontations that resulted during the early years, but their settlement provided the foundation for the future emigration of Scottish Highlanders to Georgia.

Anthony W. Parker recounts their story in considerable detail. As such, this book forms part of a rapidly growing literature on the involvement of Scots in early British America. Parker's contribution is especially welcome in that his concentration on Highland Scots helps to balance the Lowland focus of much recent research on Scottish settlement. And the author does much to bring their story to life. For the years he has chosen to cover, he has left almost nothing out. The records of the period yield abundant material on the circumstances and experiences of individual settlers, allowing Parker to flesh out the personalities of such figures as John Mohr Mackintosh, a large man who had fought for the Jacobites in 1715 and had suffered in the forfeitures that followed, whose son Lachlan was to become a wealthy rice planter and political leader. Parker discounts the argument associated with Grady McWhiney that "Celtic" emigrants to the southern colonies were essentially lazy and uninterested in farming; he persuasively demonstrates that the intention of the Trustees was to attract settlers who would be both soldiers *and* settlers, defenders of the colony but also contributors to its growth and prosperity.

With such a promising beginning, one might have hoped for more substantial treatment of some of the topics involved. For one, many readers will want to know more about what happened to those Scots after 1748, which is discussed only briefly, and how the early settlers interacted with later arrivals. Alas, the book contains almost nothing on that topic, a decision Parker defends by describing an investigation of the whole period as "encyclopedic" (p. 4). Yet the whole is fewer than 170 pages; the text, without notes and appendixes—some only marginally relevant—is a mere ninety-nine pages. With two chapters devoted to the history of the Georgia territory before Highland settlement and the history of the Highlands and another half-chapter to recruitment in Scotland, the main subject receives fewer than fifty pages. Doubtless those other topics are important, but so brief a treatment simply does not leave sufficient space to address even some of the most obvious questions. Thus, there is little discussion of possible relations with Highlanders who remained at home, or even a comparison of social conditions and lifestyles. No comparison is attempted with Highlanders who began to settle in New York or North Carolina within a few years of the Georgia settlement. There is no discussion of how Highland settlement may have differed from that of Lowland Scots in Georgia or elsewhere; indeed, there is little comparison of the Highland experience in Georgia with that of any other group in British America.

What we are left with is a fairly straightforward narrative history, one that confines itself to a few substantive questions while answering them in meticulous detail. Parker confines the work to the topics

included in his subtitle—recruitment, emigration, and settlement—and restricts himself to the Darien settlement from 1735 to 1748; only a few pages, in fact, extend beyond 1740. A more extended treatment of how the Georgia Highlanders fared after the brief Trustee period must await future work. If Parker has not undertaken to answer all of the questions a reader might have asked about his story, he has told that story better than any other historian to date. We should all look forward to further work on the significant topic of the Highland experience in Britain's southern American colonies.

NED LANDSMAN  
State University of New York,  
Stony Brook

ROBERT BLAIR ST. GEORGE. *Conversing by Signs: Poetics of Implication in Colonial New England Culture*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 466. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

To read Robert Blair St. George's large and complex book is to dwell in the houses of early New England's patriarchs. Four sprawling chapters provide a topical and roughly chronological exploration of a series of critical sites in colonial New England culture. The opening chapter offers an extended analysis of a Connecticut farmstead and its relationship to the "bawn," an enclosed and fortified domestic space with special significance in England's commercial and colonial expansion. Chapter two explores analogies between houses and bodies: in particular, the metaphorical implications of a unitary and hierarchical understanding of the body for the ordering of the "houses" of family and state. Chapter three turns from the seventeenth century to the eighteenth, and from rural Connecticut to Boston, to examine the violent collision of houses and bodies in crowd assaults on the mansions of the gentry. Chapter four returns to Connecticut for a close look at the paintings of Ralph Earl, whose portraits of Federalist gentlemen and their houses were allegories for their cultural aspirations, balancing the yearning for an Arcadian past with the tensions of living in a commercial republic. But to describe what the book is "about" fails to capture the rich, dense, learned, ingenious, digressive, often rewarding, and sometimes maddening method by which St. George performs this work of cultural inquiry.

In a theoretical introduction, St. George defines the "poetics of implication" as the "density of apprehension, memory, and imagination" (p. 2) within a culture and sees implication as the process whereby connections between objects, words, forms, and ideas are folded together. His extended investigations of particular cultural locations aim to reveal multiple levels of meaning and interaction operating simultaneously and therefore to complicate overly rigid chronological or conceptual schemes. In St. George's New England, "Puritanism" does not give way to "Enlightenment," nor does capitalism succeed agrarian subsistence econ-

omies. They dwell in tension alongside one another, in the same way that a new addition to an old house transforms its interior life without effacing the significance of the original structure.

A method that relies so heavily on metaphor has its flaws, among which the author acknowledges "a hankering after coincidence [and] an undisciplined notion of influence" (p. 10). By-products of this evocative style include unlikely interpretations and forced arguments. In 1737, a Boston crowd destroyed a public market and announced that it had "Five Hundred Men in Solemn League and Covenant" ready to defend the act (p. 225). St. George sees this as an occasion to discuss New England's tradition of religious covenants, but he makes no mention of Parliament's 1642 "Solemn League and Covenant" with Scotland, by far the more obvious connection. Elsewhere, numerical evidence is cited to suggest a "second Great Migration" in Boston without sufficiently rigorous analysis of its significance. How can 959 immigrants between 1660 and 1740 (averaging twelve per year) compare with the 20,000 immigrants of the "Great Migration" of 1629–1642? Similarly dubious conclusions about Boston's economic conditions are drawn from very small numbers of migrant artisans. In other instances, the demands of an argument force misreadings of sources, as when early Plymouth colorist Robert Cushman's description of Indian farming techniques is mistaken for a critique of English practices. In light of these tendencies, the book is not the most reliable guide to New England culture for the uninitiated.

At the same time, for readers who have already dwelt too long in the sometimes stultifying scholarship on early New England, this book can be enormously rewarding, even liberating. Perhaps the book's greatest accomplishment is its willingness to question long-standing assumptions about historical and cultural processes that far transcend the limited scope of early New England. St. George is among the few scholars who challenge received notions that the inner values of capitalism and religion are antithetical, and his occasional meditations on *communion and consumption*, commerce and Christ merit further attention. In his playful, audacious investigation of "embodied spaces" and the transactions that take place on these complex sites, St. George uncovers profound ways in which the spiritual and the commercial implicate one another.

The virtue of St. George's method lies in its ability to recover multilayered complexity in past experience. By dwelling at such length in a Connecticut farmhouse, we see how lived reality resists rigid categories such as "Puritanism," "capitalism," or "republicanism." But in this virtue lies a limitation as well, for by confining his discourse to the cultural sites themselves, the houses and the bodies that fill the book, St. George shows the inadequacies of historical categories but cannot go very far toward correcting them. If our standard narratives and chronologies need adjustment, we gain few suggestions for clear or convincing alternatives. But that is perhaps expecting more than this already

lavish book promises. Scholars of early New England will return frequently to St. George's many mansions for new building ideas.

MARK A. PETERSON  
University of Iowa

CHARLES P. HANSON. *Necessary Virtue: The Pragmatic Origins of Religious Liberty in New England*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 1998. Pp. x, 277. \$35.00.

In this book, Charles P. Hanson argues that although anti-Catholicism was a hallmark of New England society, the circumstances of war were instrumental in creating a cultural "space in which previously marginalized ideas about religious toleration could circulate" (p. 21) and religious liberty could emerge. Essential to this argument is the way in which the confluence of interest produced strange alliances within North America. The Quebec Act, for example, created interesting political bedfellows. For French Canadian elites, the act seemed the best means for furthering the ambitions of *seigneurs* by making possible their holding of colonial office, while to Bishop Jean-Olivier Briand, who got along well with Guy Carleton, it was a means for preserving the Roman Catholic Church. For New Englanders, it hearkened back to their traditional prejudices and raised the specter of creeping imperial papism and tyranny. When the war broke out, Patriots reversed their position and had to explain how dependence on Catholics was consistent with their crusade for liberty, while Briand and other French Canadian elites moved quickly from being accommodationists to becoming active supporters of the empire.

Hanson's treatment of the Quebec expedition and the French alliance illustrates the emergence of a new, more complex understanding of French Canadians and a reconstruction by New Englanders of the relationship between Catholicism and the civil state. To their surprise, the Americans found themselves dependent for survival on ordinary French Canadians who gave food and shelter willingly. The American expedition exacerbated class and social differences with the elite and provided ordinary French Canadians with a common political objective: the expulsion of the British from North America. Patriots found the Catholicism of their allies interesting and unthreatening, while Tories tended to be more hostile and bigoted. As they coped with the problem of melding old ideology with new experiences, Patriots began to downplay religious criteria when defining liberty. A more secular definition of liberty became the means for distinguishing and splitting anglophile Catholic elites and clergy from the masses of ordinary French Canadians. Conditioned by two centuries of anti-Catholicism and attacked for being "Catholic-loving rebels," Patriots developed an explanation for their toleration. One device was to separate belief from the institutions of the Catholic church, for example, portraying King Louis XVI as a protector of liberty and the rights of man by citing his

defiance of the pope and the suppression of the Jesuits.

New Englanders also came to terms with Catholicism because their own Calvinist presumptions were in flux. As they debated orthodoxy, as they rejected their doctrine of predestination and the leadership of the saints, Universalist reformers like Charles Chauncy began to resemble Catholics with their more open process of salvation. In contrast, Calvinist conservatives demonstrated a pattern of intolerance that was anachronistic and counter-productive. For Patriots outside the immediate theological battlefield like Mercy Otis Warren, these debates led to the sense that some moral belief was probably better than none. A devout Catholic was of greater social value than an atheist. In effect, according to Hanson, coming to grips with the practical need for French support led to a reformulation of Puritan belief and a new understanding of Catholicism that gave rise to religious liberty.

This book reminds us of the role the Revolution played in changing the culture and society of the United States. Where Gordon S. Wood pointed out its unanticipated consequences for ideology and political institutions and Thomas Doerflinger, Benjamin Woods Labaree, and Richard Buel, Jr., its influence on commerce and society, Hanson looks at how the war produced a climate for religious liberty. He sees the decline of New England's Calvinist orthodoxy as concomitant with the rise of religious liberty. Writing with an eye for the telling detail, Hanson provides us with compelling practical explanations for why intellectual paradigms change. Yet, with this particular issue, context and perspectives are everything. Massachusetts did not disestablish the Congregational Church until 1833, a year before the Ursuline Convent was burned, and it is still a misdemeanor in the commonwealth to reproach God, the Holy Ghost, Jesus Christ or "holy scriptures" [sic] (Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 272, §36). What Hanson describes is a limited achievement: an opening in cultural space leading to the reconsideration of what constituted acceptable patterns of belief. If the Revolution did not produce religious liberty, Hanson's book cautions us about the contingent nature of our unshakable, absolute values.

JONATHAN M. CHU  
University of Massachusetts,  
Boston

TIMOTHY L. HALL. *Separating Church and State: Roger Williams and Religious Liberty*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1998. Pp. 206. Cloth \$44.95, paper \$19.95.

Timothy L. Hall is a legal historian. Accordingly, his primary interest in this book is "to make Williams's arguments for religious liberty accessible to legal analysis" (p. 6) by judges and fellow legal historians. He finds the "historical base" for present legal theory on religious liberty to be "shockingly scanty" (p. 4). In large part, this is because of the desire of contempo-

rary thinkers to make Thomas Jefferson's thought the primary fountainhead of tolerationist doctrine, even though, as Hall observes, Jefferson's writing on the matter is surprisingly limited. Roger Williams, on the other hand, thought and wrote on the subject persistently and extensively, but (apart from Hall's own previous work) he is absent from contemporary arguments on First Amendment rights.

Scholars already familiar with Williams's works will find less that is new in Hall's book than other readers. More than half the text is devoted to explaining familiar Puritan history and Williams's participation in it. Hall reviews relevant details of Williams's biography, stressing his conflicts with the Puritan establishment in the Massachusetts Bay Colony on the issues of toleration and Separatism. The narrative is clear and balanced, strengthened by Hall's insistence on understanding Williams as a seventeenth-century man. He appropriately laments the tendency of some twentieth-century writers to surround Williams with "the aura of democratic sainthood" (p. 3), popularizing his supposed modernity. He was no democrat, as Hall makes clear, but "a paragon of obstinacy," "utterly unreasonable" in some aspects of his thinking, and "a religious fanatic" (p. 18). Indeed, as an extreme Separatist he "abhorred" toleration of the unredeemed within the church, finding the church so corrupt that in his view no pure churches or true ministers existed any more. He awaited the advent of "new apostles" to renew the church. In such views he was—although Hall does not so name him—a Seeker, a radical voice of dissension in Puritan Massachusetts Bay. Hall also properly stresses the important point that, however it may look from today's vantage point, the opposition of the Massachusetts Puritans to toleration of sectaries possessed a logic that was internally consistent and, to its supporters, sensible.

As Hall demonstrates, Williams was profoundly convinced that the church should not be superintending people's secular lives and that the civil establishment should keep out of religious affairs. In these ways, he was at odds with his New England contemporaries, and to some extent with English thought generally. But it is just here that Hall believes Williams can usefully speak to us today.

Hall does a considerable service in the final two chapters by subjecting Williams's ideas to comparison with those of the later founders, James Madison and Jefferson, as well as those of their intellectual forebear, John Locke. Interestingly, he finds an "uncanny resemblance" between Williams's and Madison's concepts of religious toleration. Both of them, although holding very different religious faiths, were interested in protecting people's rights to perform specific religious acts. Jefferson did not share their primary personal interest in religion. His famous "Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" (1786) therefore protects diversity of opinion but, Hall notes, does not speak to religious acts.

Williams was an original who, in some aspects of his



thinking, now looks archaic, but in others he survives to speak—despite the generally acknowledged difficulty of his prose—in a relevant way today. Although he may not be most at home in the materials of other seventeenth-century discourse, Hall is thoroughly conversant with the pertinent writings by Williams, including especially his *Bloudy Tenent* volumes, and by such opponents as John Cotton and John Winthrop. Occasional slips occur, as in calling the Arminians “Armenians” (p. 14) and on one occasion placing the Massachusetts Quaker persecutions in the 1640s (p. 64), although he elsewhere correctly locates them in the next decade. (Regrettably, there are some two dozen proofreading errors in the book.) In addressing a particular audience inside the legal profession and the discipline of legal history, where Williams’s thought is largely ignored while that of Jefferson and Madison is repeatedly cited, this book represents a significant contribution to dialogue on “establishment theory.” Moreover, with its analytical clarity as a reading of Williams on this issue, Hall’s work will be helpful to the broader ongoing effort to understand the writings of that prolix, prickly, intolerant tolerationist, Roger Williams himself.

SARGENT BUSH, JR.  
University of Wisconsin,  
Madison

KERRY S. WALTERS. *Benjamin Franklin and His Gods*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 213. Cloth \$44.95, paper \$18.95.

Kerry S. Walters, who distinguished himself with earlier work on the American Deists and how Enlightenment thought penetrated strands of American religion, offers the first full-length analysis of Benjamin Franklin’s religion in more than thirty years. His work is revisionist; at the outset, he states his intent to counter the prevailing understanding developed by Alfred Owen Aldridge in *Benjamin Franklin and Nature’s God* (1967).

Aldridge argued that Franklin was an idiosyncratic deist who espoused a kind of polytheism. Walters does not deny the existence of an idiosyncratic dimension to Franklin’s thought but counters that it leads to a theistic perspectivism, not polytheism. Both acknowledge that Franklin’s religious insights evolved throughout his long life, always reacting against the Calvinism proffered by Franklin’s parents.

Walters fixes on key documents to make his case, beginning with the *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain* (1725). Published in England while Franklin was still a teenager, the treatise was starkly deistic in tone and content but strident in repudiating traditional Calvinistic understandings of Christianity. It represented a “false start,” for Franklin quickly regretted what he wrote and moved in other directions.

The next stage, pivotal for Walters’s interpretation, was the “Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion” that

Franklin prepared strictly for personal use. Franklin compiled this relatively short list of personal beliefs late in 1728, when he was twenty-two years old. It is in this very personal document that Walters finds Franklin’s “great insight,” what he terms theistic perspectivism. In a nutshell, Franklin posited the existence of God (at least in the sense of deism’s First Cause) but remained convinced that the being of God was so fundamentally different from human being as to be always inaccessible to the human mind (reason) and emotions. Hence, ordinary folk developed a variety of ways to represent God symbolically, many of them anthropomorphic but some almost as lesser divinities. This last point is what led Aldridge to see Franklin as a polytheist, and it leads Walters to see Franklin as one who recognized that humans developed a range of ways to portray God, a variety of perspectives from which to describe deity.

In other words, Franklin recognized that individuals would always fashion a variety of images in their attempts to capture the infinite in finite categories. Here Franklin sounds like the later American pragmatists, a point that Walters notes. William James, for example, argued that in the absence of rational verification, the utility of a particular belief in endowing life with meaning (so long as it did not bring harm) made such belief plausible and worthy of acceptance. Franklin, according to Walters, would have concurred.

As Franklin aged, he retained a concern for virtue and connections between religious belief and virtue. For Walters, this interest reflects Franklin’s philosophical posture. But it also had practical utility. Walters interprets passages in Franklin’s *Autobiography* (1771–1788) that were critical of Presbyterians and religious sects in general as indicative of Franklin’s conviction that doctrinal particularity detracted from a philosophical emphasis on virtue. It may be simpler than that. Like others inclined toward Enlightenment rationalism, Franklin understood the social value of having citizens who shared common understandings of right and wrong. They were less likely to pose problems for social order and therefore would be easier to govern. George Washington articulated similar ideas about the social value of religion in his “Farewell Address.”

Walters connects Franklin’s theological evolution with “stages of faith” advanced by James W. Fowler, who drew on theories of human development suggested by Erik Erikson and Jean Piaget. Fowler never strictly correlates stages of faith to chronological age, but it is rather striking that Franklin at age twenty-two should have arrived at the fifth stage, a conjunctive faith where one integrates personal identity with a specific religious outlook, aware of all the paradoxes it brings. For Fowler, this stage represents significant maturity for the individual, but a maturity rarely attained in young adulthood. Hence, although Walters’s efforts to tie Franklin’s belief to psychological stages of faith development are enticing, they may be a bit overstated. Nonetheless, Walters has provided a solid analysis, one sure to provoke reflection, and



those interested in American religious culture of the eighteenth century are once again in his debt.

CHARLES H. LIPPY  
University of Tennessee,  
Chattanooga

ELIZABETH A. PERKINS. *Border Life: Experience and Memory in the Revolutionary Ohio Valley*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 253. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$17.95.

"Cultural cleansing" (p. 176) is the term Elizabeth A. Perkins chooses to describe the work of some historians of the trans-Appalachian West. Too often, she writes, these historians have produced "triumphal and patriotic narratives" and "shaped their accounts along increasingly racist and nationalistic lines" (pp. 175, 173). She aims to remedy this situation by viewing the late eighteenth-century Ohio Valley backcountry "not from the perspective of distant elites, but instead up close . . . through the eyes of common settlers as they reflected upon their own experiences" (p. 2). To accomplish this, she combines a deep reading of primary sources with poststructuralist literary theory and the ethnographic methods of Clifford Geertz.

This book is based on three hundred oral interviews of surviving Revolutionary Ohio Valley pioneers (mainly Kentuckians), collected and transcribed by nineteenth-century historian John Dabney Shane. The Shane transcriptions are now housed in the Draper Collection of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, where Perkins has obviously labored long and hard. Perkins begins with a chapter overview of the Shane sources, stressing the paradoxical, "ambivalent and conflicting perceptions of his pioneer informants" (p. 175). She then organizes her study into successive chapters focusing on environment, Indian-pioneer interaction, ethnic and cultural diversity, and the socio-economics of frontier politics and power. A final chapter focuses on "memory" and the ways in which Perkins believes informants (and historians) "construct" their recollections of the past.

Throughout her book, Perkins exhibits a wariness of primary sources, and she questions the ability of historians to produce from them truthful depictions of the past. Yet she simultaneously states that the same firsthand accounts, "when used with care and a critical perspective, can field important insights" (p. 175). Perkins's insights, woven into the middle chapters, are that Indians greatly influenced non-Indian settlers via warfare methods, foodways, dress, and other aspects of their material culture; that the early trans-Appalachian West was a "multicultural" environment exhibiting great human diversity and interaction among Indian, African-American, biracial, and varied European-American (and gendered) groups; that there was growing disparity of wealth between classes of border folk; that an incipient frontier egalitarianism was ultimately coopted by power seekers (like Henry Clay and, later, Andrew Jackson); and that some scholars of

the region, beginning with Theodore Roosevelt and Frederick Jackson Turner, ignored all of the above, instead choosing to romanticize and moralize the history of the trans-Appalachian West.

Perkins's insights and her interesting research on frontier folkways are often hidden from the reader. This book exudes the poststructuralist jargon and political correctness that was in vogue over a decade ago. Pioneer folk do not simply live their lives, they "enact" them (p. 39). Pioneers' reminiscences are "mental maps" that "give temporal shape and narrative coherence to their lives" (pp. 3-4). Time is "the 'topography of indigenous historical perception'" (p. 155), and the pioneers' efforts to organize and recount the passage of time are "interpretive acts" (p. 153). Thus the job of the literary critic/ethnographer is to determine the "categories—situational, masked, or veiled—through which [pioneers] bounded their own social spaces" (p. 153). Perkins concludes: "I hope to shed light on the interpretive process by which experience, filtered through layers of perception, eventually came to be molded into divergent—and radically simplified—historical texts" (p. 4).

I would not recommend assigning this book to undergraduates, although its theses might be distilled and effectively served up in a lecture format. At the same time, the book would provoke a lively discussion in a colonial or frontier history graduate seminar. Its text is accompanied by ample illustrations, tables, and appendixes and uses a typeface that will also provoke discussion. Specialists in the eighteenth-century trans-Appalachian frontier should order a copy of this book for their graduate libraries.

Of course, the writing of the social history of the trans-Appalachian West did not originate with the new social historians, "new" western historians, or the ethnographers and literary critics. Roosevelt and Turner led the way for three generations of historians, much of whose work remains valuable. Archer B. Hulbert's *Waterways of Westward Expansion* (1903), Thomas D. Clark's *The Rampaging Frontier* (1939), Leland D. Baldwin's *The Keelboat Age on Western Waters* (1941), Frank L. Owsley's *Plain Folk of the Old South* (1949), Arthur K. Moore's *The Frontier Mind* (1957), Harriette Simpson Arnow's *Seedtime on the Cumberland* (1960), Malcom J. Rohrbough's *The Trans-Appalachian West* (1978), Grady McWhiney's *Cracker Culture* (1988), and John Mack Faragher's *Daniel Boone* (1992) are all solid, even-handed, and well-written accounts of the elusive frontier folk that Perkins depicts in this book.

MICHAEL ALLEN  
University of Washington,  
Tacoma

JON F. SENSBACH. *A Separate Canaan: The Making of an Afro-Moravian World in North Carolina, 1763-1840*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History

and Culture, Williamsburg, Va. 1998. Pp. xxiii, 342. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$17.95.

In this richly documented and engaging study of the interaction between African Americans and German Moravians in the North Carolina piedmont, Jon F. Sensbach recounts the gradual surrender of whites to American racism and the lived experience of blacks in the Moravian settlement. Although the Moravians were in many ways unique, Sensbach's analysis—of racial attitudes and tensions, of waning religious idealism, of slave culture and community—sheds light on larger trends and developments in the South and the nation. This book is a pioneering study of a German slaveholding community in the South and a valuable addition to scholarship on slavery, early American religion, and race relations.

The members of the Renewed Unity of Brethren, known as Moravians by the English, who settled in central North Carolina in 1753 came to establish a community of the faithful. To minimize worldly influence, the Brethren carefully monitored members' lives and limited contact with "strangers," as non-Moravians were called. Within a decade, however, Moravians began hiring slaves and in 1769 collectively purchased their first slave, Sam, christened Johann Samuel when he became their first black convert in 1771. Moravians were not morally opposed to slavery, but the church did demand that slave owners treat enslaved Moravians well, keep the marriages and families of converted slaves intact, and admit African-American members to a biracial fellowship that could be remarkably color-blind. Sensbach terms Moravian interracial relationships "fraternal." Fraternalism did not, as Sensbach notes, mandate social equality or slave manumission, but because of the church's emphasis on righteousness, religious status, in some contexts, was more important than race.

As white Moravians imbibed the racial mores of the wider world, they erected barriers between themselves and all African Americans. In the early nineteenth century, they no longer exchanged the "kiss of peace" with new black members, stopped burying black Moravians alongside whites, ceased consecrating slave marriages, and, in 1822, ended the biracial fellowship by relegating African Americans to a separate mission congregation. By adopting the racial ideology of the slaveholding South, Moravians lost much of what had made them religiously distinct. Pacifism foundered on fears of slave insurrection. The Moravian idea that all work was noble gave way to a view that the most difficult or unpleasant tasks properly belonged to blacks. The decision, in 1856, to put up settlement lots for sale to the general public marked the final end to the Moravian theocratic ethos.

Sensbach sensitively recreates the world of slaves and free blacks in the Moravian settlement, detailing their work, their religious lives, and their efforts to wrest as much autonomy as they could from their owners. Elaborate networks of godparentage bound

blacks in the settlement together, and as Sensbach rightly argues, for slaves, religion and family were often interconnected. Although the mission church was central to the Afro-Moravian community, slaves in the settlement frequently attended Methodist services, especially those conducted by black preachers. Slave religion was thus a complex mix of Moravian-influenced decorum inside the mission church, evangelical spontaneity in Methodist-led services, and African folk belief. And, as Sensbach notes, some slaves rejected Christianity altogether.

Slaves were vital to a range of crafts and trades. Some were tanners, potters, and blacksmiths; others made bricks, tiles, and paper. Gradually excluded from the skilled trades, by the early nineteenth century, most slaves in the settlement labored on farms and plantations in the countryside. Sensbach shows how slaves worked within, creatively exploited, or resisted Moravian culture. Some slaves used their status as Moravians to change occupations or protest abusive treatment. There were even, in the early decades of the settlement, slaves who, weighing Moravians against other Carolina masters, pled to be purchased by the Brethren. Slaves nonetheless demonstrated in a host of ways—from work sabotage to flight to arson—their desire to be their own masters. One particularly valuable feature of this book is Sensbach's skillful fleshing out of individual slaves' lives from the sources, evocatively capturing the toll the transformation of white Moravians took on their slaves.

Sensbach's work is a model case study, for he weaves the developments within Moravian society into the larger trends in slave owning, racial ideology, and slave culture. As a result, we understand both the distinctive features of this community and how its evolution mirrored that of the wider South and nation. This book tells a compelling story, and, as Sensbach convincingly argues, an American one.

CYNTHIA LYNN LYERLY  
Boston College

BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR. *The First Impeachment: The Constitution's Framers and the Case of Senator William Blount*. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 344. \$40.00.

The nation was outraged. The acts of the case went uncontested. After much fustian, the House of Representatives rushed to impeach. In the Senate, however, cooler heads prevailed and after sober deliberation, the managers of the impeachment were turned away empty-handed. Sound familiar? But Buckner F. Melton, Jr.'s detailed, thoughtful, fair-minded, and highly readable account concerns the first impeachment, in 1797, not the most recent case.

The facts in the impeachment of Tennessee Senator William Blount were straightforward; the evidence was overwhelming; the defendant fled; and the outcome was predictable. Blount, a North Carolina politician and land speculator who joined other go-getters (in-

cluding Andrew Jackson) to exploit Tennessee lands, had conspired with other Americans and approached British officials to begin a war against Spain in the Southwest, in violation of the Pinckney Treaty. Blount's motives were as much pecuniary (he had over-extended himself and his speculation could not bear fruit until the Mississippi was cleared of foreign obstacles) as patriotic. But his machinations left the frontier ablaze with rumor and bands of armed men, making the threat of war realistic.

Blount's incautious letters were seized and read in the House, leading to a swift motion for impeachment. Blount was a Jeffersonian Republican, and his loudest accusers were Federalists, but the consternation the revelations of his plot caused was general. The vote on his impeachment (in advance of formal articles) was nonpartisan, and the Senate immediately expelled him. Nearly two years later, the Senate decided that it had no jurisdiction to try an impeachment when the defendant had left office. Blount departed Philadelphia in the dead of night before he could be impeached, eluded capture, and was greeted as a hero in Tennessee, where his warlike posturing appeared normal. He was elected to state office and died in 1800. Why, then, is this case important?

The answer is precedent, for the lawyers in the Congress and the lawyers who represented Blount—many of them framers of the Constitution and all of them familiar with the original meanings of constitutional language—explored a wide range of vital issues. Not only did they debate the obvious questions—could a member of Congress be impeached; could the Senate try a non-office holder; was a threat to national security an impeachable offense even though the activity itself was not criminal?—but they also pondered whether the Constitution incorporated the common law, the precedents of Parliament, and the sentiments of the framers. In the end, they decided that offenses that threatened public safety or that violated public trust were impeachable as “high misdemeanors.”

As one might surmise from the past year's events, the Senate had trouble with its own procedures. Indeed, the senators were uncertain whether they could institute their own procedures. They wondered how to conceive of themselves; were they jurymen sitting on oaths, prosecutors and defenders, or judges? After considerable debate, the Senate majority (some Federalists voting with all the Republicans) determined that the trial would not resemble a criminal proceeding but was a “unique instrument” for ferreting out and punishing political misconduct (p. 176). Nor were the impeachment and trial judicial matters; they were legislative ones instead.

There are historical lessons of more general scope here as well. The first is the relative weakness of the early federal government relative to the states. Blount could not be arrested once he returned to Tennessee; no one could be found to do it. But he could be impeached and tried in absentia. Partisanship played a role. The Federalist majority in both houses of Con-

gress insisted on a wide latitude for the prosecution, arguing at one point that anyone, in or out of office, could be impeached, tried, and disqualified for future office. Thus Blount, although already expelled, could be tried. The Senate majority demurred.

Melton has given us more than a constitutional history. It is also political, diplomatic, and western history, told with clarity and force. More important, he has blended the lawyer's rigorous logic with the historian's skill in untangling and presenting complexity. Thus the book works on two levels, as scholarship and as constitutional law. I cannot imagine that we will ever need another study of this case.

PETER CHARLES HOFFER  
*University of Georgia*

HAROLD D. LANGLEY. *A History of Medicine in the Early U.S. Navy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1995. Pp. xix, 435. \$49.95.

This insightful study traces the history of medical practice in the U.S. Navy from 1794 to 1842. These dates mark the construction of the first American naval vessels, including the U.S.S. *Constitution*, and the establishment of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. Harold D. Langley is a former curator of naval history at the National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, and the author of important contributions to naval history. Research for the study was drawn from a wide variety of sources, since the U.S. Navy medical records for this period are not gathered in a single collection. In fact, medical records before 1842 were rarely collected at all. This fact makes it difficult to understand not only the practice of medicine but also its practitioners. What Langley has accomplished in light of this handicap is a tribute to his determination and patience and the assistance of others recognized in more than five pages of acknowledgments.

The book consists of seventeen chapters that interweave the history of naval medicine with that of the development of the newly created U.S. Navy and the emergence of the American state. The quasi-war with France (1798–1801), the Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812 receive special attention because of the medical needs of a wartime navy. Langley's account of the period after 1812 strikes a different tone, emphasizing more the creation of a professional service and the institutionalization of health care through reform efforts. The establishment of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery forty-eight years after the creation of naval surgeons and mates in 1794 was a defining moment in the history of naval medicine. Readers will find instructive Langley's explanation for the reorganization of the navy at that time. Much of the impetus was due to several scathing articles published between April 1840 and June 1841 in the *Southern Literary Messenger* by Lt. Matthew Fontaine Maury, writing under the pen name of Harry Bluff. His criticisms of the navy included the practice of medicine. Ship

captains could limit medicines taken aboard their vessels, driving some surgeons to list their supplies in Latin to avoid scrutiny. Maury proposed that a navy medical bureau be established. The election of 1840 swept out the Democrats and brought in the Whig William Henry Harrison as president. Virginian Abel Parker Upshur was made secretary of the navy and recommended a restructuring of the navy to Congress. By August 1842 the House and Senate approved the plan with amendments, and it was signed by President John Tyler.

Langley's examination of the early practice of naval medicine contains some enlightening and shocking revelations. Foremost is the ponderous movement of bureaucracies, most notably the Navy Department, which could not produce a decision on the means to provide care and treatment for wounded and infirm sailors. No permanent naval hospital was built until 1830. Six years earlier, examinations to qualify medical officers were established by navy doctors. Professionalism was further enhanced by the establishment of the medical school in Philadelphia linked to the Medical Institute and the University of Pennsylvania.

The number of qualified medical personnel grew slowly. The War of 1812 concluded with fifty-three surgeons and seventy-five surgeon's mates in the navy. In 1840, the navy counted sixty-one surgeons, seventeen passed assistant surgeons, and fifty-three assistant surgeons. Some of these men achieved recognition for their research and writing, especially Edward Cutbush, William P. Barton, Thomas Harris, William Ruschenberger, and Usher Parsons. Cutbush authored a book of practical knowledge on the treatment of soldiers and sailors. Barton proposed many improvements for the health of sailors and in 1814 published a book containing a plan for marine hospitals and the reorganization of the navy medical department. His views were praised but not adopted. He taught at the University of Pennsylvania and authored four books on botany. Harris became professor of surgery at the Medical Institute and Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia. He was a strong advocate of the benefits of exercise. Parsons spent his career addressing health issues, studied in Europe, and published *The Sailor's Physician* (1820), revised four years later and retitled *Physician for Ships*. This last edition continued in print and was revised in 1852, almost thirty years after Parsons left the navy.

Ruschenberger is an interesting figure. Unwilling to risk embarrassment if the book did not succeed, he published *Three Years in the Pacific* (1834) under the pseudonym "An Officer of the United States Navy." Appointed surgeon in 1836 for the East Indies Squadron, he completed this tour with another book, *Narrative of a Voyage around the World* (1838).

Langley's careful scrutiny of manuscript collections reveals some interesting insights on efforts to improve life in the lower decks. Ventilating ships so that air is adequately circulated to the lower decks is both a medical issue and technological problem on sailing

ships. Commodore James Barron's papers at the College of William and Mary include Barron's efforts to address the health of sailors. Barron invented a ventilating bellows composed of cast iron pipes available in local hardware stores. His ventilator was tried out on the *Hornet* in 1824 and earned high marks, as there was a decrease in sickness compared to earlier cruises. The ventilator was credited with reducing the occurrence of yellow fever while in the Caribbean and was eventually installed on all ships. Barron requested compensation for his invention from the navy and Congress, but they refused to pay him.

Langley's study of naval medicine to 1842 incorporates medicine within the larger history of the United States and its newly created navy. Boston, Charleston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and other port cities receive attention for their part in the health care of sailors. In addition to the focus on the navy in war, Langley discusses the medical care of the peacetime navy. Students of exploration will find an interesting discussion of the Wilkes Exploring Expedition of 1838–1842. Six vessels carrying eighty-three officers and 342 men under Lieutenant Charles Wilkes circled the globe exploring Pacific islands, Antarctica, and other locations, subjecting the crew members to all climates. A careful record of medical treatment provides interesting details on how the medical staff addressed diseases and injuries. One medical journal is abbreviated, as Dr. Gillou refused to turn in his journal to the unpopular Wilkes, claiming it had personal information in it. He later handed it over after cutting out some pages. The trip was considered a great success: only twenty-seven men were lost, fifteen with the pilot schooner *Sea Gull*.

There is much to explore in this informed and well-researched study of the early American navy. For those buoyed by the recent medical determination that a few glasses of wine in moderation is a healthy additive, the story of the demise of the daily ration of grog may appear an opportunity lost to improve sailors' health. After debate in Congress in 1831, the navy began payment of six cents per ration to those who voluntarily relinquished their liquor ration. After 1840, the grog ration was cut to one gill for those at least twenty-one years of age. Tea, coffee, and cocoa were offered as options. One reads the debate by the navy and Congress on the health of seamen only to find that the debate reveals more about society and attitudes concerning health than the medical needs of the men at sea. Langley received a John Lyman Book Award from the North American Society for Oceanic History for this volume, which was well deserved.

TIMOTHY J. RUNYAN  
Cleveland State University

JOHN HARLEY WARNER. *Against the Spirit of System: The French Impulse in Nineteenth-Century Medicine*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 459. \$55.00.



John Harley Warner has written a magisterial book. In examining how nearly a century of American physicians remembered and reconstructed their experiences studying medicine in Paris, Warner explains how Americans invented and reinvented their own profession, shaped and expressed their values, and even developed their personal identities. Although Warner is particularly concerned with exploring the meanings that American doctors ascribed to their European experiences, he also offers rich descriptions of the underlying realities of medical life and thought. He chronicles the transmission of European medical ideas to the United States, and he offers revealing accounts of medical practice and education in both North and South, in both antebellum and post-Civil War America. Warner's overarching narrative integrates medical reform and medical sectarianism, the changing content and meaning of medical science, and comparisons and contrasts of the multiple contexts—American, British, French, and German—within which these issues played out. Warner bases his argument on prodigious research and on careful and sensitive readings of his sources. This is a work of enormous ambition, and it is enormously successful.

Paris attracted Warner's American doctors—a narrow professional elite at the outset of his narrative—because of the rich opportunities for experiential learning its hospitals and dissecting rooms offered. State control had replaced church ownership of the city's many hospitals; revolutionary morality had displaced the religious qualms that might otherwise have blocked postmortem examination; and public funding had opened access to Parisian hospital clinics to foreign medical students at no cost. Warner returns time and again to the issue of access, to the fact that Paris excited the American medical imagination less because it was in the forefront of medical science than because it allowed students and physicians closely to observe and touch sickness at the bedside and to dissect an endless supply of cadavers.

The notion that Paris epitomized medical science evolved as Americans returned home and constructed narratives of—and professional lives around—their French experiences. Their stories owed a great deal to why these physicians had initially made the trip. Antebellum American medicine mirrored its democratic and intensely competitive society. Collapsing professional standards vested self-improvement—and this is why study in Paris was so important—with both self-esteem and competitive marketplace advantage in an otherwise degraded profession. Returning doctors built reputations by proselytizing for French medicine, by declaring their allegiance to the revolutionary empiricism challenging the highly speculative theoretical systems—complete with bleeding and purging—that had heretofore characterized formal medicine. Warner points out that empiricism was hardly the revolutionary epistemology that returning doctors claimed; he argues that ambivalence toward Great Britain required a term distinct from Baconianism and that the self-

conscious nationalism of a new republic favored a celebration of intellectual revolution.

Warner drives this point home by contrasting the meanings that English and American physicians ascribed to their French experiences. English doctors, also drawn to the easy clinical access offered in Paris hospitals, explained their attraction in terms of their own distinctive needs: postrevolutionary France limited the hold of privilege in its hospitals and placed the needs of medical science ahead of the sway of tradition. English reformers thus used their construction of French medicine to argue that the state should replace the corporations and guilds that had traditionally controlled English medical institutions; the state should also fund those institutions so that they could allow access on terms as free as those available in France. Americans, living in a society hostile to claims for government support, made no such demands. American doctors, Warner argues, returned not so much with agendas for institutional reform as with the conviction that they needed to transform practice so that they could earn the support of the public in the medical marketplace. They would use “the cognitive and technical tools” they had acquired in Paris—the education of the senses that came from their experience seeing and touching disease—to do battle with medical sectarians and other competitors. Americans and Britons in effect viewed French medicine as a Rorschach blot: both groups acquired unparalleled clinical experience, but both came back more convinced of distinctive agendas for medical reform in their own countries.

Finally, Warner extends his argument about the retrospective construction of American medical experiences in Paris by using it to challenge the standard account of the later nineteenth-century transfer of America's medical affections from France to Germany and Austria. Historians have attributed this shift in medical destinations to the rise of German laboratory science, particularly experimental physiology, and the intellectual exhaustion of the French empiricist program. Warner minimizes (perhaps excessively) the attractiveness of basic science research in animating this shift, and he argues that better access to practical clinical instruction, now especially in newly developing specialties, once more drew American doctors, this time to Vienna and Berlin. It would only be after these physicians returned to the United States that they would reproduce the efforts of their French-trained countrymen in constructing the meaning of the medical tradition to which they had been introduced. The German medicine that returning Americans came to idealize was thorough and exact in both laboratory and specialty clinic. It was, indeed, the ideal medical form for a late nineteenth-century American society embracing a culture of professionalism and expertise.

Warner has provided an impressive account of nineteenth-century medical transformation. What makes this book particularly impressive is its attention to how individual physicians experienced the transformation



and reshaped medicine by the way they came to understand their roles in the process. This is superb medical history.

MORRIS J. VOGEL  
Temple University

ELIZABETH RAUH BETHEL. *The Roots of African-American Identity: Memory and History in Free Antebellum Communities*. New York: St. Martin's. 1997. Pp. xiii, 242.

This book, which examines the thought of northern free blacks between the American Revolution and 1860, is a collection of essays with some chronological structure. For that Elizabeth Rauh Bethel, a sociologist, begs historians' indulgence. She seeks "to write about race and to explore the construction of a politicized racial identity . . . [about] ways in which a relatively small population of free African Americans living in the antebellum North reformulated their collective past and . . . perceived, understood, acted upon, and remembered past events." Bethel asserts that "a fundamentally marginalized people crafted a uniquely New World ethnic identity that informed popular African-American historical consciousness" (p. vii). In a ten-line sentence on her first page, she gives the reader an ominous sense of the prose to come. Collective efforts to claim the American dream were forged before 1860, informing the national conventions of the 1830s and migrations to Haiti, Canada, and Africa, and shaping Reconstruction, pan-Africanism, and the 1960s civil rights movement.

The book has five sections. In the prologue, Bethel focuses on the March 8, 1858, festival at Boston's Faneuil Hall that commemorated the anniversary of Crispus Attucks's death and protested the *Dred Scott* decision and underscores the importance of its organizer, William Cooper Nell. In part one, she explores the formation of a "moral community" between 1775 and 1800. In part two, which deals with the years 1800–1835, she says the ending of slave importation and the Haitian revolution were the most important events shaping historical identity. The Cincinnati race riot of 1829 produced a series of conventions through the mid-1830s demonstrating race identity. In the third part, Bethel treats 1835–1860, when she claims that twenty percent of the free black population left the United States to establish permanent homes in Africa, Canada, and Haiti. Pan-Africanism and the rejection of the tenets of American racism by J. W. C. Pennington, William Wells Brown, and Nell were, she asserts, created in this era. The book's epilogue traces the formation of collective experiences between the Civil War and the end of the century, "recalled through constructed memory and told in historical time" (p. x) chiefly by William Still and Frances E. W. Harper.

Unfortunately, the author's efforts are unconvincing. One reason is her prose, which is fraught with factual errors or omissions, pseudo-jargon (especially the never-defined "lieux de memoire"), and irritating

asides, like the gratuitous label "nominally free North." Repetition tends to be substituted for argument. Here, too, thought lacks relationship to time and space and is given an unconvincing amount of coherence and continuity from the early nineteenth century to the present.

This theory-driven study also rests on biographical sketches of a score or so residents of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. Thoughts of such major figures as Martin Delany and Frederick Douglass, although mentioned, are not systematically explored, and religious leaders tend to disappear from the narrative after 1815. This work also offers little historical context. It glosses over community life in the North and South, despite the statement (p. vii) that the memories "of families, of communities, and of generations" form the basis of corporate identity. That the writings of Bethel's subjects shaped historical development is assumed but not demonstrated. The impact of major events—the origins of the first black newspaper, the reasons for the short-lived national convention movement and the rash of race riots in the urban North between 1829 and 1841, or the appeal of a "nominally free" region to most slaves—is buried or unmentioned. Curiously, what happened between 1850 and 1860 seems not to have concerned Bethel's subjects: the Fugitive Slave Act, the Underground Railroad, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, "Bleeding Kansas," John Brown's raid, the emergence of the Republican Party, and secessionism are absent from this book. The antislavery movement, though mentioned from time to time, is glossed over. Although the author asserts that Africa was an appealing place to free persons, in the pivotal section of the book (part three) she allocates only two pages to the subject. Her assertion about the percentage of emigrant free blacks—especially to Africa—is unsupported. Similarly, such statements as African Americans fought "not for nation but for race" (p. 185) in the Civil War are imprecise. There is scant evidence in the sketchy epilogue connecting her discussion of post-1860 America with the bulk of the text.

Oversimplified and overgeneralized, ponderous and ahistorical, this work is not easy to read and adds little to our understanding of the subject.

DARREL E. BIGHAM  
University of Southern Indiana

CARYN COSSÉ BELL. *Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana, 1718–1868*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 325. \$35.00.

In the broad sweep of history, there is seldom just one cause or a single origin of such major historical events as wars or revolutions. Rather, it is the accretion of numerous ideas over time and the chains of evolving circumstances that bring about major disruptions to normal life. Social revolutions, in that sense, are similar to political upheavals. Caryn Cossé Bell emphasizes these factors as she analyzes a major theater

of the socio-racial changes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As usual in works on Louisiana, she calls primarily on New Orleans to represent the entire colony and state, and her emphasis is on the background and leadership of that city's mixed Creole elite.

The impact of revolutions elsewhere—British America, France, and Haiti—upon Louisiana is by no means a neglected aspect of Louisiana history. Bell, however, carries Louisiana's interpretation of those revolutionary ideas and spirit into the Civil War and Reconstruction that triggered the region's first significant changes. From there, it is easier to see how those ideas culminated in the famous separate-but-equal doctrine of *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) and the civil rights movement of the twentieth century. Bell presents the free person of color, who is more commonly portrayed as "the man in the middle" without much influence, as a proactive citizen who took revolutionary ideas seriously and struggled to advance his class in Louisiana's tri-racial system.

The historical setting is well presented. Certainly, Louisiana's status as a pawn of war and peace contributed to opportunities there for protest. Shifted, as it was, from France to Spain, then back to France, and finally to the United States, the region did not lack for situations in which the Creole elite could take action. Traditionally permitted to serve in the military and in a position to influence the balance of power between slaves and masters, they saw and used an edge to assert their own rights and demands.

What might he termed "outside influences" or "intellectual impact" is really Bell's major theme. Separate chapters explore literary romanticism, spiritualism, and Freemasonry. These influences provided the intellectual basis for an important chapter in the history of civil rights in the United States, even though *Plessy v. Ferguson* would be a setback to the aspirations of activists. The romantic movement was French-language based and due in large measure to waves of refugees washed into Louisiana by decades of revolution in France. Rebellious spirits alienated by a conservative trend in the Catholic Church sought refuge in spiritualism, a movement that denigrated orthodoxy and emphasized personal empowerment—traits suited to the rebel intellect. Freemasonry, of course, was revolutionary within itself; in New Orleans as in France, it had extensive ties to the elements promoting radical ideas. These intellectual influences combined with the larger socio-political climate of the United States to create conditions for social change.

One slight problem is evident in terminology used for the racially mixed population of Louisiana. The nonwhites under discussion are, overwhelmingly, the prosperous mixed-race elite. This class should not be referred to generically as "black." In their tri-racial society, they did not consider themselves black. Although twentieth-century ideologists might attempt to shoehorn all African-American classes into the same group, doing so warps the reality of eighteenth and

nineteenth-century ideology and obscures the nuances that heavily influenced the lives of those involved. Admittedly, terminology is difficult to manage in discussions of Louisiana; but the distinctions among black, brown, and tan (not to mention red) are not maintained here as clearly as history needs them to be.

Bell's work is important to understanding both Louisiana and the development of civil rights in the United States. Traditionally, scholars have assigned a marginal, albeit interesting, role to "free people of color" in pre-twentieth-century America. Yet, as Bell demonstrates, the efforts of this class to assert its rights were important steps toward the larger civil rights movement of the 1960s.

GARY B. MILLS

University of Alabama

JENNY BOURNE WAHL, *The Bondsman's Burden: An Economic Analysis of the Common Law of Southern Slavery*. (Cambridge Historical Studies in American Law and Society.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 277. \$49.95.

Charting a new route across familiar terrain, Jenny Bourne Wahl employs economic and legal theory to argue that southern jurists stamped a mark of economic efficiency on the common law of slavery. Taking her cue from scholars of the law, she maintains that "legal disputes are resolved efficiently when costs of dispute resolution are minimized, legal liabilities go to parties who can bear them at least cost, and legal entitlements go to those who value them most" (p. 2). By virtue of its focus "primarily on outcomes and incentives rather than on the underlying motives of judges" (p. 3), this definition has merit. But its twin assumption, "that the costs of legal rules to those affected most—the slaves—simply did not matter," displays a level of callousness that she concedes appears "heartless," even "noxious" (pp. 3, 9).

Wahl's case for economic efficiency rests upon approximately 11,000 appellate cases involving slave law heard in the southern states between 1787 and 1875; the bulk of these originated in the antebellum period and half in the four states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana. Wahl develops her thesis around the themes that preoccupied the litigants: disputes originating from the sale, transfer, and hire of slaves and from losses slaveholders sustained at the hands of common carriers, government officials, and other third parties. She finds remarkable uniformity in the rulings across space and time, from the Carolinas to Louisiana and from early in the nineteenth century through the Civil War. Not surprisingly, given her neoclassical theoretical orientation, she observes that the rulings "steered people toward the marketplace" (p. 7).

Readers who do not share this bias may cast a skeptical eye on her approach, but they will overlook this book at their peril. Parallel to Wahl's arguments on the law of slavery run astute comparisons with

broadier trends in the evolution of the common law in the free states of the antebellum North and in the nation as a whole in the period since the Civil War. "The common law of slavery," she concludes, "whether it concerned the sale, hiring, transport, or injury of a slave, looks more like modern-day commercial, employment, tort, and family law than nineteenth-century law" (p. 9).

Southern jurists willingly accommodated slaveholders' claims for intervention in matters touching the fundamental institution of their society. Wahl properly attributes this meeting of the minds to the fact that the disputants in slave cases were almost always property owners whose claims the courts took seriously. By way of contrast, the aggrieved yet propertyless employees, passengers on common carriers, and wives and children in the free states stood little chance of persuading northern courts to act on their behalf. In such circumstances, the peculiar flavor of the common law of slavery may have derived as much from proslavery ideology as from a preference for market-mediated solutions to legal disputes. There was more than a kernel of truth to the ideologues' claim that slave society protected its dependent classes whereas the nominally free northern states left them defenseless before their wealthy and powerful countrymen.

When, after the Civil War, northern jurists began ruling in favor of persons without property, they did so cautiously and only in response to broader social pressures. Wahl finds that they often drew on rulings in antebellum slave cases as precedents. If at first striking, this connection also makes eminently sound sense. Because slaves stood before the law as both persons and property, antebellum southern jurists had wrestled with a broad range of issues associated with assessing liability in common law cases. In one of its many "unintended consequences," slave law provided the foundation for "[m]any of the principles that we now consider standard, particularly in personal-injury disputes" (p. 177).

In light of the range and depth of these insights, it is particularly regrettable that Wahl dismisses so casually the slaves' stake in the cases. The point is not to resurrect the ghost of monetary reparation. But it is to recognize that the actions of slaves—not merely their status as property—often prompted the owners' to resort to law in the first place. From that perspective, the "legacy of legal doctrines that eventually served the interests of ordinary Americans" (p. 178) derives not only from the judges' rulings but also from what the slaves as well as their masters and the other disputants thought and said and did. That caveat notwithstanding, scholars of slavery and of the law will find this an original and thought-provoking work.

JOSEPH P. REIDY  
Howard University

DAVID GRIMSTED. *American Mobbing, 1828–1861: Toward Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xx, 372. \$65.00.

This book, covering the antebellum years, has been long in the making, but it proves to be well worth the wait. Thanks to careful and extensive research, David Grimsted provides convincing conclusions about the differences between the riots and lawless public conduct in the free states and those in the slave South. The author has relatively little to offer regarding anti-Catholicism and assaults on Irish immigrants and workers. Despite strong ethnic and religious tensions throughout the period, he justly stresses instead the struggle over African-American slavery. Constraints of space and current interest in racial history doubtless explain the choice. In the North, anti-abolitionism often included vicious attacks on free black communities. In the South—no surprise here—defense of bondage quickly brought whites into the streets.

Although the same sorts of riots might occur in both regions, Grimsted's account finds markedly divergent features in mob action. With 1835 as the sectional dividing line, he shows that the abolitionists' ambitious campaign that summer set the stage for continual conflict. The postal enterprise ignited southern outrage and widespread northern opposition. Thereafter, Grimsted argues, two separate patterns emerged in the increasingly contentious sections. He proposes that the differences consisted of "the distinction between property and person as focus of attack, the number of deaths, the situation of those who died in riot, the actions of officials, and the differing quotients of sadism" (p. 13). Southern riots were responsible for eight times the number of fatalities that occurred in the North. Moreover, the Yankees who met their deaths were most often rioters killed during restorations of order. In the South, however, those who died were generally victims of grisly mob executions.

No less important, as Grimsted concludes, the northern states set much stricter limits on mob action than southern communities did. Riots, he points out, cannot materialize if communities oppose them. Sometimes throngs challenged municipal authority, but if judges exercised their powers to the fullest, they usually repressed the most infamous atrocities. With a stronger sense of professionalism, northern judges were more likely to do so than their southern counterparts, who ordinarily surrendered to local opinion. As a result, the assassins of individuals stigmatized by popular outcry seldom appeared before the bench in a slave state. If indicted, they were soon set free by the justices or acquitted by the juries. As the Border Ruffians of the Kansas Territory declared in the turbulent 1850s, everyone was expected to be "sound on the goose question." That is, no one violated racial custom in any fashion except at considerable peril.

Grimsted's account is not free from interpretive deficiencies. For unexplained reasons, the author does not categorize some of the mob actions (chiefly southern) as lynchings. Sometimes even judges themselves were subject to attack for rendering unpopular decisions—as one justice was during the Mississippi insurrection scare of 1835. The reason for raising the topic

is that some scholars claim murderous lynch law to have been strictly a post-Civil War phenomenon. Tragically, it was not, as Grimsted's own descriptions of mobbings attest. Moreover, Grimsted mocks the notion that the code of honor figured much in outbreaks of public violence. He asserts rather awkwardly, "the recent kettle of Southern violence features a dash of bloodily Celtic or Sicilian spice in the older Sir Walter Scott stew" (p. 86). Contrary to his gratuitous oversimplification, mob action, at least in the South, could become almost religious in character. The purpose was to sacrifice an alleged offender against community values or racial rules as a means to exorcize aberrant behavior and thereby cleanse the polity. Charivari or shivaree, to use the anglicized term, receives no notice. Yet, forcing victims to ride rails, whipping them unmercifully, or tarring and feathering them were not so rare occurrences as their absence from Grimsted's index might suggest. In addition, he oddly finds John Brown's murderousness in Kansas unexceptional, as if mutilation of the corpses at Pottawatomie were a common feature of American violence. Although not himself guilty of committing the offense, Brown, as leader, held the responsibility. In dealing with Brown's emotional life, Grimsted seems unaware of the complexities involved. The author betrays a lack of anthropological and psychological sophistication.

Nonetheless, Grimsted's materials are superb both statistically and descriptively. Apart from the criticisms mentioned, this book is the fullest study of American public violence likely to appear for many years ahead. It deserves careful study by scholars, students, and general readers. The book brilliantly illuminates just how violent our social order once was—and, unhappily, continues to be.

BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN  
University of Florida

CHARLES M. HUBBARD, *The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1998. Pp. xvii, 253. \$38.00.

The failure of Confederate diplomacy during the American Civil War has been the subject of debate for more than one hundred and thirty years. Charles M. Hubbard's excellent study offers succinct yet thorough insight into Southern diplomatic problems and questions at the center of that debate.

Too often, the debate has been fueled by students isolating and homing in on the pros and cons of specific aspects of Civil War diplomacy to the neglect of the total efforts of all the players and factors involved. For Hubbard, however, there is little ground for debate.

Confederate diplomacy, which sought both European recognition and intervention, was flawed from the beginning because it focused on the inaccurate assumption that cotton was king in Europe as it was in the southern states. Their singular faith in cotton did not allow members of the Confederacy to take into

account the diverse economy and political stability in Great Britain. Their narrow view reflected a southern appreciation of the commodity rather than its value to Europeans.

Yet, it is difficult to compare Hubbard's work with Frank L. Owsley's definitive study, *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America* (1936). Although Hubbard agrees with Owsley's conclusions, he does not endeavor to duplicate the latter's exhaustive, classic study. His scope is much more limited. He does not include an in-depth analysis of Confederate trade. Instead, Hubbard has produced a masterful narrative and evaluation of the diplomatic burdens with which the southern leadership struggled.

Where the federal diplomatic team of President Abraham Lincoln, Secretary of State William H. Seward, and Minister to England Charles Francis Adams was creative and flexible, the southern diplomatic team of President Jefferson Davis, a series of secretaries of state, and inept ministers in Europe remained stubbornly determined to use cotton to force European cooperation.

Hubbard advances seven reasons for this inflexibility in the southern cotton diplomacy: they futilely counted on a British government response to their unemployed textile workers who, in reality, were not a large enough voting bloc to vote officials out of office; they miscalculated that the British economy was overwhelmingly dependent on Southern cotton; they errantly thought that New England commercial and banking interests were dependent on the southern cotton trade and would force the Lincoln administration to accept peaceful coexistence; they mistakenly believed that British material interests would override their antislavery and free trade principles; they failed to understand their own vulnerability to a slowdown in the cotton trade; Confederate diplomats failed to take advantage of British neutrality but instead continued to demand intervention; and southern diplomats overlooked the potential weakness within Seward's strategy and failed to exploit the opportunity to identify Seward as a manipulator attempting further to divide the British and French.

Hubbard briefly reviews the Confederate efforts with the Indians of the trans-Mississippi territories, Henry Hotze's work in Europe, the Henri Mercer mission to France, the Matamoros trade, the Caleb Huse and Baron Elmire Erlanger loan efforts, the Laird Rams dispute, and the failed Duncan F. Kenner mission.

This book is of interest and importance to both the scholar and casual reader of Civil War history. Hubbard has pulled together an excellent bibliography including the classics as well as the latest sources on the subject. He has included a good selection of documents and manuscripts. Both his bibliography and notes reflect a thoroughly researched monograph. His



interpretation is solid, well supported, and touches all of the major aspects of Confederate diplomacy.

JAMES W. DADDYSMAN  
*Alderson-Broadbush College*

RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL. *Grass-Roots Reconstruction in Texas, 1865–1888*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 251. \$35.00.

Hoping, in part, to disabuse Texans of their belief that Reconstruction was “one of the darkest pages in their state’s history” (p. 232), Randolph B. Campbell detailed six county histories to show how Reconstruction issues “came home to people at the local level” (p. 1). In so far as Campbell demonstrates that Reconstruction meant “progress” to many groups, while not generally displacing old economic elites, he does a convincing job. This well-documented study shows that the impact Reconstruction had on the lives of people at the grass roots varied considerably, depending on many local factors. Despite this variety, however, Reconstruction was “largely democratic” and “non-revolutionary” for the freedpeople. While perhaps not revolutionary, Reconstruction “contained much that was positive” (pp. 230–31).

To achieve his purposes, Campbell proceeds county by county, presenting a chronological history of the six Texas counties he selected as representative of the different regions across the state. Politically, Campbell provides a detailed account of who ran in and who won each election held in the counties from 1865–1880, with as much biographical information as he could find; who got appointed and removed from office during each Reconstruction period; the percentage of each population group registered at different times; and the successes of the different political parties, along with an attempt to explain these successes and failures by examining factionalism within the ranks. Although he provides rich detail of political races and leaders, Campbell rarely talks of policies and programs. He often labels political leaders “conservative,” “liberal,” and “radical” but fails to give the reader any sense of what it would mean if a “liberal” won over a “radical” in terms of policies and programs. Moreover, Campbell fails to discuss how, if at all, blacks were able to translate their majorities at the polls into meaningful programs to help them improve their lives.

Beyond this political history, Campbell provides the reader with a sketch of grass-roots life. Economically, Campbell details the increase in property taxes in each county under Republican rule. He does an excellent job of explaining why taxes increased, detailing the cost of free public education, railroad subsidies, repair of roads and bridges, and the like. But the reader finds little about the economic life of individuals at the grass roots. Relying solely on the 1880 census, Campbell lists the percentage of freedpeople farming and how much property each owned. Relying on the same source, he also shows the persistence of the economic elite in each county. But when using the census, Campbell

focuses solely on those engaged in farming. Even in Harrison County, a heavily rural county, this focus raises questions. Campbell reports that sixty-two percent of Harrison County blacks engaged in farming. Sixty-two percent for a “heavily” rural county seems quite low. What did the other thirty-eight percent do? Were they unemployed? Did they hold jobs in urban areas? For Jefferson County, the figures tell us even less. In that county, only fourteen black household heads engaged in farming. Almost three-quarters of the black population lived and worked in Beaumont. While Campbell lists their occupations, he provides no information on their wealth or economic independence.

Finally, while Campbell concludes that blacks throughout Texas “worked . . . to improve their economic status and stabilize basic social institutions” (p. 230), he provides little evidence. Again relying only on figures from the 1880 census, he lists how many black children attended some school and the percentage of blacks living in nuclear families. We know nothing about black fraternal organizations, churches, schools, celebrations, or any other community institutions. We also know little about the personal security and legal rights of blacks. Campbell does examine the impact the Freedmen’s Bureau had during the times soldiers were present in each county, summarizing the level of violence and mistreatment against freedpeople and Unionists that the Bureau’s agents reported. But Campbell rarely uses court records to examine the type of crimes blacks and whites were arrested for and the quality of justice blacks could expect. For example, did the level of justice improve once blacks could serve on juries?

Although H. Carl Moneyhon’s *Republicanism in Reconstruction Texas* (1980) and William L. Richter’s *The Army in Texas During Reconstruction 1865–1870* (1987) fill in some of the gaps about party policies, the position of various factions, and attitudes toward the military and the level of violence that plagued the state, the economic and social history of Texas still needs to be written.

ROBERTA SUE ALEXANDER  
*University of Dayton*

CANTER BROWN, JR. *Florida’s Black Public Officials, 1867–1924*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 252. Cloth \$44.95, paper \$22.50.

Undeterred by complaints about the dearth of sources, imaginative and persistent scholars have located more and more of the materials necessary for the recovery of the African-American past. One of these scholars is Canter Brown, Jr. He is the author of several earlier books on Florida history, including a biography of the Reconstruction governor Ossian Bingley Hart, from which his new book evolved.

Brown’s book begins with a short, five-chapter narrative. In Republican factional politics, the first black politicians were Baptist ministers, more militant Afri-



can Methodist Episcopal (AME) ministers, and army veterans, the last group usually born in other states. In the early 1870s, an African-American revolt against carpetbag manipulation produced the election of a black congressman and a friendly white governor. The heyday of black politics occurred during the brief administration of Hart, who died a little over a year after he was inaugurated as governor in 1873. After the Democrats reestablished their control over Florida's state government in 1877, fewer and fewer blacks were elected to the legislature, and very few were appointed to state or county offices. Despite this disaster, it was probably during the post-Reconstruction period that a majority of Florida's black office holders served. There was no quick surrender to intimidation and disenfranchisement. Competing with whites, blacks succeeded in getting elected to town and city offices until the turn of the century, indeed, in isolated cases as late as 1924.

Stuffed with names and squabbles, Brown's narrative of black politics and office holding is too concise for easy reading, and it would benefit from more comparative context. But its clear themes, abundant detail, and command of the sources guarantee that it will remain the standard account for many years.

More important than Brown's narrative (and longer) is his biographical directory, the core of this composite book. The biographical directory covers many more years than does Eric Foner's pioneering *Freedom's Lawmakers: A Directory of Black Officeholders during Reconstruction* (1993). It also describes about ten times as many elected and appointed Florida officials as those depicted in Foner's less specialized book. Brown's biographical sketches vary from a terse single line to over half a page and sometimes are accompanied by pictures. As anyone who has tried to find basic biographical information for even a handful of such officeholders will gladly attest, the amount of research invested in Brown's six hundred biographies is awesome. (Compare, for instance, his account of Joseph E. Lee with Foner's.) Brown also provides a useful appendix listing office holders by political subdivision. His path-breaking research on Florida's black public officials should serve as a wake-up call for historians of states with larger black populations.

DAVID M. FAHEY  
Miami University

PHILIP SCRANTON, *Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv, 415. \$39.50.

In this book, Philip Scranton meaningfully relates such diverse phenomena as the fraternal "shop culture" of mid-nineteenth-century machine shops, the style-conscious consumerism spawned by the manufacture and sale of downmarket jewelry and upscale furniture around the turn of the century, the federal government's shaping of mandated accounting standards and forbidden trade-governance tactics by the 1920s, and much else. Scranton's achievement builds on his ear-

lier monographs, *Proprietary Capitalism: The Textile Manufacture at Philadelphia 1800-1885* (1983) and *Figured Tapestry: Production Markets, and Power in Philadelphia Textiles, 1885-1941* (1989). There, Scranton treated Philadelphia's labor, social, business, urban, and technological histories as a unified industrial history. Here, he extends this approach to a range of industries and a set of cities stretching from Providence to Philadelphia and west to Chicago. This carefully researched, theoretically informed, and imaginatively structured book will command a broad readership.

Scranton's central aim is to establish the strength, vitality, and significance of specialty production as conducted by small and large firms. Three sections based on national census data (1890, 1909, 1923) make a powerful claim that specialty manufacturing accounted for perhaps half of the national's total value added in manufacturing (p. 17), an equal share of employment, and economic growth second to none. Biographies of individual entrepreneurs, their firms and associations, and the associated development of industrial districts anchor this volume. Scranton illuminates topics that have found favor recently among business historians, especially those going beyond Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.'s writings on managerial capitalism and the rise of big business.

Since specialty production formats were deployed by smaller textile firms, medium-size machinery manufactures, and even industrial giants like Baldwin Locomotive and Pullman, Scranton rejects such commonplace labels as "core" and "periphery," or big and small business. More fundamental than size, he finds, was a set of specialist strategies quite distinct from the rationalization and standardization strategies that dominated the mass-production industries. Instead of price competition driven by technology-fanned economies of speed and scale, specialists in furniture, textiles, and machine building adopted business strategies to limit price competition by keeping consumers focused on quality, style, and product innovation.

Endless novelty was not a formula for success, however, but a format for competition. Scranton's close attention to the interconnections between the designing, manufacturing, marketing, wholesaling, and retailing of goods allows him to identify where the quest for endless novelty led to falling prices, falling profits, unstable employment, and industrial misery (the fate of downmarket jewelry makers in the Providence region and, somewhat later, of textile manufacturers in Philadelphia) and where specialist strategies led to prosperous firms, steady employment, and sustained regional development. Manufacturers' capacities for collective action, typically on a regional rather than national basis, figure in most of the successes. Specialist manufactures might sponsor annual expositions to showcase novel goods and span the gap between manufacturers and buyers (as in Grand Rapids furniture), or they might sponsor labor exchanges to fill their own immediate needs and ensure that

valuable skilled workers remained in the district (as in Cincinnati machine building). Lobbying governments, fighting unions, and forming manufacturers' associations rounded out their collective actions. Less common were successful efforts to replenish skilled labor through educational initiatives, such as Worcester's Polytechnic Institute, the University of Cincinnati's pioneering cooperative courses, and Philadelphia's Textile School.

Scranton's richly textured studies of selected industries and cities can stand on their own (his footnotes are a gold mine). Yet his placing of these case studies in a comprehensive framework is even more impressive. At the core is Scranton's attempt to understand the dynamics of industrial districts (following leads gathered from Alfred Marshall, Jane Jacobs, and recent work in historical geography). To understand these dynamics, Scranton proposes three sets of typologies: for manufacturing formats (specialty, batch, bulk, and mass production), industrial districts, and specialist firms. The last, four-part typology does the most work. "Integrated anchors" were typically large, self-contained firms that practiced specialist strategies. Philadelphia's Baldwin Locomotive, Chicago's Pullman, and Providence's upmarket Gorham Silver had the in-house resources to stand alone; some anchors, like Cincinnati's Lodge and Shipley, fostered numerous start-up firms. "Network specialists" relied on the collective resources of an industrial district to achieve the range of technical competencies needed in that specific sector. In his earlier studies, Scranton found that Philadelphia textile manufacturers practiced an alternative to New England's Lowell-style mills, which vertically integrated the processes of carding, spinning, and weaving cotton textiles, putting them literally under one roof. Network specialists instead relied on contracting for the necessary tasks; the result was a spatially compact production format adaptable to rapid changes in output and style. Smaller, often highly focused "specialist auxiliaries" provided essential products and services. For instance, Manhattan's publishers and printers relied on auxiliary book binders, type foundries, engravers, and lithographers. "Bridge firms" spanned custom and bulk production. Significantly, both General Electric and Westinghouse maintained separate facilities for making staple goods (light bulbs) and custom goods (electrical machinery).

This volume presents a coherent and compelling alternative to the studies of managerial capitalism and big business that have so dominated business history. Greater attention to the specialist-format underpinnings of the classic "mass production" industries would have strengthened Scranton's efforts to "recast the history of the Second Industrial Revolution" (pp. 3, 6–8, 354). I suspect that the blending of custom and batch work (as in "bridge firms") was surprisingly important for the chemical, automobile, petroleum, and steel industries.

THOMAS J. MISA  
*Illinois Institute of Technology*

TIMOTHY MESSER-KRUSE. *The Yankee International: Marxism and the American Reform Tradition, 1848–1876*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 319. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$18.95.

Nearly a century ago, Werner Sombart asked, "Why is there no socialism in the United States?" Sombart and historians following his lead have rightly pointed to the effects of racial, ethnic, and religious divisiveness, waves of immigration, high living standards, the two-party system, the ideal of social mobility, liberal democracy, and outright repression of organized labor. Without dismissing their significance, Timothy Messer-Kruse interestingly turns from these broader issues to the internecine wrangling among American radicals. His case study focuses on the International Workingman's Party, whose troubled existence from 1864–1874 foreshadowed much of the ideological discord that continues to bedevil the American left.

With a solid grounding in primary sources, Messer-Kruse argues that the American reform tradition and European Marxism were ultimately antagonistic despite common concerns. The diverse cultural agenda of the former was often at odds with the single-minded theoretical imperative of the latter. Antebellum reform in the United States by 1850 embraced a diffused egalitarianism, which contemporaries called a sisterhood of reforms. Often configured together were abolitionism, temperance, feminism, spiritualism, vegetarianism, hydrotherapy, educational innovation, land reform, anticlericalism, and various utopian inclinations. Many paths, it was thought, led to the same destination. A core value was the sovereignty of the individual, an inheritance with republican, liberal, and antinomian roots. The failure of moral suasion alone, however, to eradicate social evils by midcentury led many reformers to turn to government to correct abuses, whether in personal liberty laws, temperance legislation, divorce reform, debtor relief, regulation of life insurance, or creation of asylums.

American reformers brought a distinct perspective to their understanding of economic equality, workers' rights, and industrial capitalism. By 1870, labor agitators, such as the New Democrats in Manhattan, drew on this heritage to call for the government to ensure justice, democracy, and equality in the market place. The radical synthesis of individual rights and economic security was a form of state socialism. The new agenda had a broad appeal, from Yankees who joined the First International to members of Nationalist Clubs spurred by Edward Bellamy's utopian novel *Looking Backward* (1888) and supporters of Henry George's single-tax plan. The language was not that of class struggle, proletariat revolution, and dialectic materialism. Instead the formulation was in the American idiom of the producer ethic, Christian perfectionism, republicanism, racial justice, and sexual equality. The Yankee component of the International Workingman's Party, Messer-Kruse argues, "expressed the possibilities in-

herent in the rooting of socialist thought in the American reform tradition" (p. 187).

What went wrong was the procrustean alteration of American conditions to fit a rigid Marxist orthodoxy. German immigrants led by Friedrich Sorge sought (with Karl Marx's blessing) to impose an alien blueprint on the New World. "The Germans there have made a grievous mistake," Friedrich Engels later realized, "when they tried in the face of a mighty and glorious movement not of their own creation, to make of their imported and not always understood theory a kind of *alleinseligmachendes* [the one true path of salvation] and to keep aloof from any movement which did not accept that dogma" (p. 254).

Almost comically, Marxists insisted that recent Irish immigrants were the vanguard of the American proletariat while discounting native-born white and black workers, who were far more numerous and well rooted in the native soil. The leadership of Victoria Woodhull and her sister Tennessee Claflin in the Yankee International outraged as much as it befuddled the Germans, as did their accompanying demands for feminism, free love, freethought, political action, and racial equality. Sorge eventually purged the movement of what he dismissed as bourgeois adventurism. According to scientific materialism, the road to revolution was precisely set. The problems of gender and race would be resolved only after the economic contradictions in capitalism had been overcome through revolutionary action. In Marxist jargon, Americans had perversely put the cart (superstructure) before the horse (base). Practical Yankees, however, failed to appreciate such theoretical nicety. Instead they viewed the Sorgean faction as intolerant and despotic.

The impasse between Yankee radicals and German Marxists in the First International left a confused legacy for the American left. While Americans were pragmatic and eclectic, Germans were rigid and doctrinaire. The former acted on moral principles; the latter on *a priori* assumptions. The one upheld republican and democratic ideals; the other was distrustful of anything bourgeois. Both sought to empower workers, but each failed to rally labor to its cause. Issues of race, gender, and broad-scale organizing versus narrow trade unionism played out during the late nineteenth century as the exclusive American Federation of Labor eclipsed the inclusive Knights of Labor. "In the final analysis," Messer-Kruse persuasively writes, "the breakup of the First International in America resulted from the collision of a carload of imported Marxist theories of social change, government, and human nature with the equally heavy freight of fifty years of belief accumulated by successive native reform movements" (p. 133). The cultural wars and identity politics that currently fragment the American left make this well-wrought book all the more cogent.

LAWRENCE B. GOODHEART  
University of Connecticut,  
Hartford

JULIE GREENE. *Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 1881-1917*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 293. \$47.95.

Not long ago, it was popular to equate the early American Federation of Labor (AFL) with "pure and simple unionism," which scorned politics and government in favor of economic action. The problem with this association (which became an excuse for textbook authors to write off the labor movement as a force in American political life) was that it was often misleading. Studies of Progressive-era reforms have documented the role of unions and organized workers in crafting labor laws and other legislative measures. In fact, most of these efforts would not have succeeded without union support; union opposition almost always spelled defeat. Earlier historians, it seems, had taken the anti-government pronouncements of AFL president Samuel Gompers as policy, forgetting that the AFL was a federation of autonomous organizations and that it embraced an extraordinary spectrum of individuals, including many who did not share Gompers's views. In recent years, it has become apparent that even Gompers's pronouncements are not a reliable guide to his behavior. Like most people, he changed his mind and became at times a devoted advocate of political action, including partisan alliances. Melvyn Dubofsky sketched the big picture in *The State and Labor in Modern America* (1994). Julie Greene focuses on Gompers and his immediate circle during the years when they became enthusiastic Democrats.

Although Greene's subtitle lists 1881 as her starting date, the early chapters are mostly summaries of secondary works and add little to what is already available (and perhaps less: the mid-1890 conflict between Gompers and John McBride of the United Mine Workers, which was partly rooted in divergent attitudes toward political action, rates only a fleeting reference in this account). The narrative really begins in 1906, with the AFL under attack from the open shop National Association of Manufacturers, which had close ties to the Republican Party. Union leaders were accustomed to hostile employers but now faced organized, hostile employers and an increasingly formidable business-government alliance. Desperate for a response, Gompers abandoned his traditional non-partisan approach to politics (really anti-partisan, as Greene emphasizes) for a counter-alliance with the Democrats. The decrepit Democratic Party was receptive. After repeated defeats, Democratic leaders sought to assemble a coalition of outsiders. Organized labor was an obvious candidate.

Greene's best chapters examine the new Gompers strategy during and after the 1908 presidential election. Having abandoned non-partisanship, Gompers threw the AFL's resources into the Bryan campaign. The voluminous AFL papers permit a blow-by-blow account of the union contribution. They also document

the multitude of controversies it generated. Many unions and union members had long-standing ties to the Republican or Socialist parties or were genuinely devoted to non-partisan political action. Others simply objected to dictation from the top. Republicans exploited these disagreements, and the Democratic campaign floundered. Yet the AFL-Democratic link persisted. Gompers continued to endorse and support Democratic candidates, but with greater circumspection and fewer resources.

In the 1910s, Democratic fortunes revived and the AFL rode to victory with Woodrow Wilson. The results were mixed. Gompers became a close advisor to the president but failed to obtain meaningful anti-injunction legislation (the AFL's top legislative goal) and achieved relatively little else until 1916, when Wilson embraced labor legislation in order to attract Progressive voters. By that time Gompers was increasingly overshadowed by Frank Walsh, the pro-union head of the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations. Yet he, too, was dependent on Wilson, whose interest in labor issues was wholly self-serving. After World War I, the president and his administration became as hostile to workers and unions as they had been supportive in earlier years. By the early 1920s, Gompers's pro-Democratic policy was as discredited as non-partisanship had been in 1906.

In essence, then, the AFL's "pure and simple politics" defied easy summary or convenient labels. Federation policy was expedient, practical, and inconsistent. Still, there is a larger theme. Apart from much useful detail, Greene has documented a gradual, often painful realization among union leaders that the health of their organizations depended on government policy and hence, on political activity. This was a lesson that many of them did not forget, even in the dark days of the 1920s. Greene's description of this important transition is a valuable addition to the history of organized labor.

DANIEL NELSON  
University of Akron

DANIEL LETWIN. *The Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 1878-1921*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 289. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$19.95.

Daniel Letwin's book contributes significantly to our understanding of how the issues of class and race mingled to shape unionization efforts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his study of Alabama coal miners, Letwin ably articulates the complexity of this interaction and its impact on worker resistance to employer control. Using the Birmingham coal mining district as his focal point, he examines to what extent union organizers and the workers stepped past racial and social constraints in the New South and cooperated within the context of an occupational/class sense of unity.

Letwin points out that organizers recognized that

ethnic and racial division within the ranks could destroy any attempt to unite workers. Thus, they made every effort to stymie operator strategies to use the race issue to wreak havoc within the miners' unions. The operators' employment of black strikebreakers time and time again made this a necessity. Letwin goes on to argue, however, that the miners took this strategy only so far; in numerous ways they continued to function within the white supremacy tradition. The segregated nature of many union locals, the predominance of white miners in leadership roles (even within largely black locals), and the stereotyping of blacks in union/labor publications demonstrated the latter. Simply put, the miners' interracialism was very complicated, qualifying as both "bold" and "adaptable" (p. 7). In an intriguing argument, Letwin takes this position a step further, suggesting that the male-dominated nature of the mining occupation removed the complication, at least underground, of the supposed sexual threat that white supremacists claimed black men posed to white women. This may have lessened anxiety about integrated working situations.

Historiographically, Letwin's work is one of numerous studies completed in the last thirty years that have identified racial accommodation in union activities. Timber workers in eastern Texas and Louisiana, waterfront workers on the Gulf Coast, and miners from Texas to Appalachia collaborated across racial lines to fight employer control. This cooperation often gave the appearance of expediency, as organizers knew that employers were likely to play the race card. Recent historical debate on this topic has moved beyond the issue of motivation to the questions of long-term resiliency, consequences, and the depth of interracial unionism. In the last decade, a number of scholars have criticized the Herbert Gutman-inspired labor history that emerged in the 1960s for overlooking the blatant reality of racism within union ranks that working-class solidarity could not breach. Even those who have defended the Gutman school on this count have not plumbed the deep ambiguity and complexity of organizers' appeals to class over race. Letwin's examination of mining in the Birmingham area fills the gap between the two positions.

As he describes events around Birmingham's coal district, Letwin refers to similar conditions in other parts of the South but does not mention Texas, which also experienced the kind of New South thinking that brought coal mining to an area deep in the throes of white supremacist thought. In that state's north central bituminous coal vein, a similar reality of boldness and adaptation existed. Despite the periodic importation of black strikebreakers during early labor unrest there, no major racial disturbances occurred. In 1889, the Knights of Labor failed to halt the introduction of black strikebreakers, but a third of those miners later refused to enter the mines and joined the Knights of Labor. In 1894, law officers arrested several men as they shared drinks in a saloon with a group of black miners whom they were attempting to recruit as union



members. Organizers who infiltrated work sites included at least one black man who with several white cohorts conducted a secret meeting inside a camp, urging the miners to strike. In 1903, when the United Mine Workers successfully organized workers in the area, the miners established a relief committee that included blacks. Black miners even joined the same two United Mine Worker locals to which whites belonged. These, interestingly enough, were divided along ethnic lines, one being referred to as the Italian local. Blacks and whites both joined this group and even elected a black president at one time. Bold as these acts were, however, segregated housing, schooling, fraternal orders, religious services, and amusements still limited interracial contact after work.

Letwin makes a compelling argument in an engaging writing style. He has done a good job of capturing the essence of coal mining as an occupation and the multiethnic as well as multiracial make-up of those who populated it. He relies extensively on newspapers but utilizes a wide variety of both local and labor presses. Above all, he has accomplished the commendable goal of "evaluat[ing] the actions of southern workers, black and white, against the circumstances of their own world" (p. 192). Such "historical empathy," as he terms it, is simply, in the end, more truthful (p. 193). Local studies like Letwin's will continue to enrich and deepen our understanding of worker behavior in the union movement's formative years.

MARILYN D. RHINEHART

*Johnson County Community College*

MADELON POWERS. *Faces Along the Bar: Lore and Order in the Workingman's Saloon, 1870-1920*. (Historical Studies of Urban America.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 323. \$25.00.

Perhaps no American institution has been more misunderstood than the saloon. In its heyday from 1870 to 1920, drys depicted the saloon as the door to Hell, host to every known debauchery, while wets portrayed the saloon as the poor man's club, refuge to the working man in a harsh world. These debates have erected barriers to later generations' understanding of the saloon or even their recognition that it was an important institution. Yet, the saloon was one of the great institutions in the lives of working people in Gilded Age and Progressive-era America. Like other institutions of the time—sporting spectacles, political machines, trades unions, and business corporations—it was ubiquitous. A glance at the maps that Madelon Powers reproduces showing saloon density in 1894 New York and San Francisco demonstrates the prevalence of the saloon in working people's neighborhoods (opposite p. 156).

Powers, whose sympathies are with the wets, has not written an after-the-fact apology for the saloon. Rather, she has produced an insightful study of the different dimensions of saloon culture in working-class life. Her book builds on work of previous scholars such

as Roy Rosenzweig, Perry Duis, Thomas Noel, and Elliott West, who have explored some of the ways in which the saloon functioned in working people's lives during the era of American industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and commercialization. Unlike earlier scholars, Powers looks at saloons from all across the nation and focuses on the salongoers themselves. She shifts the focus from the business of saloonkeeping and the saloon's relations with the outer world to focus on what went on inside saloon doors. Drawing on diverse sources, she explores the community that salongoers built around drinking.

Central to her argument is what she calls the dual nature of the saloon; saloons were both "brotherly and businesslike, both communal and commercial" (p. 22). These commercial enterprises thrived only by catering to the communal aspirations of their clientele. Powers argues that saloons were appealing to their patrons because they offered their regulars—who usually were young, single, working-class men—a place where they could reaffirm their masculine worth by displays of camaraderie.

The crucial social ritual of saloon life was clubbing. Whether they were at the bar in a spontaneously formed group, at a table with a group of regulars, or in the back room with a organized group, the drinkers employed drinking traditions designed to promote sociability. Clubbing was accomplished in two main ways: first by treating, buying a drink for someone else; and second by collection, when a group of people pooled their money to buy liquor for their group. These actions built and reaffirmed group solidarity, but they also had a commercial side: for every treat a man received, he was expected to return the favor, and in collecting money to be spent in a certain way, drinkers made, in essence, a contract. The "rite of the club was the engine that made saloonlife go" (p. 133) by harnessing sociability to the money-making aspects of the saloon.

Beyond drinking, patrons of saloons did other things that reinforced the social nature of saloon life: they gamed, they gave voice, they ate. The men who gathered in saloons bet on sporting events and played games, especially games like cards that mixed competition, chance, and camaraderie. Salongoers also engaged in talk, storytelling, and singing. Two aspects of these vocal activities are key: first, they were the customers' own; and second, the saloon created a space where men could engage freely in these activities. Salongoers, in effect, rented a space in which they could express themselves. The competition for regulars prompted saloonkeepers to create the free lunch by providing a buffet of food for any patron who bought a drink. Patrons found the food at the lunch cheaper and better than that at working-class restaurants. Regulars did not abuse the lunch; they even guarded it from freeloaders. Indeed, "the free lunch exemplified the marriage of marketplace and community values in saloonlife" (p. 226).

But this marriage did not last. In the second decade



of the twentieth century, new forms of amusement (movies) and stronger working-class institutions (lodges and unions) drew working men out of the saloon, just when the saloon's enemies were poised to outlaw the sale of liquor. Prohibition divorced the saloon from the working class, and when liquor retailing returned, workers "had long since turned to other institutions for" the services and camaraderie that "the saloon had once supplied" (p. 236).

RICHARD F. HAMM  
State University of New York,  
Albany

ROBERT L. DORMAN. *A Word for Nature: Four Pioneering Environmental Advocates, 1845–1913*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 256. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$16.95.

Robert L. Dorman wishes to speak a word for George Perkins Marsh, Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, and John Wesley Powell. Identifying them as prototypes of the common division of environmentalists into conservationists (Marsh and Powell) and preservationists (Thoreau and Muir), Dorman provides for each a biographical sketch, a description of his social and political context, a close reading of his writings, and an assessment of his career. A brief epilogue emphasizes their contemporary relevance to environmentalism.

Beautifully produced by University of North Carolina Press and quite readable, the book constitutes a very good introduction to the thought and careers of these four men. As a contribution to environmental history, it brings out some new and interesting points. Dorman examines the impress of Marsh's Federalist-Whig ancestry and politics on his influential, elite-based conservation solutions. He draws out the tensions between man and nature, the individual and society, and town and wilderness that were inherent in Thoreau's thought and points out how his personal political philosophy hindered any practical proposals for nature preservation. Dorman notes how Muir and Powell institutionalized the environmental concern that Marsh and Thoreau first expressed but failed to effect. He emphasizes how Powell's political skill and connections allowed the U.S. Geological Survey, which he headed, to thrive despite many an indifferent or hostile Congress, yet how this political sense fatally deserted him at the end of his career in the controversy over his utopian scheme of commonwealth irrigation districts for the river basins of the West.

Because Dorman here gleans in fields so often threshed by others, and because he relies almost exclusively on published sources, for all his fresh insights his book departs little from standard accounts. The dates of his title refer to Thoreau's arrival at Walden Pond and Muir's defeat in the Hetch Hetchy dam battle, two rather standard landmark moments. The somewhat overdrawn distinction between conservationists and preservationists dates at least from Roderick Nash's thirty-year-old standard, *Wilderness*

and the American Mind (1967). Although Dorman follows the well-worn paths pioneered in the intellectual history of environmentalism by Nash, Donald Worster, Carolyn Merchant, and others, he does not directly engage the literature of environmental history. For example, Worster's long meditation on Thoreau in *Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas* (2d ed., 1994) does not appear even in Dorman's footnotes for the Thoreau chapter.

Dorman's arguments are generally cogent and clear, but grand-sounding, ill-defined terms like "sympiotic," "holistic," and "biocentric" frequently create a foggy or confusing impression. By judging nineteenth-century figures in contemporary or Deep-Ecology terms, these expressions also tend to make Dorman's analysis teleological and anachronistic in places. Likewise, Dorman uses certain terms imprecisely. How could Thoreau, in the 1850s, be a "Darwinist" (pp. 72, 75–77), especially since Thoreau died shortly after the publication of *Origin of Species* in 1859 and moreover never discussed natural selection? Muir also is probably better thought of as a Lamarckian than a Darwinist (pp. 122–26). And it is not clear how Transcendentalism is "secular," like science (p. 113).

Since the complexity of his analysis implies that this is intended more as a scholarly than a popular book, the author really needs to make abundantly clear why such standard, often scrutinized figures need another look. This reader wished, for example, that Dorman had spent more time in his brief epilogue teasing out and exploring the contemporary relevance of more of the issues he raised. Is modern environmentalism still "tainted" by its origins in Marsh's reliance on the elite and suspicion of the common person? How do the many tensions in Thoreau's ideas about wilderness shed light on current thinking and debate regarding wilderness? Do changes in the implications of "ecotourism" render obsolete Muir's call to come to "God's wilderness"? Is Powell's vision today good for nothing but "consciousness-raising purposes" (p. 224)? Dorman has written a good, thoughtful book, but one that seems to fall short of its full potential.

MARK STOLL  
Texas Tech University

HUGH PRINCE. *Wetlands of the American Midwest: A Historical Geography of Changing Attitudes*. (University of Chicago Geography Research Paper, number 241.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 395. \$21.00.

Hugh Prince is one of a small number of British geographers whose foreign area of expertise happens to be the United States. Although he is better known for the insightful interpretations of the English landscape that he has published in British and American journals over the years, Prince has been a frequent contributor to American geography. This book represents the first systematic attempt to interpret both the

historical and contemporary significance of wetlands in the American Midwest.

Historical study of the ditching, drainage, and use of naturally wet land is a well-developed theme in Britain, where tracts such as the Cambridgeshire fens occupy a comparatively larger fraction of the nation's potentially arable total. Drainage efforts there extend back more than a millennium. The largest area of natural wetlands in the United States is contained in a broad swath from the Dakotas across Iowa and Illinois to Indiana and Ohio, where the last glacial advances took place between twelve and fourteen thousand years ago. Some of this land had a dense cover of broadleaf forest when it was first described by Europeans, while other areas supported a marshy vegetation of tall grasses and other herbaceous plants. For a time, these lands were simply bypassed or used as seasonal pastures for grazing. With the advent of steam-powered dredges and the invention of low-cost methods to produce drainage tiles in the 1880s, drainage efforts expanded rapidly across the Midwest. Prince's book focuses primarily on the wet prairies, the great expanses that were drained to plant crops of corn a century ago and that today supply a good share of the nation's contribution of cash corn and soybeans sold on the world market.

Prince's work was projected fortuitously into the 1990s, when the subject of wetlands took on a new and entirely different meaning. Federal environmental legislation, including clean water acts, farm bills, and endangered species laws, began to discourage wetland drainage beginning in the 1980s. Other legislation created mechanisms for wetland restoration and even encouraged the construction of new wetlands ("wetland mitigation banking") in the name of conservation and flood control. Disastrous floods in the Mississippi and Missouri basins during the summer of 1993 were blamed in part on the extensive network of drainage ditches that channeled storm runoff to streams much more rapidly than would have been true prior to drainage, thereby exacerbating the flood problem. Wetlands, which once were championed mainly by duck hunters (and thus for dubious purposes, in the minds of many Americans) suddenly became a national treasure. And if they were natural features, rendered useless in their natural workings by human intervention, could they not be restored by a reverse application of that intervention?

Prince masterfully accepted the challenge posed by the twist his subject had taken. He ends the book with an essay, "Changing Wetland Images and Values," which refocuses the discussion within the scholarly tradition that has been his hallmark, the study of what Prince elsewhere has called "landscape tastes." Poorly drained land is simply that. Whether such a condition is good or bad, and whether it should be eradicated or cherished, clearly are matters of public perception and open to continuous reappraisal by successive generations. The giant dredges that gouged ditches in the wet prairie and raked the wet muckland into ridges are not

likely to be seen again. Nor are the miles of buried tiles and culverts that have been deactivated from their drainage role likely to be reconnected any time soon. For the near future, at least, the impact of public policy will favor broadening the conservation role at the expense of cropland. But "are wetland restorations authentic and natural?" Prince asks. Or are they "cultivated water gardens"? As his concluding chapter convincingly demonstrates, future generations may give a different answer to this question than the present one has.

JOHN C. HUDSON  
Northwestern University

PAUL F. STARRS, *Let the Cowboy Ride: Cattle Ranching in the American West*. (Creating the North American Landscape.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, in association with the Center for American Places, Harrisonburg, Va. 1998. Pp. xx, 356. \$35.95.

This appealingly written work of geographic history belongs on the top shelf of important books about western cattle ranching. It merits comparison with classic studies by Ernest S. Osgood, Walter Prescott Webb, and Terry Jordan. The volume also deserves inclusion among the best cultural geographies dealing with the American West, including those by Jordan, D. W. Meinig, Yi-Fu Tuan, and David Wishart. The book is worthy of the high praise it will receive.

Paul F. Starrs focuses on cattle ranching in the American West. The first four chapters summarize historical as well as present-day problems facing ranchers beyond the 98th meridian. Then Starrs provides brief case studies of ranching in five western counties. The final three chapters take up the future of ranching, noting the economic, environmental, and legal pressures on ranchers. Scattered throughout the book are more than 100 photographs, charts, and graphs that clearly illustrate its major points. The endnotes and bibliographical essay also attest to the author's familiarity with leading scholarship about the American West.

Starrs's long, thorough, and well-researched book should appeal to all readers. He utilizes a variety of sources, such as federal and state government records; autobiographical, biographical, and fictional accounts; fieldwork notes; and a full run of geographical and historical studies. From these varied sources, Starrs fashions a smoothly crafted story of ranching in the western United States. His narrative furnishes important background information concerning land laws, land wars, and legislative enactments such as the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.

The chapters treating five ranching experiences in the interior West are particularly revealing. Starrs's initial chapter in this section illuminates the cultural influences, especially age-old Hispanic land use and grazing practices, that shape ranching and farming in Rio Arriba County in northcentral New Mexico. Unique land laws in Texas, the establishment of

sprawling ranches in the late nineteenth century, and recent gigantic feedlots have markedly influenced ranching in Deaf Smith County in the Texas Panhandle. In contrast, ranchers in Cherry County, Nebraska, making use of elastic land legislation, carved out huge ranches that still dominate the Sandhill areas of northwestern Nebraska. Sheridan County of northcentral Wyoming is a patchwork of large ranches from earlier years, several dude ranches, and smaller holdings along river streams and upland meadows. Finally, in Elko County, Nevada, an area to which Starrs devotes extraordinary attention, large cattle (and a few sheep) ranchers are tied to their federal grazing allotments. These five case studies reveal much about the varieties and changing nature of western cattle ranching.

A few problems mar Starrs otherwise strong volume. The opening and closing chapters surrounding the case studies sometimes wobble with repetition and necessary ambivalence. Also, Starrs inexplicably leaves out nearly all ranching experiences in California and the northern West, thus underemphasizing the superb work on cattle ranching there by Meinig, J. Orin Oliphant, and John T. Schlebecker. Historians will notice, too, that the author mistakes western historian Gerald D. Nash for colonial historian Gary Nash. Even more problematic, Starrs asserts that Meinig, the superb geographical historian, has nearly singlehandedly demolished Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis. Finally, the author undervalues the major role that Turner played in pioneering discussions about the regional American West.

The abundant contributions of Starrs's valuable volume far outweigh these limitations, however. Most significantly, Starrs clearly reiterates the realistic conclusions of John Wesley Powell: the U.S. government and many nineteenth-century federal and state legislators, failing to understand the needs of ranchers, hamstrung them with inappropriate land policies. The villains of Starrs's book are these governmental officials, national and local, who refused to allot the extensive lands ranchers required to work their cows in arid, western settings. Now, adds Starrs, radical anti-grazing forces threaten to lock ranchers out of federal grazing areas and thereby close down western ranches that rely on land leases. As an academic with experience as a buckaroo/cowboy, Starrs rightly hopes that such environmentalists will be unable to destroy a valuable historical and economic part of the American West.

RICHARD W. ETULAIN  
*University of New Mexico*

ELIZABETH JAMESON, *All That Glitters: Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple Creek*. (The Working Class in American History.) Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 367. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$23.95.

In this book, Elizabeth Jameson has produced one of the finest works ever concerning the early, tumultuous

history of the Cripple Creek Mining District of Colorado. Bracketing her study with the victorious strike of the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) in 1894 and the WFM's disastrous strike of 1903–1904, the author examined the people of the district throughout the intervening decade in a manner that, heretofore, has not been done. Her focus on the sources of diverse "identities" within the district's working-class community closely attunes her work to the community studies in the New Labor history produced by David Emmons, Alan Dawley, Bruce Laurie, Sean Wilentz, and others. The result is a book that enormously expands our knowledge of the interrelational life of members of Cripple Creek's working class beyond that found in the earlier works of Melvyn Dubofsky, Vernon Jensen, Richard Lingenfelter, Ronald Brown, and others, most of which focused essentially on either the district's "labor wars," the origin of working-class radicalism, the Socialist question among union members, or the causative role of the state in the demise of the WFM.

After the successful strike of 1894, won primarily because of state intervention on behalf of labor, the Cripple Creek Mining District became a union stronghold controlled to an extraordinary degree by locals of the WFM. So powerful was the grip of organized labor on the district's institutional life that its failure in the strike ten years later has caused labor historians ever since to ponder why the power shifted so dramatically and decisively to district mine owners. In answering this question, many scholars have pointed to Governor James H. Peabody's strong role in support of management as the determining factor in bringing about the defeat. Unconvinced, however, Jameson reexamined the question. Using approaches less driven by the violence of the two strikes and state interventions to explain labor's defeat in 1903–1904, she analyzed the myriad working-class relationships involving class, gender, family households, fraternal orders, race, ethnicity, political parties, and unions in a effort to explain why and how power relationships in the district shifted to favor the opponents of organized labor. Although the strikes (the centerpiece of earlier studies concerning the district) are not ignored, in this work they become but bookends to a thorough study of relationships within the district's working class. It is this approach that makes Jameson's work both different and outstanding.

The author's examination of working-class life and culture in the Cripple Creek Mining District during the decade between the strikes is, in my view, the most detailed analysis of the district ever made. She used the district and its people as a social laboratory. Although essentially a study in local and state history, Jameson's work revealed much about the emerging working class in all the industrializing mining camps throughout the American West. She explored the cross-class involvement of union members in the numerous lodges, fraternal orders, and political parties; she probed the role of race and ethnicity in industry and social life; she analyzed the role and status of

women, both at home and the workplace, and their significance in district life; she scrutinized the shifting political alliances of union members as they attempted to accomplish their organizational goals; she clarified the competitive divisions among owners and managements concerning business and labor; and most importantly, using principally the census of 1900 of the newly formed Teller County, she profiled district workers in terms of class, race, age, job skills, nationality, marital status, and gender. From her research, Jameson concluded that labor unity was undermined by the internal tensions resulting from the complex, working-class relationships that existed prior to the strike of 1903–1904, and that this weakening of labor solidarity contributed significantly to the dramatic shift of power that caused the collapse of the WFM in the district. This different interpretation separates Jameson's work from other interpretations that focus primarily on the violent strikes.

This book is the result of prodigious research and penetrating analysis. After using a variety of methods (oral histories and quantitative analysis of census, lodge, strike, union, and political party data), tapping into every significant repository of pertinent records (WFM convention proceedings, published state and federal documents, district newspapers), and consulting the voluminous literature concerning working-class history, Jameson has produced a distinctively different and influential book about the Cripple Creek Mining District that is flawed only by occasional repetition. Full of new insights, it is essential reading for all students and scholars of the American West who are interested in pursuing new perspectives in the district's social and labor history.

GEORGE G. SUGGS, JR.  
Southeast Missouri State University

KATHERINE G. MORRISSEY, *Mental Territories: Mapping the Inland Empire*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. Pp. ix, 220. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$18.95.

In this book, Katherine G. Morrissey proposes to explain how a particular region of the western United States—the Inland Empire of eastern Washington, northern Idaho and southeastern British Columbia—came to be known as such by both the people who lived in the area and those who resided outside of it. This is particularly interesting because the Inland Empire was not initially defined by specific geographic features such as rivers or mountain valleys. Maps that existed immediately after the Civil War showed no area or region that conformed to the eventual boundaries of the Inland Empire. Thus settlers who migrated to the area were not moving to a known region. Instead, they created the “mental” image and boundaries of the Inland Empire once they got there. This mental process took place between roughly the late 1870s and the turn of the century. How does Morrissey explain the transformation in the last quarter of the nineteenth

century of these vaguely charted lands into a region with a widely, even passionately, held identity?

On the surface, the Inland Empire, in both its rhetorical and map forms, was created by the town boosters of Spokane Falls, Washington. The town, noted for its abundant water power, was founded in the 1870s in anticipation of the arrival of the Northern Pacific Railroad. With the completion of the railroad, Spokane quickly boomed as a distribution center. The boosters' rhetoric went into high gear after the fire of 1889 demolished the town. Visions for a rebuilt city, trumpeted at Spokane's Northwestern Industrial Exposition of 1890, proclaimed the potential “imperial” progress of the newly coined Inland Empire. New railroad lines expanding out of Spokane made it possible for the now emerging center of the empire to claim the “tributary” areas of the Coeur d'Alene mining district of Idaho, the Kootenay mines of British Columbia, and the wheat fields of eastern Washington's Palouse Valley.

The Spokane boosters' Inland Empire is only part of the story. Morrissey is equally concerned to show how the ordinary inhabitants of the region came to accept that image and how they came to feel that they “belonged” to the Inland Empire. She produces a fascinating chapter on the management/labor disputes of the 1890s in the Coeur d'Alene mining district and shows how the rhetoric of these disputes sharply defined images of “insiders,” “foreigners,” and “who belonged.” She also shows how the diaries and letters of new settlers described and affirmed the image of an Inland Empire. There is an interesting chapter on the debates and rhetoric that created the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation within the Inland Empire. Morrissey also devotes attention to the effect of the international border between the U.S. and Canada as a dividing factor in the creation of the region. She delineates the ways in which settlers and boosters transcended that border to create a unified transnational region.

Finally, Morrissey explains how the insiders' image of industrial progress and growth in the Inland Empire was reshaped after 1900 by outsiders, including railroad promoters of western tourism and western writers such as Zane Grey, who depicted the region as an exotic, untamed, romantic wasteland. There were thus competing mental images of the Inland Empire. The outsiders' image often thwarted and stymied the insiders' desires, with the effect that the unfulfilled dreams of the boosters eventually constituted a “ghost region.”

For the most part, Morrissey is eminently convincing in her explanation of the Inland Empire's identity. Some readers may find the book overwritten at times. Morrissey spends many introductory pages telling us what she is going to do and the methodologies she will use to do it before actually moving to her explanations. At times, she includes story after story that may not be absolutely necessary to prove her case. Although her approach may be overkill in the context of merely explaining the Inland Empire, it does have a wider



purpose. This is a superb methodological case book on the wide variety of sources an investigator can use to map and define the emergence of any region or territory. It is truly a "how to" book for the study of regions. As such, it should have wide appeal not only to those interested in the Inland Empire but to readers concerned with explaining the identity of a host of other regions.

JOHN WHITEHEAD  
University of Alaska Fairbanks

ALLAN G. BOGUE. *Frederick Jackson Turner: Strange Roads Going Down*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 557. \$34.95.

Perhaps the name of no American historian stirs more impassioned response than that of Frederick Jackson Turner. An intellectual lightning rod, sparking controversy across decades for his notions about the development of democracy, especially as expressed in the western frontier experience, Turner struck an emotional chord in the collective heart of American thought. Allan G. Bogue, himself the Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History emeritus at the University of Wisconsin, undertakes the daunting task of assessing the life of the noted historian, the varied responses to his work and his personality, and the ultimate importance of that emotional chord reverberating through the scholarly community of America. The result is this finely crafted book.

Acknowledging that the man and his thought have already inspired volumes, Bogue proposes a dual goal: to mold a human portrait of Turner, as well as track the emergence and evolution of his historical ideas. With so much literature on the subject available, Bogue needed to find a broad platform on which to build yet another lengthy biography of such a well-known subject. Bogue succeeds in doing so, for he bonds his narrative to the development of American higher education in general and Frederick Jackson Turner's place within it.

This context opens out the scope of the book and allows the reader to see Turner as an educator moving through a burgeoning American profession. Thus, Bogue avoids a role as either defending disciple or attacking opponent. It is refreshing to consider Turner as something other than a provincial philosopher of the frontier, rather as a teacher's teacher, hoping to bring about the best for history. Bogue paints a Turner anxious about the uses of history, caught by unexpected turns in university affairs, motivated to advance, concerned about his own legacy, and piqued by professional criticism. In short, Bogue illuminates the phases and stages of the usual university career, making it possible for any reader from the academy to empathize with Turner and his array of lofty colleagues and famous students. Frederick Merk, Edgar E. Robinson, Carl L. Becker, and Charles A. Beard seem very much like the university professors of today, worried about jobs, salaries, peer evaluation, and professional

stature. Bogue has placed the very real engine of ambition and competition in the center of his work, bringing humanity and life to his characters. He makes it clear that the threat of "publish or perish" carved its niche early in the history of American university life.

Bogue deserves praise for the balanced evaluation he brings to Turner's contributions as a mentor and as a force at the University of Wisconsin and Harvard University. Through this story, however, runs the theme of Turner's ultimate failure to produce the publications that all expected. Bogue points out painful deterrents that kept Turner from publishing, including lingering grief at the death of his son and constant fretting over life-threatening health problems. Yet, in the end, Bogue, intentionally or not, indicts Turner for his willingness to permit almost any distraction to keep him from his pen and paper. Given the many people who encouraged Turner to publish, provided the comfortable circumstances to prod him forward, and tolerated his endless delays, one feels, along with the author, frustration that vacations and fishing trips impeded the scholarly production of an articulate and compelling historian, a reflective and intelligent man.

The research is meticulous, drawing on a mighty collection of Turner papers for documentation, and the writing notable for its rich patterns and courtly style. The text, however, is occasionally hard going for detail that follows Turner closely through each season of his life. The volume is enhanced by a fine collection of photographs, perhaps the most charming that of Turner holding his grandchild, the destined-to-be well-known historian Jackson Turner Main.

Although analysis is woven through the text, Bogue is at his finest in the final chapter, in which he brings together two separate elements—a summation of Turner's life and a critique of Turner historiography—seamlessly connected to present a capstone statement about the evolution of American intellectual thought. It is here that the reader appreciates the full range of scholarly command, judicious balance, and keen insight that mark this book. Everyone knows that Turner disappointed modern readers in matters of ethnicity, gender, and class. Bogue refuses to shy away from these issues, but he also refuses to dismiss the impact of this American thinker. Frederick Jackson Turner, admired and maligned, is fortunate to have such a biographer, one willing to explore the human and intellectual contradictions in his subject, as well as the enduring and endearing qualities. Bogue may not reverse the opinion of the Frederick Jackson Turner naysayers, but he will have earned their admiration for the definitive, even majestic, treatment he offers this dean of America's history profession.

ANNE M. BUTLER  
Utah State University

RONALD L. NUMBERS. *Darwinism Comes to America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. 216. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$18.95.



For nearly three decades, Ronald L. Numbers has been exploring the convoluted story of the reception of evolutionary concepts in the United States. As author of numerous articles and *The Creationists* (1992), and as an editor of the multivolume *Creationism in Twentieth-Century America* (1995), he has added significantly to our understanding of this important topic. His purpose in writing the compact volume under review is to correct various myths, errors, and misinterpretations of the Darwinian legacy in America. Based on a careful analysis of documentary and published sources, this book offers historians a needed corrective to existing perceptions of the evolution controversy.

Following a concise introduction that traces the reception of evolution from the late nineteenth century to the present, Numbers begins his analysis with an effort to gauge the initial acceptance of evolutionary concepts by American scientists. He focuses on the eighty naturalists who were members of the National Academy of Sciences before 1900 and finds a very complex situation. Although the concept of special creation does appear to have been rejected by all but a few of these naturalists, they adopted such a wide range of evolutionary concepts and definitions that it is impossible to argue that any sort of consensus had been reached by 1900. Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) thus reinforced naturalists' growing commitment to naturalistic explanations, but the variety of these explanations indicate a much more complicated situation in late nineteenth-century thought than most historians realize.

Numbers corrects other errors in the traditional view of the evolution controversy as well. He points out, for example, that only recently has the term "creationism" referred to a young earth/flood geology concept. Before the 1960s, this term was both indistinct and relatively rarely used. Similarly, Numbers shows that the American South was not uniformly anti-evolutionist in the period through the 1920s. Opponents of the teaching of evolution existed, to be sure, but so, too, did naturalists who pursued their craft from the perspective of the new science. Numbers also provides a much-needed corrective to traditional accounts of the Scopes trial. Not only does he show how erroneous the *Inherit the Wind* (1955) version of this event was, but he also examines several other aspects of its legend. The 1925 trial, for example, did not mark the end of the anti-evolution crusade but rather encouraged opponents of Darwinism to continue their campaign to outlaw the teaching of evolution. The year 1927, in fact, marked the high point of these efforts, when legislatures in at least a dozen states considered anti-evolution statutes.

Numbers concludes his discussion with two chapters that focus on often overlooked religious aspects of the evolution controversy. In a well-focused study of Adventist responses to evolutionary concepts, he emphasizes their commitment to young earth concepts and a universal flood. Their opposition to developmental

theories, both in geology and biology, was based on these theories' apparent conflict with revelation and a literalistic interpretation of Scripture. The flood geology of George McCready Price provided a "scientific" base for Adventist beliefs but attracted little attention until the 1970s, when it became the foundation for "scientific creationism." In his final chapter, Numbers examines the Holiness and Pentecostal response to evolution. Although these groups have long rejected evolutionary explanations, their commitment to personal, experiential salvation has led them away from active involvement in anti-evolution campaigns. Thus, the tendency for historians to characterize evangelical Protestantism as "fundamentalist" and marked by active anti-evolution sentiment is another example of historical inaccuracy.

As Numbers suggests in his introduction, he and other historians of the evolution controversy have examined and challenged the various myths related to the topic for many years. Even a cursory perusal of the notes to this volume reveals a rich secondary literature. Unfortunately, these correctives have not been integrated into the more general historical accounts that serve as the base for most Americans' knowledge of their past. Historians now have a succinct and effective corrective to the mythological portrait of the evolution controversy in America. The misinterpretations and inaccuracies concerning the place of evolution in American thought may well remain in texts and classrooms, but only if this book is ignored.

GEORGE E. WEBB

*Tennessee Technological University*

DAVID M. TUCKER. *Mugwumps: Public Moralists of the Gilded Age*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1998. Pp. x, 139. \$27.50.

For decades, historians have seen little to admire in the Mugwumps, the elite critics of American politics in the late nineteenth century. In this slim volume, David M. Tucker seeks to refurbish their image. Tucker rejects the portrayal of these men as ineffectual dilettantes or disappointed office seekers or whining victims of status decline. Rather, he sees them as worthy and necessary exponents of public morality who had greater impact on the politics of their time than is commonly recognized.

Tucker traces the origins of the Mugwump outlook to the antebellum training in moral philosophy that many received in colleges where the main texts in ethics were Francis Wayland's *Elements of Moral Science* and *Elements of Political Economy* (both 1837). As the sectional conflict intensified, the abolition movement served as a practicum capping their moral education. Although Darwinism overpowered their religious faith, they retained a belief in moral imperatives rooted in social scientific laws governing human relations. Believing themselves particularly qualified to guide their country as public moralists, "they vigor-

ously pursued their benevolent duty to direct America toward virtue, civilization, and progress" (p. 14).

At the height of their influence in the postwar decades, the Mugwumps addressed several issues. Appalled by what they considered rampant corruption and excessive partisanship in public life, they labored to reform the civil service with a merit-based bureaucracy insulated from politics. In the unceasing debate over the currency, they embraced the gold standard and opposed inflation either by greenbacks or by silver coin. The volume of money, they believed, should reflect the decisions of bankers and other businessmen, not the whim of Congress. Steeped in the economic tenets of the Manchester school, they favored free trade and denounced tariff protection as a corrupt bargain between politicians and special interests. At the end of the century, they decried immorality in the nation's imperialist thrust.

Tucker's principal aim is to deny that the Mugwumps were either self-centered or self-interested and to depict them as altruistic proponents of benevolence. Unfortunately, Tucker's decision to present so brief a treatment affords him little space to substantiate his claims. Moreover, he occasionally offers evidence to the contrary. He reminds us, for instance, that the free trader Edward Atkinson, who argued for duty-free raw materials, was a textile manufacturer "who knew the costs for New England cotton spinners" (p. 27). Similarly, self-denial seemed to have little bearing when, Tucker notes, Carl Schurz "deserted" his fellow independents in part because Rutherford B. Hayes "would give him a cabinet position" (p. 76).

Tucker frequently invokes the word "benevolence" to characterize the Mugwumps' goals and purposes, but one wishes for a fuller explanation of what he means by the term. Rigid adherence to greenback contraction betrayed little benevolence toward debtors and others who suffered the effects of deflation. Perhaps most egregious was the spectacle of many former abolitionists-turned-Mugwumps retreating from federal government protection of the civil and political rights of former slaves, an issue that Tucker gives only passing attention.

Tucker's work is commendable for recognizing the central role that ideas played in the politics of the Gilded Age. The book's focus, however, encourages the misperception that Mugwumps had a monopoly on deeply held convictions about how to promote the good society, while regular party leaders were mere corruptionists and spoilsmen. This dichotomous approach puts *laissez-faire*, virtue, and benevolence on one side and government activism, corruption, and selfishness on the other. The real problem for governance in the Gilded Age, however, was less the scarcity of public-spiritedness among politicians than the stalemate wrought by divided party control of the national government, which, more than anything else, inhibited benevolent government activism, especially as advocated by the Republicans. Once in control in the Fifty-first Congress, Republicans passed a record num-

ber of public laws, including the Meat Inspection Act (1906), the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890), and the Forest Reserve Act (1891), none of which Tucker mentions. Indeed, the whole tenor of his book begs the question of whether it is possible for government to act benevolently at all.

Tucker's work raises as many questions as it answers and is thus a provocative entry in the expanding debate over the meaning of politics in the late nineteenth century.

CHARLES W. CALHOUN  
East Carolina University

TIMOTHY A. HACSI. *Second Home: Orphan Asylums and Poor Families in America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 297. \$39.95.

Timothy A. Hacsí has written the first comprehensive history of orphan asylums since Homer Folks published *The Care of Destitute, Neglected, and Delinquent Children* (1900). This well-researched book, which pays close attention to the history of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish orphanages from the early nineteenth century to the 1930s, is a long-overdue addition to the history of children and social welfare in the United States.

Hacsí traces the history of orphanages from the antebellum era, when they grew rapidly in number, to the 1890s and the Progressive era, when critics challenged their very existence—criticism that provoked children's asylums to integrate young inmates into local communities and more willingly return children to their families. The history concludes in the 1930s, when most orphanages were displaced either by foster care programs or Aid to Dependent Children (later Aid to Families with Dependent Children), which permitted poor children to stay with their own families and avoid institutionalization. Subsequently, many orphanages transformed themselves into homes for children with behavioral, emotional, or psychological problems or into foster care agencies.

Overall, the history of orphan asylums challenges the model of asylum growth put forward by David J. Rothman in *The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic* (1971). Hacsí argues that Rothman's model of asylum change—from early nineteenth-century optimism and reform to pessimism and custodialism by the late nineteenth century—fits reform schools, mental hospitals, and prisons but not orphan asylums. They, instead, became more humane over the years.

There were literally thousands of orphanages in the U.S. before the 1930s, and Hacsí has studied a representative sample of them closely. One problem with such large numbers is that any generalization made about orphanages inevitably has one or more exceptions, and the text sometimes seems burdened with such qualifications. Nonetheless, the author has made a valiant attempt to categorize orphanages into three types: protective, isolating, and integrating asylums.

Although this model is interesting, it is not consistently followed in all chapters.

Chapters cover various aspects of asylum life including how asylums were managed and funded, the types of children that were admitted to them, the routine and discipline employed in asylums, and their educational and recreational programs. In the first chapters, Hacsí divides the history of orphanages into four parts: the pre-1830 era, the antebellum years from 1830 to 1860, the Civil War through the Progressive era, and 1910–1933. Since orphanages did not change dramatically over time, there is a good deal of repetition from one historical period to the next. In later chapters, Hacsí drops the division by time periods, a decision that considerably improves the flow of the text.

One problem with the book is the absence of a consistent effort to distinguish the different ways in which orphanages were perceived by and actually served children, parents, and founders. Another problem is that while the issue of social class is occasionally discussed, it is not explored in any depth. Asylums were founded by middle-class Americans to serve poor and working-class families. The different social classes did not inevitably share the same attitudes toward child rearing. Hacsí argues that, by the late nineteenth century, middle-class asylum managers viewed children “as emotionally valuable rather than as economic assets” (p. 137), and so they sought to place children in family homes where they would not have to work for their keep. Did this practice really serve the needs either of working-class parents or of their children, who may have required a more practical, vocational education? In this case, managers presumably treated poor asylum children as they would their own sons and daughters. At the same time, however, in an era when the middle class tried to discipline their own children without resort to the rod, asylum managers used corporal punishment on their young charges. Hacsí argues such punishment was consistent with working-class family discipline. But why did asylum managers in one case treat children like their own and in the other more like their natural families would? A greater attention to the nuances of class and to the subtle distinctions that managers made between their own children and those they cared for in asylums is necessary.

Hacsí concludes with a sensible evaluation of orphan asylums. He recognizes their previous value but urges that Americans today pay more attention to the structural causes of poverty, avoid moral critiques of parents of impoverished children, and keep needy children in their own families.

PRISCILLA FERGUSON CLEMENT  
Penn State University,  
Delaware County

PHILIP JENKINS. *Moral Panic: Changing Concepts of the Child Molester in Modern America*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 302. \$30.00.

At the heart of this book is Philip Jenkins's desire to understand the hysteria that since the 1980s has surrounded America's obsession with the sexual abuse of children. This is a serious and important social issue that a range of social analysts, such as Joel Best, Neil Gilbert, and Cynthia Gentry, have tried to understand as a social construction: a crisis that is manufactured and grows through the exaggerated claims of advocacy groups and other social stake holders and is rapidly spread through media excess.

In the second half of the book, Jenkins effectively connects the complex of issues that have become associated with this obsession: child abduction, child molestation, satanic ritual abuse, incest and recovered memory, and, most recently, internet sex rings. He reconstructs the ways in which these issues grew and developed as the media, lawmakers, and, above all, a growing coterie of child advocates embedded in the helping professions have played on social fears and anxieties. In describing this complex, Jenkins raises extremely important questions about how our laws and criminal justice procedures have been affected and recreated as a result of this panic. The current multiplication of Megan's Laws (which require that communities be notified about the presence of sexual predators) is one questionable consequence. Another is the growth of new kinds of sentencing for sexual predators who are increasingly viewed as suffering from an irremediable condition. In some states today, such criminals can be detained in mental institutions beyond the expiration of their sentences, and in some (such as California), they can be chemically castrated. In many ways, the sexual abuse of children has since the 1980s been used to overturn the whole rehabilitative regime in the criminal justice system, and Jenkins does a fine job showing how child sexual abuse has been manipulated so that we are now confronting the cumulative legal consequences of this social panic.

Jenkins is less successful when he tries to embed this experience historically. The first half of the book is, in fact, a prelude to the second, as Jenkins attempts to show how previous panics about sexual crimes anticipated our current experiences. Jenkins sees two such previous “cycles,” as he calls them. The first of these coincided with the Progressive period, when reform-minded child advocates in conjunction with feminists spread alarm about child exploitation and changed the age of consent laws that were the basis for subsequent statutory rape indictments (a subject previously examined by Mary Odem). The second lasted from 1936 through the mid-1950s, when a series of sex crimes against women was exploited by J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and resulted in the creation of a large number of sexual predator statutes throughout the country (a subject previously studied by Estelle Freedman). Throughout his discussion of these episodes, Jenkins makes continuous reference to current concerns, and he even finally exclaims “plus ça change,” implying that we have seen it all before. In fact, however, despite some obvious resonances, the

proper historical expression is "autre temps, autre mœurs," since the historian's goal is to understand events fully in their context.

In describing these episodes as part of recurrent cycles and in seeing them only as anticipations of current events, Jenkins both obscures the real historical context in which they are illuminated and elides significant differences among them. From the late 1930s to the mid-1950s, for example, Americans were not fundamentally concerned about sexual crimes against children but rather about the rape of adolescent and adult women and about homosexuality. This is a significant and serious distinction that Jenkins is aware of but discounts by emphasizing those instances in which crimes against children were used to inflame public opinion. Moreover, by emphasizing the cyclical nature of the panics, Jenkins obscures the experience of the 1920s. For Jenkins, the 1920s provided a lull in the cycle because few laws were passed. But when examined historically, the period was full of occasions when the sexual abuse and murder of children were steadily and hysterically used to inflame public opinion. The Leopold and Loeb case in 1924 was one such instance. Another was the case of William Edward Hickman, who abducted and dismembered ten-year-old Marion Parker in Los Angeles in 1927. As the *New York Times* proclaimed that "Terror Grips the City," the crime resulted in one of the largest manhunts in West Coast history and almost caused a public lynching. This was followed by an extraordinary and widely followed trial. There were others.

By concentrating on "cycles" of panics, Jenkins both neglects significant historical periods in the development of concerns about child murder and their psychological meaning, and does not fully contextualize the episodes he covers. This is more than a little strange in a book that proclaims its "constructivist" *bona fides*. In fact, however, Jenkins has allowed his analysis to be narrowed by the definitions of this perspective provided by the sociologists from whom he has borrowed. Constructivist in their sense does not mean historicist or require a fully historical reconstruction. Instead, it offers a more limited reconstruction of the interest groups who promote certain kinds of policy outcomes. This is a useful form of contemporary analysis, but it is limited as a means of cultural understanding. Since Jenkins draws all kinds of cultural conclusions from his material, he is forced to do this in an ad hoc way, since he has not given the reader a full portrait of the times (either today or in the past). By concentrating on intermittent cycles, Jenkins also misses the opportunity to understand how the twentieth century has evolved continuously around its contradictory impulses toward children. It is this evolution that could be most valuably captured in the changing portrayals of child sexual abuse. In the end, the book is not about changing conceptions of the child molester, as its subtitle promises, but about creating laws concerning sex crimes generally. From that different perspective, Jenkins has written a useful book and one

that properly engages us in the Durkheimian and Foucauldian questions of how society has used sexual deviancy as a spur to outrage and a recipe for law making.

PAULA S. FASS  
University of California,  
Berkeley

KAREN W. TICE. *Tales of Wayward Girls and Immoral Women: Case Records and the Professionalization of Social Work*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1998. Pp. x, 260. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$26.95.

For anyone wondering about the reasons for hostility toward social workers, this book is a good place to start, although it does have some positive things to say about them. Because the book focuses on the history of case records and how they were generated, it presents a very close picture of social workers as they functioned on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, the way Karen W. Tice analyzes the evolution of case recording says a lot about social work's efforts to establish itself as a profession; how the substance of social work differs from related fields, such as psychology and psychiatry; and the nature of social workers' relationships with their clients plus some glimpses of clients. Most social welfare historians have taken case recording for granted. Consequently, Tice's book is important in calling attention to a neglected area and also very important for its analysis of what amounts to case workers at work.

When social work emerged as a profession in the late nineteenth century, case workers such as the Charity Organization Society's friendly visitors shared prominence with settlement house workers. However, case recording gave the caseworkers a distinct method; and as social work schools were established in the early twentieth century, they emphasized casework while the settlements began declining in influence. The Russell Sage Foundation favored the casework approach with its grants, while the settlement houses had no comparable benefactor. According to Tice, the actual keeping of case records was quite haphazard and meager until the 1920s. For example, individual case records at the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children were rarely more than one page around 1901. By 1906, that agency had added a cover sheet and filing system. After 1907, its records expanded in length to necessitate a summary paragraph. Meanwhile, the Salvation Army's refusal to go along with formal case record-keeping cost it professional prestige. Furthermore, Tice is interested in how vocabulary changed to become more technical, with phrases such as "conditioning factors." She is also very interested in such issues as to what extent the case worker allowed clients to speak in the records. Some caseworkers devoted most of their space to negative comments and speculation about their clients that they had picked up from landlords, foster mothers, and even the milkman, but paid correspondingly little



attention to the complaints of the clients themselves. Hence, case records reflected the power that case workers had over clients.

However, case workers were not always producing investigative records of "detection," as Tice calls this approach. Many case workers sought to develop positive relationships of friendship and trust, spent considerable time with their clients, and produced what Tice calls records of "protection." Finally, Tice is concerned with the various uses the profession has made of case records, such as publicizing itself to get public support. The lack of respect for clients' privacy, the imposition of middle-class values, the case workers' ability to coerce by controlling financial aid plus their access to the court system, and the ease with which a juvenile could be consigned to a house of correction were all appalling.

Tice's book does have some weaknesses. She fails to set her material in international context, ascribing the origin of civic (most historians would say "social") surveys to the New York Charity Organization Society, as opposed to Charles Booth's multivolume *Life and Labour of the People of London* (1891–1903). She also credits Buffalo with the first Charity Organization Society, neglecting to mention that it was preceded by one in London. As for her sampling of case records, that is limited to five agencies focusing on child and family welfare—two in Boston and three in Minneapolis—with a total of 107 records in public archives. It is unclear if she sampled available records and, if so, how. Furthermore, while criticizing certain types of practitioners, like psychologists, for categorizing their clients according to pathologies, such as "paranoid," Tice herself tends to categorize case records, and by implication, caseworkers, as being into either the "detection" or "protection" modes. Also, she does not extend her analysis into the public welfare era that followed the 1930s, except to note some current criticisms of record keeping. Nevertheless, this book is one that social welfare historians should read.

JUDITH ANN TROLANDER  
University of Minnesota,  
Duluth

HELENE SILVERBERG, editor. *Gender and American Social Science: The Formative Years*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 334. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$18.95.

Historical interpretation without gender now seems woefully incomplete after more than a decade of empirical research and theoretical debate. This is apparent in the historiography of social science itself, where men's positions as academic insiders and women's as reform outsiders shaped both institutional practice and structures of knowledge, sometimes in surprising directions. This solid interdisciplinary collection reconsiders "the formative years" (1870s to 1920s) of social science in the United States. The standard story, emphasizing professionalization and

American exceptionalism, assumed the social scientist to be male amid an evolutionary trope that moved from amateur to academic. This book offers alternative markers of development, such as "the opening of Harvard's psychological laboratory to women, the founding of Cornell's School of Home Economics, or the invention of sociological jurisprudence by Goldmark and Kelley" (p. 21). But editor Helene Silverberg has an even more ambitious goal. "The reorganization of gender relations," she argues, "was central to the transformation of American social science" (p. 4).

The contributors unevenly reveal how shifts in Victorian concepts of gender informed social knowledge and institutional locations, because they mostly discuss social science rather than changing gender constructions. Silverberg attributes the boundaries of political science to middle-class men who projected their Progressive-era fight against urban bosses onto definitions of the field. Anthropologist Kamala Visweswaran provides a nuanced consideration of popular women ethnographers, who smashed conventional womanhood but remained tied to "white settler ideology and imperialist projects" (p. 111). "The confrontation of Victorian feminism with evolutionism created the conditions necessary for the articulation of 'woman' as a universal category" but "worked to prohibit gender identification," she concludes (p. 110). Sociologist Desley Deacon's biographical portrait of Elsie Clews Parsons cogently explains an intellectual position in terms of a gender shift: 1910s feminism's rebellion against domesticity precipitated Parson's critique of conventional sexual arrangements within marriage.

Ironically, in celebrating experience as the source of knowledge, Parsons resembled Jane Addams, whose theory of social democracy incorporated the despised domestic model. But as Dorothy Ross notes, the interpretative sociology of Hull House's founder derived from pragmatist as well as romantic thought, which provided an "androgynous, human stamp" (p. 252). In contrast, Kathryn Kish Sklar's reconstruction of *Hull-House Maps and Papers* (1895) connects this activist sociology to women's philanthropy and religious impulses. She contextualizes the meticulous survey method that Florence Kelley deployed in the National Consumers' League's quest for labor standards.

But, in a particularly tendentious piece, Guy Alchon describes the career of Taylorite Mary Van Kleeck to ridicule feminist historians for associating women with "'soft' reformist social science" (p. 311). Such misreading of Sklar and other scholars replicates the very gendered dichotomies that Alchon finds so threatening to his own authority. His gratuitous attack on gender as a category of analysis—charging its practitioners for being "concerned more with present politics and jobs than with any respectful relation to the dead" (p. 295)—is unworthy of his own intellectual project. That is to write empathetically about the life of a woman whose ideological journey he abhors. Van Kleeck traveled from Christian Socialism through industrial



sociology to an uncritical defense of Joseph Stalin's regime.

Certainly, Nancy K. Berlage would reject any characterization of Cornell's home economists as "soft." Their applied social science adopted "empirical, scientific tradition, national professional associations and journals, and ever higher standards of academic credentialism" (p. 186). Less revisionist than she claims, Berlage nonetheless enhances our understanding of home economics by investigating the impact of government and private foundation support. Tensions among child guidance researchers, between rejection of inherent gender differences and refusal to take on biological determinist paradigms, stem from the influence of funders as much as from adherence to "objectivity."

Some essays successfully document the persistence of notions of male breadwinning and female domesticity within various disciplines. Neoclassical economics differentiated the family from the market. It assigned women, associated with sentiment, to a sphere outside of political economy. "Unpaid labor in the home," thus writes economist Nancy Folbre, appeared "morally important but economically unproductive" (p. 35). Folbre deftly connects "economic theory, discrimination against women scholars, and the treatment of 'women's topics'" (p. 36) through the careers of Edith Abbott and Sophonsiba Breckinridge. These University of Chicago graduates gained access to the prestigious journal edited by their mentor, J. Laurence Laughlin, but not to positions within the economics department.

While economists embraced family wage ideology, early political scientists regarded citizen and state as male. Political theorists Mary G. Dietz and James Farr ferret out the contradictory and confusing "overgendered" nature of a discipline full of "manly states, mother countries, father lands, sister nations, paternal governments, fellow citizens" (p. 76). Political scientists viewed women's suffrage as an unthinkable abomination that would interfere with women's domesticity, disrupt the family, and undermine its male head, who represented wives and daughters through his vote. Turning away from theories of the state, the discipline developed "a political reserve" (p. 78) toward controversial issues.

As a whole, this collection more than belies Alchon's intemperate polemic against gender as "absolutist, universal, and totalizing" (p. 294). It confirms the explicatory potential of gender for intellectual as well as policy history.

EILEEN BORIS  
*University of Virginia*

ROBERT A. TRENNERT. *White Man's Medicine: Government Doctors and the Navajo. 1863-1955*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1998. Pp. xii. 290. \$39.95.

The reputation of Indian reservations has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis. Initially understood as

places of confinement and laboratories for the transformation of "Indians" into "Americans," they have evolved into sites for cultural persistence, renewal, and regeneration. Yet rarely do people perceive reservations as places of physical health or prosperity. Robert A. Trennert's detailed history of government-sponsored health care on Navajo reservations relates the grim story of efforts to deliver that care. It is largely a story of failure. Happily, since 1955, when the Public Health Service took control from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, conditions have improved markedly.

Throughout the nation, implementation of the reservation policy meant ostensible federal responsibility for Indian health and welfare; an obligation that was long neglected, underfunded, and consequently insufficiently met. For the Navajos, the story began at the Bosque Redondo reservation, where over 8,000 Navajos came under federal jurisdiction after the Kit Carson campaign drove them from their homes in the early 1860s. Malnutrition, disease, lack of sanitation, and mental distress led to a high mortality rate. Navajos turned, first, to their own healers but proved willing to adapt Western medical practices that offered tangible benefits. Individuals voluntarily came in for smallpox vaccinations, for example. By 1868, policy makers declared the Bosque Redondo experiment a failure, however, and Navajos returned to their homelands of northern Arizona and New Mexico.

For decades thereafter, federal efforts to improve health care delivery to the growing and much dispersed Navajo population largely failed. Indian affairs in general, and health care in particular, rated low among Congress's priorities. Thus, political appointees rather than well-trained physicians controlled what little funds the legislature allocated. This haphazard commitment to Indian health proved particularly vulnerable to outside forces. World War I, for instance, swept away reservation medical personnel. Cultural conflict and mutual suspicions meant doctors and Navajo healers competed rather than cooperated with one another. Interestingly, Navajos remained consistently willing to incorporate aspects of Western medicine that offered obvious benefits. Simultaneously, they also continued their own practices, which focused on both spiritual and bodily solace. For many decades, non-Navajo doctors disparaged such customs and only gradually, around the 1930s, began to accept the validity of Navajo healing methods. Of course, this development paralleled the Indian New Deal with its emphasis on validating and encouraging the perpetuation of Indian cultures.

The main health problems that reservation-based Navajos faced between the 1860s and the 1950s included trachoma (also known as sore eyes or conjunctivitis) and tuberculosis, both highly contagious diseases. Health care workers, particularly those who were also missionaries, viewed their role as not only treating the sick but demonstrating the superiority of "white civilization." Frequent failures with the former meant not much success with the latter.

The Indian New Deal brought some improvements. The Navajo Medical Center, which "truly represented the beginning of the modern era" (p. 190), opened in 1938. Government doctors reduced trachoma to less than five percent of the population, but they were less successful in other areas. Tuberculosis continued to plague Navajos, remote parts of the reservation remained underserved, and medical personnel continued to leave. Further, World War II devastated the gains of the 1930s. Ironically, postwar implementation of termination policies, generally viewed by historians and Native Americans alike as incredibly harmful to Indians, offered some benefits to the Navajos. Transfer of health care to the Public Health Service represented the termination impulse to mainstream Indian people. In practical terms, that meant great advances in quality and availability of care, reduction of disease, improved communication, and more reliable funding for Navajo health. Over time, government doctors demonstrated greater willingness to incorporate Navajo traditions, hire Navajo health care professionals, and show sensitivity to tribal concerns. Health conditions eventually approximated those of the nation as a whole.

This clearly written, carefully researched case study makes an important contribution to a long overlooked topic. Trennert notes that the book is a policy history and admits that it focuses mostly on government actions, or inactions. He zeroes in on the particulars of the Navajo case, however, and rarely ventures into larger, national implications. What broader lessons might we learn? Nevertheless, this book represents a beginning. Other tribal case studies will help to build a more complete picture of the medical story of federal-Indian relations.

SHERRY L. SMITH  
Southern Methodist University

DAVID TRAXEL. *1898: The Birth of the American Century*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1998. Pp. xiii, 365. \$28.95.

In 1899, John Dewey wrote: "One can hardly believe there has been a revolution in all history so rapid, so extensive, so complete" as the growth during the century then ending "of a world-wide market as the object of production, of vast manufacturing centres to supply this market, of cheap and rapid means of communication and distribution between all its parts." David Traxel, who writes history with a diverse reading public in mind, has a keen eye for appropriate quotations to introduce chapters. He chose a lengthy excerpt from Dewey's *The School and Society* (1943) for the epilogue to this book. The similarity between Dewey's thoughts and those that now appear frequently in reflections on the coming millennium sums up Traxel's argument that the main outlines of the century now coming to an end were apparent at its beginning. To show his readers how the United States looked to its disparate inhabitants as it shot, sold, and invested its way into the ranks of the world's imperial powers,

Traxel offers a panorama of events featured in the nation's press between the tumultuous public celebrations that greeted the advent of 1898 and the Christmas shopping that marked its conclusion.

The author offers a narrative in a pre-postmodern style, based on extensive perusal of secondary works, memoirs, the commercial press, and books by travelers and famous reporters. The metropolitan consolidation of New York City, the novel wonders of electricity and bicycles, efforts of pioneer conservationists, the Yukon gold rush, Isadora Duncan's dancing debut, the founding of the Gideon Bible Society, the armed assaults by whites in Wilmington, North Carolina, which overthrew the elected local government and expelled middle-class African Americans from the city, November's terrible "Portland Gale," and L. Frank Baum's writing of *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz* (1900) all pass before the reader's eyes, sometimes in glorious detail, at others in frustrating brevity. This book walks in the footsteps of Bernard A. DeVoto's classic, *The Year of Decision, 1846* (1943). Nevertheless, in contrast to the attention DeVoto lavished on political controversies that were to lead from a war of conquest to a civil war, Traxel has portrayed an emerging political consensus, albeit one troubled by racism and by blatant contrasts of wealth and poverty.

Traxel reserves his most detailed treatment for the war against Spain. The destruction of the battleship *Maine*, the assembling of troops and ships, the assault on Santiago de Cuba, and the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay are carefully recreated here on the basis of the copious record generated by what Traxel calls "the age of the reporter."

The war is depicted as a clash between an egalitarian and efficient United States and a decrepit imperial Spain. Traxel pays little attention to the struggles of Cubans, Filipinos, and Puerto Ricans, aside from disparaging references to blood-thirsty independence fighters, whom U.S. forces kept at arms length, and against whom in the Philippines they waged a long and bloody war of repression. No influence of the historical writing of William Appleman Williams, Walter La Feber, Thomas McCormick, or Louis A. Pérez is evident in these pages. In contrast to this book, the Spring 1998 issue of the *Organization of American Historians' Magazine of History*—devoted to historians' controversies concerning "The War of 1898" and edited by Pérez—reads as though it dealt with an entirely different conflict. Scarcely any of the many books the magazine's authors discuss, from differing points of view, appear in Traxel's bibliography.

In a word, this book is celebratory. Its hero figures are men and women of "vision," such as Henry Ford, Theodore Roosevelt, Admiral George Dewey, Clara Barton of the Red Cross, and Adolphus Green of the National Biscuit Company. Despite violent strikes by coal miners in Illinois and the army's bloody confrontation with the Chippewa in Minnesota, Bishop Tuttle of Missouri could assure the annual convention of the

Episcopal Church late in the year that "The Anglo-Saxon race seems harnessed to the twofold work of giving to the world the sweets of personal liberty and the restraints of order, without which liberty cannot be preserved."

That benevolent image of the American century was quickly put to the acid test by the annexation of the Philippines and the initiation of intense battles among Americans about the proper use and limits of their country's power over the rest of the world. The events and controversies that evoked Dewey's reflections and Tuttle's euphoria have a familiar ring to readers one hundred years later.

DAVID MONTGOMERY  
Yale University

STEVEN J. ROSS. *Working-Class Hollywood: Silent Film and the Shaping of Class in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 367. \$29.95.

The argument of this book refutes its title, for "working-class Hollywood," Steven J. Ross has gone a long way to show, is an oxymoron. Writing against Frankfurt School and conservative critics of mass culture, for whom it is imposed from above on passive consumers, Ross has uncovered a lively scene of decentralized, diversified production in the early motion picture business. Petty immigrant entrepreneurs, themselves doing battle against the Motion Picture Patents Company monopoly and without any labor troubles of their own, as well as film makers associated with socialism and with working-class movements, produced thousands of movies that presented workers as the heroes of their own lives. Other cultural studies scholars, Ross argues, minimize the constraints now placed on audiences by the narrow range of films available to them. "One of the great power struggles in American history" (p. 10), it is his thesis, took place in the early decades of the twentieth century, "when the class character of the movies was still being formed" (p. xv).

The very merit of Ross's detailed investigation, to be sure, complicates this heroic picture. The conjunction of decentralized production, progressive reform, and active socialist and trade union movements did issue forth in a broad spectrum of class and politics on film. Nonetheless, only about ten percent of the prewar output consisted of working-class films, and of the smaller subcategory depicting labor-capital conflict, one-third took a conservative line. The condition for working-class sympathy in the bulk of the others, moreover, was that workers be depicted as helpless victims incapable of collective action. D. W. Griffith may have been "one of the most powerful critics of class injustice that the movie industry ever produced," but he exacted the price of working-class passivity (pp. 36–37). Such widely seen worker films as *From Dusk to Dawn* (1913), *The Jungle* (1914), and *What Is To Be Done?* (1914) tell a different story, however, mixing fiction and documentary, strikes, socialist agitation,

and romance. "When the orchestra at a Lower East Side theater began playing *La Marseillaise* during a particularly poignant scene in *The Jungle*," as Ross describes the scene, "the large immigrant audience spontaneously broke out in song" (p. 107). The recovery of such films, their milieu, and their reception constitutes a major achievement.

Although working-class movements struggled to continue film production during the 1920s, working-class pre-Hollywood was shattered, Ross shows, by American entry into World War I. As class conflict films flooded the screen between April 1917 and 1922, they moved decisively in a conservative direction. "Bolshevism has attacked America," warned one screen hero in 1919, and "those filthy, longhaired degenerate murderers . . . stab in the back, dynamite homes, (and) parcel their women among them as if they were cattle" (p. 115). At the same time that motion pictures were beating back the red menace, Hollywood was emerging as at once a place, a centralized, homogenous system of production, and a point of view. (Griffith contributed to this development not with his short, working-class films but with the racist epic, *The Birth of a Nation* [1915], in which the victim position migrated from robber baron-exploited white workers to racially menaced white virgins.) Once primarily attended by the working class, motion pictures were attracting a middle-class public by the 1920s, and audiences in the new motion picture palaces enjoyed fantasies of consumption and cross-class reconciliation. The triumphant star system pulled workers out of their own lives into vicarious identification with idols of consumption who reappeared in one film after another. A burgeoning white-collar proletariat saw itself reflected back as middle class on screen. As before the war, worker films faced censors less energized against sex, vice, and criminal violence—contrary to the prevailing view—than against radical politics, labor struggle, and state violence. By 1930, the battle was over.

The paradoxical result of this book is to undercut popular culture after the Hollywood consolidation as a source of resistance and to ally the author with the Frankfurt School critics he has initially disparaged. Although Ross begins in the manner of such forward-looking tales of struggle and triumph as *From Dusk to Dawn*, his chronicle ends up in the place of a Griffith depiction of worker defeat. The book takes off from the decline of artisanal autonomy at the end of the nineteenth century, with the conjoined working-class turn to leisure. But the perpetuation of the artisan mode of production in the emerging mass, culture motion picture industry is what has given Ross his place to sit in motion picture theaters alongside the native-born and immigrant working class. Those seeking left politics in American popular culture in the final three-quarters of the twentieth century, at least where motion pictures are concerned, will, on the

evidence of this book, have to make use of different resources from those that Ross has mobilized.

MICHAEL ROGIN  
University of California,  
Berkeley

ELIZABETH HAIKEN. *Venus Envy: A History of Cosmetic Surgery*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1997. Pp. ix, 370. \$24.95.

PETER N. STEARNS. *Fat History: Bodies and Beauty in the Modern West*. New York: New York University Press. 1997. Pp. xvi, 294. \$25.95.

We know each other from the outside in. Our bodies show the way to the inner sanctum of character. We slouch in fear that the outside will betray the inside, that it will reveal to everyone the failed interior self. Social historians Peter N. Stearns and Elizabeth Haiken highlight the complicated relationship between character and appearance negotiated by twentieth-century Americans. They point to the 1920s as the time when significant cultural shifts plunged the nation into what became obsessive concern with beauty and slenderness. The 1920s is when consumer culture began to shape the body as yet another sign of achievement. For Haiken, this period marks the transition to a beauty contest culture in which the ugly lose. For Stearns, this when the relationship between overweight and faulty character is consolidated.

Stearns argues that the dramatic incompatibility between American diet mania and ever-increasing weight can be better understood if compared to twentieth-century French diet culture. Several factors in American culture guarantee the symbolic resonance of weight and diet. First, the diet regime is meant to function as punishment of sorts for consumerist self-indulgence; the religious fervor attached to weight-loss practices undermines from the outset the practitioner's ability to follow through on overly severe regimens whose rigor is a corrective not for weight but rather for widespread social guilt. In this sense, Stearns observes, dieting cannot work when it is displaced from its ultimate objective. Moreover, the American culture of abundance is ever in conflict with the demand for lean self-denial. Such conflict becomes overt in the case of childrearing, where parents continue to place enormous emphasis on the child's healthy appetite in defiance of adult imperatives. Finally, women especially are punished with bodily restraint for having violated their rightful position as chaste wives and mothers. The payment served up for their sexual freedom is, of course, the interminable diet.

In contrast, France, equally invested in a slender aesthetic, has managed to become a relatively slim nation. How so, wonders Stearns, when the United States and France share so many cultural features and concerns. It is because, he tells us, the French do not feel guilty. Without the intensity of the moral guilt/diet

connection, diets are likely to be more successful. The self-abasement, the sense that with each furtive bite one is proving oneself unworthy, even socially loathsome, is what makes a diet more than a simple diet—and what makes slenderness an almost unattainable sacrifice instead of a simple shift in aesthetics. French women, in contrast to their transatlantic sisters, wanted to look good in the new fashions. Given an ingrained national diet based on moderation and quality over quantity, as well as the symbolic neutrality of culinary appetites, Stearns points out that losing weight for the French was considerably simpler.

Stearns's thesis is amply supported with a wide range of cultural documents, and the comparative study of the United States and France offers an especially compelling perspective on our history of diet and weight gain. Given Stearns's extremely valuable contribution to theories of diet culture, it is surprising that he often justifies his own project by criticizing the work of feminist scholars on this subject as overly narrow and historically uninformed. As many of Stearns's own insights are dependent on just these feminist accounts, his criticisms are both unjustifiable and perplexing.

Finally, Stearns should reconsider his description of African-American culture as largely resistant to white slenderness imperatives. This is not an unfamiliar argument, and it ignores the degree to which all members of our culture are influenced by mainstream "white" aesthetic standards. Thus, even Stearns's own evidence that *Ebony* repeatedly urges its readers to ignore the cultural mania for thinness suggests that black Americans are not entirely safe from the lure of diet culture.

Haiken's book on plastic surgery focuses on the chilling paradox of how the freedom to buy whatever one wants (including youth and beauty) can lead to widespread social conformity. In the melting pot of the United States, which supposedly has a more profound investment in maintaining racial and ethnic diversity, Americans seem to have arrived at an undeclared but universally agreed upon set of aesthetic standards.

In the United States, the power to change oneself surgically is linked to the culture of self-improvement. In competitive twentieth-century society (from business success to marriage prospects), it is critical to do what you can to enhance your opportunities. If you are a flat-chested woman in the midst of the "sweater girl" era, you lessen your chance for finding a mate, not just because you have the wrong figure but also because your low self-esteem keeps you hiding indoors when you should be out there marketing yourself. The popularization of the notion of an "inferiority complex," observes Haiken, made cosmetic surgery seem like the necessary solution to a whole array of social dangers threatening the individual. Importantly, as Haiken puts it, "traditional boundaries between mind and body began to blur: mental (or moral) qualities no longer seemed distinct from physical ones." If you look good, you make the right first impression. If you feel good about yourself, you will look better to other



people. If you feel good about the way you look, you will feel good about your "self." The outside transforms the inside. Your reshaped nose does not make you less Jewish, insist Jewish rhinoplastic patients; rather, you are seen for "yourself" instead of "stereotyped" as Jewish. Haiken repeatedly underscores the irony of the self-creating body that is driven to look like everyone else. Haiken holds surgeons accountable as well, despite their protests that they simply give the American public what it wants. By medicalizing and normalizing beauty, Haiken asserts, the surgeons participate in creating the very "inferiority complexes" they purport to cure. Her account of the history of breast implants and the controversy surrounding implant materials powerfully underscores her representation of cosmetic surgery as a kind of "medicine" that casts healthy bodies as aesthetically diseased. Ironically, in many instances, the "healing" of the "deformed" body part (wrinkles, small breasts) has involved the implantation of materials later found to be health hazards.

Haiken overlooks the extent to which the confusion between character and appearance was already well under way in the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century American women novelists, in particular, repeatedly made clear the necessity for the outside to be beautiful. Cosmetics were worrisome precisely because women might be able to "pass" as young and beautiful when they were no such thing. Moreover, at the end of the twentieth century, Americans do not seem to be nearly as complacent about cosmetic interventions as Haiken suggests. The acceptance or shame alluded to cosmetic surgery is very much linked to one's subculture. For many, surgery continues to be perceived as a shameful and private practice.

While Haiken certainly never lectures on the evils of cosmetic surgery (which is a relief), throughout the book she makes it apparent that she considers the trend bad news for a culture where even individual differences of face and body succumb to normalizing effects of assembly-line beauty. The putative freedom to remake one's face and body begins to feel like social responsibility. Those who are less than attractive in this culture, who grow old (dis)gracefully, untended, with unruly pockets of fat and sag and wrinkles, who have "let themselves go" increasingly are made to feel reviled by a culture that has lost the ability to distinguish between the body and any other commodity.

VIRGINIA L. BLUM  
University of Kentucky

LINDA J. LUMSDEN, *Rampant Women: Suffragists and the Right of Assembly*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1997. Pp. xxxii, 273.

"Virtually the entire suffrage story can be told through the prism of the right of assembly" (p. 144), Linda J. Lumsden contends. "All Americans are indebted to the suffragists for the forthright way they insisted upon exercising their right to assemble peaceably" (p. 160).

This book explores the link between the suffrage movement and the right of assembly by examining the many ways in which suffragists acted collectively. Lumsden looks first at clubs, delegations, conventions, and other nineteenth-century gatherings. The year 1908 marked a shift to more aggressive campaign tactics. Soapbox orators and street meetings reached larger audiences, challenged cultural barriers, and occasionally faced legal obstacles. Lumsden explores the significance of petition drives, the impact of suffrage parades on participants and onlookers, the role of pageants as political theater, and, finally, the picketing of the White House by the National Woman's Party (NWP) that began on January 10, 1917. Picketing surely represented the most confrontational of suffragist actions. Authorities tolerated the pickets for six months but then arrested them, under charges that were inconsistent and unconvincing. Lumsden points out. Jailed suffragists' protests, including hunger strikes, evoked sympathy for the cause. NWP civil disobedience, Lumsden asserts, "influenced the epic civil rights protests that unfolded decades later in the American South" (p. 142).

Lumsden's discussion of suffragist tactics reveals a rich array of events, but it lacks a compelling interpretive framework, such as that offered by Michael McGerr, for example, in his memorable article, "Political Style and Women's Power, 1830–1930" (*Journal of American History* 77 [December 1990]: 865–85). McGerr asks why suffrage tactics changed so dramatically in the first decades of the twentieth century and why activist women later rejected the style that brought them victory; his answers anchor the suffrage movement in a larger political context, as this book does not. More important, a chasm develops between the contents of Lumsden's study—suffragist campaign tactics—and its purported theme. The book, in short, is more about how suffragists promoted their cause and won press coverage than about the right of assembly. As suffragist tactics take center stage, the right-of-assembly theme grows more tenuous, and the more the author reiterates its importance, the less relevant it seems. Many of Lumsden's observations serve instead to vitiate the theme.

All agitation for reform depends on the right of assembly, as Lumsden concedes at the outset. It is never clear, however, in what ways suffragists' exercise of this particular right differed substantially from that of any other group. Moreover, the right of assembly was not one with which suffragists were preoccupied or even much concerned, apparently. Authorities rarely impinged on suffragists' right to assemble because these women typically enjoyed the protection of class—as political radicals often did not. Indeed, as Lumsden reveals, suffragists raised no objection when authorities deprived antisuffragists of the right of assembly; white suffragists denied the assembly rights of black suffragists. On the sole occasion in which suffragists ran into serious trouble—the case of the NWP picketers—Lumsden never clarifies whether



picketing represented the right of assembly or of free expression and starts to discuss "First Amendment rights" in general, which clouds her argument. Nor does she examine to what extent the NWP leap into civil disobedience in 1917 diverged from the strategy of the mainstream suffrage movement. Finally, since all of Lumsden's information about suffragists' tangles with the law comes from the press, not from legal sources, it is hard to tell what constitutional rights, if any, were in fact at issue. Indeed, Lumsden informs us, the right of assembly only became significant in law long after the suffrage campaign ended.

One would like to concur with at least some of this book's many assertions—for instance, that the right of assembly was "instrumental in helping nineteenth-century American women acquire a feminist consciousness" (p. xvii) or that "suffragists indirectly helped prod the legal system to establish protections for dissidents exercising their First Amendment rights" (p. xiv). But, in the end, the special connection that Lumsden perceives between the suffrage movement and the right of assembly remains hazy. A useful appendix describes twenty suffrage organizations and provides a chronology of major events in the suffrage campaign.

NANCY WOLOCH  
Barnard College,  
Columbia University

ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN. *African American Women in the Struggle for the Vote, 1850–1920*. (Blacks in the Diaspora.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 192. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$16.95.

One of the first significant topics of scholarly examination in American women's history, and a topic that today is among those most studied, is the woman suffrage movement. Many of the scholars who have paid significant attention to black women's efforts in the struggle for the vote have been able, since 1977, to utilize Rosalyn Terborg-Penn's dissertation and the articles it yielded. Now her book examines changing strategies, tactics, and leadership of black women in the suffrage movement within a framework that allows for a generational analysis. The book considers black women's involvement in the larger, mostly white-controlled organizations as well as their work within their own black communities, institutions, and organizations. It explores these women's alliances with black men and the circumstances under which women worked independently. And finally, it examines the women's efforts not only as activists but also, eventually, as voters and candidates for public office.

Terborg-Penn is as conscious of the process of historical research and its implications as she is aware of the results of such research. The details of her own odyssey in the historical profession provide a useful backdrop to this narrative. But Terborg-Penn does not ignore "state of the field" questions. Considering both theoretical and empirical work, she finds the "happy

medium" and contextualizes this work in both. She allows her subjects to speak for themselves and shows that in their own lives, they, too, searched for and found the middle ground (even though it sometimes shifted), and that they were not merely nationalists, which is how much of the earlier work on black women activists characterized them, and not merely feminists, which would also be an oversimplification. Terborg-Penn describes them as black nationalist feminists, whose work in every arena was shaped in part by their complex identity, the limitations it created, the opportunities it provided, and the obligations it commanded.

Terborg-Penn's narrative is at once familiar and unique. That is to say that, in general, the struggle for woman suffrage is a familiar one. But before engaging exclusively in a woman suffrage movement, and even after coming to focus on woman suffrage, black women were also instrumental in a universal suffrage struggle. Thus, this volume is, literally, about "the struggle for the vote" as much as it is about the struggle for woman suffrage. But, equally important, black women had to continue to struggle for the vote for two generations beyond the passage of the woman suffrage amendment to the Constitution. In each of its phases, the history of that struggle was obviously shaped by conditions the women faced. But it has never been documented and detailed in this way before. Terborg-Penn notes at the outset, and shows over the course of the narrative, that this quest was shaped by black women's changing status "from slave to free, from rural to urban, from illiterate to literate, from unskilled to skilled or to professional workers" (p. 1). And as each of these characteristics might suggest, the struggle was shaped both by changes in the women's status and by the changes in their consciousness.

Among the freshest discussions in the book are those that pertain not only to the shift in the leadership of the movements from male to female but also that from the North to the South. Equally important and mostly new is the discussion, scattered over several chapters, of the participation of black working-class women in the suffrage movement. And, finally, an early chapter in the book provides a detailed discussion of the well-studied split in the larger woman suffrage movement that resulted in the creation of the American Woman Suffrage Association and the National Woman Suffrage Association, but from the perspective of black women suffragists. Although readers will finish this volume wanting to know more about all these topics (in this case a compliment as much as a criticism), they will also experience the satisfaction of knowing that a significant gap in the history of the "woman suffrage movement" is being closed.

STEPHANIE J. SHAW  
Ohio State University

MELINDA CHATEAUVERT. *Marching Together: Women of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters*. (Women in American History.) (The Working Class in American

History.) Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 267. Cloth \$46.95, paper \$17.95.

The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) has been the subject of many recent studies, most of which have focused on the African-American union, its charismatic leader, A. Philip Randolph, and the union's connections to the broader struggle for civil rights and racial equality. Melinda Chateauvert brings a new side of the Brotherhood to light: namely, the role of women in the union and its women's auxiliaries. Originally called Women's Economic Councils, the renamed Ladies' Auxiliaries provided crucial support to the union in the years before it achieved legal recognition and bargaining rights. Because they were not employed by the watchful Pullman Company, wives often performed the union work their husbands could not, including collecting dues and insurance premiums in the BSCP's early years. Although the wives of Pullman porters dominated the organization, Pullman's small number of women workers, the Pullman maids, also were consigned to the auxiliary by union rules. Not surprisingly, the history of the "ladies' auxiliaries" is one of the increasing marginalization of both activist wives and women workers. In a tale familiar to women's historians, the African-American women who sustained the union in its movement-building days were shuttled aside once the union was recognized in the 1930s and power increasingly resided in the hands of its central leadership. Acknowledging the path of the women's organization in the 1930s and 1940s, Chateauvert seeks to reclaim the women's auxiliary story on its own terms. In helping to build the BSCP, women such as Lucy Randolph, Halena Wilson, and Rosina Tucker also built one of the most important institutions in African-American community life and contributed to the civil rights struggle in doing so.

Chateauvert's work is the first book to focus on women's union auxiliaries, which labor history has tended to ignore. Apart from a few scattered articles and chapters, the history of women's auxiliaries is virtually unknown, although they constituted a major reason for the survival and maintenance of unions during the 1920s and helped rebuild unions in the crucial years of the Great Depression. Chateauvert's telling of the story of the BSCP auxiliary, however, echoes more with the burgeoning civil rights movement of the 1940s than the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)-inspired growth of women's auxiliaries from the Depression decade. The course of the BSCP women's organization, and the choice for "ladies' auxiliary" over the more common union "women's auxiliary," departs radically from the class-conscious tale of the Women's Emergency Brigade in the Flint Sit-Down strike of 1937. Instead, the path of the BSCP women seems to be more a search for a racially informed, middle-class respectability rather than a gender-informed class consciousness, and it is that story with which Chateauvert seems most comfortable. Respectability, Chateauvert argues, had different

meanings in the context of racial inequality, poverty, and social conflict. Such "respectability," however, was not far removed from the code that governed most craft unions at the time and certainly shared its values concerning family and gender. Shaped by the dynamic relationship between "black manhood," a central tenet of BSCP union ideology, and "female respectability," women's activism was circumscribed by gender conventions and legitimated only by male authority. By the 1950s, women of the BSCP auxiliaries had moved from union to political activism. At that time, anticommunism and the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, both of which restricted union activity, undermined the usefulness of trade unionism as a civil rights vehicle for African-American workers and wives. Declining membership for both generational and industrial reasons, the flagging support of union president Randolph, and lack of independent financial resources brought about the end of the BSCP women's auxiliary.

Chateauvert's book restores the Ladies' Auxiliaries of the BSCP to historical visibility, uncovering the connection between masculinity in politically assertive guise ("the New Manhood movement") and the marginalization of women in political life. Although Chateauvert could have sharpened the study's analysis with a longer look at the gender dynamics of both union and community, its lack is the only weakness in this strong contribution to our growing understanding of African-American, women's, and working-class history.

ELIZABETH FAUE  
Wayne State University

KEVIN J. MUMFORD. *Interzones: Black/White Sex Districts in Chicago and New York in the Early Twentieth Century*. (Popular Cultures, Everyday Lives.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1997. Pp. xix, 238. Cloth \$49.50, paper \$17.50.

The personal story of the African-American heavyweight champion Jack Johnson serves as a central and recurring trope for Kevin J. Mumford's history of race, sex, and culture in early twentieth-century America. Johnson, the most successful fighter of his era and the first African-American boxer to win an international reputation, was known not only for his intellectual prowess but also for his sexual relationships with white women. Indeed, as Mumford explains, it was on both accounts that Johnson, who was eventually prosecuted under the infamous Mann Act, became a scapegoat for white discomfort and rage over black migration, urban growth, and, not unrelatedly, the emergence of new forms of popular culture. But Mumford's story is ultimately not about the casualties of America's racial history; it is about the cultural forms and social life that emerged in what he calls "interzones": the spaces, both geographic and cultural, where black and white, homosexual and heterosexual, mixed and played and, in the process, created an intense and vibrant cultural life. His purpose is to write a history of black/white

sexuality, to situate cultures often regarded as marginal at the center of historical analysis, and, finally, to offer a new perspective on the historical construction of modernism.

To carry out this ambitious project, Mumford divides his work into three sections. The first treats the changing social geography of interzones in the Progressive period; the second chronicles places of leisure and the social groups that inhabited them in the 1920s; and the third argues how alternative or marginal culture redefined both avant-garde and mainstream American culture. An introduction and epilogue provide a theoretical framework. The term "interzones" refers specifically to areas of interracial culture (identified as vice districts by Progressive reformers) that emerged either within or on the margins of African-American neighborhoods in the first decades of the twentieth century, areas like Harlem in New York and the Levee in Chicago. Here were the brothels, saloons, and dance halls that had been pushed out of more respectable urban zones. As mixed social spaces, they provided a variety of social functions and even allowed reformers to claim success in cleaning out vice from other districts. Thus, Mumford postulates, the politics of social and sexual reform in the Progressive period were simultaneously the politics of race and gender. But these interzones, which were defined by their inhabitants' marginality, also quickly became viable and vibrant cultural spaces.

By the 1920s, these places of interracial life also provided sanctuary for others on the margins of middle-class white society. Here Mumford broadens his study to include Asians, especially Filipinos, homosexuals, and both black and white prostitutes. His discussion of homosexuality centers on the world of black and white "inverts" who frequented clubs featuring drag dances, cross dressing (male and female), and open solicitation. In an examination of black prostitutes, Mumford argues that these "new" fallen women replaced white prostitutes on the lowest rung of the social and economic ladder. But in addition to providing a social history of interzones and their inhabitants, Mumford's point is that these locations were important sites of cultural formation. And, in producing dynamic and countercultural forms, marginal social groups—black, white, homosexual, interracial—reshaped the mainstream culture that had shunned them.

This larger cultural influence is the subject of the book's final chapters. Starting with a fine discussion of the 1924 production of Eugene O'Neill's *All God's Chillun Got Wings*, starring Paul Robeson, Mumford writes that this production (attacked by both black and white groups) exposed the "psychological conflicts" of interracial couples and "the profound anxiety of those who protested against them" (p. 121). The play, he writes, brought interracial sexual relations into the mainstream. And finally, Mumford argues, the culture of the "slums," its music and dance as well as elements

of its cultural style such as dress and hair style, merged with and transformed mainstream culture.

Mumford's study is hung on an elaborate and sometimes cumbersome theoretical scaffolding. Working out of Joan Scott's theoretical construct of gender, as well as recent cultural theory, he argues for interracial sexual culture as a category of analysis. Clearly, he sees his work as providing a theoretical perspective on race and sex as well as a historical narrative of black/white sexual culture over time. The sources for the work are a wonderful blend of literary texts (O'Neill's play, Carl Van Vechten's 1926 novel, *Nigger Heaven*), reports of social workers and vice crusaders, and private correspondence and memoirs. The book is a good addition to an emerging body of creative and innovative work on the cultural history of race and the complicated relationship between marginal and mainstream culture in early twentieth-century America.

AMY GILMAN SREBNICK  
Montclair State University

DOMINIC J. CAPECI, JR., *The Lynching of Cleo Wright*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1998. Pp. xiii, 274. \$29.95.

The summary murder of Cleo Wright in Missouri in January 1942 differed little from other lynchings. After entering a private home, Wright allegedly wounded a white woman, fled, and then knifed an arresting police officer. Swift retribution followed attacks on "white womanhood" and the law. Although dying from wounds received during his arrest, Wright was seized from a hospital annex, dragged behind an automobile, and finally set afire.

Dominic J. Capeci has written a painstaking and valuable study of these tragic events that confirms and extends the findings of other recent scholars of lynching. He briefly describes the lynching of Wright and then places it in the larger context of local and national race relations. The lynching, he contends, may be traced to the transition from "frontier to civilization [which] merged Yankee and southern prejudice" in the so-called "Bootheel" of southeastern Missouri. There, residents (one-quarter of whom were black) confronted "a whirlwind of change" and "a clash of the old and new" (p. 5). These tensions between modernism and traditionalism became manifest in the differing responses to the lynching by C. L. Blanton, a local white editor who endorsed it, and his son David, the county prosecutor who struggled to punish the lynchers.

Capeci's book is at its best when he describes how various constituencies reacted to Wright's lynching. The response of local blacks underscores the expanding opportunities for black activism during the 1940s. After the lynching, they used traditional tactics to deal with white violence; some sought protection with influential whites, some fled to safer environs, and others armed themselves. They also organized a local branch of the National Association for the Advance-

ment of Colored People (NAACP), thereby transforming themselves "from a paramilitary unit into a para-legal organization" (p. 28). Blacks in St. Louis held mass meetings, while blacks across the country added their voices to calls for the punishment of the lynchers. The Wright lynching became symbolic of the injustices that blacks sought to overcome in their "Double-V" wartime campaign: victory over America's enemies abroad, and victory over racism at home. These aims became encapsulated in the slogan, "Remember Pearl Harbor and Remember Cleo Wright" (p. 43). Finally, white "modernists," including prominent businessmen, newspaper editors, and politicians such as Republican Governor Forrest C. Donnell joined the chorus demanding an investigation of the lynching.

Capeci adeptly shows how the awkward timing of Wright's death provoked the Roosevelt administration to acknowledge that lynching was more than "a local problem" (p. 49). Concerned about the impact of lynchings on national morale and by depictions of them in Japanese propaganda, Attorney General Francis Biddle ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate. He also launched a probe by the recently established Civil Rights Section within the Justice Department. These steps represented precedent-setting extensions of federal authority; for half a century, federal authorities had shied away from using Reconstruction-era statutes to defend black civil rights. Biddle's order demonstrated that the absence of a federal anti-lynching statute need not completely enervate federal protection of civil rights.

Much of Capeci's account is devoted to a careful narrative of the complex legal proceedings conducted by local, state, and federal authorities. Local prosecution was stymied by a judge who, as Capeci demonstrates, sent coded messages that discouraged a grand jury from indicting the alleged lynchers. A subsequent effort by federal officials to secure indictments from a federal grand jury also failed, overcome by "legal precedent, internal differences, racial prejudice, and probably resistance to federal interference" (p. 62). Thus, the federal response to the Wright lynching is noteworthy not because the lynchers were prosecuted successfully but rather because the government took an active interest in the first place.

Capeci's excellent work is not without questionable analysis. Why, for example, were some businessmen "modernists" who denounced the lynching while others remained gripped by "racism and provincialism" (p. 65)? Capeci's lengthy discussion of this topic is not altogether convincing. His judgment about Wright's motivations for his alleged crime spree also may trouble readers. Wright emerges from these pages as a young man whose yearning for respect degenerated into "full-blown defiance" and "nihilistic rage" (pp. 87, 96). "The self-hatred inherent in a life of subservience," Capeci suggests, "finally overwhelmed his drive for manhood" (p. 87). "His repressed impulses broke through," and his attack "completed the emotional journey of endeavoring to be a black man in a white

society by violating one of its women" (p. 97). That psychic traumas—especially a stern taskmaster mother—generated Wright's purported "emasculatation" and "resentment of all women" (p. 103) is highly speculative. Wright's behavior and state of mind are worthy of study. But given that Wright committed no clear act of sexual aggression—he entered a house through a bedroom window and then wounded one of its occupants when she tried to flee—Capeci is altogether too quick to label him a "rapist" and to ruminate about the impulses that led to his actions and eventual death. Perhaps this fine study would have been even stronger had Capeci accepted that some aspects of the gruesome history of lynching simply defy explanation.

W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE  
University of Florida

JONATHAN J. BEAN. *Beyond the Broker State: Federal Policies toward Small Business, 1936–1961*. (Business, Society, and the State.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. xiv, 281. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$16.95.

Jonathan J. Bean's insightful and extensively researched book on federal small business policy between 1936 and 1961 challenges three major analytic interpretations of modern American political history: corporate liberalism, the brokered state, and rational choice. The corporate liberalism argument, developed by scholars such as James Weinstein and Martin Sklar, claims that corporate capitalism was triumphant in the twentieth century. Almost every federal policy and politician, they argue, sought to protect an economy that revolved around national corporations. But the brokered state thesis, grounded in pluralism, posits that U. S. politics involved an ongoing competition between organized interest groups, particularly labor, agriculture, and big business. In this interpretation, the federal government acted as a broker that attempted to achieve equilibrium; government policy thus reflected the demands of organized interest groups. Finally, the rational choice model presents representatives and senators as capable of acting only on the basis of electoral self-interest.

Bean's work challenges all of these claims. The book starts with the "Magna Carta" of small business, the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which limited the discounts available to chain stores. It ends with the institutionalization of small business concerns through the Small Business Administration. Bean argues that a shift took place among proponents of small business from relying on anti-trust policies to emphasizing financial and administrative assistance. Unlike the existing literature on government-business relations, which focuses on the executive branch and independent regulatory commissions, Bean pays close attention to Congress. Small business policy, he says, found its greatest champions in congressional entrepreneurs such as Robert Taft, James Murray, Emanuel Celler, and Wright Patman who continued to champion the



cause of the noncorporate world. According to Bean, a small business ideology rooted in Jeffersonian principles rather than pure political interest motivated these politicians to take action. They legitimated their contradictory demand of asking government to save free enterprise by invoking a "crisis rhetoric." Not sharing any "consensus" over corporate capitalism, they warned of the eclipse of small business without political assistance. Contrary to the brokered state interpretation, these policy entrepreneurs acted of their own volition on the basis of an ideology rather than the economic interests who supported them. Notwithstanding the fact that many of their supporters were not from small business and the economic reality that small business was doing well, political ideology drove these congressional entrepreneurs to seek government assistance.

But Bean does not stop with legislative politics. Importantly, he follows the programs through the politics of administration to understand why they ultimately failed or how they produced unintended results. For example, Bean shows that the Miller-Tydings Act (1937), which initially aimed to limit price competition from chain stores by allowing manufacturers to establish minimum prices on brand name goods, fell apart in practice since the government did not enforce price agreements, while the judicial and executive branches challenged the law. Discount retailing, moreover, also diminished the political popularity of this program. As a result, Congress repealed the law in 1975.

There are a few parts of the book that could have been stronger. Foremost, Bean should have developed the chapter that provides a collective biography of the congressional entrepreneurs. As it stands, that chapter is not fully convincing. Since Bean makes such a strong claim that ideology—not self-interest—motivated these leaders, readers would have benefited from a thicker analysis of their political districts, professional ties as lawyers, and electoral support; even their personalities are somewhat elusive. Nor does Bean come to grips with the constant failures of small business policies. In some respects, his work still fits within the corporate liberal framework. Although this book shatters the claim that all politicians cared only about the modern corporation, he shows that small business policy was marginal and failed to accomplish its goals. His analysis only includes a handful of congressmen, many of whom were seen as being on the extremes of the political spectrum (Patman, for example). Even after reading this book, one could still conclude that the dominant economic policies and mainstream politicians favored policies aiding the modern corporation.

Nonetheless, Bean has written an excellent book that is invaluable to twentieth-century political and business historians. By bringing small business back into political history, Bean provides a shrewd analysis of an important area of public policy that has been downplayed by historians and political scientists. His

work raises important challenges to the current historiography on business-government relations.

JULIAN E. ZELIZER  
State University of New York,  
Albany

DANIEL T. RODGERS. *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. 634. \$35.00.

Daniel T. Rodgers has reconstructed American social politics from the Gilded Age through the New Deal along an axis that stretches across the North Atlantic. "Tap into the debates that swirled through the United States and industrialized Europe over the problems and miseries of 'great city' life, the insecurities of wage work, the social backwardness of the countryside, or the instabilities of the market itself," he writes, "and one finds oneself pulled into an intense, transnational traffic in reform ideas, policies, and legislative devices" (p. 3). Historians, he claims, neglect this distinctive transatlantic moment in America's past.

Rodgers tracks Americans as they went to Europe to observe, interview, and gather data that found their way into doctoral dissertations, magazine and newspaper articles, books, public documents, reform, and legislation. With a focus more on connections than national differences, American social politics, he argues, originated not in "nation-state containers" but "in the world between them." The traffic flowed more often from East to West, and until the New Deal the pace of change in social policy lagged behind Europe's. During the New Deal, Europeans finally began to arrive in America to observe a transformation of social policy more thorough than any undertaken on their side of the Atlantic—but, then, Americans had a long way to go just to catch up.

Rodgers stresses the importance of ideas and individuals. Ideas set the agendas for politics; individuals carried ideas back and forth across the Atlantic and urged their implementation. Rodgers weaves his tapestry of interconnections through multiple biographical narratives of idea and policy brokers: the human links that composed the transatlantic social politics cable. Moving in and out of government, between positions in the world of social reform, publishing, and academic life, they were "self-taught experts working on the intellectual margins of imperfectly professionalized fields" (p. 26).

One thread stitched together their efforts across a multitude of different projects: "not everything belonged in the market" (p. 29). As they tried to navigate a passage between individualism and statism, reformers criticized laissez-faire economic theory and resisted the threatened commodification of social policy. Although Rodgers does not draw it, the contrast with today's transatlantic neo-liberal approach to the core issues of the welfare state is unmistakable. Today, entranced by declining American welfare rolls, European policy brokers participate in a transatlantic mar-



ketization of social policy and weakening of entitlements. In the new transatlantic moment, Europeans look to Wisconsin the way Americans once turned to Berlin.

In a roughly chronological sequence, Rodgers reports on a multitude of issues that historians for the most part discuss separately: for instance, subsidized housing, municipal transportation, city planning, rural reconstruction, wage and workplace regulation, workers' insurance, modernist architecture, the single tax, and the New Deal. His account of each draws on massive reading in transnational sources. The extraordinary footnotes that document the arguments in this long, and never dull, book alone are worth its price. Indeed, Rodgers has written a book that can be studied profitably for its craft as well as its substance. He has shown historians how to join narrative and analysis in a powerful and persuasive argument. Beautifully written, masterfully organized, always with an eye for the telling detail, this work rides lightly on great learning.

Rodgers not only transforms the history of social politics in the crucial years between 1870 and 1945; he also recasts welfare state history. (He points out, rightly, the anachronism of applying the label welfare state to the aspirations of the social policy brokers of the Progressive era.) A variety of theories contend for primacy among explanations of the welfare state; of these, the "institutional-political process" approach is the latest. Although abundant evidence supports each of them, observes Rodgers, none alone is adequate. Each explains some developments, not others; each fits some time periods, not all. No single factor dominates the untidy history of relief, social insurance, or the welfare state. The story remains sorted out best by historians unencumbered by theoretical straightjackets and unwilling to flatten causal variety and multiple processes into a false consistency.

A work as bold and comprehensive as this one will provoke healthy controversy. Here are five questions worth some debate. First, has Rodgers identified the second transatlantic moment in social politics? In education, mental health, crime, juvenile delinquency, and the poor law, antebellum American discussions of policy drew on European examples, and reformers frequently crossed the Atlantic for purposes similar to their successors in the Progressive era. Second, how does the massive international assault on outdoor relief in the 1870s and 1880s fit Rodgers's paradigm? Outdoor relief was, after all, as much a part of social politics as workers' housing or social insurance.

Third, is Rodgers's virtual equation of social politics in the 1920s with housing adequate? Would the inclusion of the modernization of state and municipal welfare, the consolidation of private charity, and the welfare work of a number of large firms reshape his interpretation? Fourth, what impact would greater attention to work and relief programs have on Rodgers's picture of the New Deal? As it stands, his interpretation, which concentrates on social insurance, fits uneasily with Edwin Amenta's startling revelation,

in *Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy* (1998), that government spending on work and relief in the late 1930s gave America the most generous social spending regime in the world. Finally, when did Rodgers's transatlantic era end? I would put it a little later than Rodgers: in the 1950s, when the Cold War that connected "welfare state" to left politics and socialism closed the lid on the era of Atlantic crossings.

These are issues for discussion. It is a measure of Rodgers's great accomplishment that he has written a book that historians not only will admire but with which they will want to contend. Like his peripatetic subjects, Rodgers has set an exciting and important agenda.

MICHAEL B. KATZ  
University of Pennsylvania

ALAN BRINKLEY. *Liberalism and Its Discontents*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 372. \$27.95.

"What is liberalism? What has happened to it?" So begins Alan Brinkley's noteworthy collection of essays about a much-misunderstood ideological tradition, one that has been on the ropes in recent decades, battered, broken and discredited in the eyes of many Americans after a prolonged season of apparent dominance dating back to the New Deal. Brinkley's survey—equal parts history, historiography, and political theory, enriched and enlivened by vivid biographical portraits—methodically demolishes whatever illusions anyone may still harbor that twentieth-century "liberalism" was ever a tightly defined system of ideas and practices, one that preempted to the point of invisibility radically different alternatives from both the left and right.

Liberalism's congenital lack of definition begins, of course, with its founder and enigmatic patron saint, Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose independence from ideological consistency is well known, read as shrewd pragmatism by admirers and shallow expediency by detractors. Brinkley sees FDR's leadership style as both an extension of his personality—"characterized by surface charm, emotional distance, and elaborate patterns of deception" (p. 7)—and as a response to certain limiting realities, even at the height of his popularity as president. Roosevelt's electoral triumphs tend to disguise the fact that deep, unrelenting strains of opposition to federal activism never vanished in the 1930s and 1940s, especially in the South. The New Deal reform impulse was, as a result, almost always modest, always cautious and endangered; its initiatives operated within daunting constraints for a rather brief moment in American history, only to be curtailed or withdrawn at the first signs of return to economic normalcy. Brinkley recounts the bureaucratic infighting and debates over fiscal philosophy that allowed critics like Richard Hofstadter later to dismiss Roosevelt's program as a "chaos of experimentation" with

few discernable core principles or goals. This goes too far, in the author's view. The New Deal was an expression of the ameliorative, Progressive-era faiths of its architects, and Roosevelt himself did sometimes dare profound challenges (at least rhetorical) to the entrenched powers of the corporate-capitalist order. Brinkley laments that FDR was the last president to worry seriously about the dangers of monopoly and the growing disparities of wealth in the U.S., the last "to talk openly" (in 1936) about the abuses of "economic royalists" and the "new industrial dictatorship," using "a language that has since become almost entirely lost to American politics, even though the problems it attempted to address have survived" (pp. 35–36). And by broadening and diversifying the base of the Democratic Party, the Roosevelt coalition began the undermining of its segregationist wing, setting in motion (perhaps unwittingly) a process of racial reform that would only become fully, momentarily evident in the 1950s and 1960s.

In other essays, arranged in rough chronological order (and only occasionally lapsing into the repetition that is almost inevitable in such collections), Brinkley explores the contradictions of postwar liberalism's ascendancy through the careers of the foreign policy establishment (men like John J. McCloy, possessed of "rock-hard certainty" about America's beneficent mission in the Cold War world), the rise and fall of public heroes (above all John F. Kennedy, the martyred prince whose posthumous hold on his country's imagination—in both romantic versions and dark "counter-myths"—symbolizes the nostalgia, cynicism, and disillusionment that have come to predominate in our own time), and the tragic ordeal of activists like Allard Lowenstein (who watched in horror as the quaint, admirably cosmopolitan ideals in which he believed all but died amid the violence and irrationality of the late 1960s). Through it all is a rejection of the idea, once a commonplace among historians and other observers, that a strong liberal "consensus" reigned during the middle decades of the century, both in the halls of power and out among the people.

Brinkley is particularly good at sketching, in all their vitality, liberalism's many challengers, including the New Left (which makes its familiar journey from innocence to nihilism and excess) and the conservative tradition, both elite and populist (dismissed by too many scholars as pathological, and rent, from theorists like Russell Kirk to evangelicals like Oral Roberts, by its own contradictions and schisms). The arguments here are uniformly convincing, have a cumulative weight, and are delivered in balanced, lucid, craftsmanlike fashion. Those seeking stylistic pyrotechnics or speculative bombshells are bound for disappointment. For the rest of us, including the many students who would benefit from this volume as a textbook, Brinkley allows a chance to rethink carefully the tangled, tortured course of American political debate since the 1930s. In the end, he sees more conflict than consensus and expresses understandable concern that

dialogue over the issues that divide Americans—a necessity in a democratic society—has fewer and fewer outlets, reflected in phenomena from the "taming" of the political convention (into "shiny, packaged commercials") to the "airbrushing" of controversial, unpleasant aspects of our history (as in recent reworkings of America's record during World War II) (pp. 264, 308). This book serves as a model of the ethic to which Brinkley calls his fellow practitioners: to ask difficult questions, to provide context to a broad public hungry to understand the past, and to counter those who would reduce complex events and ideas to sweeping narratives and empty clichés.

GREGORY SUMNER  
*University of Detroit Mercy*

PAUL MILKMAN. *PM: A New Deal in Journalism, 1940–1948*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 254. \$45.00.

The tabloid New York newspaper *PM* lived from 1940 to 1948, and it differed from other daily newspapers in one fundamental respect: it did not carry advertising. The paper was sold for five cents—a high price in 1940—in the belief that readers would pay this premium because *PM* was strikingly designed, used better newsprint and more photographs, and offered new consumer services such as radio and movie listings and advice on good buys in New York stores.

It also differed from other New York papers in the intensity of its partisanship on the left, favoring Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal in general, labor unions and racial tolerance in particular, and, above all, in its determination to fight fascism and fascists to the death. That emphasis brought to its editorial staff a collection of intellectuals representing almost every variety of left-wing thought in the country.

It is the politics of the period and the paper that most interests Paul Milkman. The man who started it all was Ralph Ingersoll, a flamboyant, erratic, but persevering aristocrat who formulated its goals and raised the money needed to start the paper. The original backers included a dozen or so liberal millionaires but eventually came to depend on Marshall Field III of Chicago, heir to the family department store fortune, who spent more than seven million dollars to keep *PM* going for as long as it did.

"We are against people who push other people around," Ingersoll said, and the liberal tone of his appeal for reporters and editors, coupled with the prospect of decent pay and benefits, brought job applications from thousands of idealistic journalists. Critics of his strategy say Ingersoll picked too many ideologues, too many editors, and too few genuine reporters. But staffing the runs with good reporters is the most expensive part of running a newspaper, and Ingersoll never had enough money.

Adherence to even a narrow band of liberal principles did not forestall conflicts among interest groups and their partisans on the editorial staff of *PM*.

President Roosevelt was moving too slowly to suit the antifascists who wanted to join England in fighting Adolf Hitler, and he was often too compromising for the liberals and too timid for the socialists who wanted the defense industries to forgo profits for the sake of the war effort. Enemies of the paper were calling its editors communists, and some *PM* writers were making similar charges against fellow workers.

These internal conflicts were at a peak when Ingersoll, beset by troubles of his own, left in 1942 to serve out the war as an army officer in Europe. Conflicts revived when he returned in 1945, and the paper went rapidly downhill. When Field at last decided to accept advertising, Ingersoll resigned.

Milkman concludes that *PM* failed politically as well as financially. Everything it had stood for was lost after the war. *PM* disapproved of the way England was settling matters in Europe and the way in which the Marshall Plan was being administered. It despised Harry Truman, and the editorial board voted unanimously to oppose him for the Democratic nomination in 1948. The paper collapsed as the voters turned both houses of Congress over to what Milkman calls "a snarling, explicitly anti-New Deal party"—the 1946 Republicans.

Milkman's concern is for the newspaper, not Ingersoll, and a great many of his sentences begin with statements such as "*PM* would continue to back labor," leaving no doubt as to the subject of the book. The study is basically an analysis based on *PM*'s actual news reports, editorials, and columns. It reports exactly what the newspaper published and how its leaders reached the positions they took. It puts the issues raised by the paper into context, and that is not easy, as the American political situation in the years just preceding U.S. entry into World War II was complicated.

*PM* never achieved a circulation of more than about 150,000, and it never had the effect on American policy that its editors thought it should. But it was an exciting adventure of a kind that is rare in modern journalism, and the author gives the adventurers credit for a noble try.

EDWIN R. BAYLEY,  
EMERITUS  
University of California,  
Berkeley

JAMES CHACE. *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1998. Pp. 512. \$30.00.

James Chace has written an extremely engaging account of the life of Dean Acheson. In doing so, Chace has chosen not to delve much into the private side of Acheson. His relations with his parents, wife, and children are scarcely touched upon. Such discretion by a biographer is a welcome antidote to the mania for knowing everything—the more sordid, the better—about the private lives of public figures. Still, Chace

does occasionally stray from the high road to psychologize. The infelicitous results show, as when he explains that Acheson felt that he never quite satisfied his father's exacting standards, or that the rebellious schoolboy lived on in Acheson, as evidenced in 1947 by his goading a ponderous congressman during a sharp exchange on Capitol Hill. Chace has also sprinkled his narrative with anecdotes—not all of them persuasive—to enliven what is already a sparkling text. The effect is to distract rather than to add another dimension of meaning. References to the quality of food, for example, served at some sumptuous repast or Chace's rehearsal of what passed for repartee between Acheson's wife and Winston Churchill are not illuminating.

These minor deficiencies are related to Chace's breathless enthusiasm for Acheson, an enthusiasm that sometimes threatens sound authorial judgment. An example is Chace's sweeping statement that Acheson was the most important person in the history of U.S. foreign policy since John Quincy Adams. Perhaps. But, then, where does one place such luminaries as Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Henry Kissinger in the hierarchy of importance? Chace does not say. He does not argue. He asserts—at which point his Acheson biography veers briefly toward hagiography. Luckily, Chace is an immensely conscientious scholar and avoids this trap.

Of the book's many strengths, two stand out. First, Chace's passion for the subject of early Cold War diplomacy and his admiration for Acheson encourage the reader to revisit cheerfully well-known events, personalities, and controversies. The causes of Cold War historiography and innovation in biographical literature may not have been radically advanced by Chace; but he skillfully weaves together into a coherent and riveting tale the many threads of an important public career. Second, the book goes much further than previous studies of Acheson in giving a comprehensive account of his service and highlighting the intellectual-social influences that shaped the man. Into this latter category fell the schools that he attended—Groton, Yale, Harvard Law School—and his friendships with such titans of the law as Louis D. Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and Oliver Wendell Holmes.

Acheson's apprenticeship in government began with the New Deal, when in 1933 Acheson (just turned forty) was made undersecretary of the Treasury. He was appointed by Cordell Hull in 1941 to be assistant secretary of state for economic affairs. Later, as World War II spewed destruction, Hull employed Acheson in creating the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. His postwar work to stall the atomic arms race (Acheson-Lilienthal Plan), embolden Harry S. Truman in the contest with the USSR (Truman Doctrine), and enlist Congress and pundits in the aims and purpose of U.S. diplomacy meant that Acheson was well positioned to succeed George C. Marshall as secretary of state. Acheson served in that capacity

during the fateful years from 1949 to the end of Truman's government.

Chace is masterful as he traces the main outline of America's Cold War policy and Acheson's role in defining problems and devising plausible remedies. The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the attempt to woo Mao Zedong's China away from an exclusive reliance on Moscow, the adoption of National Security Council policy stated in NSC 68, and the protracted and frustrating war in Korea are among the issues expertly treated by Chace. He is at his best when he reviews Acheson's heroic defense of the State Department and the Foreign Service against the furies of the McCarthy era.

Chace also provides useful sketches of Acheson's relationships with the prominent men of his day. These included George F. Kennan, with whom Acheson often clashed on matters of practical policy and philosophy, but with whom he maintained a decent friendship. Paul Nitze and Charles Bohlen were nearer to Acheson in outlook and temperament than Kennan; consequently, Acheson worked more smoothly with them in giving tone and substance to containment. As for Marshall, Acheson was hardly alone in holding the soldier-statesman in awe. Yet Acheson was not so overcome that he was unable to assist Marshall in his several duties. These included persuading a reluctant Congress to support the initiatives of aid to Greece and Turkey and then the European Recovery Program. Chace is particularly winning when he portrays the Truman-Acheson friendship. Forged in Cold War crises, it deepened in the years after government, when both men enjoyed broader popularity than in the waning years of the Fair Deal administration.

DAVID MAYERS  
Boston University

CHRISTIAN BREMEN. *Die Eisenhower-Administration und die zweite Berlin-Krise, 1958–1961*. (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, number 95.) New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998. Pp. xi, 625.

New archival sources that have become available since the end of the Cold War allow for a more comprehensive picture of the diplomacy of the second Berlin crisis of 1958 to 1961. Recent books have reassessed the Soviet and East German intentions in unleashing the crisis, as well as the reactions of the British government and of the Kennedy administration. Christian Bremen adds to our understanding of the conflict by presenting an exhaustively researched analysis of the Eisenhower administration's policy. The study is based on an examination of an extraordinary number of government documents (many of them only recently declassified) from various American and British archives, and on a half dozen interviews with former Eisenhower administration officials.

In October 1958, ten years after the Berlin blockade, Nikita Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the Western Allies to turn West Berlin into a demilitarized "free

city" within six months' time. To some Western politicians, such as British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Khrushchev's demand appeared to be a basis for defusing the most threatening Cold War hot spot in Europe. The West German government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, in contrast, was opposed to any change in the status quo in Berlin and insisted on Western Allied commitments to the freedom of West Berlin and support for the German goal of reunification.

Bremen presents a comprehensive analysis of the decision-making process within the Eisenhower administration. The picture that emerges is not new: it is one of a president looking at the Berlin issue in a narrow political and military framework and willing to question the city's status quo. Initially, German area specialists in the State Department advocated "talking the Berlin crisis to death" (p. 124). They criticized the notion of Western concessions under the threat of the ultimatum. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, rejected that approach and sought to separate the West German claim for reunification—which appeared increasingly unrealistic to him—from the question of the status of West Berlin. On the latter, the president leaned heavily toward a compromise solution with the Soviets. In the summer of 1959, he warned Adenauer that the Western Allies would not indefinitely maintain the existing position in the city. Later he even gave the Soviets some encouragement when he told Khrushchev: "We do not want to perpetuate the present situation in Berlin and keep our Occupation troops there forever. We hope to find a way out with honor" (p. 425).

Eisenhower, however, feared an anti-American and pro-neutrality backlash in West Germany if he publicly forced Adenauer to accept a new international status for West Berlin. Talking to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the president demanded that there be constructive new elements in the Western response to the Soviet initiative. The Germans should suggest areas in which compromises could be reached, but Eisenhower ruled out any agreement with Moscow that did not have West German support. Faced with the American insistence on negotiations, the West German government sought to win time. In August 1959, Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano told his American counterpart, Charles Herter, that a revision of West German policy had to wait until after the 1961 German election.

While the West German government saw Berlin as the symbol for the claim for unification, Eisenhower believed it was an indefensible outpost. With this narrow view of the Berlin issue, the administration never considered a solution to the crisis along the lines that the Kennedy administration later developed. When Khrushchev issued a new ultimatum in June 1961, President John F. Kennedy opened an avenue to a quick end of the confrontation by giving his unequivocal support for the freedom of West Berlin but indicated his willingness to grant East Germany *de*



*facto* recognition. Unfortunately, Bremen's analysis ends in January 1961. A brief comparison of Eisenhower's and Kennedy's approaches to the crisis might have been useful to the reader.

Bremen reaches a surprisingly positive assessment of Eisenhower's policy. The author concedes that the administration did not come any closer to a Berlin settlement in more than two years of crisis negotiations, and that it put enormous pressure on its German ally. But the president defended the freedom of the city against Moscow's repeated threats and maintained unity among the Western Allies by working toward compromise solutions with them in spite of obvious differences of opinion. One can question, however, why the president offered giving up core rights in West Berlin that stemmed from the occupation after World War II.

Bremen assembles an impressive array of documents to analyze the decision-making process within the administration, among the Western Allies, and between East and West. One can only hope that there will be an English-language edition to ensure the widest possible distribution for this extraordinary study.

GEORG SCHILD  
University of Bonn

JON R. STONE. *On the Boundaries of American Evangelicalism: The Postwar Evangelical Coalition*. New York: St. Martin's. 1997. Pp. x, 229. \$45.00.

One wonders what that is new or original remains to be said about twentieth-century American Protestant evangelicalism, but sociologist Jon R. Stone gives it a try. He acknowledges the difficulty of defining this diverse body, a reality that most who write on the topic, including this reviewer, readily admit. Something is obviously out there, because so many people believe they are evangelicals and are willing to accept the label, flawed as it may be. Stone indicates that such metaphors as "kaleidoscope," "mosaic," "spirit," "family resemblances," "tradition," and "movement" are analytically inadequate and opts for the concept of "coalition," which implies a dynamic alignment of individuals or groups with common interests or goals. The heart of this study is his attempt to determine what the "boundaries" of the coalition are and how they shift over time. He sees the quest for the definition of post-World War II evangelicalism as futile; he focuses instead on its ongoing effort to set coalitional boundaries.

Commentators have concentrated far too much on theological and ideological concerns and ignored boundary consciousness. They have identified theology as the defining characteristic of evangelical Protestantism and the engine of its differentiation from rivals on the right and left. Theology is a symbol marking the boundary between groups, however, not the boundary itself. Thus, when the "new evangelicals" emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, they took a middle position

among the options of fundamentalism, neo-orthodoxy, and liberalism that was not ideological but social structural in character. The religious ideas that created and informed the differences were not in themselves the differences. Stone agrees that "two-party" models applied to the study of American Protestantism (the fixed opposing positions of liberal and conservative) are inadequate for understanding evangelicalism, a point that *Re-Forming the Center: American Protestantism from 1900 to the Present*, edited by Douglas Jacobsen and William Trollinger (1998), makes forcefully. In fact, the definitional typologies that various scholars of evangelicalism utilize reveal the difficulty of labeling any specific group as evangelical.

Stone argues that boundary theory is the best approach, since it takes into account symbolic differences, the relatively arbitrary and shifting character of oppositional differences, the vital importance of distinctions to a group's identity, and the intensity of boundary threats perceived and defended against. First he applies this analytical tool in a historical discussion of the liberal and conservative divide in American Protestantism (1880–1930) and the emergence of the new evangelicalism (1940–1960). Then he examines the dilemma that the new evangelicals faced in checking the drift toward liberalism. In the process of differentiating themselves from fundamentalists, they edged toward the left while simultaneously affirming theological correctness. This was especially apparent in their efforts to pursue unity without being ecumenical, social concern without identifying with the Social Gospel, and evangelical orthodoxy without acknowledging Barthian neo-orthodoxy.

As moderate evangelicals increasingly participated in secular society, they began cooperating with instead of separating from those with whom they disagreed, developed a distinct social agenda, and played down extreme fundamentalist doctrines like dispensational premillennialism and biblical inerrancy. The result was a shattering of the coalition. People on both the left and right reached out to mainline groups with whom they had ideological affinities regardless of their doctrinal differences. The right joined forces with conservative Catholics, Mormons, Orthodox Jews, and others to combat abortion and promote the New Right political agenda. The left linked up with ecumenical Protestants and liberal Catholics and Jews to foster racial reconciliation, economic justice, and world peace.

Stone, however, fails to grasp the full implications of this break-up of the coalition in his discussion of the Richard J. Neuhaus-Charles Colson Evangelicals and Catholics Together venture. What really happened was that conservative evangelicals put aside their commitment to theological orthodoxy in favor of an even more rigid political and ideological orthodoxy regarding "moral" issues. It is hard to argue with his contention that evangelicalism is now in such disarray that perhaps it is a fiction.

Stone provides a challenging interpretation, but I have one technical objection to his book. When will



publishers finally cease using the infuriating "social science" style of annotation that requires the reader to keep two fingers in the back of a book for the many pages of "notes" (they should be incorporated in the text, where they belong) and to find references cited merely by the author's name and the year of publication?

RICHARD V. PIERARD  
Indiana State University

DOUG ROSSINOW. *The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America*. (Columbia Studies in Contemporary American History Series.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 500. \$32.50.

The "New Left," 1960s generation of young, white, radicalized students has been the subject of countless studies, historical and ahistorical judgments, and varying degrees of vilification. Not surprisingly, many treatments, as noted by Doug Rossinow, are the products of historians who themselves were participants in the events they attempt to describe and analyze. Rossinow represents a new generation of historians that offers a fresh perspective on this controversial era. His book is an intricately interwoven tapestry of regional case study, cultural analysis, and a rather deft handling of New Left politics that traces the emergence, development, and decline of left-wing radicalism. It is thorough, insightful, and well-written.

Rossinow contends that "the search for authenticity lay at the heart of the new left" (p. 4), and that theme takes center stage in his account. Instead of focusing his attention on dissecting debates about the connection between the "old" and "new" left, especially the preoccupations of what he deems a "metropolitan elite" spread across the northern edge of the country, he wrestles with the experiences of a broader cross-section of radicalized young people. Drawing on an in-depth investigation of students at the University of Texas at Austin, he argues that sources for the New Left were more varied than is usually assumed to be the case. In Texas, a less stereotypical form of political liberalism combined with an engaged expression of Christian activism to produce an existentialist politics that sought to address experiences of alienation and anxiety. Rossinow, in stark contrast to the authors of most standard accounts of the New Left, takes more seriously the role that Christian liberalism played in its formative development, arguing that it provided not only a language but also a way of understanding the link between the personal and the political that served as the basis for student involvement in the civil rights movement.

In exploring the impact of the civil rights movement on the emerging New Left, Rossinow makes a convincing case for the pivotal role that white student participation played in giving shape to a politics of commitment. Nevertheless, the search for authenticity, particularly the need for a grounding of the New Left's

revolutionary hopes, shifted throughout the 1960s from one historical agency of social change to another, from interracial movements of poor people to a new working class and finally to privileged white college students themselves. In each case, although the agent of social change varied, the New Left sought overall to articulate a vision of socio-political change, based on a critique of the contradictions of a capitalist system, that called for a democratic project that would transform every aspect of American life.

The concluding three chapters of Rossinow's work are particularly engaging. In Rossinow's analysis of the New Left's involvement in the antiwar movement, he contends that although it was unavoidable, given the context of the time, it was also, ultimately, self-defeating in that it derailed the former from focusing its energies on "a comprehensive political critique and an alternative vision" (p. 246). Rossinow is perhaps at his best in his analysis of the New Left and the counterculture movement. His critique of the limits of the countercultural revolution is that in spite of all that was said and done, what was achieved was "a holistic consumer society, naturalized sexual commodities, a less bureaucratic university education, and an authenticated capitalism: a softened social experience for themselves, not a transformed society" (p. 295). Rossinow's final chapter stresses the degree to which the feminist left offered a sustained, and warranted, critique of the how much the New Left's quest for authenticity was based on an affirmation of masculinity. The feminist left underscored the fact that just as important in any discussion of a community, democracy, and citizenship was the inclusion not only of the realities of class and race but also that of gender. The lingering tragedy, according to Rossinow, is that "the feminist revision of the search for authenticity and democracy never formed the basis for a regrouping of the American left" (p. 333).

Although there are those who might disagree with the conclusions that Rossinow draws as to the New Left's legacy, it cannot be overstated that this work makes a major contribution to our understanding and appreciation of the New Left of the 1960s.

ROBERT H. CRAIG  
College of St. Scholastica

HOWARD BRICK. *Age of Contradiction: American Thought and Culture in the 1960s*. (Twayne's American Thought and Culture Series.) New York: Twayne of Macmillan. 1998. Pp. xix, 242. \$33.00.

Howard Brick offers this volume as the latest contribution to the Twayne Series on American Thought and Culture. The 1960s may already have generated more studies than any decade in American history, and now Brick joins Morris Dickstein, Todd Gitlin, James Miller, Stewart Burns, Terry Anderson, James Farrell, and others in bringing the period under examination. From the textbooks to the television media, and even in the academic literature, the 1960s registers emphatic

images. The Vietnam War and the protests against it, the continuing civil rights movement and the turn to "Black Power," the manifestations of a "counterculture," the resurgence of the modern feminist movement: all perpetuate this decade in vivid memory.

In a work that focuses on formal ideas and artistic trends, Brick has chosen not to consider the decade in terms of such expected subjects as the New Left, or black nationalism, or feminism. Instead, he has organized his chapters by conceptual themes that distribute these items throughout the book and bring them into discussion with many related subjects. Thus we have such categories as "Knowledge and Ideology," "Development and Its Discontents," "Authenticity and Artifice," "Community and Mass Society," and "Systems and the Distrust of Order." Brick gains considerable strategic advantage and insights by this reordering. To be sure, it often requires him to shoehorn some subjects into these categories, as in his discussion of authenticity in jazz, and an awkward inclusiveness sometimes emerges. But the topical arrangement has the useful effect of connecting 1960s discourse to a larger continuum in the twentieth century, making the decade less the singular radical moment by which some would like to remember it.

For illustration, consider one of the best chapters in the book, "Knowledge and Ideology." Social critiques in the 1960s widely reflected on the institutional location of ideas and its implications both for the structure of power and influence in American society and for the truth content of ideas themselves. Brick leads the discussion of this issue with Clark Kerr's book, *The Uses of the University* (1963). Others who enter the dialogue are James S. Coleman, Hannah Arendt, Lewis Coser, Christopher Lasch, Noam Chomsky, and Thomas Kuhn. Subtopics include the "end of ideology" debate sparked by Daniel Bell's book of that name in 1960.

Brick makes much of the word "contradiction," and herein lie some problems. It is a bit nondescript as a label for a decade, for almost any such time period could qualify, and it is misleading. "Contrast" would be more accurate. Among the many times Brick cites contradiction is in an excellent chapter on systems and the distrust of disorder. The idea of system is not likely to appear in the intellectual history of any decade prior to the 1960s. Here Brick discusses Robert McNamara, Rachel Carson, Gregory Bateson, and New Left historians and philosophers. He observes that some thinkers perceived opportunities in promoting reform through a holistic notion of society, urging that social evils derived from systemic qualities, not isolated or ad hoc situations. To others, however, "system" suggested an intimidating control and inspired quests for personal identity or communitarian retreat. These diverging reactions seem perfectly plausible and to be expected: that is, contrasting but hardly contradictory in the sense of a logical incongruity.

Brick's recurring critical interventions make this book all the more interesting. He clearly sympathizes

with the reformist impulse of the decade. One of the intellectual themes he identifies at the outset is the "enriched sense of social context" that emerged among thinkers. That trend, in fact, serves as a criterion for his assessments of different individuals and groups. Brick disparages movements and ideas that did not connect usefully with the social matrix. He faults Chomsky's politics for formalism and abstraction, anti-systemic sentiment for lack of strategy, and the cult of urban violence for embracing "a muddled idea of revolution, inspired by guerrilla movements in quite different settings" (p. 162). Revealingly, only one individual name appears on the chapter subtitles in this book. It is that of Erving Goffman, much of whose writings disavowed a widely cultivated notion of the autonomous self. Brick appreciates Goffman's rejection of such notions in favor of an alternative view that locates the real person or "authentic personality" within the social complex and not apart from it.

Brick barely deigns to discuss conservative ideas or thinkers. He gives passing references to Straussians and neoconservatives, but the only individual considered as a conservative thinker, many readers will be surprised to learn, is Marshall McLuhan. Brick's interests lie elsewhere and yield many learned discussions. With the exception cited, his is the most useful intellectual history of the 1960s to date.

J. DAVID HOEVELER  
University of Wisconsin,  
Milwaukee

DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT. *Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880–1996*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1997. Pp. xix, 269. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$14.95.

This book provides a thought-provoking, new history of how the "experts" have "depicted the personalities of black folk" (p. xi). Probing the work of the social scientists who have been seen as America's leading experts on race, Daryl Michael Scott is especially intent on examining their role in the shaping of "damage imagery" depicting African Americans as psychologically scarred and pathological. Bringing close attention to the social and cultural influences that have shaped their constructions of race, he contends that the social science portraiture of black Americans as a damaged people fundamentally originated in the racial liberalism of post-World War II America. Scott's challenge to those scholars who have emphasized the deeper-rooted historical origins and continuities of damage imagery is both exciting and also perhaps a bit problematic for his book.

The challenge is made so explicit and central that the first four chapters might seem to tell the reader especially about what the experts did *not* say about African Americans prior to the 1950s and civil rights era. Moreover, the author paints those whom he challenges with an overly broad brush as having inter-

preted the imagery of damage as in origins inherently, uniformly, racially conservative and/or racist.

Commencing with the late nineteenth century, Scott persuasively interprets W. E. B. Du Bois's depictions of damage as an attempt to appeal to white compassion and *pity* by portraying the suffering of black Americans at the hands of white racism. Drawing a major distinction between theories/depictions of damaged moral character and those of personality damage, subsequent chapters argue that defined thus in psychological terms, damage imagery was not created or furthered by either racially liberal or conservative social scientists during the interwar and segregationist era.

The second half of the book innovatively contends that the image of psychological damage actually originated in the racial liberalism of post-World War II America that was shaped not so much by the Cold War emphasis on the nation's creed of democracy as by American culture's new "therapeutic ethos." Pointing to white, middle-class, medicalized definitions of happiness as personal, psychological health, Scott argues that racially liberal historians and social scientists emphasized the psychological scarring of black Americans resulting from slavery, segregation, and continuing oppression to appeal to white middle-class compassion and pity. Scott further argues that the experts' anti-racist, psychiatric utilization of damage imagery thus underpinned the era's racially liberal policy making, commencing with the historic, anti-segregationist decision of the Supreme Court in the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) case and including Daniel Patrick Moynihan's *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (1965).

Characterizing the "matriarchal" black family as the taproot of black "pathology" and the "emasculatation" of black males, the Moynihan Report has often been interpreted as representing racially conservative and/or racist perspectives. In contrast, pointing to the report as fully in concert with the liberal utilization of damage imagery for anti-racist ends, Scott emphasizes its justification and legitimation of the Johnson administration's liberal racial policies and welfare statism. Yet, as he shows, the controversy over the report for "blaming the victim" discredited and labelled damage imagery as inherently racist, and the experts turned instead to emphasizing—and perhaps overemphasizing—black resilience and health.

This book is by no means an attempt to provide a blanket defense of the damage imagery/portraiture of black America. On the contrary, the concluding chapter especially eloquently points to its recent resurgence, not only in the writings of those who have attempted to resurrect scientific racism but also in a wider utilization of cultural pathology theories to forward conservative and/or racist agendas.

Today's conceptualizations of America's "black underclass" all too often reflect and promote stereotypes of welfare-dependent, mother-led families and "criminal" black youth. And as Scott highlights, conservative

opponents of the welfare state all too often utilize theories and images of black Americans as psychologically and culturally pathological that feed and promote racist stereotypes of black inferiority. In accordance with its title, Scott's book suggests that because pity and contempt may be two sides of the same coin, racially liberal depictions of African Americans as a deeply damaged people constitute a double-edged sword. Certainly this challenging study both reminds us of the importance of interpreting "social science knowledge as imagery" (p. xv) and strongly encourages questioning and challenging of the "experts'" constructions of race.

PATRICIA MORTON  
Trent University

SHERIE MERSHON and STEVEN SCHLOSSMAN. *Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces*. (A RAND Book.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 393. \$34.95.

This book is a work of public history, which is to say, history written for a client. The original client in this case was the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), responding to a memorandum sent by President William J. Clinton one week following his inauguration in January 1993, directing the secretary to submit by mid-July "a draft of an Executive Order ending discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in determining who may serve in the Armed Forces" (p. vii). OSD in turn contracted with the National Defense Research Institute of the Rand Corporation to explore alternatives relevant to developing policies toward openly homosexual military personnel.

Rand, in examining the subject of homosexuality and military service from social-scientific, legal, and historical perspectives, subcontracted with the Center for History and Policy at Carnegie Mellon University to investigate historical analogies between the military's treatment of homosexuals and its treatment of racial minorities, especially blacks. The project was conducted by Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman. Relying on secondary sources and published documents, they analyzed the military's transition from racial segregation to formal racial integration between 1940 and the mid-1960s.

Mershon and Schlossman examine military desegregation in three phases, stressing policy implementation and organizational behavior. During the first phase, from 1940 to the end of World War II, the armed forces sought to make compulsory racial segregation more equitable without eliminating it altogether. The second phase, desegregation itself, extended through the end of the Korean War and centered on President Harry S. Truman's Executive Order 9981 of July 1948 and "intense" military resistance to it, especially by the Army and Marines. Phase three extended to 1965 and covered military efforts to alleviate off-base racial discrimination.

Military desegregation, the authors note, was para-

doxical. Military traditions reinforced social conservatism, including deeply rooted social norms of black inferiority and fear that racial integration would shatter unit cohesion. Yet military hierarchy and discipline hastened the transition and in time placed the armed forces in the vanguard of fundamental change in American race relations. Mershon and Schlossman emphasize political processes, including the partisan, electoral, and interest-group advocacy accompanying the civil rights movement and the bureaucratic politics of interservice rivalry and inter-agency disagreements. They stress the importance of leadership provided at crucial junctures by key civilians, including black civil rights leaders, Truman, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and by committees led by Charles Fahy in the late 1940s, Gerhard Gessell in the early 1960s, and Adam Yarmolinsky during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

As a work of synthesis, this book breaks no new ground. As applied history, it is well grounded in the literature, clearly written, and balanced in its assessments. The authors generally strive for a tone of social-scientific neutrality. Yet underpinning their analysis is a presumption that racial segregation was incorrect policy and that resistance within the military was rooted in conservative traditions and beliefs that national policy should attack. In matters of racial policy, there is little dissent in contemporary American society that nondiscrimination policies were morally imperative and also improved armed forces efficiency. On questions of military discrimination by sex, however, or by sexual orientation, which triggered the present study, there is far less agreement in contemporary society. Applied history involving such controversial policy questions would be less free to begin analysis by presuming the correct policy answer.

HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM  
Vanderbilt University

DAVID A. J. RICHARDS. *Women, Gays, and the Constitution: The Grounds for Feminism and Gay Rights in Culture and Law*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 531. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$22.00.

In this, his latest foray into what he calls American revolutionary constitutionalism, David A. J. Richards focuses attention on women and gays. He traces the common ancestry of their constitutional claims to the arguments of the feminists who, in taking to the public platform to condemn slavery in the antebellum era, attacked sexism as well. Their broad-ranging condemnation embraced not only chattel slavery but also "moral slavery," defined as the dehumanization of a group of persons by denying to the individuals who compose the group their basic human rights. Richards argues that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments should be interpreted as corrective responses to the antebellum distortion of the nation's rights-based constitutional tradition. These amendments, by recapturing and then extending this tradition, provided the

basis not only for the emancipation of African Americans but also of women, gays, and all others who, because of their identification with a group, have been marginalized, silenced, and denied their equal rights as citizens.

The very success of African Americans and women in advancing their claims for equal rights has led to a frustration on the part of many Americans who have seen such gains as socially disruptive or as an assault on traditional values. This frustration is evidenced by the growth of homophobia. The claim of gays for equal rights is similar to that of the other groups, but with those other groups now constitutionally insulated from the prejudices of the democratic majority, that majority has focused its energy on denying to gays the inalienable rights of conscience, speech, intimate life, and work. Such rights, Richards insists, are the essence of liberty in that they empower individuals as moral beings fully equipped to create their own identities.

When the gay rights movement is not treated as a whipping boy, its demands are ridiculed. Richards would remedy this structural injustice by supporting affirmative action for gays to overcome the socially compelled privatization of homosexual preference. Forcing gays to stay "in the closet" he considers insulting in that it denies such persons the right to live their private and public lives free from demeaning restrictions. Richards agrees with the Supreme Court's recent decision in *Romer v. Evans* (1996) that struck down a Colorado attempt to invalidate protective laws against discrimination on grounds of sexual preference. Such popular campaigns, Richards says, treat homosexuality as heresy, and the government's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" approach to homosexuality in the military violates free speech. The easy condemnation of gay marriages, the author continues, brings to mind the earlier disparagement of blacks and women for deviating from the roles assigned to them by the dominant political and social mythology.

For historians, the most pertinent part of Richards's book is his useful tracing of the successes and failures of the campaign of women for equal rights within the male-dominated society. Starting with the early feminist abolitionists, the author demonstrates how the post-Civil War concentration on the suffrage issue brought with it compromises that repudiated the earlier commitment to inalienable individual rights for all and set back the quest for equal rights for women until the 1960s. Richards pays tribute not to the traditional or institutional interpreters of the Constitution but rather to dissenting social and political critics who argued for readings of the fundamental law that challenged the existing consensus and the stereotypes it embraced. His heroes are outsiders—from the Grimké sisters to Walt Whitman to Emma Goldman—who insistently called attention to the commandments of the nation's constitutional tradition.

At a time when the rights-based nature of the nation's constitutional system is under attack because it supposedly atomizes society and exalts the individual



to the detriment of the community. Richards eloquently defends the system. Implicitly taking issue with those who would rewrite the American constitutional tradition to recognize group rights, he argues that the individual members of the group are only asking that their identification with others not be used as a basis for denying them their rights. Unity in the American nation comes not through conformity but rather through an ongoing progressive recognition of the liberty of all individuals within its territorial boundaries. To stigmatize and stereotype persons and thus deprive them of their individuality fundamentally challenges a constitutional tradition not only that has defined us culturally but also has endured our survival as a nation of very diverse beings.

JOHN E. SEMONCHE  
*University of North Carolina,  
 Chapel Hill*

PETER G. FILENE. *In the Arms of Others: A Cultural History of the Right-To-Die in America*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 1998. Pp. xvii, 282. \$27.00.

Research into the history of death in America is in a state of growth and diversification. Monographs on a range of topics, such as cremation, war memorials, and disasters are available or forthcoming; a recent National Endowment for the Humanities summer institute entitled "The History of Death" included scholars studying death in the Civil War, African-American funeral homes, and representations of dead women in American literature; and undergraduate and graduate courses in the humanities and social sciences are incorporating historical views on death and dying in the United States. Peter G. Filene's book not only makes a significant contribution to the field, but it also serves as a model for future investigations.

What is most refreshing about the book is the way it begins: Filene immediately discloses that "at heart" the book is about his mother's death. Although this kind of self-reflection disappears from much of the cultural history, it returns periodically to remind the reader that the author is not some detached, emotionless entity narrating "the story." Read Filene's short description of his own reaction to learning about the suicide of Joe Cruzan, who fought to have a hospital remove the feeding tubes for his daughter Nancy (p. 183).

Additionally, Filene's history carefully weaves together the legal, ethical, political, and medical perspectives on the right-to-die movement with the personal stories of individuals who must confront disturbing questions about death, and life. Besides the Cruzan story, Filene deftly and respectfully deals with others who figure prominently in this movement, including "infant doe" (born with Down's syndrome and esophageal atresia), who died within six days after the parents decided against surgery and intravenous feeding; Claire Conroy, an eighty-two-year-old woman whose case proceeded through the legal system even

after her death; and, most significantly, Karen Ann Quinlan, whose popular story haunts the pages of Filene's book. Indeed, Quinlan's tragic case is the watershed event in this cultural history. Filene demonstrates how all the key people related to the case—parents, doctors, lawyers, judges—struggled with fundamental questions that have driven the movement since then, such as what ultimately constitutes personal identity, who controls the destiny of patients unable to speak for themselves, and how society determines the meaning and definition of death.

Another element of the book that makes it a first-rate investigation, and a model for others, is the way Filene contextualizes all the technical, legal, and ethical issues in a larger cultural frame. Quinlan, for example, is not depicted solely as a complicated medical case with profound legal implications; Filene demonstrates how she became a highly contentious symbol in American society, given various meanings by individuals in the press, religious organizations, and legislative bodies. In other words, the book links long-standing and newly forming cultural attitudes, related to such controversial issues as abortion, suicide, and AIDS, to the public debates surrounding the right-to-die movement.

The book also includes a historical perspective, situating the right-to-die movement, and death and dying in general, in a longer historical trajectory. By doing this, Filene draws the reader's attention to the historical and social circumstances determining changing cultural assumptions about death. For example, on the notion of a "good death," Filene writes: "In the nineteenth century a 'good death' meant one in which the person endured suffering or even welcomed it as a test of fitness for heaven. In twentieth-century consumer culture capitalism it meant painlessness or gratification, a quick fix" (p. 67).

Finally, the most innovative aspect of the book is its conclusion, "Cultures of Dying," which shifts from history to cross-cultural reflection. Filene understands the value of thinking beyond U.S. society and turns to brief discussions of community, illness, and death in Bali and the Netherlands. The normative reasoning behind these discussions, "to set 'right-to-die' within an ethic—a tapestry—of relatedness" (p. 201), does not detract from the solid historical narrative. Instead, these comparative cases shed valuable light on the limits of the American imagination and the social and cultural forces and values that shape American attitudes toward death.

GARY LADERMAN  
*Emory University*

ALBERT BOIME. *The Unveiling of the National Icons: A Plea for Patriotic Iconoclasm in a Nationalist Era*. (Cambridge Studies in American Visual Culture.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xvii, 427. \$59.95.



In the past decade, art historians and literary critics have made important contributions to historians' understanding of American nationalism through the analysis of public art and monuments. The best of these works include Kirk Savage's *Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War and Monument in Nineteenth Century America* (1997), James E. Young's *Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (1993), John Gillis's anthology *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (1994), Karal Ann Marling and John Wetenhall's *Iwo Jima: Monuments, Memories, and the American Hero* (1991), and Michele H. Bogart's *Public Sculpture and the Civic Ideal in New York City, 1890-1930* (1989). Such studies pay close attention to the shifting relationships between artists, patrons, and publics; to the way that powerful symbols built for all time change meaning in different historical and social contexts; and to the connections between the prevailing political culture of a period and its forms of representation. Albert Boime adds his voice to this discussion by examining the nation's most durable national icons, as he terms them, images widely popular, easily reproduced, and subject to manipulation. Five chapters trace the history of the flag, the Statue of Liberty, Mount Rushmore, the Marine Corps Memorial, and the Lincoln Memorial, with an epilogue analyzing the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

Boime seeks to historicize and demystify these revered national symbols, demonstrating how each has been manipulated by the power elite. "The history of each icon reveals that privileged members of the American hierarchy, bent on maintaining their economic and social class advantages, attempted to appropriate the symbols of America almost from their inception and use them to stimulate an illusion of inclusivity" (p. 8). By unveiling the undemocratic origins of these national symbols, Boime hopes to wrest their exclusive use away from the political right and make them more accessible and usable for the democratic movements that he favors. His model of how this might happen is the Lincoln Memorial, dedicated as a neoclassical symbol of the conservative social order of the 1920s but transformed into a symbol of racial emancipation by Martin Luther King, Jr.'s March on Washington in 1963.

Although the book offers some interesting details about the making of some of America's best-known monuments, by and large it fails to accomplish what it sets out to do. Its largest flaw is conceptual: there is no discussion of nationalism, or patriotism, or the differences between the two. A passing reference in the introduction to Russian religious icons is the sole attempt to place the American story in comparative perspective. Nor does the book help its readers to gain a better understanding, through art, of the ebb and flow of American nationalism. A powerful nation-state and popular feelings for it seem to have developed together in the aftermath of the Civil War, reached high tide in the decades between World War I and the

Vietnam War, then waned in what some scholars have called a post-national era. Did changes in the prevailing national iconography follow this pattern? Perhaps most frustrating, the book contains no discussion of how ordinary Americans incorporated these national symbols into their lives or of the particular meanings that they gave to them. Why were the symbols so popular in the larger culture, and what enabled the elite to hijack them for their own repressive purposes?

The audience for this book is unclear. It has little original to say to scholars of nationalism or to those interested in political iconography, who would be better off reading the books mentioned in the first paragraph of this review. Nor is the book written in a style that engages the general reader. It is badly in need of an editor. The five main chapters (averaging sixty pages each), thirty-page epilogue, and three appendixes are stuffed with off-the-cuff political pronouncements only tenuously related to the material at hand. After describing how the Marine Corps Memorial at Arlington National Cemetery "serves the cause of domestic hierarchy and global dominance while appearing in the guise of an emblem of popular democracy" (p. 208), Boime goes on to lecture his readers about how the U.S. in the years since the memorial's dedication in 1954 continues "to intervene in the affairs of other countries in an effort to organize them into a system of post Colonial global imperialism" (p. 216). Like Mount Rushmore, Boime's prose is often gargantuan and grotesque. If "unveiling" implies a delicate process, a nuanced, subtle effort to see behind appearances, then this is a jackhammer of a book, with Boime giving rough shape to a mountain of unpolished words and half-formed ideas. The volume appears under the auspices of a new series, Cambridge Studies in American Visual Culture. Let us hope that the series advisory board—which includes Boime—and the editors at Cambridge University Press will take more care with the manuscripts they publish in the future.

DAVID GLASSBERG  
University of Massachusetts,  
Amherst

JULIA S. ARDERY. *The Temptation: Edgar Tolson and the Genesis of Twentieth-Century Folk Art*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. x, 353. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$19.95.

This book contributes significantly to the growing literature on the intricate social and economic relationships between artists and their collectors and dealers. It also introduces Edgar Tolson, a colorful figure in the development of a new genre, twentieth-century folk art. Julia S. Ardery's diligent research illuminates how the 1960s war on poverty attracted well-meaning volunteers and professionals to backward corners of Appalachia and how they discovered and came to value art made by poor, uneducated folk.

Ardery conducted many lengthy interviews with

those who found, in the Kentucky hills and hollers, a population and an art as exotic as those earlier travelers had discovered in Tahiti or Melanesia. She is also familiar with landmark works on collectors and collecting, often a tale of doing well by doing good. She shows that those who encouraged Tolson to carve more of the charming Biblical figures he had only occasionally created also profited mightily from their kindness. For example, Michael D. and Julie Hall, who came upon Tolson soon after joining the University of Kentucky (Lexington) art department and bought some of his sculptures for three dollars, ended up selling their folk art collection to the Milwaukee Art Museum for \$2.3 million dollars. Furthermore, Tolson's patrons influenced his subject matter and style, often suggesting that he create another "Temptation," a unicorn, an Uncle Sam, or an "Expulsion," providing him with illustrations, and suggesting he not paint the carvings.

The Halls and other early Tolson collectors created a market for the artist's work by alerting the Smithsonian Institution, the American Folk Art Museum, and various dealers to his work. They promoted Tolson's inclusion in the Whitney Biennial show of American art, saw to it that his work was illustrated in books about folk art, and helped him get an Artists' Fellowship from the National Endowment for the Arts. As their own collections grew, they urged him to raise his prices and extracted from him colorful statements about his artistic intentions. Finally, they made Tolson an archetype for an invasion of dirt road America by well-heeled collectors getting red dust on their Volvos and Audis amid the poverty, ignorance, religiosity, alcoholism, and sloth surrounding any number of naïve or "outsider" artists. The artists quickly learned what these people were looking for and did their best to oblige. They posed patiently for photos in their overalls and laconically accepted bottles of whiskey while sharing their own moonshine. Upon the rickety porch, they lined up their (often numerous) children in bare feet and raggedy jeans for more photos.

All this fascinating material—and more—is in this beautifully designed and illustrated book. But the reader will have to shape the scattered pieces into a coherent whole. For example, the Tolson of 1976 appears as the quintessential outsider: a trim, toothless fellow in boldly striped pants, his hand on the shoulder of a carved Uncle Sam, grave, stiff, and painted (p. 8). In 1984, Tolson was on his deathbed (p. 171). But the book continues on for 100 more pages, with Tolson miraculously resurrected, repeatedly quoted, and pictured at various points in his life.

Trying to reinforce theoretical points in what was obviously once a doctoral thesis, the author clumsily tramples back and forth through time and space, and clutches at every scholarly straw: what have Theodor Adorno, Reinhold Niebuhr, or Pierre Bourdieu to do with American folk art? Even in the few pages of her conclusion, Ardery is still quoting authorities, sometimes anonymously, instead of presenting the reader with her own final verdict on her subject.

This book is amply documented, with twenty-three pages of footnotes and twenty-two of bibliography. What is sorely lacking is a chronology detailing Tolson's life and career. A chart or graph relating the upticks in value of his works to exhibitions, awards, and publications would also be helpful. Such documentations would not only benefit the reader but would have provided the author with a sturdy framework for the book. Virtually every historian faces the problem of how to move the factual story forward while simultaneously weaving in theory and interpretation. Perhaps a future revision will do this for Edgar Tolson's story.

Alice Goldfarb Marquis  
University of California,  
San Diego

WILLIAM M. LEONGRANDE. *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 773. \$39.95.

In the words of former New York Yankee baseball great Yogi Berra, the crisis in Central America during the 1980s was "déjà vu, all over again" for President Ronald Reagan and his advisors. The United States had traveled this path in Vietnam and appeared on the verge of doing so again in Central America. To avoid repeating the tragedy and embarrassment that the Vietnam War brought to the United States, the Reagan administration determined to act decisively in Central America. The Sandinistas were to be ousted from Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí prevented from coming to power in El Salvador. But as William M. LeoGrande explains, the challenge was not an easy task.

Within the Reagan administration, "hardliners" who sought a military solution confronted "pragmatists" who argued for a more peaceful settlement to the crisis. In the Congress, Democrats came to challenge Reagan's policy, and in Central America, the so-called allies did not always cooperate with Washington's policy objectives. LeoGrande weaves this complex story together from declassified documents located at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., published government materials, personal interviews, and a wealth of secondary sources.

Reagan's first secretary of state, Alexander Haig, led the "hardliners," and he was joined by United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Casey, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, and Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Elliott Abrams. While LeoGrande criticizes the collective lack of Latin American experience that prevented them from coming to grips with Central America's internal economic, political, and social dynamics, he saves the severest criticism for Haig, whom LeoGrande characterizes as an intellectual lightweight. Haig was convinced that a military victory in Central America would come easy.

All of the "hardliners" accepted Kirkpatrick's dictum that U.S. interests would be better served by right-wing dictators than by left-wing revolutionaries. Because Reagan shared the "hardliners'" perception of events in Central America, moderates such as Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders were forced to resign, and Haig's replacement George Shultz was ignored.

In Congress, Democratic opposition to Reagan's Central American policy intensified over time, and as it did, the administration's spokespeople skirted telling the full truth before various congressional committees. In the House, Thomas Foley, Edward Boland, Thomas Harkin, and Clement Zablocki led the Democratic charge, and they were joined in the Senate by Christopher Dodd, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Republican moderate Nancy Kassenbaum. As the opposition intensified, the administration's half-truths became non-truths. Casey neglected to discuss CIA-sponsored covert operations against Nicaragua; the president's human rights and land reform certifications in El Salvador became vague assertions; the solicitation of foreign monies for the Nicaraguan *contras* was at first denied but, once public, defended as a moral good; and the administration's professed support for peace negotiations were mere fabrications. As the Democrats intensified their opposition, the most ardent Republican conservatives, such as Newt Gingrich, attacked them in McCarthyite fashion. The president himself charged that the Democrats were soft on communism.

The Democratic opposition led to the passage of two so-called Boland Amendments, the first in 1982 and the second in 1984. The first prevented the use of CIA funds for military activities against Nicaragua. The second cut funds to the Nicaraguan *contra* forces. The cutoff of funds prompted Reagan zealots like Oliver North and John Poindexter to find foreign sources, including the sale of weapons to Iran. Despite the illegality of these actions and circumstantial evidence indicating the president's knowledge of the operation, LeoGrande explains that the Democrats recognized that Reagan's popularity prevented their seeking recourse.

In hopes of convincing Congress to support its Central American policies, the Reagan administration understood the need to bring an end to human rights violations practiced by the Salvadoran military and paramilitary forces and the Nicaraguan *contras*; to have the Salvadoran elite accept the implementation of a land reform program, and to forge unity among the *contra* leadership. The Reagan administration failed, not for lack of trying but because the Central American actors refused to cooperate. Despite these failures, until the very end, Reagan insisted on a military solution and refused all offers for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. While the U.S. used economic pressure on Mexico to cease its peace initiative and to turn Honduras into a proxy obstacle to the Central American peace process, it ignored mediation offers from European and South American nations.

Only because of the tenacity of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and the need of his Central American neighbors to terminate the conflict did peace finally come to Central America.

LeoGrande's well-written volume will serve for a long time as a most serious analysis of Reagan's Central American policy. Those critics who assert that LeoGrande's association with congressional committees during the 1980s colored his perception should be reminded that Robert Kagan's equally massive study, *The Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990* (1996), which defends Reagan's Central American policies, may also have been colored by his association with the administration.

THOMAS M. LEONARD  
University of North Florida

HAROLD M. HYMAN, *Craftsmanship and Character: A History of the Vinson and Elkins Law Firm of Houston, 1917-1997*. (Studies in the Legal History of the South.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 658. \$60.00.

Law firm histories share the general bias of American legal history toward studies of the Boston-to-Washington corridor. This history of a major institution in the American Southwest offers a welcome change of focus. Law firm histories pose difficulties for historians because lawyers are reluctant to share files with outsiders due to fear of breaching the principle of attorney-client confidentiality. In this case, Harold M. Hyman enjoyed complete access to the firm's files and full cooperation from members of the firm.

This book offers an institutional history of the firm, an internal account of its administrative operations. Hyman chronicles the growth of the firm from a two-man partnership, through a mid-size firm with an imperious and arbitrary senior founding partner, James A. Elkins, to its stature as a mega-firm with over five hundred lawyers, an equal number of support staff, and perhaps a hundred legal assistants. The book explores pressures that growth placed on the firm to depart from the vision of the founders, who had hoped for a partnership of generalists. Instead, the firm gradually developed various departments, or specialties, and created various administrative committees and subcommittees charged with attending to the complicated tasks of administering such a complex organization. Missing from this account is a clear sense of the role that the firm played in the city of Houston or the state of Texas. Hyman chose not to explore the web of political, economic, and social relationships created by Vinson & Elkins lawyers.

The first substantial growth of the firm came during the Depression when legal business spawned by various federal and other government public policies resulted in a sharp increase in the number of associates at Vinson & Elkins. During World War II, Elkins threatened that lawyers who volunteered for service would find no job awaiting them at the end of the war.

Notwithstanding this threat, many volunteered, and the ranks of the firm declined. Elkins eventually softened his stance and welcomed the lawyers back, although perhaps only because he needed warm bodies to do good legal work. Vinson & Elkins partners eventually became wealthy, but their real money came not from the practice of law but from the opportunities that practice provided for investment in banking, real estate, oil and gas, and insurance.

Elkins was the all-powerful leader of the firm. He did not consult partners or associates as to how or whether he was spending their money or on what. He did not disclose what percentages partners received from firm profits. He abided by no rules for when or whether an associate might become a partner.

William A. Vinson died in 1951, but Elkins's intensely personal managerial style continued to govern the firm for another two decades. Things began to change when Elkins named a managing partner to succeed him and created a standing executive committee. Nevertheless, Elkins retained control over hiring and partnership decisions. Lawyers hired were almost invariably native-born, rural Texans who were white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, preferably Methodists. A system of nepotism favored sons of clients in the recruiting process.

Hyman very nicely explores the demographic changes in personnel that occurred in the aftermath of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the emergence of the modern women's movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The firm became more diverse, although certainly never a rainbow coalition. In 1969, significant change occurred when the firm recruited outgoing Texas governor John Connally to join the firm as a named partner. Connally turned out to be a major rainmaker, and through his connections, Vinson & Elkins quickly began to have a world-wide client base.

Just as great-man histories focus on kings, presidents, or prime ministers, this study emphasizes the succession of managing partners of the firm, from Elkins to Connally and beyond. Hyman ably sketches the nature of the law practices of the various managing partners. He also devotes considerable attention to the actual administration of the firm: for example, to questions of office-space allocation or overtime pay. Hyman does not explore other questions that might have enriched his portrait. By 1980, the firm had grown to almost 300 attorneys, yet the reader has little sense of what all these other lawyers were doing. Whom did they represent? What causes were they involved with? What community activities occupied their time? This volume does not address the economic or other forces that prompted the firm's explosive growth, the emergence of new fields of law in response to legislation and litigation, or the important role of Vinson & Elkins in the Houston community. Notwithstanding these reservations, however, the book is a welcome addition to the literature on law firms and a careful

chronicle of the emergence of a major southwestern institution.

ROBERT JEROME GLENNON

*University of Arizona*

*James E. Rogers College of Law*

DAVID GERARD HOGAN. *Selling 'em by the Sack: White Castle and the Creation of American Food*. New York: New York University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 199. \$24.95.

David Gerard Hogan tells the story of the White Castle fast-food restaurant chain from its 1921 beginnings to its present position as a small, regional competitor with such major fast-food hamburger chains as McDonald's and Burger King. Hogan's self-described combination of social history, biography, and corporate history focuses not only on White Castle but also traces the rags-to-riches story of its founder, Billy Ingram, who was the first to implement the fast-food restaurant formula so successful today. Hogan also examines White Castle within the larger context of American eating habits. Since White Castle (not McDonald's) was the first promoter of the fast-food hamburger, the author identifies it as a major force in shaping Americans' contemporary eating habits. White Castle, asserts Hogan, provided "American democracy an accessible, egalitarian, and standardized style of eating" (p. 6).

The book's chronological narrative presents a decade by decade account of the ups and downs of White Castle. After a solid, engaging introduction into Americans' pre-fast-food eating habits, we learn about Ingram's partnership with short-order cook Walt Anderson, "inventor of the modern hamburger sandwich," in Wichita, Kansas, which eventually led to the first White Castle restaurant (p. 25). Hogan then traces White Castle's ability to weather the Great Depression; its simple menu of hamburgers and coffee at moderate prices helped the hamburger become firmly entrenched in American culture. Ingram's shrewd management during World War II helped White Castle survive despite food shortages and rationing, and it coped with labor shortages by hiring younger men, women, and "less desirable workers" to replace its former employees, more mature young men now gone off to war. Throughout the 1950s, White Castle's darkest hour, the company endured despite a too-rapid expansion program, racial discrimination in hiring, attempts to unionize workers, and rising crime rates in the downtown neighborhoods where White Castle restaurants traditionally were located. After a decade of faltering, Hogan explains, Ingram was once again able to put White Castle on firm ground by "reinforcing his original business principles . . . offering customers cleanliness, quality, and service" (p. 111). In the final chapter, "White Castle in the Age of McDonald's," Hogan recognizes White Castle in the 1960s through 1990s as maintaining its own niche despite the rapidly growing fast-food giants. A short epilogue nicely summarizes and reiterates White Cas-



tle's effect on American, and even global, history and culture. In addition to the chronological survey, Hogan discusses interesting facts about White Castle, including the origin of the name (Ingram's desire to evoke images of purity and stability), its unique architecture, and the dozens of imitators throughout the century that sought to replicate White Castle's successful formula. There are also several compelling photographs that nicely accompany the written text.

This book is most successful as a boosterish corporate history. Hogan examines White Castle largely through the lens of the corporation, relying heavily on in-house documents. The reader learns a myriad of details about White Castle corporate culture, management, technology, menu expansion, employee benefits, and the inner workings of the White Castle restaurants, all from a virtually uncritical viewpoint. More exploration of White Castle as a cultural icon, however, would have enhanced the book's value as a social history. Although Hogan provides some discussion of the uniqueness of the White Castle burgers, a sustained cultural analysis of their shape and size, their mode of consumption (in multiples as opposed to the ever-increasing sizes of other fast-food burgers), and their relation to American life seems a missed opportunity. Other elements are curious. For example, the author conflates ethnicity with nationalism when he asserts that White Castle paved the way for the hamburger to become America's ethnic food and recognized as an ethnic symbol (pp. 6–7) but does not provide further discussion of this concept.

AMY BENTLEY  
New York University

#### CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

AVIVA CHOMSKY and ALDO LAURIA-SANTIAGO, editors. *Identity and Struggle at the Margins of the Nation-State: The Laboring Peoples of Central America and the Hispanic Caribbean*. (Comparative and International Working-Class History.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. vi, 404. Cloth \$64.95, paper \$21.95.

This is an important volume. Its innovative essays focus on the diverse participation by working peoples in the modern histories of the nations of Central America and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean. Taken together, the studies demonstrate that political and ideological debates and elitist visions have too long structured historical perspectives. Analyses have presumed that elites and servant states, often backed by U.S. power, dominate national developments with dictatorial ease; challenges, when they have come, have been led by alternative elites, usually on the left, who mobilize popular support and define popular interests. In such histories, working people are pawns. The essays here emphasize that popular groups have been neither quiet subjects of elites and dictatorial states nor mere followers on the left. They have participated within established regimes. They have

challenged regimes, often driving "radical" leaders toward popular agendas.

Several essays emphasize that social structures rarely divide simply between dominant landed elites and expropriated, subordinated, working populations. Co-editor Aldo Lauria-Santiago shows that peasant coffee growers joined the nineteenth-century export boom in El Salvador. Julie Charlip examines parallel groups and their involvement in credit markets in Nicaragua. Co-editor Aviva Chomsky and Dario Euraque add new complexities to our understanding of labor, production, and popular participation in politics in Honduras and Costa Rica, emphasizing the importance of immigrants from the English-speaking Caribbean. Jeffrey Gould revises the history of Nicaragua, and issues a caveat to all historians, by demonstrating that although elite ideological visions proclaimed the disappearance of indigenous peoples, indigenous communities remained and held essential roles in production and political mobilization well into the twentieth century.

Several essays extend to explore the consequences of popular participation in national histories. Cindy Forster looks at coffee and banana workers in Guatemala, demonstrating that each pressed the governments of the 1944–1954 revolution toward policies addressing popular demands for land and better working lives. Barry Carr documents how early twentieth-century Cuban sugar workers helped to create what producers saw as labor scarcities and then used those conditions to press, often successfully, for concrete gains. And Richard Turits demonstrates that the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, often portrayed—perhaps caricatured—as the ultimate dictatorship, used agrarian reform to create a popular base that provided the state with a counterweight to oligarchic interests. Had Turits found sources generated by popular groups, he might have discovered that Trujillo's reform responded to popular mobilizations and demands. Did the regime not just seek a popular base to counter oligarchic power? Did it respond to popular assertions and become, *de facto*, a mediator between popular power and oligarchic interests?

Perhaps the two most innovative essays in the volume are by Patricia Alvarenga and Eileen Findlay. Alvarenga explores how the Salvadoran state incorporated segments of the peasantry into the apparatus of repression, beginning in the late nineteenth century. This is not surprising in the context of Lauria-Santiago's demonstration that segments of the same peasantry joined in coffee export production. The result was the extension of the export economy and the state apparatus deeply into rural communities, often dividing them into factions, some linked to local oligarchs and the state, others pursuing diverse local and popular interests. Alvarenga's insights demand—and provide the basis for—a fundamental reconceptualization of the conflicts that have driven twentieth-century Salvadoran history.

Findlay reminds us that labor and gender are inseparable.



arable historical categories. She emphasizes that both work and labor activism involved men and women and that gender ideologies and politics played key roles in popular mobilizations in Puerto Rico as the twentieth century began. Working women pressed feminist agendas; workingmen struggled to deflect women's demands by arguing that gender exploitations resulted from elite depredations. Women's mobilizations made the Puerto Rican labor movement more encompassing; divisions, sometimes conflicts, between working women and men limited the unity and effective power of the same movement. Alvarenga and Findlay both demonstrate that popular participation often came with diverse, even conflicting, visions of popular interests. They point us toward new histories of great complexity.

Lowell Gudmundson and Francisco Scarano ably synthesize the diverse studies. They emphasize that the analyses open new and complex issues that demand serious and continuing investigations if the histories of Central America and the Hispanic Caribbean are to move beyond limited, politicized conceptualizations and incorporate popular groups, their diverse powers, and participation. I have only one major quibble with this volume. The title suggests that labor relations and popular participation develop historically at the margins of the nation-state. The essays demonstrate that relations among elites and states and the majorities who work and produce (and generate profits and tax revenues, and repeatedly mobilize to press their own goals) are not at the margins of state power relations. The social organization and cultural construction of contested relations between powerholders and the people who work are at the core of state powers. They are the center, the essence, of national histories.

JOHN TUTINO  
Georgetown University

LILLIAN GUERRA, *Popular Expression and National Identity in Puerto Rico: The Struggle for Self, Community, and Nation*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998. Pp. xi, 332. \$49.95.

Hotly debated in both the cultural and the political arenas, national identity constitutes unarguably the dominant issue in Puerto Rican society over the course of the twentieth century. Because the politicians and the *letrados* have overwhelmingly dominated the public debates about the nation and the national question, however, the vast academic production on Puerto Rican identity refers mostly to the notions of the dominant sectors of society; little of it pertains to the conceptions and ideas of the popular classes. This is the case even among the latest works that deal with this issue, among them Juan Manuel Carrión's *Voluntad de nación: Ensayos sobre el nacionalismo en Puerto Rico* (1996), Luis Fernando Coss Pontón's *La nación en la orilla: Respuesta a los posmodernos pesimistas* (1996), Rafael Bernabé's *Respuestas al colonialismo en la política puertorriqueña: 1899-1929* (1996), and the

several articles by Carlos Pabón on the nation and nationalism. Even Kelvin Santiago-Valles's "*Subject People*" and *Colonial Discourses: Economic Transformation and Social Disorder in Puerto Rico, 1898-1947* (1994), which explores the reactions of the subaltern classes to structures of power and to economic transformations under United States' colonialism, lacks a head-on approach to popular discourses on nation, community, and identity.

This is, precisely, one of the greatest contributions of Lillian Guerra's book, which brings the thorny topic of national identity to another level of discussion by incorporating the subalterns' voices to those of the elite sectors of society. In so doing, Guerra creates a more nuanced conception of national identity. This is not a completely novel proposition. In the 1970s and 1980s, Angel G. Quintero Rivera's *Conflictos de clase y política en Puerto Rico* (1976) and José Luis González's *El país de cuatro pisos y otros ensayos* (1980) offered influential interpretations on the role of the popular classes in the making of the Puerto Rican nation. This line of inquiry was not pushed to its limits by subsequent scholars, however.

In the first three chapters of her book, Guerra studies the constructions of national identity by the political and intellectual elites during the early twentieth century. The author's purpose is to show how the elites appropriated the image of the *jíbaro*—the reputedly white peasant—to build a national identity upon it. This construction of identity (a construction of the self), was a cultural and political response to the encroachment of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico. The end product was a *jibarista* discourse that emphasized those traits of the popular classes that made them akin to the elites and that disdained those characteristics of the subalterns that contradicted this image of the self (for example, the African ancestry of a wide proportion of the laboring classes). Although the main argument is not completely new (González, above all, emphasized the idealization of the *jíbaro* in the literature of the early twentieth century), Guerra develops a more thorough approach to it, including in her analysis of the *jibarista* discourse of sociologists José Colombán Rosario and Miguel Meléndez Muñoz, poets Virgilio Dávila and Luis Lloréns Torres (its main exponent in poetry), essayist Antonio S. Pedreira, and politician Luis Muñoz Marín.

In the other three chapters of her book, Guerra focuses on the construction of identities by the popular classes, and here, I think, she makes her most valuable contribution. Basing her study on the J. Alden Mason collection of Puerto Rican folklore, folktales, riddles, and popular music originally collected in 1914-1915, Guerra probes into "folkloric politics" with the intent of "entering the discursive realm of popular culture" (p. 126). She finds, on the one hand, that the laboring classes' notions of identity were strongly founded on "class consciousness" and a "thirst for social justice"; but, on the other hand, these notions seldomly contested some of the most ominous forms of exploitation

and marginalization ingrained in the discourse of the elites. Among the subalterns, views on gender and race tended to reproduce (or were shared with) those of the elites; their constructions of community, identity, and nation were (and still are) as problematic and contradictory as those of the dominant sectors of society.

This book raises several important issues, and, obviously, offers some debatable interpretations. For instance, Guerra interprets the *jibarista* discourse of some intellectuals as a sort of guilty conscience because of their "collaboration" with the colonial system. Some readers might wish for a more in-depth discussion of the theoretical aspects of her research. Guerra does shed light on the constructions of national identities by the upper and lower classes, however, and this is no mean feat with regard to a problem that often seems like a cul-de-sac.

PEDRO L. SAN MIGUEL  
University of Puerto Rico,  
Río Piedras

JORGE IBARRA. *Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898–1958*. Translated by MARJORIE MOORE. (Studies in Cuban History.) Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner. 1998. Pp. viii, 231. \$48.00.

Jorge Ibarra is a prominent and prolific Cuban historian. His *oeuvre* is a mainstay of the post-1959 historiography premised on continuity between the struggles for national independence and social justice during the nineteenth century and the revolutionary movement that overthrew Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship at the end of the 1950s. Ibarra wrote the history of Cuba that, since the 1960s, has served as the principal text on the subject on the island. He is also the author of a seminal monograph, *Ideología mambisa* (1967), in which he cogently argues the thesis of "One Hundred Years of Struggle"; in 1968, the Cuban leadership widely disseminated it to commemorate the centennial anniversary of the Ten Years' War. Ibarra's careful eye has similarly gazed upon a broad range of historical and cultural aspects of Cuban historical development during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In short, his work is an obligatory point of reference for all interested in the island's history.

This book is an exhaustive overview of socio-economic data, beginning with the U.S. occupation and ending on the eve of the revolution. Ibarra has culled a profile of the old Cuba from a wide variety of sources, which scholars will find useful as a bibliographic compendium. Based on well-known evidence, he asserts the island's modernity wrought by the sugar industry and catalogs the crises that befell the economy when sugar could no longer sustain growth rates after the 1920s. Cuba's development, of course, was of a peculiar sort—with the United States so preponderant, national aspirations so frustrated, popular movements often so militant—and Ibarra makes these familiar arguments. He rightly underscores the absence of an oligarchy, the weakness of the bourgeoisie,

and the centrality of the working class. Few would dispute his central thesis: Cuba was rapidly becoming a "proletarian" society (that is, a society where people increasingly depended on wage labor for their livelihood) that was not, however, creating enough jobs. What the author fails to do is live up to his title: this book is no prologue to the revolution of 1959. The facts simply do not speak for themselves, and Ibarra writes as if they do. Human agency, except in the clichéd recourse to "generations," falls through the cracks.

Ibarra's failure reflects the affliction besetting a once-vibrant historiography on the island. Amid the revolutionary effervescence of the 1960s, "One Hundred Years of Struggle" offered a provocative framework for understanding Cuban history and a platform for intellectuals hoping to become "organic" to the new Cuba then in process. From the outset, the thesis of continuous struggles confronted a serious dilemma: the closer in time to the revolutionary break of 1959, the harder it was to make use of it. A socio-economic profile of Cuba between the 1930s and 1950s just does not explain the revolution, not the least of the reasons being that, pace proletarianization, the syndicalized working class (whether led by Communists, *Auténticos*, or *batistianos*) constituted a bulwark of reform and had achieved notable gains. In the early 1960s, most workers indeed supported the revolution, but the "proletariat" was not the decisive actor in Batista's overthrow; Ibarra offers us no new insights on this crucial fact.

A century and a quarter of struggles may well characterize Cuban history since 1868, but the revolution can only be explained in the context of contingencies, and these are nowhere to be found in this book. The revolution, in fact, becomes more interesting, politically and intellectually, if we understand the failed alternatives. Why, for example, was Batista able to craft an impressive transition to democracy during the late 1930s and forge a social compromise in the Constitution of 1940 but unable to do the same during the 1950s? Although a complex web of political factors is the midwife of all revolutions, Ibarra focuses on caricatured versions of both republican politics and the revolutionary movement that toppled Batista. Forty years after 1959, and, given the greater understanding we now have of revolutionary transformations, Ibarra should have produced a mature, critical inquiry of the origins of the Cuban Revolution. Long ago, *Ideología mambisa* provoked; today, this book—unaided by a stilted translation—disappoints and saddens.

MARIFELI PÉREZ-STABLE  
State University of New York,  
Old Westbury

ROSALIE SCHWARTZ. *Pleasure Island: Tourism and Temptation in Cuba*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1997. Pp. xxi, 239. \$45.00.

Prior to the 1959 revolution, many Cubans diagnosed the politico-economic and social condition of their island as one of national diabetes. It was not sugar alone that evoked this diabetic state but a new staple, tourism. Yet, while Rosalie Schwartz's book acknowledges that by 1925 tourism had become "a potential second crop" (p. 4), it fails to discern in this metaphor its diverse attributes beyond mere recognition of tourism's potential as an income generator. Tourism was purportedly a neoplantation industry because it replicated the systemic contours of the plantation complex in Cuba: seasonal business activity, functional and structural economic dependency, market instability, social segmentation, racism, inequality, and despoilation. True enough, Schwartz shows how Cuban authorities courted and accommodated to the visitor flow, manufactured traditions, and virtually genuflected for their guests' gratification. But in an era of Jim Crowism in the United States, visitor satisfaction additionally connoted usurpation of beaches by private interests, segregated hotels, and other outrages. Notwithstanding the persistent yearning among Afro-Cubans for "our rightful share," this study of an industry that reeks of white privilege somehow avoids any discussion of the color question.

From the start, the book disclaims any interest in a panoramic portrayal of Cuban tourism history, preferring to fix its historical gaze on a few selected features of the industry. As its title indicates, its focus is riveted on the temptations that accompanied tourism development in the island: narcotics, gaming, prostitution, pornography, and the like. Collateral interest also encompassed the many mobsters spawned by the pleasure business, the political collusion and pay-offs, as well as real estate schemes. Although from early on critics discerned in the tourist traffic a threat to turn Cuba into a toilet, this does not grab the author's interest. The book does inform, however, that the revolutionaries of 1933 sought not to abolish tourism but to reform it through an emphasis on culture not casinos (p. 94). For its part, when the July 26 Movement took power in January 1959, this new generation of revolutionaries tried to close the casinos but rapidly had to rescind that decision because of its economic repercussions. It was not the morality of the Castro government that wrought eventual closure of Cuba's casinos but the financial calculations of private investors faced with imminent bankruptcy, as trade with the U.S. plummeted in 1960 (p. 203).

Besides the vice that characterized the history of Cuba's tourism, what stands out most in the book is the economic volatility. First were the "fat years" of the 1920s, followed by a lean phase occasioned by international depression, domestic revolution, and world war. Happy times were back again for the industry during the 1950s, thanks to the growth of air travel after World War II and Fulgencio Batista's wiles in expanding the visitor plant. At the end of that decade, however, the industry floundered once more on the shoals of revolution and changes in Cuba's foreign

relations with Washington. Since 1980, Cuba has been enveloped in its third tourism boom cycle, with an ascribed macro-economic growth role that has been even more salient to the national well-being than in the 1920s or 1950s. Although the book focuses on the first two boom cycles, it inexplicably pays scant heed to the third. Yet it admits that "the industry undoubtedly will have a more profound and lasting impact on society this time than in previous incarnations" (p. 204).

Like its handling of the latest years of Cuba's tourism history, the book gives short shrift in its narrative to the earliest phase. For Schwartz, the story begins in the year 1919, when the U.S. passed its Prohibition Act and the first casino legislation successfully made it through the Cuban Congress. With its offerings of liberal libations and gambling legally sanctioned, the stage was therefore set for Cuban tourism to take off. For over a generation before this launch date, however, Cuba had been the locus of a burgeoning tourist industry, about which Schwartz's account is visibly reticent. Schwartz also seems oblivious to the paradox that, virtually until the end of the nineteenth century, Cuba had been a malarial death trap. How it became a health and pleasure resort is not fully explained. Nor is there any exploration of the part the Platt Amendment played in making Cuba safe for tourism physically, financially, and politically. Its defects aside, this is an important and informative book and stands alongside existing work on Jamaica in opening up the frontiers of historical information on the Caribbean's number one industry.

FRANK F. TAYLOR  
Boston College

MATTHEW RESTALL. *The Maya World: Yucatec Culture and Society, 1550–1850*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 441. \$55.00.

Matthew Restall's magisterial book is the first comprehensive study of the Maya in colonial Yucatán based on Maya-language sources—above all, the notarial documents produced by local communities. These records, Restall insists, take us to the very heart of the colonial Maya world, for the individual community—the *cah*—was the fundamental political, social, and cultural unit of Maya life. Along with the patronymic group known as the *chibal*, the *cah* shaped indigenous identity. At the same time, it mediated Maya interaction with the Spaniards, largely containing the disruptive impact of the conquest: "the *cah* exhibited a remarkable ability to expose itself to Spanish influence with the least amount of cultural compromise" (p. 318). The book's emphasis, then, is on continuity rather than change. This has been an important theme of recent studies on Nahuatl-speaking communities in central Mexico, but the Yucatecan Maya emerge as a more extreme case. Castilian, for example, had less impact on the Maya language than it did on Nahuatl; and the Maya, unlike their Mexican counterparts, did not adopt Hispanic patronymics (one might easily find

a Juan Cocom, but seldom a Juan de la Cruz). Restall, however, is not arguing so much for active Maya resistance as for the relative insignificance of Spanish impositions compared to more deeply embedded indigenous practices. Thus, migration has often been seen as a characteristic Maya response to resettlement and Spanish exploitation. But Restall downplays the impact of *congregaciones* and presents colonial migration mainly as a continuation of pre-conquest patterns, driven by the demands of Maya agriculture and sanctioned by the fluidity of Maya territorial boundaries.

Of course, some changes were forced upon the Maya, but this did not imply passivity. Restall is at his best precisely in his detailed descriptions of how local communities refashioned Spanish institutions to serve their own ends. The discussion of land tenure, which weaves in and out of several chapters, provides a particularly rich illustration. Indigenous descriptions, understanding, and use of land remained fundamentally Maya. Land tenure patterns were both complex and flexible, combining (as in pre-Columbian times) private and communal holdings. The Maya readily seized upon Spanish-style wills as a means of transferring property to the next generation, but usually in the form of joint ownership. Even when the official recipient was an individual (typically a male head of household), he represented a larger family or kinship group. Restall regards such "representation" as one of the key "organizing principles of Maya culture" (p. 315). Though Maya communities were hierarchical, common people were not voiceless, nor were important individuals allowed to ride roughshod over collective interests. Indeed, "private" transactions, such as the sale or inheritance of land, were hardly private: they had to be ratified by the *cabildo*, the town council that, in its exuberant Maya form, might include thirty or more community leaders. They in turn would draw upon the testimony from the relatives of all involved parties. *Cabildo* decisions, therefore, ultimately reflected community norms. Yet this collective wisdom was not infallible. In particular, a *cah* might well acquiesce in land sales to Spaniards to gain short-term benefits, while ignoring the long-term consequences. By the late eighteenth century, Spanish intrusion (fueled by demographic changes) finally began to erode the land base and autonomy of Maya communities.

If Restall's Maya-centric perspective provides new insights, it also raises some questions. The most obvious is whether Maya-language documents are always the best, most informative sources. The view from the *cah* may contain its own distortions. In celebrating Maya agency, Restall at times comes close simply to reversing the old active Spaniards/passive Indians stereotype. The Maya were masters at manipulating Spanish institutions, while the poor Spaniards were clueless: "the Maya petitioners got their way, and the Spanish authorities could continue to enjoy the three-century-old delusion that they understood and controlled indigenous politics" (p. 80). The danger here is that the broader power dynamics of an oppressive

colonial regime may drop from sight. Restall's treatment of religion, while valuable, is far less penetrating and original than Nancy Farriss's in *Maya Society under Colonial Rule: The Collective Enterprise of Survival* (1984), which is based mainly on Spanish sources. Finally, the majority of Restall's documents postdate 1720. How much of the continuity that he finds is an artifact of his limited evidence for earlier periods?

In the conclusion, Restall points out that scholars must aim at bringing Maya and Spaniard into a single analytical framework. This is not the purpose of his book, but by illuminating the internal workings of Maya society, he has taken a giant step toward that goal. In its scope, erudition, and informed use of comparative analysis, this book joins Farriss's study as the essential work on the colonial Maya of Yucatán.

R. DOUGLAS COPE  
Brown University

FRIEDRICH E. SCHULER. *Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934–1940*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1998. Pp. x, 269. \$47.50.

Friedrich E. Schuler's exploration of Mexican foreign relations during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) is not only the best work to date on that topic but also the best general look that we have at the upper-level internal politics of Mexico at that time. Schuler gracefully and clearly handles the intertwining themes of the ways in which the Mexican political scene—including political, cultural, economic, and military arenas—interacted within a world context. The study is particularly rich in that the time periods involved were both complex and significant in the evolution of Mexico's postrevolutionary state and in world developments leading up to and encompassing the first years of World War II.

The conclusions that Schuler comes to about the Mexican political leadership's ability to counteract the assumed "power advantages" of other nations, including most particularly the United States, are entirely justified by his evidence and his analysis. Mexican policy makers were skilled in exploiting the distractions of the times and the multiple policy concerns of other countries to push forward their own agendas and to escape repeatedly from seemingly perilous situations, both internal and external. Of course, the ability to chart their own course and even to defy apparently more powerful countries—especially in the nationalization of the Mexican oil fields in 1938—played well to internal Mexican political opinion. In fact, Cárdenas was able to leave office in 1940 as a national hero, an outcome that must have seemed laughably unlikely to friends and foes alike just a few years earlier.

Although the book contains far more, it is the best discussion to date of why Cárdenas was able to get away with the oil expropriation. Schuler shows that Mexican policy makers from Cárdenas on down had prepared the way for just such an action—seemingly



undertaken in the heat of nationalistic passion—should it become necessary. Efforts by the president to permit advantageous although not ideal agreements with the companies in the months leading up to the expropriation had come to nothing; the companies maintained an attitude of arrogance that ignored their own possible difficulties in obtaining support from the Roosevelt administration in the event of strong Mexican action. At the same time, a Mexican presidential administration besieged by internal critics could not afford to suffer public defeat and humiliation in regard to Mexican control of their own natural resources, a concern growing out of the economic nationalism of the Mexican Revolution and especially Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917. The control of subsoil rights was a theme and an image of Mexican national stature in internal politics. A move to curb the power of the companies would benefit Cárdenas in the face of domestic political attack from both left and right, the latter at least supported by foreign sources unfriendly to the United States. And, in fact, that is what occurred. These forces had suffered a double blow when German troops moved into Austria on March 12, 1938. Cárdenas, as Schuler shows, had already been discussing the possibilities of expropriation and had even assigned his close adviser, Francisco Múgica, the “public staging” of the nationalization on March 10. The German move immediately shifted Mexican expropriation from a center-stage issue to the sidelines. The oil companies, understanding at least to a degree their loss of relative advantage, suddenly asked to resume negotiations. By this time, they had lost; the international situation now gave Cárdenas both the power to and the necessity of moving ahead. Nationalization of most of the industry on March 18 was greeted with jubilation by the Mexican people and strengthened Cárdenas’s identification with revolutionary and national goals. Support of Cárdenas and the expropriation became a support of the Mexican nation itself.

At the same time, a lack of focus and particularly a lack of coordination—both internal and external—hindered the possibilities of the U.S. and British governments doing anything to help the oil companies. In the United States, the primary concern became the European situation. Although some major policy players wanted a hard line on Mexico, others were unwilling to jeopardize U.S. security by provoking either unfriendliness on the part of the Mexican administration or Mexican public or further destabilization of the political situation on the country’s southern border. These conflicts played out within the administration and made strong action impossible, despite pressure by the U.S. companies. As for Great Britain, the other world power with considerable Mexican oil holdings, public pressure by the British ambassador on Mexico both solidified internal Mexican support for Cárdenas and led him to recall the Mexican ambassador in London. The British were forced to recall their own ambassador from Mexico City, leaving the United States to deal with the oil expropriation. Interestingly,

U.S. policy makers declined to meet with the recalled British ambassador, although he passed through Washington, D.C., and New York on his way home.

The virtues of Schuler’s book do not end here. He has several excellent chapters on the development of the Mexican political opposition, always securely framed within an understanding of the international situation and its effects on Mexico, and one on the development of the Mexican military. He examines Mexican relations not only with the United States and Great Britain but also with Germany, France, Spain, and even Japan. Throughout, Schuler shows that Mexican policy makers were informed and astute promoters of the interests of the Mexican state against both internal opposition and foreign powers. Indeed, effective assertion of Mexican state goals against foreign interests reinforced their internal political support in dramatic ways. He concludes that they were able to establish “a self-confident, assertive approach” in which they viewed themselves “as developers of their own state, not as victims of international capitalism” (p. 200). This reviewer profoundly agrees.

LINDA B. HALL

*University of New Mexico*

JEFFREY W. RUBIN. *Decentering the Regime: Ethnicity, Radicalism, and Democracy in Juchitán, Mexico*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 316. Cloth \$54.95, paper \$17.95.

Jeffrey W. Rubin has woven together a compelling postcolonial treatment of a leftist, grass-roots movement in southern Mexico during the 1970s and 1980s. It focuses on the questions of ethnicity, identity, discourse, gender, and the contradictory relationships between leaders and supporters, popular groups and elites, and social movements and political regimes. Rubin has contributed to at least three ongoing critical debates in Mexican studies today. First, he presents a strong critique of corporatist theories of the Mexican one-party state by demonstrating how a decentered approach to national politics reveals the underlying weaknesses of the regime and endurance of regional movements. He also approaches grass-roots movements from the perspective of ethnicity, identity, discourse, hegemony, and culture rather than from a structural perspective. Finally, he engages in a comparative analysis with the scholars who have written on Mexico’s regional movements in particular and Latin American popular movements in general and suggests that Juchitán’s moderate and radical forms of mobilization represent models for the entire Latin American left.

As do an increasing number of scholars today, Rubin rejects the state-centered model approach to post-revolutionary Mexico, where hegemony was maintained by management and coercion. Like other culturalists, Rubin argues that hegemony must be continued, renewed, and recreated, and that national politics must be understood as something partial and



complex that coexists and responds to regional and local politics. The rise of radical movements in the 1970s in Mexico cannot be attributed therefore to the breakdown of a cohesive, homogenous state corporatism but rather to enduring regional "domains of sovereignty," to use Partha Chatterjee's concept.

Juchitán identity on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec was shaped by ethnicity, rebellion against the outside world, class, and gender. As a Zapotec center for centuries, it maintained a strong indigenous heritage through language and culture. Unlike most indigenous communities based on subsistence corn agriculture and commerce, its identity was based on a multi-class community where elites consciously allied with peasants to confront the outside world. Gender also played a role, in that women controlled the markets and men dominated politics. Zapotec culture was consciously preserved through women's apparel, ritual, song, and poetry through the 1990s.

Juchiteco identity is traced through four stages of shifting hegemonies. During the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century, it was the multi-class pueblo against the foreign invader or the modernizing state. After the revolution of 1910, a regional political boss created his own "domain of sovereignty" based on his experience as a revolutionary leader, his ability to satisfy the basic needs of his supporters, and his adeptness at negotiating with federal regimes from the 1930s into the 1960s, which were unable to exercise their control over the countryside. Third, outside development policies stimulated reformist Zapotec elites in the 1960s and 1970s to seize the initiative, intent on reforming the local branch of the PRI from within and profiting from the new economic opportunities.

The emergence of the Coalition of Peasants, Workers, and Students of the Isthmus (COCEI) in the 1970s was due in part to a political opening, local discontent with political corruption, and economic dislocation brought on by economic development. The COCEI combined militant, class-based discourse with an eclectic agenda of nonelectoral goals to improve working conditions for factory workers and fight legal battles to attain land for subsistence agriculturalists in a communal *ejido*. At the same time, it engaged in electoral politics to capture the municipal presidency in 1980 by refusing to accept vote fraud. Thrown out of power in 1983, it returned in 1986 after making political alliances first with leftist opposition parties and then with the official party. Rubin attributes COCEI's success to its intellectuals' abilities to construct a strong ethnic and cultural identity on the one hand and, on the other hand, to field an ambiguous and contradictory agenda that could adapt to shifting alliances with local, state, and federal elites, reject internal democracy, and manipulate gender along unique ethnic lines.

Although he presents a logical and coherent argument to explain the success of this "first" grass-roots movement, some problems must be mentioned concerning his research methods and his characterization

of COCEI as the perfect model. For the historian, reliance almost exclusively on secondary sources and unattributed interviews conducted in "courtyards" and "markets" will not usually pass muster. This research methodology casts doubt on Rubin's construction of the COCEI as a popular movement with enormous popular support among peasants and workers. It remains almost a nebulous organization with only supporters and a set of phantom-like leaders, who refused to be interviewed by a foreigner. Finally, Rubin's macroanalysis of Mexican regional movements is quite convincing for studying popular movements within the framework of decentered cultural politics, but it fails to highlight some of the intrinsic social and political differences between these regions.

HEATHER FOWLER-SALAMINI  
Bradley University

DOUGLASS SULLIVAN-GONZÁLEZ. *Piety, Power, and Politics: Religion and Nation Formation in Guatemala, 1821–1871*. (Pitt Latin American Series.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 182. \$45.00.

In this intriguing study, Douglass Sullivan-González explores the relationship between religion and nationalism in nineteenth-century Guatemala. Whereas previous authors date the beginnings of a nationalist project to the Liberal victory of 1871, he argues that a revitalized Catholic Church, through elite theological discourse and a deepening popular religiosity, assisted the popular caudillo Rafael Carrera in the task of forging a Guatemalan nation between 1840 and 1870. Whereas R. L. Woodward's standard work on the period employs the term "republic," Sullivan-González says "nation." And whereas still others see failure in the collapse of the Central American union (1824–1839), he sees achievement: Guatemala's emergence as a nation distinct from its Central American neighbors. The achievement was as much theological as political.

Lively and thought-provoking, the book is based on the skillful use of copious but previously inaccessible Guatemalan church records. Although the author pays relatively scant attention to more conventional social, political, and economic themes (such as land issues), he adapts the interpretive insights of such diverse authors as Benedict Anderson, Caroline C. Ford, and Serge Gruzinski to explore elite and popular attitudes and their relation to the national question. He provides an excellent analysis of the collapse and partial recovery of the institutional church in the mid-nineteenth century. The reliance on interim appointments rather than permanent benefices reflected both the struggle of the church to reproduce itself in harsh times and a deliberate strategy of trying to retain institutional autonomy from both the hostile 1830s Liberal governments of Mariano Gálvez and Francisco Morazán and the much more friendly Carrera, who sought to control the church for his own ends. Such

practices, however, led to the erosion of long-term church influence.

Sullivan-González convincingly refutes the idea that churchmen, with a few notable exceptions, supported the initial Carrera revolt or took up arms on its behalf. In the wake of the Carrera revolt (1838–1839), creole clerics of the capital (namely Juan José de Aycinena, the former marqués de Aycinena), once they overcame their fears of a caste war, devised the notion of a covenant between God and Guatemala, marking Guatemalans as a chosen people. The author's skillful deconstruction of Aycinena's rhetoric would benefit from additional historical context. His role as spokesman for the creole elite as well as the institutional church needs to be considered. A more sustained comparison of Guatemala's church question with Mexico's or that of other parts of Latin America, and consideration of the views of important conservatives like Lucas Alamán, would seem to be as apt as erudite references to South Africa and New England.

Although Sullivan-González recognizes the difficulties of linking elite discourse with popular beliefs and actions, he adroitly explores numerous fascinating episodes in Guatemalan social history, seeking to divine the meaning of cemetery revolts, the murders of priests, popular responses to epidemics, and the appearance of Sun Gods in the western highlands. Most outbursts, it seems, reflected a tenacious resistance to assaults on *costumbre*, traditional practices.

The connection between such phenomena and the formation of a nation is not always clear. Nevertheless, the author asserts that in the rebellious ladino east, popular religiosity and a partially revitalized church establishment, undergirded by the notion of a divine covenant, formed and eventually consolidated a Guatemalan nation, able to defend itself against "foreign" attacks from El Salvador and Honduras. With somewhat greater dexterity, he argues that in the predominantly indigenous western highlands, Mayan communities grateful for newfound political and religious autonomy were bound to the Guatemalan "nation" via an almost mystical connection to Carrera, a process that Sullivan-González defines as protonationalism. The link between nation and protonations was provided by Carrera.

Yet, this particular national vision, and the multi-class and multi-ethnic alliance that sustained it, collapsed rather quickly after Carrera's death in 1865, raising doubts about its sustainability or long-term significance. The author attributes the success of J. R. Barrios in 1871 primarily to his Remington rifles, ignoring the demands of coffee and the emerging coffee elite. He speculates that Barrios was killed in El Salvador in 1885 by angry Guatemalan easterners, by implication as punishment for destroying the earlier national vision. He does not deal at all with the subsequent Liberal era (1871–1944), jumping instead to the 1990s by way of an epilogue entitled, "What Changed?" A sense of continuity is thus difficult to discern. Although some readers may be reluctant to

accept all aspects of Sullivan-González's vigorous argument, he has made an important contribution nevertheless, adding new layers of meaning to Guatemala's nineteenth-century history.

RICHMOND F. BROWN  
University of South Alabama

JEFFREY L. GOULD. *To Die in This Way: Nicaraguan Indians and the Myth of Mestizaje, 1880–1965*. (Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 305. Cloth \$54.95, paper \$18.95.

Shortly before his party's electoral defeat in Nicaragua in 1990, Sandinista leader José González told Jeffrey L. Gould, referring to his home region of Matagalpa, that "there are no 'real Indians' [here] and so their demands aren't valid" (p. 274). Decades earlier, in the 1950s, an editorial in the *Revista Conservadora del Pensamiento Centroamericano* declared: "The Nicaraguan people, formed during colonial times, [are] a product of mestizaje. In reality, there is no other Central American country where this process has been realized to the same degree. Practically speaking, the Indian element has ceased to exist" (p. 167). Ideologues and fora of both the left and the right, Gould makes it clear, subscribed to this ethnic construction of Nicaragua from the late nineteenth century on, thus making "the indigenous people of central and western Nicaragua largely invisible to intellectuals, politicians, and most city folk throughout the twentieth century" (p. 3). It is this mythologizing of Nicaragua as a homogeneous mestizo society, "Nicaragua mestiza" as he terms it, that Gould explores and explodes in this provocative and absorbing book.

Gould lays out his case, cumulatively and convincingly, by a creative mix of archival foraging, ethnographic fieldwork, oral history, regional analysis, and judicious recourse to the now formidable theoretical literature on ethnicity, identity, and nationalism. He takes it all in his stride, punctuating his narrative here and there with an easy use of first person singular for the most part mercifully free of self-reflexive angst and postmodern hand-wringing. Chapter one examines "diverse forms of indigenous resistance" (p. 38), including armed insurrection, by which native peoples in Matagalpa and Jinotega in north-central Nicaragua responded to a "frontal assault on their land and labor resources" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (p. 19). In chapter two, Gould shifts the scene of Indian-state collision south and east to Boaco and Camoapa before moving west, in chapter three, to Sutiaba, "where the annexation of the indigenous municipality to León accelerated the process of communal land privatization and dealt a serious blow to the cohesiveness of the community" (p. 19). Chapter four concentrates on the discourse of mestizaje between 1920 and 1940, with Gould pointing out that even Augusto César Sandino bought into the myth. He attributes to Sandino such assimilationist sentiments

as "[we must] do whatever [is] necessary to civilize these Indians, who are the marrow of our race" and "[we must] make true men out of them" (p. 159). Sandino's "Indo Hispanism" is perhaps best captured by the statement: "I used to look with resentment on the colonizing work of Spain, but today I have profound admiration for it . . . Spain gave us its language, its civilization, and its blood. We consider ourselves to be the Spanish Indians of America" (p. 134).

The theme of native resistance to state intrusion is developed further in chapters five and six, primarily by charting episode after episode of confrontation in the 1930s and 1940s. Here Gould focuses on "the growing gulf between the national discourse of ethnic homogeneity and grassroots ethnic conflict and repression" (p. 20), even after the government of Nicaragua endorsed the Pátzcuaro Convention of December 19, 1941, and established (as did other Latin American countries) an Instituto Indigenista Nacional. "The signing of the treaty," Gould informs us, "had far more to do with Somoza's strategic alliance with the United States than with any particular program in favor of the country's Indians" (p. 192). Chapter seven deals with the 1950s and 1960s and is an attempt "to reconstruct the role of collective memory in the peasant movements" (p. 20). Gould offers some trenchant remarks about "the Central American Left's failure to resolve the dilemmas of Liberalism and in particular its tragic inability to come to terms with ethnic identities" (p. 264). His comment that "revolutionary nationalism" contains "its own forms of erasure and amnesia" (p. 16) is one that certainly applies beyond Nicaragua's borders to other parts of the much-troubled isthmus.

Numbers, of course, do not allow us humanize the story very well, but they do afford us some idea of the scale of "erasure and amnesia" Gould refers to. He draws on the work of Linda Newson (*Indian Survival in Colonial Nicaragua* [1987]), who calculates that an Indian population of 825,000 at contact had been reduced to some 85,000 by the late eighteenth century, at which time "Indians represented between 50 and 78 percent of the population" (p. 16). Nicaraguan historian Germán Romero Vargas reckons that Indians constituted less than fifty percent of the population during the early nineteenth century (*Las Estructuras sociales de Nicaragua en el siglo XVIII* [1988]). A census dating to the year 1846 furnished E. G. Squier with an Indian population of 80,000, or thirty-two percent of the Nicaraguan total (*Nicaragua: Its People, Scenery, Monuments and the Proposed Interoceanic Canal* [1852]). The French geographer Pablo Levy estimated the native population at fifty-five percent in 1870 (*Notas geográficas y económicas sobre la Republica de Nicaragua* [1873]). Gould suggests that, in 1900, Indians made up some forty percent of Nicaragua's population.

It is at this juncture that mestizaje myth making gears up a notch, for the national census of 1920 recorded an Indian population of under four percent, a drop from thirty to forty percent in 1906. Indians,

racialized as *cobrizos* (copper-colored) in the language of the census, were not even recorded in eleven institutionally recognized Indian communities. Between 1877 and 1923, these communities resisted eight attempts on the part of the government to abolish them. Gould comes up with an estimate of the Indian population in 1920 "at between 90,000 and 125,000, or between 15 and 20 percent of Nicaragua's population" (p. 18), significantly more than officially recognized. By 1950, however, the state's attack on "the institutions that defined indigenous ethnicity" had achieved its ends, after which time "it took but a short leap of faith to declare the Indians dead upon arrival of the twentieth century" (p. 49).

Regarding debates about how to theorize Indian identity, Gould's evidence lends itself to a constructionist as opposed to an essentialist interpretation, which means that he depicts ethnicity "as a social construct with no reference to any primordial essence" (p. 69). Consciousness of being Indian is therefore "not a given transmitted from the distant past but rather a constructed identity mediated by contact with nation-states and with other ethnic groups" (p. 14). An emphasis on cultural survival gives way to thinking in terms of cultural transformation.

Gould's portrayal of the "imagined community" of Nicaragua reveals "the myth of mestizaje" to be a fundamental element of nation building. It thus complements the work of Dario Euraque on Honduras (*Estado, poder, nacionalidad y raza en la historia de Honduras* [1996]) and Erik Ching and Virginia Tilley on El Salvador ("Indians, the Military, and the Rebellion of 1932 in El Salvador," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 30 [1998]: 121-156) and invites comparison with the way in which Costa Rica, to employ the categories of Carolyn Hall, has been conjured as a "White Euro-American" society as opposed to the "Mestizo-American" one it really is (*Costa Rica: A Geographical Interpretation in Historical Perspective* [1985]).

Gould is to be congratulated on a fine piece of research that not only adds to our understanding of Central American history but also forces us to rethink it. Although this book will be read principally by Latin Americanists, scholars of other parts of the world with interests in ethnic identity and the rise of nation-states will find much to engage them.

W. GEORGE LOVELL

Queen's University,  
Kingston, Ontario

[All reviews of books by Indiana University faculty  
are selected with the advice of the Board of Editors.]

SAMUEL AMARAL. *The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas: The Estancias of Buenos Aires, 1785-1870*. (Cambridge Latin American Studies, number 83.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 359. \$59.95.

Samuel Amaral has written a solid book on the business of cattle raising on the pampas from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century. He touches all the appropriate bases. The environment, raising cattle ("Cattle did not breed themselves on the pampas"), finance, labor, management, profit, and markets are meticulously examined. Anyone who has had to research the financial records of haciendas knows the number of hours that must have been spent on recording and tallying data and, more importantly, figuring out what they all mean. The pampas have long been a lure for tourists as well as researchers. There is something magnetic about their stark beauty, and the gaucho mystique adds to it. But Amaral has not had to thread his way through the many studies on the pampas to come up with something original. He has incorporated most of them into this work, producing both a synthesis and an original argument. His focus is on the business of raising cattle, and that means an examination of the rationale and activities behind the poetic imagery of the pampas.

The sources for Amaral's study vary considerably. In studying profit and labor for the eighteenth century, only the estate records of Clemente López Osornio yielded data for examination, whereas probate inventories were the major source of information and data for pampas estates of the nineteenth century. Travelers' accounts provided much of the data for wages and labor. Markets were studied by examining commercial correspondence in Argentine archives and abroad. Missing, although I am not sure they are even available, are litigation records, the most boring and tedious type of document to read, but they sometimes reveal gems about traditional landholding practices not available elsewhere.

Profits from rural estates were considerable but hardly exorbitant. Much depended on how well managed and organized the estate was. It is here that Amaral's major point is made. Cattle raising was not profitable in and of itself. It only became so if a confluence of circumstances made it such. Land, labor, a ready market, and good management were the major contributory factors to growth and success.

This book may not be the last word on the cattle ranches of the pampas in the nineteenth century, but every future study will have to refer to it.

NICHOLAS P. CUSHNER  
*Empire State College,  
 State University of New York*

KIM D. BUTLER, *Freedoms Given, Freedoms Won: Afro-Brazilians in Post-Abolition São Paulo and Salvador*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 285. Cloth \$52.00, paper \$22.00.

The abolition of slavery in various colonies and independent nation-states in the New World produced an ambiguous set of circumstances for former slaves. The formal granting of freedom was rarely accompanied by support from white elites and national governments to

assist slaves in their transformation from subjecthood to citizenship, from forced labor to relatively independent labor, whether in the form of wage labor, cooperative production, or smallholding. Throughout the New World, former slaves were faced with new modes of economic and political subordination. Thus freedom did not necessarily mean economic, political, or cultural autonomy but rather another site of contestation between former slaves and their reluctant former masters over the role and presence of African-descended populations in former slaveholding societies. Kim D. Butler provides a detailed, nuanced account of this process of contestation among two former slave populations in São Paulo and Salvador, Brazil. Roughly covering the crucial period in Brazilian history between the late nineteenth century and the 1930s, when Brazil underwent the transition from empire to republic, Butler provides a granular portrait of the similarities and differences in the post-abolition trajectories of these two urban, Afro-Brazilian populations.

A singular attribute of the book is its comparative scope. Not only does Butler compare and contrast the emergent, vanguardist organizations of mutual aid, religious divination, and racial uplift in both cities, but she also situates their experiences within the context of what she characterizes as an "Afro-Atlantic" perspective, thereby assessing Afro-Brazilian cultural, political, and social formations alongside the histories of other African-descended populations in the post-abolition epoch, most recurrently those of Cuba and Jamaica. In her introduction, "Brazil and the Afro-Atlantic Diaspora: Recontextualizing Abolition," Butler writes that "The fundamental problem was that people of African descent viewed abolition as freedom from the oppression they suffered since colonial times. In contrast, the privileged classes of the Americas perceived abolition as a structural shift that could be prevented from jeopardizing race-based social relations of power" (p. 2). Thus, the often dialectical relationship between white elites and former slaves chronicled and interpreted in the succeeding six chapters is set against a hemispheric backdrop. The crux of Butler's comparative thesis, first alluded to here, is that in contrast to São Paulo, where Afro-Brazilians developed politically explicit forms of racial identification and solidarity in the first decades of the twentieth century, Afro-Brazilians in Salvador, Bahia "chose cultural confrontation over a bid for political power" (p. 16). The implications of this distinction, along with important qualifications, are outlined in chapters two through five.

Chapter one, "Order and Progress: Elite Objectives and the Shaping of Abolition," examines the conjuncture of abolition, immigration, evolving racial ideologies, and cultural norms in São Paulo and Salvador. Afro-Brazilians in both cities were in marginal sectors of the economy, their niches determined not only by color but by differences in socio-economic development in each region. São Paulo had (and has) a smaller



Afro-Brazilian population but became organized along more explicitly racial lines due to outright racial discrimination and competition with newly arrived immigrants. Brazilian elites attempted to mold their new republic in accordance with their ideologies of racial hierarchy, which placed *pardos* and *pretos* at the bottom. In Salvador, Afro-Brazilians attempted to carve out a cultural space for the acknowledgement and appreciation of Afro-Brazilian contributions to Bahian culture, despite the claims of Nina Rodrigues and others concerning the corrosive effect of Afro-Brazilian religious practices on elite aspirations toward a more "European" civilization.

This is explored in depth in chapter two, where Butler provides a very rich examination of the emergence of *candomble*, the West African cosmology, as an organizing principle of collective identity in addition to a religious practice. In contrast with São Paulo, Butler notes how the concept of *nação*, or nation, among Afro-Bahians emphasized the ethnic diversity of African ancestry and lineage more than phenotype. Nonetheless, she is careful to underscore the racial oppression experienced by members of all African-descended groups in Salvador. Butler persuasively shows how internal dynamics of the Afro-Brazilian community mattered as significantly as the external labels imposed by white elites.

As in the work of Michael Mullin, John Thornton, and others on the creolization of African-descended populations in the New World, Butler shows how the rise in the Brazilian-born African population led to a lessening of ethnic (*nação*) distinctions in Bahia. At the same time, the process of creolization, according to Butler, was still distinct from the creolization of New World Europeans, as Afro-Brazilians melded components of Afro-Atlantic themes into their political and cultural practices. This was significant at a time when Bahian and other Brazilian elites were agonizing over the indelible imprint of Africanisms upon their society. Chapter three, "The New City—The New Negro," utilizes the trope of the New Negro to develop her account of the more explicitly political formation of the Frente Negra Brasileira and other Afro-Brazilian organizations, which often struggled against discrimination in housing and employment for Afro-Brazilians in the city of São Paulo. Butler argues that "significant parallels exist between the changing consciousness in post-World War I New York City and in São Paulo" (p. 68).

The growth of a black intelligentsia, many of whose families migrated from the interior of São Paulo state and elsewhere in Brazil in search of better life opportunities for their families, led to the proliferation of no fewer than twenty-five newspapers between 1910 and 1935. In chapter four, "The Politics of Race in São Paulo," Butler provides insight into the numerous, often conflicting internal debates within the black *paulista* community, as evidenced in the articles of black newspapers of the era, to indicate the degree to which black political consciousness and notions of

collective solidarity were internally as well as externally constituted. Given the comparative scope of the book, Butler could have been more analytical in linking the distinctions of the São Paulo community in this regard to larger themes in the literature on race and ethnic relations in multiracial polities. As Pierre L. van den Berghe and others have noted, there is often an inverse correlation between the size of an ethnic minority community and its political cohesiveness: the smaller the community, the greater propensity for group consciousness and collective action, a thesis that is compatible with Butler's explanations of the distinctions between cultural and political organization in São Paulo and Bahia. Moreover, the concept of the New Negro actually predates the Harlem Renaissance, and as Michael Mullin (*Africa in America: Slave Acculturation and Resistance in the American South and the British Caribbean, 1736–1831* [1994]) and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ("The Trope of the New Negro and the Reconstruction of the Image of the Black," *Representations* 24 [Fall 1988]: pp. 129–55) have chronicled, has had several different, often competing meanings over historical time. Were the New Negroes of the 1920s and 1930s in São Paulo more or less elitist than their New York City counterparts, given that many members of the latter formation were quite ashamed of such "residues" as the blues and other folk idioms transported from the U.S. South? Butler is to be credited, however, for generating and utilizing a comparative historical method that makes such questions possible.

Chapters five and six further illuminate the implications of the emphasis on cultural politics in Bahia. The increasing projection of Afro-Brazilian cultural practices such as *candomble* into the public sphere of Salvador was a "political act of self-determination." Although less explicitly political than the efforts of the *Frentistas* in São Paulo, Butler asserts that "the underlying objectives of Afro-Brazilians did not differ so dramatically in the northeast and the south" (p. 133). Here, Butler successfully problematizes any dichotomous categorization of political and cultural practices, suggesting instead that differing rates of demographic, political, and economic change in the two cities helped structure and inform the modes and vehicles of political and cultural articulation. Public events such as carnival in Salvador, represented and analyzed in great detail, become occasions for quotidian contestation of Eurocentric, authoritarian norms of dominant society. The only criticism here is that political engagement by Afro-Brazilians in the two cities is at times conflated with political power, where at other points in the book the author acknowledges that much of Afro-Brazilian political and cultural engagement is rooted in the power—and politics—of marginality.

The concluding chapter raises several provocative avenues for future research on Afro-Brazilian communities in comparative perspective and culminates Butler's discussion of the three broad approaches to abolition adopted by Afro-Brazilians: integration, al-



ternative integration, and separatism. Here, Butler is more categorical in her identification and employment of the three tendencies among post-abolition Afro-Brazilians, as evidenced in the behavior of those groups that sought to assimilate into the dominant political, economic, and cultural order and those individuals and groups that exhibited varying degrees of estrangement from that order. Parallels are drawn between the use of cultural symbols of blackness in Brazil and in African-descended communities in Nicaragua and Jamaica. It is a fitting end to a thoughtful, well-researched historical account of two Afro-Brazilian communities in post-abolition Brazil. Rather than view abolition as a clean break with the past, Butler successfully demonstrates that past and present often collided and intermingled as former slaves tried to create new lives for themselves amid a climate of unfamiliar constraints and opportunities.

MICHAEL HANCHARD  
Northwestern University

D. S. PARKER. *The Idea of the Middle Class: White-Collar Workers and Peruvian Society, 1900–1950*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 266. Cloth \$49.50, paper \$19.95.

Many recent histories of Peru argue that classes emerge there when capitalism splits communities apart—as it did in the seventeenth century, in the nineteenth century, and again in the twentieth. D. S. Parker convincingly transcends that formula by arguing that the middle class in Lima did not emerge from an egalitarian “community” but rather from a pre-existing hierarchical division between estates of “decent folk” and “the people.”

Peru’s “idea of the middle class” crystallized when a new political grid of insurgent subordinate classes was superimposed on the map of two social castes. In 1919, commercial employees went on strike for the eight-hour day and other benefits that manual workers had won the year before. They successfully persuaded themselves—and virtually all others—that they were a “middle class” that suffered more than other classes because its members were obligated to keep up the appearance of an upper-caste lifestyle on a lower-caste salary. They won a 1924 law that codified traditional paternalist rewards for loyal clerks as mandatory benefits (chiefly, indemnification upon termination). This created a tremendous vested interest in becoming or remaining classified as an *empleado*. Politicians, from Augusto Leguía in the 1920s through the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) Party in the 1930s, began to court middle-class support through defense of these benefits as rights. Seen in retrospect, the radicalization of the middle class during the 1930s actually frustrated potential class solidarity because it focused on the special needs of non-manual workers in a way that implied they were “inherently distinct” from manual workers. The stakes were high. Repeatedly, between 1920 and 1950, Lima’s commercial employees

won significant privileges from the state, everything from summer beach-going hours to the construction of a splendid hospital for their special health plan.

From 1950 to 1990, the middle class fought to maintain its distinctiveness. Bureaucratization of firms and government agencies, expansion of suburban single-family housing, and growth of the universities offered opportunities to white-collar employees but also eroded markers on the boundary of “decency.” White male employees came to occupy a precarious special career echelon above female typists and mestizo clerks; middle-class families pinched budgets to buy homes in remote suburban developments, despite the grueling commute across metropolitan Lima; middle-class parents now paid high tuition to get their children better education. It was still possible to feel beleaguered, and after 1950 bank clerk unions and employee associations radicalized again, fighting to preserve their salaries against inflation and their special benefits against populist measures extending equivalent social benefits to all workers. A constant struggle not to be leveled or proletarianized linked strategies in daily life to political strategies. This is perhaps the best analysis in Latin American historiography of how actively and creatively people will maneuver to maintain status hierarchies in a massifying society.

Some boundaries of the Peruvian middle class remain unclear. The first politically self-defined “middle class” was formed only by Lima’s commercial employees, not by the government employees (too insecure), storekeepers (too immigrant), or artisans (too blue-collar). But did “middle-class” *empleados* and their families not continue to associate and intermarry with these other respectable groups after 1919? It seems unlikely that their defense of distinctiveness excluded such groups from their marriage pool. Parker sketches, but does not fill in with details, women’s active role in defining “decency” by organizing family networks and displaying symbols of respectability. Parker also tells little about the middle class in cities outside Lima, although he argues that “decent” families deserted small towns for Lima during the 1930s Depression, and other historians have depicted the city of Trujillo as an incubator of nationalist, middle-class politics. Did the Peruvian middle class absorb declining landowning families from the provinces, as happened in other Latin American countries after 1929?

Parker focuses a bright, satirical light on work and the political front, where the identity and strategies of Peru’s middle class take on clear and sharp outlines, particularly in the generation from 1920 to 1950. He offers persuasive, mildly revisionist accounts of the ideology and base of the APRA Party and Sánchez Cerro’s quasi-fascist Unión Radical (UR) through the 1930s; neither of them, least of all the UR, ever captured middle-class loyalty. Here the author assumes a reader familiar with the debates surrounding Peruvian political history in the 1930s. However, this monograph can be read profitably by any scholar

interested in the formation of "white-collar" categories and middle classes. It is full of astute comparative references to the United States, Germany, and other countries in Latin America. It provides strong evidence for the argument that Latin American politics, which centers on lobbying the state for privileges, favors, and benefits, is less a colonial legacy than an outcome of political struggles of the 1920s and 1930s.

DAIN BORGES  
University of California,  
San Diego

THOMAS MILLER KLUBOCK. *Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile's El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904–1951*. (Comparative and International Working-Class History.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 363. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$19.95.

Thomas Miller Klubock is in the forefront of an emerging younger generation of Latin American labor historians who have taken up Joan Scott's stress on the social construction of sexual difference and its shaping impact on social hierarchies. But where most of these scholars have looked at women workers, Klubock uses the lens of gender to cast some of the most self-consciously masculine workers in Latin America—the copper miners of Chile's El Teniente—in a new light. If Klubock's account is cutting edge in its gender analysis, his combining of gender with class analysis and his application of both to the labor history of a masculine Latin American workforce is pathbreaking. Moreover, he relates both to state formation and politics in Chile during the Popular Front in ways that illuminate that important era. Research in local and national archives, company papers, and contemporary periodicals, as well as oral histories, lend this ambitious study strong and varied documentary foundations.

Klubock begins by tracing the making of the working class at the El Teniente mine. Central to the formation of a workforce and working class at this U.S.-owned mine were the efforts of the Kennecott subsidiary, Braden Copper, to transform an unstable and unruly labor force drawn from itinerant rural workers into a stable and disciplined workforce of skilled miners. Part of this effort revolved around changing the single women in the free-wheeling mining camp into wives who embraced the gendered middle class ideal of the "modern" nuclear family through corporate welfare policies that had their state counterparts after 1920, reinforced by leftist unions and parties for their own purposes in the 1930s. After initial resistance, male miners and their women accepted these attempts to discipline them: the men in return for authority over their wives and a new definition of male virility based on their ability to provide for their families, the women in return for economic security and social respectability. Together with leftist unions and parties, they built

a community constructed around gender, class, and politics.

The second part of the book examines the everyday struggles over these issues and their implications, one in which alliances and interests shifted over time and terrain. It is here that Klubock's oral histories are most revealing, lending his book the richness of a history from below and underscoring his argument for worker agency in the face of attempts to impose from above new norms of work and sociability. A solidarity that reflected both class and gender united the male miners in their efforts to subvert the new norms, denying both the company and their wives many of the benefits they expected. Klubock also shows how workers' wives learned to use the new discourses and state and company institutions to buttress their own claims to a secure family life.

Braden may have succeeded in imposing U.S.-style gender roles on its Chilean miners, but this domestication did not lead to the obedient and passive workforce envisioned. In part, this was because the workers responded to the attempts to discipline them with an oppositional work culture and class consciousness that reflected their redefined masculinity. Moreover, their wives, expected by the company to moderate their husband's radicalism, instead supported their class-conscious labor politics. The result was a radicalized working-class politics that Klubock explores in the last part of his book, which culminates in an account of the great copper strikes of the 1940s. Ironically, the mobilization of the El Teniente community of nuclear families that the company had imposed made these strikes possible, with wives setting up soup kitchens and cost-of-living committees.

The strikes also demonstrated the new importance of the state—and both national and international politics—in labor conflicts. In 1942, state arbitration by the Popular Front government under the new labor code gave the copper workers major victories on wages and job classification. In 1946–1947, however, under U.S. Cold War pressure, state intervention broke the El Teniente movement and purged union leaders and activists as part of an anticommunist rightward turn by the Radical Party that marked the end of the Popular Front and its populist experiment.

Klubock tells this complex story with narrative skill and analytic clarity. Labor historians will debate whether he overstates the primacy of gender in his analytic mix, but this book will force them to confront the claims of gender in realms where class and politics have long reigned supreme.

PETER WINN  
Tufts University

#### EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

SARAH B. POMEROY. *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities*. New York:

Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 261. \$65.00.

Sarah B. Pomeroy is well known for her pioneering work on women in ancient Greece; this book also draws on her earlier work on women in Hellenistic Egypt and on Xenophon's treatise on estate management, the *Oeconomia*. The work is presented as "a book that professional family historians who were not specialists in ancient history could understand"; I am not sure, however, that it is well suited to this audience. Pomeroy's explanations of the more technical questions on which she touches are often hard to follow and not invariably reliable (the standard of proofreading and editing is also low), and her references to work on family history in other periods are sketchy. One article in the *New York Times* (p. 120, n. 62) hardly seems an adequate reference for studies of female infanticide in the modern world (no evidence is presented to support the rate of twenty percent female infanticide in ancient Athens that Pomeroy accepts as "persuasive"). The author's decision not to deal with questions of affect removes the possibility of dialogue with much of the most prominent work on the family in more modern periods. The book is subtitled "Representations and Realities," but the two are not clearly distinguished. The two "case studies" (of the orator Demosthenes and of Apollodorus, son of Pasion of Acharnae) are based on forensic speeches, and therefore they belong as much to the category "representation" as the tomb reliefs studied in chapter three—perhaps, indeed, more, since tomb reliefs exist in sufficient number for quantitative analysis to be useful, as J. Bergemann has shown (*Demos und Thanatos* [1997]).

The book includes a chapter on the Hellenistic period, and Pomeroy stresses her interest in long-term change. Nevertheless, she has not entirely freed herself from the conventional image of the family as a stabilizing factor in society. Chapter two deals with heredity and personal identity, covering a mixed bag of topics: naming practices, patrifilial recruitment to corporate descent groups, inherited debts and associated penalties, beliefs about hereditary curses and inherited athletic ability, and medical theories of reproduction. Chapter four discusses generational continuity in professions. It is perhaps arguable that the evidence from ancient Greece for high rates of divorce and widow remarriage, high infant mortality and a preference for limiting the number of legitimate children, division of inheritance among sons (daughters got dowries), and relatively high rates of migration (both within city-states and abroad) would justify us in regarding the Greek family as, by premodern standards, unusually unstable.

Pomeroy makes interesting observations (pp. 216–17) about the effects of the greater instability of the early Hellenistic period on both homosexual and heterosexual liaisons; a good-looking young man or woman of free parentage might be subsidized by a

wealthy patron without incurring the stigma associated with such relationships in the classical city-state.

One of the primary facts about Greek patterns of informal association is surely that they were markedly homosocial. Pomeroy collects some data on household composition and relations with neighbors, but there is more to be said about the ways in which homosociality affected the family and familial patterns of socializing and cut across the distinction between citizens and slaves.

"The family" seems to us such a natural phenomenon that scholars are tempted into writing about it without thinking critically about the questions to be asked. Linking the analysis to the issue of gender does not remove this problem. It might suggest, however, that the position of women as members of two families deserves systematic analysis. On the one hand, this introduced an element of discontinuity into their social lives, in cases where (as often) a woman moved to another village or neighborhood on marriage. On the other hand, maintaining ties to her family of origin not only gave a married woman an external source of support, if needed, but also enabled her to play a significant role in negotiating transactions between her husband and her father or brother(s).

S. C. HUMPHREYS

University of Michigan

FERGUS MILLAR. *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic*. (Jerome Lectures, number 22.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 236. \$42.50.

Fergus Millar's book on Roman politics in the last century of the republic represents a departure for a scholar who has produced important studies on the Roman Empire, including an institutional history of the personal authority of the emperor. Millar investigates the political transformation from republic to principate and argues for a decisive role of the assemblies in that evolution. The focus on the institutional parameters of Roman political behavior and the attempt to analyze the voting citizen body as a discrete institutional actor in politics offer important counters to top-down interpretations of Roman politics that emphasize the competition and effective influence of powerful individuals or groups. Millar is also attempting to analyze the voting public when it acted as an incorporated institutional influence, not simply or only as a "mob" whose primary political strategies were violence and riot (p. 35) and not simply or only as a witness to publicly enacted government (pp. 45–46).

In order to make his argument at all, Millar must first establish an effective political role for the assemblies. This he does in chapter two, in which he locates popular participation—both the institutional venues and procedures—within the broader history of republican government and establishes the centrality of the Forum Romanum as the physical space for politically important activity. Yet he must also establish the

existence of a discourse between leadership and constituency and so must confront a fundamental problem with his evidence (pp. 9–10, 109). For literary accounts of public oratory, either composed by the ruling elite who delivered the speech or recorded in historians (contemporary and not), are literary. At best, they suggest the speakers' perceptions and expectations of their listening constituency and only by inference the constituency's perspective on politics. Millar considers the contexts of public oratory (e.g. Cicero's political speeches during his well-documented consulship in 63). From the arguments of speeches, Millar suggests leadership's concern for public opinion and the existence of a voting public competent to evaluate complex questions regarding specific political issues and the constitutional principles of republican government (e.g. pp. 101–105 on the Rullan agrarian law of 63).

Millar traces a process of deterioration in Roman public discourse and popular political sovereignty. He begins with the 70s when, after Sulla's reforms, the tribunes briefly lost the authority to convene a voting assembly of the people and when the people consequently lost the privilege to vote in assembly under their own peculiar elected leadership. Millar examines public criminal trials to show the essential political role of the Roman people in subjecting publicly enacted government to watchful scrutiny, and he argues that the failure of senatorial leadership to enforce accountability in the courts brought about the restoration of the tribunician legislative authority and so the triumph of popular sovereignty. Two chapters then illustrate the successful working of popular sovereignty, and Millar shows how the system allowed, absorbed, and profited from political disagreement. Tribunes and members of the senatorial elite engaged in public debate before the assembled people in the Forum, and popular opinion within the assemblies mediated disagreements of leadership, in particular the authority of the tribunician veto (e.g. pp. 80–82 on Pompey's command in 67). The assembly made the mighty accountable to the Roman people (e.g. pp. 115–18 on Pompey's return to Rome from the East in 62/61). Procedure to resolve the Bona Dea scandal in 62—tribunician legislation establishing a public judicial process—shows “the ultimate constitutional weakness of the Senate even when it displayed a high degree of unity” (p. 119) and reveals the critical role of public scrutiny and so of the people in the successful functioning of government. Millar devotes two chapters to considering the decline in popular sovereignty and shows how organized popular action (e.g. mass demonstrations and violence against individuals or property) subverted public deliberation about important constitutional principles, both the public conduct of disagreement among public officials and political dialogue between public officials and the people. The explanation of the breakdown in popular politics is conventional: “The conduct of the different elements of Roman public life in fact depended absolutely on the observance of limits and on an unspoken accep-

tance of some norms of conduct” (p. 141). Yet chapter seven highlights changed political circumstances that point toward the principate, particularly tribunician legislation of 52 allowing Julius Caesar to stand for the consulship *in absentia*. The Roman people as a sovereign voting assembly supported the dominance of a powerful individual and thus contributed to the establishment of the principate and the loss of popular sovereignty.

The structure of the book and its apparatus can be traced back to its origins as a series of Jerome Classical Lectures, delivered at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) and at the American Academy in Rome. Millar's arguments are consistent with a lecture format and are composed from images conjured up from careful reading of individual texts. There is no bibliography, nor are the footnotes generous in situating Millar's arguments in the historiography of Roman republican politics. The general index is cursory and disappointing (given the subject of Millar's study, one would expect a full list of legislation proposed and voted), although the index of sources is welcome and useful.

Millar concludes with an assessment of the republican political system as a democracy in formal terms (p. 208, 210). The label is less interesting than the positive argument made both for the effective role of the Roman people in first-century politics and for the value of a methodological focus on institutions for understanding republican history. The institutional frameworks of Roman public life (not simply the logistics of travel) also worked to restrict the effective exercise of popular sovereignty. For example, the theoretical enfranchisement of Italians after the Social War was purposefully restricted by repeated failures to conduct a census and so to register the actual voting public. Again, only a public official had the authority to conduct even a deliberative public assembly or *contio*, and a group otherwise assembled had no legitimacy (cf. *SC de Bacchanalibus* of 186 B.C., Degraffi, *ILLRP* [1963] 511, lines 19–21). Public debate of proposals (p. 46, citing Livy 45.36.1–6) involved other members of the elite who spoke for or against a bill, and the *trinundinum* between proposal and voting of a bill did not permit emendation of a proposal based on a motion from the floor. The pre-Julian (republican) calendar distinguished market days from voting days (ambiguously, p. 19), perhaps beginning in 287 B.C., thereby requiring a separate journey to Rome for the sole purpose of voting. These qualifications do not diminish Millar's important argument for viewing the Roman people as an independent force in Roman politics, and his work suggests new avenues of research in the history of the late republic, especially of other institutions (ritual and political) that gave an effective political role to the Roman people and of the power of institutions to incorporate and control the political expressions of the Roman people.

ROBERTA STEWART  
Dartmouth College



YITZHAK HEN, *Culture and Religion in Merovingian Gaul, A.D. 481–751*. (Cultures, Beliefs and Traditions: Medieval and Early Modern Peoples, number 1.) New York: E. J. Brill, 1995. Pp. xiii, 308. \$100.50.

Yitzhak Hen's goal is to "present a detailed picture of Merovingian popular culture in its institutional and intellectual context." To the question of "whether popular culture might turn out to be synonymous with (popular) religion" (p. 17), Hen responds in the affirmative, his thesis being that Merovingian society and culture were thoroughly Christian, as opposed to pagan or secular.

The introduction surveys the Christianization of Gaul, emphasizing the overall lack of religious disruption that resulted from the barbarian settlement (p. 14). In chapter one, Hen considers the significance of literacy and orality and concludes that "there is no way in which one can define Merovingian society as 'purely oral'" (p. 42). He subsequently focuses on written sources for Merovingian popular culture.

In chapter two, Hen turns his attention to liturgy, positing three kinds of liturgical "cycles": "temporal," "sanctoral," and "personal." The third chapter considers the Christmas-Easter cycle of feasts and discusses the Merovingian Mass, which Hen describes as a "big social event" (p. 74). In the fourth chapter, Hen suggests that "there is . . . little reason to doubt that the saints' feasts were very popular events in Merovingian Gaul" (p. 88) and documents the "immense growth" of local saints' cults. Chapter five looks at liturgical celebrations of events in the human lifecycle. Hen minimizes the depth of popular piety by questioning such things as the existence of the daily Mass and worshippers' willingness to attend lengthy vigils and private masses.

In his sixth chapter, Hen argues "against [the] notion of Merovingian Gaul as Christian in name but pagan in practice" (p. 155). He rejects the extensive evidence for pagan practices, and dismisses them as "literary conventions" (p. 187, cf. p. 205). Thus, he asserts that a pagan shrine "where the Franks worshipped" was not "a real pagan sanctuary" because "no actual ritual or priest was mentioned"; instead he equates it with "the local pub" (p. 192; cf. p. 166). Other such evidence is dismissed as "accidental, negligible as cultural phenomena" (p. 193). The chapter concludes by suggesting a Carolingian conspiracy: "whenever Merovingian policies were adopted . . . no acknowledgement . . . was made" (p. 202).

In the final chapter, Hen turns to secular popular culture, discussing dice and ball games, public spectacles, and drinking and arguing that in spite of ecclesiastical condemnations, "drinking did not vanish from Gaul" (p. 241). Ultimately, he concedes that "secular culture did exist" (p. 249), but he reiterates his contention regarding "the religious predominance of Merovingian culture" (p. 249).

This book reflects its dissertation roots by often reading like a survey of the secondary literature, with

many pages peppered with the names of, and often extensive quotations from, modern writers. As a result, it sometimes is difficult to separate Hen's own ideas from the many secondary opinions. Aspects of Hen's methodology sometimes detract from his ability to persuade. The reader is overwhelmed by the repetitious intrusion of the first person pronoun and arguments often made by simple assertion. Hen also goes out of his way to expose the "errors" of others and sometimes lectures those whose views he criticizes (e.g. p. 83; cf. pp. 71, 169). Yet elsewhere it is Hen's own modern biases that intrude (pp. 72, 86, 163, 165, 192). Moreover, along with dismissing recalcitrant sources, Hen sometimes clings to theories even when his own evidence contradicts them (e.g. p. 62 on vigils) and uses arguments from silence (e.g. p. 192) and against straw men (p. 252). Other distractions include a sporadic use of the wrong footnote font, superfluous spaces, misplaced parentheses, dittography, incorrect grammar, misspellings, and inconsistencies regarding dates. More regrettable are a number of factual statements. Wrongly dated (by a century or more) are Gennadius of Marseilles, Avitus of Vienne, and Stephanus, author of the *Vita Amatoris* (p. 132). The author of the *Vita Hilarii* was not Cassian (p. 228 n. 104). The correct *locus classicus* for the Gallic Rogations is Sidonius Apollinaris (Epist. 7.1). Not all bishops wore the pallium (p. 78). Claudianus Mamertus (p. 53) and Salvian (p. 237) were not bishops. Arles fell under Frankish control in the late 530s, not in 507 (p. 89). There also are a number of infelicitous translations (e.g. pp. 98–99, 191–192).

In conclusion, Hen's book has several things to recommend it. It provides a very thorough and helpful survey of the pre-1994 secondary literature relating to Merovingian culture. It also draws our attention to the importance of the Merovingian liturgy, not only to the texts as texts but also to how they can inform our understanding of contemporary culture. Hen usefully contrasts the lack of "regulation and central control" (p. 119, cf. p. 251) of the Merovingian period with the Carolingian role in "consolidating and centralising Christianity" (p. 201), although he is careful to stress that "Carolingian practices were deeply rooted in Merovingian developments" (p. 137). Yet Hen overstates the degree to which Merovingian culture was fundamentally Christian, and this leads to such self-defining conclusions as "If Merovingian Gaul were indeed Christian . . . then superstitions and pagan survivals must have been marginal and insignificant" (p. 157). Hen also overstates the extent to which he provides "a complete and comprehensive exposition of the written sources" (p. 252). Much is missing. The creation of canon law is hardly mentioned, and there is little on secular law, on epistolography (a particularly rich source), or, except in the most cursory way, on inscriptions. Nor does Hen make much use of archaeology, save to assert that "little archaeological evidence had so far been found" (p. 150).

Finally, this book provides little sense of chronolog-



ical development. One is left with the impression that the world of Clovis (481–511) was essentially the same as that of Pippin III (751–758). Hen underestimates not only the time it took for the Franks to be Christianized but also the tenacity of pagan beliefs among the Roman population, especially in rural areas. In Merovingian Gaul, as in many places in the modern day, it was possible to have a Christian society in which “pagan” practices continued to have a deep-seated place.

RALPH MATHISEN  
University of South Carolina

JOSEPH H. LYNCH. *Christianizing Kinship: Ritual Sponsorship in Anglo-Saxon England*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 272. \$45.00.

This is more an applied case study than simply a sequel to Joseph H. Lynch's *Godparents and Kinship in Early Medieval Europe* (1986). Lynch's earlier monograph emphasized—to the great benefit of American medievalists who were largely unfamiliar with the issue and the relevant European literature—the importance in early medieval society of the role played by godparents and of the ties of spiritual kinship as created and defined through common or joint baptismal sponsorship. This new study covers many of these same ideas, but now the emphasis is on their role (in theory and in practice) in the development of Anglo-Saxon Christianity and society. Lynch is concerned to compare Anglo-Saxon practices with those prevailing in the Frankish church, as well as with what was being legislated (and implemented) in Rome and Byzantium. As we might expect, English practices had their own peculiarities: the insular custom of same-sex baptismal sponsorship, for example, eliminated the worry about whether marriage between co-sponsors was considered incestuous. When Boniface worked on the continent in the mid-eighth century, he was surprised by the expectation that he would preach against such unions and, if need be, anathematize those who entered into them. Distinctions of this sort are clearly stated and relatively easy to document (given the selective and elusive nature of early medieval sources about practice in contrast to the injunctions and theories of councils and synods).

I do have one criticism to make. I think Lynch's study falls a bit short, because in many instances it seems as though he is searching for too much precision regarding such things as the details of Anglo-Saxon practices touching the godparents' sponsorship at confirmation, baptism, and for catechumens, and in his effort to read texts and single words or phrases too closely (so that they confirm his views). There is a tendency to accept the evidence as supporting Lynch's views unless it clearly runs in a contrary direction. This study is so rich that such special pleading is hardly necessary; it would suffice for the author to draw our attention to so many possibilities rather than to worry if they were the case. Lynch deals with very basic

issues, and to suggest their importance, rather than to push for a precise answer or interpretation, would be sufficient.

But this is a small criticism, hardly detracting from the book's value or interest. Taken as a whole, this new volume is a valuable study and a “good read.” It is rich in its sensitivity to the many layers of and currents flowing within the sociopolitical context of seventh-century conversion enterprises, or of Alfred's sponsorship of Guthrum's baptism, or of the crafting of the texts of dooms and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (as in the famous long entry for 755). Lynch draws on, and draws together, material from patristic reflections and early councils, and he uses a wide range of sources to support his arguments. He is at ease when comparing the Anglo-Saxons with Scandinavia when the church was established there, just as he negotiates his way with comfort through the teachings and behavior of the mainline church(es) of the continent. Like his earlier book, this monograph will take its place on the basic shelf for discussions of early medieval society and church. It is also—last but hardly least—rich with ideas that can be taken into the (undergraduate) classroom; baptism, confirmation, and marriage patterns are still with us.

JOEL T. ROSENTHAL  
State University of New York,  
Stony Brook

SIMON BARTON. *The Aristocracy in Twelfth-Century León and Castile*. (Cambridge Series in Medieval Life and Thought, fourth series, number 34.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xvi, 366.

This thoroughly researched and well-conceived work fills a lacuna in the historiography on the Castilian nobility, complementing thematic studies, such as I. Beceiro Pita and R. Córdoba de la Llave's *Parentesco, poder y mentalidad: La nobleza castellana, siglos XII-XV* (1990) and the recent overview by M. C. Gerbert, *Les noblesses espagnoles au Moyen Âge, XI<sup>e</sup>-XV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (1994). As Simon Barton frequently reminds us, the sources for reconstructing the history of Castilian and Leonese nobles are sparse, compared, for example, to the relative abundance of material available to historians of high medieval Catalonia. Barton does an admirable job of amassing and organizing the disparate chronicle and charter evidence. He presents some of the fruits of his industrious research in very useful appendixes treating twelfth-century counts and noble genealogies. The upshot of all this is that although Barton necessarily bases many of his conclusions on slim evidence, he is able to substantiate his assertions with apposite examples from whatever extant sources there are.

Unlike scholars who have given most attention to the lower nobility and the upwardly mobile *caballeros villanos* of Iberian frontier towns, Barton focuses on the high nobility, including the counts, whose titles, although heritable, still depended on royal approval.

He points out that even though the upper stratum of the noble order was not as fluid and open as the lower stratum, it nonetheless saw the entry of newcomers. Also, some aristocratic families fell from the heights of power. As Barton explains, movement up and down the noble ladder had much to do with kinship and inheritance strategies. In contrast to the agnatic kinship, primogeniture, and collective consciousness of contemporary French and German aristocratic lineages, among Leonese and Castilian nobles bilateral kinship was prevalent and partible inheritance, among male and female heirs, was still practiced, a strategy made possible by the relative abundance of land. Yet Barton does see some signs of an incipient lineage consciousness in León-Castile: the use of surnames, the adoption of coats of arms, and burial in family pantheons.

After guiding the reader through the noble life cycle—childhood, marriage, and old age—Barton examines the sources of aristocratic power: land and lordship over peasants and knightly vassals. He wisely avoids getting mired in the debate over the meaning and use of the term “feudalism.” Rather, he explains how nobles added to inherited lands through acquiring the properties of indebted peasants, exchange with other nobles, and royal largesse. The paucity of sources for lay, as opposed to ecclesiastical, lordship prevents Barton from undertaking a sustained analysis of seigneurial economies, but extant aristocratic *fueros* enable him to show that the burden borne by peasants, in the form of rent and other services, lightened over the course of the twelfth century. Lords offered their tenants better conditions in order to dissuade them from moving to lands on the frontier or to growing urban centers. The magnates nonetheless maintained considerable authority over their tenants, particularly through the exercise of judicial powers granted them by the crown.

Barton discusses the bonds of vassalage linking knights to magnates and then, in much greater detail, those tying magnates to the crown. He emphasizes the delicate but usually cooperative relationship between crown and nobility: in return for military service and playing a consultative or even official role in the royal *curia* and household, nobles received titles to estates and villages, non-hereditary fiefs, and cash stipends. Those interested in the political history of the reign of Alfonso VII of León-Castile will find Barton's discussion especially useful. He exploits chronicles and the witness lists of charters to establish which nobles attended Alfonso at court and which served on the king's various military campaigns. He also gives due attention to military organization and to the magnates' motives, material and spiritual, for engaging in warfare. Not surprisingly, Barton presents evidence of the growing influence of crusade ideology on the nobility.

The final and, to my mind, most interesting chapter treats aristocratic piety and patronage of ecclesiastical institutions. Here Barton demonstrates that the proponents of church reform indeed influenced Castilian

and Leonese nobles, prompting many to relinquish or “restore” proprietary churches to episcopal and monastic control (often while retaining some rights to ecclesiastical revenues). At the same time, noble families ceased to dominate the episcopate, which increasingly was the domain of foreign appointees. The main beneficiaries of the piety and charitable impulses of the nobles were the newer orders of Cistercian monks and Premonstratensian canons. Yet nobles also clashed and litigated with bishops and monasteries over property, especially when they found that their resources were diminishing.

Barton's book provides a fairly complete and nuanced portrait of the magnates of Castile and León until the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), which ushered in a period of vast territorial conquest and a new era of relations between crown and nobility.

MARK D. MEYERSON  
University of Toronto

JAMES WILLIAM BRODMAN, *Charity and Welfare: Hospitals and the Poor in Medieval Catalonia*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 229. \$39.95.

James William Brodman has written an excellent study of the institutions of care for the poor, invalid, and dying in Catalonia during the high and late Middle Ages. Brodman proposes, and to a large degree achieves, a synoptic, contextual, and comparative study of charity and welfare for Western Europe based on his research in Catalonia and his reading of other studies on Western European charity. This book is rich in historiographic comparisons and careful distinctions. Brodman especially wants to distinguish between secular and lay as a means of refuting those who claim that hospitals and care became increasingly secular after 1300. Charity may have come under lay and public authority, but Brodman demonstrates that it remained deeply religious in character nevertheless.

The author first traces medieval conceptions of the pauper, showing that in Catalan linguistic sources the pauper was conceived as either one who was unable to work, one who was in a momentary state of need, or one who refused to work. The poor in the first two categories were seen as “deserving.” From the thirteenth century, assistance to the poor became based on the distinction between the deserving shameful poor, who would not beg publicly because it would be shameful to them, and the “public poor” (vagrants, foreigners, and other rootless groups). While Brodman recognizes that this funneling of most charity to the shameful poor served to maintain the status quo, he does not dismiss this form of charity as simply conservative or aiding the elite. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, lay and public hospitals and other institutions became more specialized in targeting particular categories of recipients and turned away from an earlier concentration on ritual almsgiving that emphasized the redemptive act of the donor. Here

Brodman sees the kernel of a public policy emerging in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in which particular groups were assisted as a means of conserving a constituted social order.

The hospital provides the institutional spine of the book. Brodman traces its evolution from the largely clerical and numerous small foundations of the twelfth century through municipal and lay hospitals of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to the more modern general hospitals of the fifteenth century, which witnessed the beginnings of medical assistance. Parallel to this development is an evolution from charity that was primarily episcopal in the twelfth century to one that was parish-based in the thirteenth century and joined to increasing municipal participation and supervision. In the late Middle Ages, there were two tracks of charitable care: parish institutions concerned themselves primarily with the deserving poor, neighbors and associates who were temporarily unemployed, orphaned, widowed, or injured, while the rootless and marginal were served by episcopal and municipal bodies.

In this evolution, most hospitals through 1300 concentrated on providing care to the poor and homeless without determining whether the institutionalization would improve their condition. Over time, more hospitals focused their resources on specific groups of the needy. The earliest examples were leprosariums, but, increasingly, new foundations specialized in serving orphans, prostitutes, victims of ergotism, and mental patients. Twelfth-century hospitals served the homeless by providing shelter with little concern for disease or medical treatment. By the fifteenth century and in the larger towns, general hospitals absorbed many of the earlier small foundations and began to focus on medical care. "[T]he outlines of the modern general hospital had emerged, staffed with physicians and nurses, who made rounds, prescribed medicines, and undertook other forms of treatment" (p. 98). This was due to the presence of a medical profession and of municipal governments that could amass social resources. Some have interpreted these changes as an evolution from religious charity to the beginnings of a secular welfare program, but Brodman more wisely recognizes that medical assistance and a focus on care constituted a social policy, but one that derived from religious motivations and operated within a Christian framework. He also shows that voluntary contributions served neighborhood and local loyalties while hospitals and assistance to the marginal groups required episcopal and municipal funding.

This review can only hint at the richness of the discourse and the historiographic reflection in Brodman's book. He has insightful discussions of a wide variety of questions including the diet and daily caloric intake of patients, child abandonment, hospital personnel, and gendered care. The author has written a valuable study of Catalonian charity and contributes a

valuable synthesis of contemporary reflection on Western European charity and welfare from 1100 to 1500.

JAMES R. BANKER

North Carolina State University

MARGARET HOWELL. *Eleanor of Provence: Queenship in Thirteenth-Century England*. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. 1998. Pp. xxii, 349. \$59.95.

Margaret Howell's study of thirteenth-century queenship in the person of Eleanor of Provence is the first biography of Henry III's queen to be published. It does much to correct earlier judgments. In her own time, Eleanor was attacked for her promotion of aliens to high office in church and administration and condemned as the foremost of the king's evil counsellors. Later historians were inclined to dismiss her as not very assertive or ambitious, though F. M. Powicke (*Henry III and the Lord Edward* [1947]) recognized that she was "more practical and far-seeing than her husband" (pp. 217-18). The one contemporary verdict that Howell quotes with approval is the Westminster Chronicler's summing up: "*generosa et religiosa virago*." *Virago* then indicated a highly competent woman of affairs; and since *generosa* carried the meaning of nobility of birth as much as nobility of character, it may indeed stand as a fair assessment. But Howell's own account of Eleanor's life and achievements, based on her personal letters and a wealth of archival material as well as on chronicles, gives a far deeper and more nuanced assessment.

Eleanor of Provence, one of the four daughters of Beatrice of Savoy and Raymond Berengar V of Provence, was brought up among kinsfolk with wide political experience and a rich cultural background. When she married King Henry III at the age of twelve, her elder sister Margaret was already the wife of Louis IX of France. She was quick to appreciate the European interests of her husband, whose policy was directed toward recovering his lost continental inheritance, and she had the contacts and diplomatic skills to help him in building alliances. An intelligent woman with a gift for finance, Eleanor was governed by strong family affections and a whole-hearted belief in the dignity of monarchy. Unfortunately, she won support by rewarding foreign kinsmen and friends, particularly those from Savoy, and by finding ways of raising revenue regardless of growing discontent and resentment among the English barons. Her activities also helped to exacerbate partisan struggles at court after Henry III began to favor his Lusignan half-brothers against the Savoyards. They caused a serious rift with her eldest son. On the positive side, however, Eleanor's close ties with her sister, the queen of France, and with the French court helped in 1259 to bring about a peaceful settlement with Louis IX, who also considered diplomacy to some extent a family matter.

If Eleanor had some responsibility for the outbreak of civil war, however, she showed her courage and resilience in adversity after the short-lived triumph of

Simon de Montfort at the battle of Lewes and used all her skill and financial shrewdness to secure the release of her husband and son from captivity. In the last years of Henry's life and as queen mother, she remained active, arranging politically advantageous marriages for her daughters and giving such support to her eldest son as he was prepared to tolerate. As Howell perceptively points out, "the style of Eleanor's queenship was made possible by her husband and probably deplored by her eldest son" (p. 312). Edward's attitude is indicated, implicitly at least, by the account of the contrasting funeral arrangements he made for her and for his greatly loved wife, Eleanor of Castile, who predeceased her. Whereas Edward had his wife buried beside Henry III in Westminster Abbey and commemorated her with a golden effigy and the twelve exquisite crosses erected at the places where her bier had rested on its journey from Lincolnshire, his mother (who had entered the convent of Amesbury toward the end of her life) was given a simple nun's burial.

This is a scholarly and very readable biography that brings out Eleanor's weakness no less than her strength. It is judicious, not judgmental, describing her as "a loyal friend, a loving but possessive mother and a harsh property-owner" who was "both blessed and cursed with a strongly active temperament" (p. 312). Howell also gives a thoughtful analysis of the nature of thirteenth-century English queenship, stressing its practical rather than its sacramental side and rejecting the view that queenship was then in irreversible decline even though the form and style had changed.

MARJORIE CHIBNALL  
University of Cambridge

WILLIAM CHESTER JORDAN, *The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Early Fourteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. 317. \$29.95.

William Chester Jordan describes a fearful event. Precipitated by exceptionally wet and chilly weather and accompanied by human and animal sickness, a famine that lasted intermittently from 1315 to 1322 was the first serious setback to northern Europe's rising living standards since the far smaller harvest failure of 1257–1258.

Although this study concentrates on secondary literature, primary sources occasionally enrich it, many of them from Fritz Curshmann's *Hungersnöte im Mittelalter* (1900). More information about these sources would have been welcome. A text describing how the indigent ate dead cattle raw in the fields is said to have become a commonplace, for example, but where did it come from? And a form letter in the *Codex Dunensis* designed to help monks in stricken monasteries find refuge in happier ones is fascinating, but nothing is said about what the *Codex* really was or when it was written.

What essentially interest Jordan are analytical questions. Many scholars maintain nowadays that rural life suffered from a "structural blockage" around 1300, a

condition evinced in overpopulation and pauperization. Subdivision of landed property is said to have prompted lords to press too hard on the "peasants." Moreover, solidarity was breached because the "abyss of poverty" is never "propitious for class struggle," only for class subordination. And "kulak" (!) farmers betrayed their poorer brethren (p. 95).

Jordan is unmoved by this updated Marxism. Noting that its proponents describe a transition in rural society in which the "language of slavery" was replaced by that of "serfdom," he remarks that their "work on the origins of medieval serfdom is polemical . . . and not very enlightening" (p. 89). Still, he does not applaud rightists who assert that, because "peasants" pay mainmort and lords relief and both burghers and rustics pay tallage, class distinctions are devoid of meaning. Jordan seems to be a centrist liberal. His "peasants" exhibit a blameless passivity. Townsfolk, on the other hand, constitute the "leading (or transformative) component of the medieval economy" (p. 127). Being especially free to act, princes are severely judged because their "chimerical" hopes "for decisive victory" over their enemies led them to persist in war and taxation despite the dearth (p. 176).

Some interpretations lack nuance. Contemporaries, Jordan says, viewed the awful event as God's punishment for sin. That is indeed what the sources say, but, as was sometimes the case among persecuted Jews during the Middle Ages, a way to bolster a badly shaken faith in God's beneficence is to blame oneself for one's own suffering. A Lombard moneylender munificently restored usuries because of "fear of hell." Possibly so, but deathbed restitution was obligatory in canon law and business practice even made it advisable.

Jordan often questions other writers, sometimes harshly. He remarks that, although "enlightening," many English scholars claim "great insights" without noting that they were both discovered "before and more substantially treated in Continental scholarship" (p. 89). The French are not much better, he thinks, and only Germans seem to master the literature in languages other than their own. Again, although flattered by being listed along with Richard Smith, Rodney Hilton, and R. H. Britnell, whose monographs show that they specialize in the subject, this reviewer is himself caught out. Having failed to correct a draft for a new edition of my general history, I had observed—almost surely mistakenly—that London was larger than Paris around 1300!

Jordan's evaluation of the catastrophe is reasonable, because, as he observes, sources both old and new are unclear. As the *Codex Dunensis* put it, "sarcina debitorum . . . propter guerras et defectum segetum et alia infortunia quamplurima" (p. 217) drove the monastery to disperse its monks. And W. M. Ormrod is said to have recently avowed it "impossible to say whether the wars and . . . taxation had a greater impact . . . than . . . the harvest failures" (p. 84). This is to be expected. The Irish famine of the 1840s was a natural catastro-



phe worsened by sickness, and social apathy, and confusion. Jordan certainly shows that the hunger was awful. Towns provide the best evidence because better records were kept there than in the countryside. The author estimates, for example, that at Tournai and Ypres in the year 1316 about ten percent of the inhabitants died of malnutrition and attendant sickness. How this physical experience affected the capacity of the young who survived to confront the great plague when it hit this region in 1346 is, he rightly says, hard to divine.

In short, Jordan has brought readers up to date on scholarship about the famine, and one must probably wait on medical archaeology for further advances.

A weakness of this otherwise very readable book is attributable to Princeton University Press. Placing footnotes at the back of a book is fine if they are largely references to succinct book titles, but readers need easy cross-referencing. Here, however, one ruffles pages forever to find a note.

JOHN HINE MUNDY  
Columbia University

BENJAMIN G. KOHL. *Padua under the Carrara, 1318–1405*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1998. Pp. xxvi, 466. \$45.00

Benjamin G. Kohl has given us a detailed and valuable case study of seigneurial rule in this book about the Carrara lords of Padua during the fourteenth century. Using city chronicles, Venetian archival collections, and the histories of centers neighboring Padua, Kohl creates his own political narrative of lordship in this important northern Italian commune. Venice's next-door neighbor and foe in the century preceding its incorporation into the Venetian regional state, Padua was known throughout the medieval and Renaissance periods for its stimulating university life as well as its rich *contado*. In 1318 the commune elected the first Carrara lord, Giacomo il Grande, who pledged to protect the polity as well as the church, university, guilds, and people. At that point, the local economy was still relatively undeveloped, making difficult the construction of a larger regional state. Over the next half century, however, the richly endowed Paduan *contado*, an important source of food, fiber, and raw materials, became the nexus of a powerful territorial state sustained by the landowning supporters of the Carrara and encouraged by alliances with the Holy Roman emperor and the king of Hungary. Parallel to this development, the dynastic lords, particularly Francesco il Vecchio (1356–1388), were transforming communal and ecclesiastical elites into a powerful household regime.

Venetian interests and policies also affected developments in Padua: statesmen of the maritime republic ostensibly backed the Carrara in the early part of their rule but looked increasingly upon Padua as part of their own state, installing Venetian patricians as *podestà*. Carrara lords consistently challenged Venetian

hegemony, attempting to establish an independent territorial state that would compete with Venetian strategic and economic interests. Seigneurial resistance against the powerful commercial entrepôt ended with Venetian conquest in 1405 and the demise of the Carrara regime.

Kohl's political narrative makes several important contributions to the general historiographical discussion of early Renaissance lordship in Italy. The first regards a long-standing debate over the nature of Renaissance seigneurial regimes. From the late nineteenth century, historians such as Jacob Burckhardt and John Addington Symonds have characterized dynastic lords as tyrants or despots. Kohl's work offers a corrective to this misleading concept. The nineteenth-century description implied that the tyrant was a merciless ruler oblivious to preexisting laws and institutions. Kohl finds this characterization inappropriate for Padua and applies instead the term diarchy to lordship, demonstrating that the Carrara shared authority with the commune at the outset of their rule. When Giacomo il Grande was elected in 1318, he relied heavily on the communal magistracies in place to cover justice, police, taxation, and public works. Indeed, over the course of the fourteenth century the original power holders of the commune ceded much of their authority to Carrara patronage, the second important contribution Kohl makes to the general discussion of lordship.

The Carrara created a new support system: a communal elite, composed of an affinity of friends and members of the Carrara family and modeled on household government. Supporters, whom Kohl terms the Carrara affinity, were richly rewarded with lay tithes from bishops loyal to the regime. They were also given special citizenship status, allowed tax privileges as well as the benefits of farming excise taxes, granted urban property near the lord's court, and appointed to communal offices. Kohl carefully documents their economic and political base. The cultivation of a Carrara affinity, distinctly military and noble in character and based both in countryside and city, enabled important achievements: by the 1370s, an organized territorial state, governed by nine *podestarie* and vicariates whom the lord handpicked; and by the 1380s, a powerful household regime of soldiers, diplomats, and jurists on whom Carrara patrons could depend. The lords delegated the administration of justice and policing to their trusted supporters, while they controlled decisions of war and diplomacy. The third contribution of this book is to lay the historical groundwork preceding Venetian rule of Padua (1405–1797) and the development of an important Italian regional state. Carrara patronage in city and countryside and its organizational mapping of the region ultimately helped lay the basis for the aristocratic rule that subsequently characterized the Venetian regional state. Kohl has performed the valuable task of mining fourteenth-century sources and drawing a picture that links the early modern regional state with its late medieval dynastic antecedents. The



book is thoroughly researched and clearly written. Its geographical scope is narrowly focused. This study of Carrara lordship will particularly interest readers who enjoy political narrative.

JOANNE M. FERRARO  
San Diego State University

#### EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

TIMOTHY J. REISS. *Knowledge, Discovery and Imagination in Early Modern Europe: The Rise of Aesthetic Rationalism*. (Cambridge Studies in Renaissance Literature and Culture, number 15.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xviii, 238. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$19.95.

Imagine the famous opening chapters of Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things* (1970)—the chapters describing the Renaissance episteme and what followed it—shorn of their poetic virtuosity and their twilight-of-structuralism whimsy but supplied with the primary and secondary documentation that historians always demanded in vain of Foucault. This evokes, in a general way, the impact of Timothy J. Reiss's ambitious and learned monograph.

Reiss traces the early modern emergence of mathematical reasoning in a provocative way: by linking it to the decline of humanist and scholastic language-based models of rationality. He discerns a wholesale shift, across the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, from confidence that words and their manipulation could lead to knowledge about the world, through a crisis of that confidence, to the emergence of a new confidence in numbers as the medium and means of discovery. The late sixteenth-century consolidation of mathematical reasoning coincides, he argues, with a novel "aesthetic rationalism" connected closely to musical thought.

In making his case, Reiss lingers on terrain that has been battle-ridden in recent interpretations of early modern culture. The first third of the book focuses on questions of language, its means of signifying, and its connection to the world. Here Reiss describes a gradual breakdown, in the years around 1500, of the ontological basis of language, which left grammar and rhetoric out of touch with reason and reason in an equivocal position. Number stepped into the breach as a medium in which rational apprehension of reality might be pursued and expressed. These chapters form a laudable and productive attempt to deal with linguistic issues that were as unsettling in the era of humanism and scholasticism as they are in the era of structuralism and its successors.

In the second third of the book, Reiss examines the impact of Peter Ramus. He questions Walter Ong's influential interpretation of Ramian method as symptom of a move from oral and verbal toward visual and spatial apprehension of the world (see Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* [1958]). Reiss argues

that Ong's position gives Ramian method an epistemological purchase that it did not originally have, incorrectly discerning a mode of discovery in what was instead a mode of pedagogy. Ong's visualism and spatialism are for Reiss a red herring in early modern epistemology. The shift from word to number, instead, is crucial.

In making this argument, Reiss seems at times too categorical, demanding a choice either of visualism or mathematicism where sixteenth-century developments present both. Nevertheless, Ong's interpretation cries out for nuancing (and cries out especially loud to historians of musical thought and practice, as I have written elsewhere). Reiss offers a needed corrective.

In the last third of his book, Reiss enumerates the areas where he finds music and musical thought to be most closely tied to the mathematization of early modern culture. Because number is now the prevailing medium of reason, and because music is increasingly viewed as a means of moving passions through a pleasing beauty, this connection constitutes for Reiss a rational aesthetics. (He offers no apology for the troubling anachronism of the second of these terms.)

This is the least successful section of the book. First, Reiss repeatedly overstates the rationalism of the harmonic numbers sixteenth-century writers never tired of discussing, in effect displacing Platonic number mysticism—nowhere stronger in this period than in musical thought—with post-Cartesian approaches. We need instead to understand how sixteenth-century harmonic thought at once cherished its connections to magical epistemologies and adumbrated later rationalisms. Moreover, in place of the concentrated, probing investigation of well-defined issues earlier in the book, the discussion in these chapters bounds from topic to topic with too little explanation of the connections among them. The topics introduced are immensely rich: poetic furor, musical imitation, catharsis in music, relations of word and musical tone, numerical analysis of rhythm, the powers of music to move the passions, even musical tuning systems.

Here Reiss's ambitions have perhaps overstepped the dimensions of his study. But even so, the general issue he raises—the place of music in the formation of early modern intellectual culture—is a basic one, too often ignored. His study signals rich historical connections yet to be explored.

GARY TOMLINSON  
University of Pennsylvania

SERGIO ZOLI. *Dall'Europa libertina all'Europa illuminista: Stato laico e "Oriente" libertino nella politica e nella cultura dell'età dell'assolutismo e della ragione di stato da Richelieu al secolo dei Lumi; alle origini del laicismo e dell'illuminismo*. Florence: Nardini. 1997. Pp. 674. L. 75,000.

This work presents a revision or, at least, an augmentation of Paul Hazard's classic *La crise de la conscience européenne* (1935). Sergio Zoli works on three levels,

offering a more general account of the intellectual history of Europe between 1620 and 1750, with some references to its Renaissance and even late medieval antecedents: a descriptive bibliography of the secondary literature; and, most important, a particular thesis. There is no doubt about Zoli's enormous command of the subject; however, it often results in an untamed profusion of erudition that makes it difficult for the reader to ferret out the threads of his intricate arguments. This is regrettable, because they constitute a significant contribution to scholarship.

The overall theme of the book is the secularization of European thought and its ethical, political, and, to a lesser degree, social ramifications. As the title of the book indicates, Zoli begins with what he calls "libertinism," a term he describes as the critical rationalism that began with Pierre Gassendi and René Descartes and led to the break-up of Aristotelianism and the legacy of both the Catholic and Protestant Reformations and then traces its transformation into the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The early stages of libertinism coincided with the age of Cardinal Richelieu, who as the personification of Niccolò Machiavelli's and Jean Bodin's ideas is a central figure in this work; his allegedly flexible absolutism, and especially his religious tolerance, created the secular state. Intellectually, this was the phase of the *libertinage érudit*. Its adherents formed an alliance with Richelieu that, based on reciprocity, supported his form of absolutism. The connecting link was François de La Mothe de Vayer, who had been Richelieu's secretary. Zoli assigns to him a key role in the evolution of libertinism. During the Thirty Years' War, libertinism broke out of its original French matrix to become a European phenomenon. The principal figures in this process were Thomas Hobbes, whose ideas Zoli elevates to the theoretical counterpart of Richelieu's applied absolutism, and Baruch Spinoza, the philosopher of individual liberty. They postulated a new mode of conceiving the relationship between religion and politics, but even more importantly between religion and morality. Under Louis XIV, the libertines again shifted their focus against his arbitrary absolutism.

The dynamic behind these changes was the European conception of the Orient, particularly China. Here the Jesuit missions and the ensuing Chinese rite controversy assume a major importance. Jesuit works, such as Athanasius Kircher's *China monumentis qua sacris, qua profanis illustrata* (1667), gave an idealized depiction of Chinese civilization, its culture, and polity and glorified Confucian ethics. This provided ammunition for the libertines. If such a high civilization could exist outside the Biblical parameters and without the Christian faith, it raised questions about the validity of traditional religion and even classical thought. Confucius was exalted first on a par with Socrates and then with Moses, even Christ. Morality, therefore, it was asserted, could exist without Christian ethics. The renegade Calvinist Isaac de La Peyrère restated the pre-Adamite thesis to account for peoples existing

outside the Biblical revelation. From these ideas and Gassendi's revival of atomism, it was only a step to postulate the eternity of the world. Hence, a curious equation ensued between Jesuits and libertines. The exponents of this thought, however, did not go unchallenged. Pierre Jurieu, P. D. Huet, François Fénelon, and G. B. Vico countered this "atheism" under a Chinese guise, especially the concept of the infinity of the world. In spite of this, Zoli claims that Pierre Bayle (in *Pensées diverges* [1683]) was the first to formulate the possible existence of a virtuous society of true atheists. Voltaire would use that argument in his struggle against so-called superstition. But by this time, the emphasis had shifted from China as the ethical-philosophical model to the political one of an enlightened despotism, exemplified by Emperor Kang-Hsi and his edict of toleration of 1692. This idealization of China in all its aspects reached its apotheosis with the founder of physiocracy, François Quesnay. But soon the myth of China began to wane. Apart from the popular satiety with all things Chinese, the reports of western travelers and merchants to China tended to contradict the earlier Jesuit relations and led to a disillusionment with the Orient. The anti-Chinese positions of Fénelon and Pierre Malebranche merged with those of the philosophes of the Enlightenment until P. H. D. d'Holbach demolished the eulogistic legend. These latter would join, albeit for different reasons, with the supporters of traditional religion to uphold the status quo.

Zoli does not hide his secularist sympathies. The work is rather heavily slanted toward the French experience, which may be natural for one who bases his account on Richelieu's rule. He does, of course, bring in some English writers, particularly such free thinkers as Matthew Tindal and John Toland, as well as Herbert of Cherbury. There is the chapter on Hobbes. But Isaac Newton and the influence of his thought are barely mentioned, except for a short denigrating reference to the latter's constricting effect. He has a whole chapter on Gottfried Leibniz and China. Christian Wolff and his follower G. B. Büllfinger with their admiration for China find a place. All in all, the thesis of the book, if perhaps somewhat overstated, is interesting enough to deserve wider diffusion, but within a more concise and precise format.

HANNS GROSS  
Loyola University,  
Chicago

RORY MUIR. *Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 342. \$35.00.

When John Keegan wrote *The Face of Battle* (1976), he popularized the study of the "battle-experience" from the soldier's perspective. Rory Muir seeks to further such studies with his examination of soldiers' experience during the Napoleonic Wars. Muir's monograph

has more an objective than a thesis. Thus, the author states that "It is precisely the practice of what actually happened in battle that I wish to study: how soldiers reacted in coming under fire" (p. viii).

Muir is best when he subtly addresses the relationship of tactics to psychology. By examining the varying roles of infantry, cavalry, artillery, officers, and men, Muir establishes what he sees as the purpose of tactics. He argues convincingly that tactics had a clear psychological intention. The military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz states that victory is achieved when the enemy's will to resist is removed. Muir illustrates this maxim through first-hand accounts of soldiers in the midst of battle, and he highlights their state of mind during combat. He is not so much concerned with a second lieutenant's position in the line of battle but rather with the rationale for officers to lead by example. Another point that Muir makes is that Napoleonic battlefield formations had a psychological purpose beyond their function of maximizing firepower or shock value. He argues, for example, that the square, which was the preferred infantry formation for repelling a cavalry charge, provided the soldier with a sense of security, with his regiment massed and his comrades close at hand. In such circumstances, the likelihood of his fleeing when faced by superior numbers of horsemen decreased dramatically. Hence, the instinct to preserve one's own life by running away was sublimated to the realization that in doing so one would be abandoning friends to their fate. (p. 131). With such insights, Muir has resurrected a dimension of military history that S. L. A. Marshall introduced after World War II.

Muir relies on memoirs, letters, and diaries of Napoleonic veterans in order to provide the reader with vivid accounts of the combat experience. This works well, but Muir unfortunately weakens his own arguments by limiting his sources to those in English. He is also preoccupied with the British military experience and the Duke of Wellington. Muir anticipates this criticism and seeks to preempt it in his introduction. "I doubt," he writes, "that this emphasis of sources affects the result, for at this level of combat national differences mattered comparatively little: Russian, Scot, or Portuguese, a line of horsemen galloping straight at you looks much the same, and the steadiness of your unit will depend on its confidence and training, its recent experience and losses, not on its mother tongue" (p. viii). He contends that Waterloo was similar to Borodino and Austerlitz to Salamanca (p. ix), and he therefore believes that the reader can learn all there is to know about tactics during the Napoleonic Wars from the British experience. Thus, Wellington is mentioned on 116 pages and Napoleon only on seventy-five. Likewise, when Muir refers to other European armies, his information is drawn largely from secondary sources, including books by Gunther E. Rothenberg and Peter Paret.

To be fair, Muir is addressing a genuine historiographical question within the study of the Napoleonic

era: namely, was the real war fought on the peninsula, or in Central Europe? Yet, in emphasizing the significance of the British army, he undermines his position. The relative success of Wellington's tactical reforms was due primarily to the limited size of the British army in the peninsula. When the Austrians or Russians attempted to carry out their own reforms, they concluded it was nearly impossible because of the social and political implications of such changes to their respective monarchical systems. The British experience was distinctly different from that of the Russian, Austrian, Prussian, or French armies. Muir also ignores the fact that British soldiers were recruited, whereas all others were largely conscripted. Although he argues that the national origin of the soldier had little impact on his combat experience, everything that relates to why the soldier was on the battlefield in the first place does matter.

Despite such shortcomings, Muir has produced a well-written book, in which an examination of psychology and tactics returns after a long hiatus to enhance the literature of the Napoleonic era.

FREDERICK C. SCHNEID  
High Point University

ANNETTE WITTKAU-HORGBY, *Materialismus: Entstehung und Wirkung in den Wissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1998. Pp. 308.

It is one of the ironies of intellectual history that German thought, which is virtually synonymous with idealism and romanticism, is also identifiable with some of the most thoroughgoing systems of philosophical and scientific materialism. In this intricately argued and highly nuanced book, and claiming a value-free analysis despite her own professed Kantianism (p. 22), Annette Wittkau-Horgby writes against the background of German criticism that singles out materialism as largely responsible for the ills of society, and possibly in the context of some of the polemics of the German Green movement suggesting that materialism undermines authentic cultural values, while offering sustenance to a spiritually deficient technological world.

Puzzlingly, Wittgau-Horgby narrowly isolates contemporary materialism as one of the principal ideologies of Western Europe. One may wonder if such a restricted definition suggests perhaps some nostalgia for East Germany and the other People's Democracies, fallen ghosts that retain the glow of a wounded but not entirely defeated socialist past, an essentially humanistic world whose legacy has not been tarnished by the triumph of Western materialistic crassness and cynicism. Or is the erstwhile Marxian world also to be condemned? What about the United States and Japan? How do they fit into the equation? Are they not also contributing partners to the same stifling materialism? The author is remarkably silent about such necessary questions.

Retracing the development of materialist thought in the nineteenth century, mainly in Germany but also devoting attention to English Utilitarianism and Darwinism and their respective contributions to German thought, Wittgau-Horgby recounts the ideas of materialistic and mechanistic thinkers like Jacob Moleschott, Ludwig Büchner, Carl Vogt, and Ludwig Feuerbach and links their thought to research in the biological sciences, especially to the advances in cell theory in the work of Matthias Schleiden, Theodor Schwann, and Rudolf Virchow. When Wittkau-Horgby extends her discussion to include representative figures of so-called German *Rechtspositivismus*, the "legal positivists" of the latter part of the nineteenth century, she believes that she has uncovered authors who exemplify the logical outcome of earlier mechanistic thought and whose writings reveal the social dangers implicit in materialism. It is precisely here that the vulnerability of her approach becomes apparent, however, and one cannot help but conclude that, despite the considerable efforts that have gone into the preparation of this volume, the line of argument appears to be doubtful.

Stating at the outset that she has chosen not to deal with that variant of materialism that was popularly known as Monism during the latter decades of the nineteenth century (a school of thought mostly connected with the widespread scientific and philosophical influence of the German zoologist, Ernst Haeckel), Wittgau-Horgby directly connects the materialism of the mid-century with the ideas of legal positivists who were active at the end of the century. These include Carl Bergbohm and Adolf Merkel, now virtually forgotten figures but at the time well-known writers who sought to eliminate from the field of law all semblance of adherence to the moral codes of Natural Law theory. Bergbohm and Merkel did not formulate their ideas, as Wittgau-Horgby believes, according to the teachings of mechanistic materialism and English Darwinism and Utilitarianism, but largely under the sway of the prevailing influence of Haeckelian evolutionary Monism as it radically transformed the content of traditional positivism in the direction of pre-fascist ideology.

Monist materialism was in substance quite different from the mechanistic positivism of the earlier part of the century. Materialistic more in name than anything else, Monism subscribed to an anti-transcendental and vitalistic pantheism that contributed to the tradition of Germanic *völkisch* nationalism while at the same time totally abandoning the humanistic assumptions of classical liberalism. In other words, what trip Wittgau-Horgby up are the assumptions she makes about the realities of historical continuity and the integration of English and German thought. Prominent legal historian H. L. A. Hart observed many years ago that *fin-de-siècle* German legal positivism seemed to represent, for reasons that were not entirely clear to him, one more step on the road to the ideology of National Socialism. In consequence, legal positivism acquired a

"sinister character in Germany, but elsewhere, as with the Utilitarians themselves, went along with the most enlightened liberal attitudes." ("Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," *Harvard Law Review* 71 [1958]: 618).

Whatever its weaknesses or deficiencies, contemporary West European liberal society is not what Wittgau-Horgby describes. Freedom and protection of individual rights, as well as conventional moral obligations, are still respected in contemporary Western society in ways that were hardly typical of the amoral social evolutionary assumptions of the German legal positivists. Because of the decisive break between the mid-century mechanistic materialists and the *fin-de-siècle* vitalistic-materialist Monists, materialism in the nineteenth century was not by any means of one cloth. The moral and social dangers to which Wittgau-Horgby wishes to alert us probably derive not from materialism *per se* but likely from "scientific" Monism. In her reading of the historical record, Wittgau-Horgby seems to have overlooked the significance of the discrete forms of nineteenth-century materialism as well as the deep boundaries separating liberal from pre-fascist thought.

DANIEL GASMAN  
City University of New York

ALBERT S. LINDEMANN. *Esau's Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xxi, 568. \$34.95.

In this 545-page polemic, Albert S. Lindemann attempts an overhaul of Jewish historiography from biblical times to the Holocaust. Distancing himself from historians who celebrate the existence of a unique Jewish genius, he reminds us that the Jews evolved in continual interaction with other peoples, beginning with the Egyptians; without such external influences, they would not be who they are. These external influences have both enriched Jewish life and posed a succession of threats to its continuation. In Lindemann's view, the threats have been in large part provoked by the Jews themselves. Continuing the theme he broached in his earlier book, *The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs (Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank, 1894-1915)* (1991), Lindemann maintains that the fundamental cause of modern racial and political anti-Semitism is an amorously defined Jewish "rise."

Lindemann discards as an oversimplification the picture of a steadily rising tide of German anti-Semitism that culminated ineluctably in the Nazi Holocaust (pp. 156-57) and develops a persuasive counterargument for the complexity and unforeseeability of events. He faults Daniel J. Goldhagen for overinterpreting traditional German anti-Semitism and the effect of Martin Luther's teachings (p. 38) and attacks "intransigent intentionalists" such as Lucy Dawidowicz and Robert Wistrich, who refuse to relieve Adolf Hitler of the charge of murder (p. 519). At the same time, he undertakes the rehabilitation of historical



figures who are usually seen as the precursors of Nazism, such as Richard Wagner, Wilhelm Marr, and Heinrich von Treitschke, whose influence "has been refracted through the distorting mirror of the Nazi years" (p. 133).

Lindemann relies almost exclusively on secondary sources to support his argument, thus interposing layers of interpretation between the reader and original sources. For example, devastatingly racist opinions are ascribed to Benjamin Disraeli, not with quotes from that worthy's own books but by way of citations to secondary sources, without any clue as to the way in which their authors utilized the quotations (p. 90).

In this and other ways, the author's prose style may be characterized as illusionist. Ambiguously worded judgments abound, and many of these convey anti-Jewish attitudes. Among the more egregious: "The financial scandals of the 1880s in France *undeniably* involved Jewish culprits" (p. 215). The proof offered later in the same paragraph begins: "*It was widely believed* that the fledgling bank had been done in by the Rothschilds" (emphases mine). Continual flagrant abuse of language seems intended to confuse and mislead the reader. Lindemann notes quite rightly that some German Jews regarded anti-Jewish resentments on the part of Gentiles as justifiable (p. 125). The deprecating attitude of Westernized German Jews toward Jews just emerging from the Pale of Settlement, triggered by the fear that the latter would upset the former's hardwon social status, is a cliché of Jewish history. Here it is put to use to justify anti-Semitism, as though "the Jews" themselves agreed that they were repellent, and at best, undesirable. In another passage, Lindemann absolves the Russian tsars of the charge of encouraging pogroms by denying "a concerted plan, or plot, to foment the riots" (p. 67). Assuredly, it would be harder to prove that tsarist governments had *con-*certed any plan than that they condoned pogroms.

Throughout the book, remarks that are marginal to the argument explode in unexplained asides that are antagonistic to the Jewish experience. For example, Lindemann dismisses tsarist restrictions on the entry of Jews into universities, since Jews only suffered because they wanted an education. After all, "few peasants were concerned about whether they got into the university" (p. 63). The reader may be surprised to read that the Nuremberg Laws were not so bad: "the exact implications of excluding Jews from Reich citizenship were unclear" (p. 524). The result of withdrawal of government protection is surely one of the most easily comprehended disasters that can befall a citizen, though its *exact implications* may for a while remain obscure. But perhaps the most shameful thrust on the author's part is his grant of equivalent moral status to Nazi leaders and to concentration camp prisoners "who did shameful things in order to survive" (p. 529). Then, shifting the paradigm, he asks us to consider what each of us might have done, as camp inmate or ordinary citizen—evading the essential question: would we have participated in mass murder?

Throughout the book, Lindemann maintains that the very existence of the Jew—in everyday activities but even more so when individual Jews achieve wealth or political power—provokes anti-Semitism. His tone implies that such a reaction is natural and to be expected. Invoking Esau's tears at Jacob's endless provocations and equating "the aversion of Gentile to Jew, and Jew to Gentile" (p. 532), Lindemann surveys centuries of anti-Semitism from the other side of Alice's looking glass.

JUDITH LAIKIN ELKIN  
*University of Michigan*

JOSEPH P. WARD. *Metropolitan Communities: Trade Guilds, Identity, and Change in Early Modern London*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997. Pp. vi, 203. \$45.00.

Thirty years ago, urban historians, many of whom were affiliated with Leicester University, attempted to revitalize our understanding of premodern cities. Going beyond the study of administrative history and the guilds, which had been analyzed intensively, they concentrated on form and function rather than institutions.

Joseph P. Ward continues this process by examining the assumption that there was an antagonistic relationship between the City of London and its suburbs and liberties. He attempts to refute the notion that the growth of suburban London inhibited livery companies, that immigrants undermined a traditional source of community in London, and that there was significant hostility between free and non-free tradesmen and craftsmen. He does not believe that the metropolis was divided into two hostile camps or that the guilds were tenacious defenders of traditional notions of community while the suburbs were more receptive to economic change.

Ward argues that livery companies adapted to the rapid growth of a suburban economy, in large part because their members, many of whom had a financial interest in the suburbs, were not hostile to their growth. The guilds, he says, were able to exercise their economic mandate in a metropolitan-wide setting and were not hostile to production and distribution beyond the walls of the city. Livery companies, he asserts, saw the suburbs as sources of financial opportunity, not urban decline.

Countering the suggestion that administrative chaos ruled in greater London, Ward argues that guilds attempted to respond to population change, immigration, and metropolitan expansion by regulating the suburbs, and the assumption that it was better to embrace than to shun one's competitors.

The inability to assert a metropolitan mandate, Ward recognizes, was a response to the fact that the guilds were not monolithic institutions. In the Grocers' Company, for example, religious controversy encouraged its members to think of London as an integrated moral community. Religion was a tool to unite the



membership, and the guilds' leaders used ceremonial activities to resist destabilizing change. The officers insisted that failure to adhere to traditional practices would lead to chaos in the future. This, of course, is a familiar refrain in medieval and early modern guild history and does not, as Ward suggests, sound like a progressive program.

The Weavers Company was no more sympathetic to competition. It worked assiduously to limit the activity of non-freemen and was more vigorous in this period than it had been a century earlier. Thus, Ward's argument that urban freemen often considered suburbs as sources of opportunity sounds less like they were embracing domestic industry than discovering a new territory for exploitation. Similarly, his assertion that flexible livery company policies helped Londoners cope with social and economic change and helped the metropolis to imagine how greater London could function smoothly has a thoroughly "medieval" ring to it.

Although Ward demonstrates that early modern livery companies were not moribund, he is less successful in his assertion that they contributed to a metropolitan-wide notion of community. Livery company records are notably reticent. It is difficult to see how this construction of identity occurred, why the leaders of livery companies felt it necessary, and how it provided Londoners with a way of imagining and realizing that they were members of communities that were metropolitan in scope. Guild records often suggest, in fact, that masters and wardens were tenacious defenders of medieval (i.e. hierarchical) notions of community that placed freemen ahead of "strangers," encouraged the support of the poor for pragmatic rather than altruistic reasons, and embraced urban solutions only when there were clearly demonstrated reasons for doing so.

Ward has written a convincing study on the tenacity of guilds in a period of rapid economic change. Based on his evidence, one could argue that they worked diligently to stave off decline and that they were not irrelevant institutions. This is a brief book on the survival of guilds, not one on the very-difficult-to-prove notion of the construction of a metropolitan identity in early modern England.

RONALD M. BERGER  
State University of New York,  
Albany

GIGLIOLA PAGANO DE DIVITIIS. *English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy*. Translated by STEPHEN PARKIN. (Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xv, 202. \$59.95.

From before the time Gregory the Great associated *angli* with *angeli* there had been close economic connections between England and Italy. Britannia formed a province of the Roman Empire; in the Middle Ages, Florentine, Venetian, and other Italian merchants and

bankers established lucrative branches in London, making England very much a part of their European business geography. Not even the events of the Reformation interrupted that commerce significantly, although the policies of Northumberland and Mary I had, to a degree, isolated the island kingdom from Mediterranean trade, which languished until the 1570s when it was resumed with new vigor, now driven more by the English than by the Italians.

It is the recovery of England's Mediterranean trade with and through Italy that concerns Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, and the purpose of this book is to explore how the English became a dominant force in Italian trade in the seventeenth century, despite competition from the Spanish, Dutch, and French, and how the Tuscan port of Livorno became the focus of that enterprise. In so doing, the author also investigates how the English superseded the Italians in regional trade and how the port of London became the magnet for much of this dynamic mercantile activity, absorbing trade previously managed by other centers, such as Bristol, Southampton, and Yarmouth.

Pagano de Divitiis illustrates a number of the strengths enjoyed by English merchants: faster, more reliable, and better armed ships; good relations with the Grand Dukes of Tuscany, who wished to maximize the benefits of the recently established free port of Livorno; a profitable, triangular, interdependent trade by which English tin, lead, or fish (often from the Grand Banks) was brought to Italy in exchange for agricultural produce from the *mezzogiorno* (especially Puglia and Sicily), spices and currants from the East, or high-quality Florentine silk, all in great demand in England. It was this concentration of advantages that ensured English success in the Italian trade to the detriment of the Spanish and Dutch in particular. Moreover, by the 1660s, England was in a position to integrate its Mediterranean trade into a global network of economic and colonial hegemony that became the foundation of the British empire.

The author has argued her case cogently and effectively. The evidence is based on a wide knowledge of the archival sources, and the complexity of the Italian context is clearly unravelled and explained: the failure of Venice to revitalize its traditional place as the central entrepôt between East and West—or even North and South—because of high customs duties and port charges; the overly close connections between Genoa and Spain cemented by the profits generated by Genoese management of the Spanish money market; the geographical, economic, and political difficulties faced by Sicily, making it unable to play a more aggressive role in southern trade; and the farsighted, if occasionally erratic, Medici development of Livorno as an international free port not just for Tuscan but for general Mediterranean trade.

It is in the closely integrated analysis of these disparate and complex elements that Pagano de Divitiis's book is strongest. The broad range of interconnected factors leading to English dominance of Med-

iterranean trade is brilliantly, if somewhat pedantically, traced. Diplomatic and mercantile sources in both England and Italy are effectively used, and her conclusions emerge naturally from them. The tables—sparingly used—are clear and helpful.

If something is missing, it is the wider context of Anglo-Italian relations in general. Despite the title of the book, the subject is really trade and shipping patterns. The long-established tradition of English study in Italy is not mentioned, nor is the significance of the grand tour, well defined by the mid-seventeenth century; and the important role of the English resident factor in Italian ports is discussed only in relation to specific examples. The enormous influence of Robert Dudley, titular Duke of Northumberland (*papae gratia*), who was the son of Elizabeth's Leicester, a pioneering naval architect and cartographer, chamberlain of three Medici Grand Dukes, and instrumental in the policy to develop Livorno, merits only a paragraph and a footnote, although his continued connections at the highest levels of English court, diplomatic, and intellectual life provided important mediation between his native and adopted lands, despite his flight and apostasy.

Still, these are minor issues when compared with the very substantial contributions Pagano de Divitiis has made not only to the study of Anglo-Italian economic relations in the seventeenth century but also to our understanding of the beginnings of the English colonial and mercantile empire.

KENNETH R. BARTLETT  
*University of Toronto*

JUDITH JENNINGS. *The Business of Abolishing the British Slave Trade 1783–1807*. Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass; distributed by ISBS. 1997. Pp. xii, 157. Cloth \$39.50, paper \$19.50.

To understand the history of British abolitionism, one must engage with the monumental economic and social transformations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the birth of an industrial class system; the role of religious dissent in challenging the established order; and the evolving definitions of equality and of individual rights. Founded on the macro-level analysis of these transformations offered by David Brion Davis, Seymour Drescher, and others, recent works seek to illuminate the larger historical trends by focusing on the nature of the commitment and the range of contributions made by individual abolitionists. Judith Jennings furthers our micro-level understanding of the roots of abolitionism by creating a "collective portrait" of four Quakers who helped to establish abolitionism as an organized and public movement in the late eighteenth century (p. viii).

Jennings studies the lives and work of the four Quaker founders of the London Abolition Committee: Joseph Woods, James Phillips, George Harrison, and Samuel Hoare. Stressing the primacy of individual agency in shaping history, Jennings examines the on-

going interaction among the four men, the organization they founded, and the tumultuous world in which they operated. These four used their Quaker-derived talents for organization as well as the international connections spawned by both their religion and their burgeoning business connections to establish an organization in 1787 that would focus and help to mobilize popular opinion on the topic of the slave trade. Jennings provides detailed accounts of the meetings of the London Abolition Committee and the organization's attempts to shepherd a number of bills through Parliament. She traces the Quakers' relationships with the evangelicals Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce through the heady days when it looked as though the anti-slave trade movement might triumph to the despair created as their cause was derailed by larger forces unleashed by the French Revolution. By 1807, when Parliament finally abolished the British slave trade, the impact of the original four founding members had waned, largely owing to illness, death, or disillusionment.

Beyond the organizational and business detail, which she provides in great abundance, Jennings connects the four's focus on abolishing the slave trade with their need as Quakers to reconcile money and morals, trade and conscience. Their commitment throughout was on the "business of buying and selling slaves not on the larger issues of human rights and freedom" (p. 131). Jennings attributes this blending of business and morality to the creation of "bourgeois benevolence," a concept she introduces on the last page of the book (p. 135). As Quakers deeply enmeshed in the emerging capitalist values of industrial England, their work in abolitionism allowed them to achieve both a level of social respectability and to advance the interests and aspirations of the emerging middle class.

The strength of Jennings's study lies in her obvious command of the historiography of abolitionism and her detailed knowledge of the operations of the London Abolition Committee. Where she falls a bit short is in her stated goal of demonstrating "how these four men interacted over the course of their lifetimes in multiple contexts as fathers, sons, husbands, Quakers, men" (p. x). We see them primarily in their roles as businessmen. Beside some tantalizing references to the journals of wives, which might have helped bring these men to life, Jennings does not shed light on several intriguing questions: what drew these particular men and not other Quaker entrepreneurs to this specific cause? How did their families and friends view their work? How did they interact with other Quaker reformers like the Gurneys, to whom they were linked by marriage? What happened to their Quaker faith over time? Beyond an accounting of how much each man left to loved ones in his estate at death, some reflection of their personalities drawn from the letters or diaries of friends and family would add a richness to the catalog of their formidable achievements as businessmen and reformers.

Focusing on the contributions of four Quakers to the

development of the anti-slave trade component of British abolitionism, Jennings demonstrates how individual commitment helped transform what had been a minority movement into a national cause. She also links Quaker work in the anti-slave trade campaign to the larger dynamics of changing class and economic realities. In conjunction with other studies of local, grass-roots antislavery organizations, Jennings adds to our understanding of the men and women who were drawn to abolitionism as a way to advance the cause of the enslaved African, and who by doing so elevated their own status as well.

KAREN I. HALBERSLEBEN  
Buena Vista University

C. J. W. ALLEN. *The Law of Evidence in Victorian England*. (Cambridge Studies in English Legal History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xvi, 205. \$59.95.

Who could testify in Victorian courtrooms? Non-believers, convicted felons, plaintiffs and defendants in both civil and criminal cases: all were deemed unacceptable as witnesses in 1800 but were talking freely by Queen Victoria's death. In this detailed examination, C. J. W. Allen offers an explanation of these well-known changes and the fear of perjury that dominated thought about them.

Historians approach changes in the law from several angles. Certainly the most common is to seek the outside forces which cause judges, lawyers, and legislators to alter the status quo. Allen claims that writers such as A. V. Dicey and William Holdsworth have given too much credit to Jeremy Bentham, whose writings about evidence were extensive, but Allen also exaggerates Bentham's importance. If utilitarianism is substituted for Bentham, however, many nineteenth-century developments are explained. Another external influence is "High Politics," the games played at Westminster. Allen suggests that Irish MPs late in the century opposed some proposals as a way to obstruct other government work. Also, perhaps, parliamentary efforts in the 1820s to give Dissenters the right to testify were precursors to Catholic emancipation. Too often, however, the explanation that the government lacked time to complete legislative reform is given to cover what was a more complex situation. Other influences include economic developments, often seen as major factors, especially during the early days of commercial and industrial expansion. Although it is true that the expansion of trade and the growth of railways in the 1840s might have contributed to the push for changes in whether religious belief was necessary before testimony could be given, similar expansions and other growths had not produced alterations. General shifts in culture are more difficult to pinpoint. Whether society late in the century felt more secure, and therefore willing to expand opportunities to testify, as Allen claims, is questionable. That middle-class culture sought to increase personal responsibility is

generally accepted, and this led to support for more witnesses. The decline of belief in divine punishment among the elite might reduce the value of oaths, but it also might heighten fears of perjury.

An alternative approach studies changes brought about by matters internal to the law and the legal system. Allen provides a long example about declarations in the course of business and the hearsay rule. Judges and treatise writers dealt with the issue piecemeal until they found their way to a generalizable rule. Moreover, the conflict of practice between local courts of requests, where much commercial litigation occurred, and the central courts led many to realize that the rules at Westminster did not ensure better justice.

The notion that law can be an instrument in the hands of individuals and groups receives support as Allen argues that the growth in the number of barristers produced pressure for greater participation in trials (and therefore more work); judges receded in their control of trials, and lawyers took over. Groups also used the law as a symbol of their cultural dominance, and the Victorian refusal to permit atheists to testify reflected a desire that such views should not gain legitimacy.

The book has some problems. It is narrower than its title suggests as, for example, written evidence, such as business documents, are not discussed. Although the interpretation appears valid, the evidentiary support often is scanty. Also, many pages are devoted to efforts in Parliament to enact changes, but the details of who introduced bills and the dates of their failures are not made relevant to the larger argument. Finally, in matters of grammar, pronouns should agree with their antecedents.

Combining social, intellectual, and political factors and using a variety of theories of legal history, Allen has written an interesting story about the changes he chronicles, a story not available elsewhere. Social historians can well use some of the insights to support arguments about other aspects of society.

ALLEN HORSTMAN  
Albion College

JOHN F. BEELER. *British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866-1880*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997. Pp. xviii, 354. \$49.50.

This book puts in new and invaluable perspective a period that naval historians, influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan and possessing the advantage of hindsight, have unsurprisingly disparaged and neglected. John F. Beeler argues persuasively, however, that far from having been fudged by short-sighted, pusillanimous politicians, Great Britain was in fact provided with a navy in all respects sufficient to the times, even if navalists thought otherwise. In doing so, he takes the reader on a tour of domestic and foreign politics, public opinion, public finance, foreign relations, the world's navies, naval strategy, technological change, and administration (including administrators).

Beeler shows that the public and Parliament hardly concerned themselves with naval matters but were very keen to have cheap government. The alternative to low taxes being political suicide, Benjamin Disraeli, despite his foreign and colonial policy, was as rigid an economist as W. E. Gladstone, even if the navalists did score a few runs off him (they never did off Gladstone). The Treasury, of course, minded the pennies and never slept. This was, moreover, a period of peace, except for the Franco-German War of 1870 and the Near Eastern Crisis of 1875–1876, neither of which scared anyone but the Cabinet and a few navalists.

France, the second naval power by a long chalk, posed no threat, its big naval program of 1858 having been rather too ambitious and its resources after 1870 being otherwise employed. Indeed, no other power, or likely combination of powers, possessed a navy that was a match, either quantitatively or qualitatively, for Britain's own navy. Nor did any other power develop a naval strategy that Britain needed to fear.

The navy's multiple roles, fast-paced technological change, and the thinness, as yet, of overseas coaling stations naturally complicated questions of what types of ship to build and of design; these, however, were for the most part handled sensibly.

H. E. C. Childers, first lord of the Admiralty in 1868–1871, and an economist after Gladstone's heart, reckoned the tonnage that should be built annually to provide the navy with sufficient strength. The target, though, was seldom reached; it was the naval program laid down by Childers's two predecessors that carried the navy through to the 1880s. Then F. T. Stead's famous articles in the *Pall Mall Gazette* (sounding a false alarm, Beeler argues) accomplished what the admirals had failed to do.

It is impossible to do justice, in a short review, to the scope and depth of this book. Some caveats are none the less in order. Administration occupies a considerable part of the text. Beeler, however, is insufficiently familiar with its dimensions; nor is the relation of administration to policy ever made clear. Childers's highly controversial reorganization of management structure in 1869—the brainchild of the controller of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson—was the most important event of the period. No one reading Beeler would know, however, that it included the dockyards, or that it was driven by the imperative of putting the dockyards (i.e. ship construction) on a footing competitive with private yards, or that Childers considered this to be his greatest challenge. Nor does Beeler fully understand the complexities of the management structure that Childers replaced. His treatment of Childers's problematical management style is selective and misleading.

The reader will not learn that the dockyards' failure to reach building targets was a factor of technological change and admiralty policy. Inconsistencies in the pattern of expenditure are carefully noted but not explained. An apparent enormous increase in the cost of ships, simply attributed to a mysterious bookkeep-

ing change, actually reflected a crucially important accounting innovation.

Beeler's book is unusual in having, literally, a hero and a villain. Childers (the hero rescued from his detractors) was unquestionably an outstanding first lord until he suffered a progressive nervous breakdown, the symptoms of which appeared when he had been in office only about sixteen months and which led to his resignation (under pressure) a year later. Robinson (the villain) was the ablest and brainiest controller ever, yet he is here convicted of, among other things, causing Childers's breakdown, wrecking his reforms, and helping his administration to its sham-bolic end. Evidence is piled on, but it is one-sided. Robinson would surely appeal if he could.

J. M. HAAS  
Southern Illinois University,  
Edwardsville

SUSAN D. PENNYBACKER. *A Vision for London, 1889–1914: Labour, Everyday Life and the LCC Experiment*. New York: Routledge. 1995. Pp. xiv, 315.

Up until the nineteenth century, London was governed by different individual local bodies; there were over 300 of them by the eighteenth century. Much of the development of the metropolitan city—sanitation, lighting, transportation, and cheap housing—was carried out by private interests. There was no central London authority to oversee the development of essential services, nor was there any authority to take control in emergencies such as epidemics and other disasters.

In 1888, the passage of the Local Government Act created a single county authority, the London County Council (LCC), to provide leadership and govern in the metropolitan area, but only in designated areas of public activity (not, for instance, policing, education, or public utilities). The first election was held in 1889, and the Progressives emerged as the dominant group on this new council.

Progressivism was a political movement that emerged in both England and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century at a time when bloody revolution was feared. Aimed at reforming existing society, the "vision" that the LCC leadership had for the metropolitan area was one where the "Progressive ethics and their political strategy prescribed a redemptive role for the government of the imperial capital, a social mission in the secular metropolis" (p.3). Evangelical values, both religious and secular, were introduced into London government and an attempt made to create a better order for all city dwellers. This book tells the story of the work of the LCC in three chapters based on discrete studies of the new bureaucracy, the government-controlled buildings trade, and the attempts at social engineering that formed a basic part of Progressive philosophy.

The first chapter, on the bureaucracy of the LCC, focuses on the large number of "black-coated" workers



hired by the LCC in order to carry out its mission. The majority of these workers were lower middle-class males; some single females were hired, but on marriage they had to resign. Most of these men, if they married, had to live in the suburbs. In metropolitan society as a whole, this class of workers constituted a rapidly growing group. They became important politically: many of them were enfranchised by the 1884 Reform Act. Unfortunately for most of those employed in the LCC bureaucracy, although they were intelligent and willing workers, their education—supplied by government schools—was poor, and so they did not qualify for the top LCC positions. This educational deficiency became an impediment to the installation of a system of promotion by merit: a £200 barrier was instituted that separated the top echelon from their lower-class brethren. Thus a class division developed within the LCC bureaucracy that caused a great deal of bitterness among those denied access to the higher ranks.

The building industry is the subject of the second chapter. Skilled workers and casual workers were hired by the Works Department of the LCC, which had an extensive housing program. This program met with mixed success, often displacing as many people as it housed. In the building trades the workers faced the usual problems of collective versus individual advancement. Soon the workers became disillusioned with Progressivism, which they had originally seen as an alternative to socialism, and turned to syndicalism and socialism.

The third and last chapter examines the problems caused by Londoners' experience with the social and cultural policy of the Progressive LCC. Fittingly entitled "Managing Other Peoples Lives," it shows how the intrusion of the LCC into the private lives of the families and the resistance that was generated led to the decline of popular support for the LCC's programs. The people's disenchantment with the LCC, along with the disillusionment experienced by many of the "black-coated" workers and the building trades workers of the LCC, led to a growing opposition to Progressivism at the polls. Consequently, in 1907, after only eighteen years in power, the Progressives were defeated by the Conservatives, and the "vision" was put aside.

This is a well-researched book that uses contemporary as well as secondary sources and should be an important addition to the body of literature dealing with London at the turn of the century.

LILIAN LEWIS SHIMAN  
Nichols College

LARRY L. WITHERELL. *Rebel on the Right: Henry Page Croft and the Crisis of British Conservatism, 1903–1914*. Newark: University of Delaware Press and Associated University Presses, Cranbury, N. J. 1997. Pp. 291. \$45.00.

*My Life of Strife* (1948) was the title Henry Page Croft chose for memoirs describing his long career in twentieth-century British politics. It was an apt choice, for despite impeccably conventional origins (more of his ancestors had sat in Parliament than from any comparable family), Croft's anticipated ascent within the Conservative Party never materialized. Frequently embroiled in controversy, this unrepentant dissident found himself on the margins of the party, or even outside it altogether. To provide the first sustained scholarly analysis of Croft's activities is one of Larry L. Witherell's aims; the other is to employ Croft's dissidence to illuminate the Conservative Party's turbulent state in the decade before 1914, a period of what the author terms "evolutionary transition" that "produced a dysfunctional party" (p. 18).

Croft represented a new generation of activists who were dissatisfied with the patrician outlook of the party's leadership and its seeming impotence in the face of challenges posed abroad by Germany's growing military and economic power and at home by a rejuvenated Liberalism and the specter of predatory socialism. Trusting in such grave circumstances to traditional palliatives, or "humdrum Toryism," as one of Croft's compatriots contemptuously dismissed them, was delusory at best, suicidal at worst. Accordingly, Croft eagerly embraced Joseph Chamberlain's call for tariff reform, with its emphasis on imperial consolidation and an activist state. Only such "constructive politics" could preserve Britain in the new century, Croft believed, and he adhered to that position with such uncompromising fervor that he worked to exclude from the Conservative Party those who could not share his zeal for tariff protection and imperial preference.

Such intransigence, and the party's inner turmoil, spelled electoral disaster, suggesting that during the Edwardian era it was the Conservatives, not the Liberals, who were staggering toward a strange death. Although some thirty years ago it was the Liberal Party's dramatic eclipse by Labour that attracted disproportionate scholarly attention, subsequent decades have seen the imbalance redressed to the point that the developments Witherell narrates are now all too familiar. Because Witherell's text does not engage with recent work (and the same is true of all but a handful of his footnotes), unsuspecting readers might assume that his is a trail-blazing account of Edwardian Conservatism, when in fact it largely piles on additional detail to confirm our general picture.

Yet Witherell's close analysis of Croft's early career does yield some fresh insights. The author's extensive research in manuscript collections, familiarity with the spectrum of politicians involved, and evident mastery of the Hertfordshire press are all deployed to good effect in illuminating Croft's role as the impresario orchestrating the repudiation of the local MP, Unionist free trader Abel Smith, by his former supporters. As a case study, it provides a welcome glimpse of the depth of tariff reform sentiment to be found on the local level as well as an instructive example of the



debilitating effect in some constituencies of "political cannibalism" (p. 85). Furthermore, by drawing attention to the issue of reciprocity between America and Canada in matters of trade, Witherell adds a new dimension to the sense of urgency Croft and others continued to feel, even as the party leaders edged away from a commitment to full-blown tariff reform.

Throughout this book, Witherell emphasizes that Croft's importance derives partly from the fact that he was not content merely to wring his hands in dismay but insistent on taking remedial action. He provides a full account of the minutia of those actions, up to 1914, but is less effective in drawing out the full significance of the career of a politician who was, admittedly, a minor figure. Croft is best known to historians, if at all, for his formation in 1917 of the National Party, to which he could devote the nationalist and imperialist energies that he felt the Conservative Party could not be trusted to express. But if the purpose of studying Croft is to explore how one individual's unwavering commitment to principle and action over expediency played out in British politics, it is curious that Witherell stops well before Croft was forced to confront the full implications of his stance. Croft himself devoted three-quarters of *My Life of Strife* to his experiences after 1914. By ignoring them, Witherell is not merely obscuring a forest by his focus on one tree; he is minimizing the full foliage of even that single tree by confining himself to the lower trunk. Furthermore, Witherell does not lay bare the assumptions that animated Croft's ideal of public service. He recognizes Croft's ardent nationalism but tends to accept it at face value rather than pursuing the meanings of Croft's professed "Englishness" (a measure of its significance to Croft is the fact that he explicitly titled the opening and concluding chapters of his memoirs "Born in England" and "England," respectively). This book provides a useful introduction to an individual of some interest, but it cannot be regarded as a definitive study.

FRANS COETZEE

*George Washington University*

NEAL R. MCCRILLIS, *The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage: Popular Conservatism, 1918-1929*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998. Pp. x, 314. \$41.95.

This book is a landmark in the historiography of interwar conservatism. As Neal R. McCrillis argues in the introduction, most studies of the Conservative Party, and conservatism more generally in the 1920s, tend to focus on policy making and the dealings of "high politics," ignoring the efforts of Conservative leaders to impart beliefs and loyalties to a mass audience. The impression they have left is one of a party passively benefitting from the prospect of uncertainty represented by Labour and decline represented by the Liberals. By contrast, McCrillis charts the Conservative Party's concerted response to the challenge of a greatly expanded electorate following the

Representation of the People Acts of 1918 and 1928. The book is based upon a wealth of hitherto untapped primary sources, principally the records of twelve representative constituency associations. These are supplemented by newspaper reports and the private papers of Conservative MPs and leaders, as well as those of Central Office. The result is a significant and forceful account of the party's achievement in organizing a broad basis of support, principally, but not exclusively among the growing middle class. As such, it reinforces two other very recent and fine studies of Conservative Prime Ministers—Andrew Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin—that stress their subjects' strenuous attempts to make the party a powerful electoral force (R. J. Q. Adams, *Bonar Law* [1999] and Philip Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values* [1999]).

The book focuses on four key organizational channels through which the party sought to enhance its appeal to voters, and in all of which it succeeded in overcoming the resistance of its traditional supporters: branches of the Women's Unionist Organisation (WUO), the Junior Imperial League (JIL) and Young Britons, and the Labour Committee (LC). The WUO proved most vital in transforming the party into a popular organization. But the LC was instrumental in the passage of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927, legislation that proved an asset rather than a liability to the party. The JIL and Young Britons were also influential in broadening the basis of Conservative Party support, despite the marginal relationship of some their activities to politics. The party developed propaganda, research, and educational work into a fine art, the latter through its Stott and Ashridge Colleges, both of which secured the services of leading thinkers and scholars. Upon all of this grass-roots activity the party grafted an emollient ideology of national unity, citizenship, Englishness, and industrial peace that was skillfully communicated by leaders such as Baldwin, who became a personification of these ideals.

Conservatism, in this period as much as in others, was not marked by sophisticated statements of principle, strategy, and objectives. Instead, it was projected as a "common sense" creed, extolling such simple and moderate virtues as those of decency, duty, and patriotism. The evidence that the book brings forth suggests that the strength of conservatism in interwar Britain was achieved because of, not in spite of, its lack of a party intelligentsia. The prominence of the left in Britain's intelligentsia, particularly in the 1930s, tends to disguise the way in which conservatism, rather than socialism, constituted the dominant ideology: one that was expressed through organization at a grass-roots level rather than through formal ideas.

McCrillis suggests that the reason why the Conservatives lost the 1929 election lay in their failure to match sensitivity to popular values with an effective policy program. The party was to be thus challenged in the next decade, too. But it sustained its efforts at

organization and education and continued to win support by being alert to, and articulating, the attitudes and values of "ordinary" people. The educational concerns, in particular, are well reflected in the efforts of Arthur Bryant both to maintain the high profile of Ashridge as a nonpartisan but Conservative-orientated forum of adult education and to launch an alternative to Victor Gollancz's Left Book Club—the National Book Club—later in the 1930s. One can only hope that the research on which this book is based will be pursued into the 1930s. It certainly provides instructive reading for the current Conservative Party leadership, tempted, as it is, to pursue an ideological exit from the electoral doldrums on terms dictated by the left rather than building a solid, grass-roots organization on the basis of popular ideals and beliefs.

JULIA STAPLETON  
University of Durham

CHERYL LAW. *Suffrage and Power: The Women's Movement, 1918–1928*. London: I. B. Tauris; distributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1997. Pp. ix, 260. \$59.50.

After twenty years of vigorous and diversified scholarship, women's historians in Britain and the United States are showing a renewed interest in the topic that launched their discipline: the first women's movement and the struggle for the vote. This second look seems to be a response to contemporary feminist concerns. As women's liberationists in both countries watched their movement split into factions based on race, class, politics, and sexual orientation, and then faced a popular backlash in the 1980s, two themes emerged in women's history. The first was doubt that women constituted a coherent political, economic, or social group, and the second was a perception that women's historical experience has had a depressingly cyclical quality, in which gains were followed by backlash and the need to fight the same battles over again. Such a loss of confidence in the progress of modern feminism raised these questions about the first women's movement: how did its leaders succeed in uniting women in all their diversity, and when and why did that unity collapse?

Cheryl Law offers a new perspective on both these questions in the context of the British suffrage struggle. She challenges the idea that the vote was an umbrella issue that united women only until it was partially achieved in 1918, when the alliance fell apart and suffragists either dispersed into uncoordinated single-issue campaigns or disappeared into male-dominated organizations. After research into an extraordinary number and variety of British women's organizations, Law argues that, far from collapsing in 1918, the women's movement retained its capacity to act cohesively for another decade. It was sustained not just by a determination to equalize the franchise but by concerted efforts among feminists of all stripes to secure women's full legal and economic equality.

For Law, the key to the endurance of the first

women's movement was that leading feminists promoted "the Cause" in the many and varied organizations to which they belonged, as well as in specifically feminist groups. Feminism in the 1920s, she argues, crossed the boundaries of social class and political and regional loyalties. Women at opposite ends of the political spectrum—she mentions Nancy Astor, the first woman MP and a Conservative, and Margaret Bondfield, a Labour MP—fought on the same side when it came to women's equality issues, as did feminists in women's trade and professional associations, international peace and church organizations, and Welsh, Irish, and Scottish groups. In her view, organizational diffusion was a strength, not a weakness, since it broadened the base of feminist support.

Yet, as Law herself admits, feminist gains in the 1920s were few. Despite the persistence and imagination with which women activists fought for them, campaigns for equal pay, equal access to the professions, an equal moral standard, and married women's right to work foundered on the rock of opposition from the male power structure. The one clear victory was the equalization of the vote in 1928, but Law cannot state definitively that the concession was a direct response to feminist pressure. A case can be made that the British government, having ignored women's demands for ten years, extended the female vote for its own political convenience. Law's explanation for women's limited gains is the deep-rooted social opposition to gender equality, which the war had failed to change. She denies that the increase in male hostility to women, engendered by the war and exacerbated by economic recession, was a backlash. Yet her own evidence of the feminist battles fought in the early 1920s to secure rights supposedly already won—the right of women to serve as jurors, for example—suggests otherwise.

This is not the only instance in which Law, in her eagerness to make the case for the postwar unity of the women's movement, misses the implications of her own evidence. She acknowledges the growing tension between "equality" feminists and the "new feminists" who put women's welfare needs first, and between feminists in the political parties and those in non-party organizations, but she argues that these divisions did not prevent continued cooperation on core issues. Such an interpretation ignores the reality of that other deep-rooted social prejudice in Britain: class antagonism. Some of the middle-class leaders of the women's movement believed that their cause was above class, but the arguments over protective legislation and among Liberals, Conservatives, and Socialists proved them wrong. Law's book shows the tenacity and adaptability of British feminists in the 1920s, but, as in the United States, the decade also revealed what Nancy Cott called "the fault lines of modern feminism."

PAMELA M. GRAVES  
Eastern Michigan University

WOLFRAM KAISER, *Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945–63*. (Contemporary History in Context Series.) New York: St. Martin's in association with the Institute of Contemporary British History. 1996. Pp. xviii, 274. \$59.95.

Since 1945, Britain has consistently reacted to initiatives on European integration with studied indifference, promotion of "constructive" alternatives, diplomatic retreat, and reluctant acquiescence. Not surprisingly, most accounts of British-European relations dwell upon this pattern of opposition. But Wolfram Kaiser professes to see a fundamental flaw in their approach, which he likens to the *Sonderweg* theory of prewar German history in that it wrongly assumes a normal course toward European integration and thus unjustifiably presents British policy as abnormal. If, he writes, "the moral perspective of the politically minded pathologist is exchanged for serious historical analysis," it becomes clear that Britain's European policy, which sprang directly from its world policy, was in fact "quite rational" (p. 204). In other words, in promoting a free-trade Europe without distinctive institutions, Britain has pursued a reasonable policy based on a clear-sighted notion of national interests, which moreover has found support elsewhere in Europe. Although rejected in favor of federal arrangements, this was never inevitable, and if Britain has seemed unreasonable, it is because of its abrasive, sometimes abusive, diplomacy and the imperatives of its domestic politics rather than any fundamental flaw in policy.

This is the first account to be based on unpublished British records, Conservative Party papers, and other manuscripts, and Kaiser sets out with clarity and style Britain's deliberations on Europe in the formative years from 1955 to 1961, while taking the story back to the war and forward to the 1990s. The central sections, which display a deep understanding of British domestic politics, can be read with profit by students of the period. But primary sources are no substitute for logical rigor, and Kaiser's contrarian thesis leads him into a severely strained reading of the evidence. A good example is the arguments he uses to explain Britain's decision in 1955 to oppose the work of the Spaak committee, which led to the European common market. First, he asserts, it is absurd for other historians to claim that Britain "missed the bus" at this time, since the Europeans had no fixed destination, nor was it certain they would go anywhere without Britain. Second, British reluctance even to contemplate European integration was still so deep-seated that its statesmen can scarcely be faulted for failing to think the unthinkable. Third, if anyone deserves criticism it is Harold Macmillan, the supposedly euromphile foreign secretary, who unwisely departed from Britain's traditional "benevolent neutrality" toward European initiatives (p. 53) by attacking the Spaak committee proposals. Taking these points in reverse order, Kaiser's own evidence confirms that British opposition to Eu-

ropean integration goes back to the Marshall Plan and that, indeed, by 1955 European statesmen had come to expect British obstruction of their initiatives. As for British reluctance to contemplate integration in 1955, this is no doubt broadly correct. Yet it sits oddly with Kaiser's account of the following months when the government, having at last aroused itself to give the matter some thought, found widespread willingness among businessmen and even Commonwealth leaders to contemplate closer British-European relations. Finally, on the existence or nonexistence of a bus, obviously European statesmen had yet to agree on specific institutions. But as Kaiser acknowledges not once but many times, most of them were determined to create an institutional framework for closer integration in order to lay to rest forever the specter of resurgent nationalism and war. Hence the momentum that drove them toward "an ever closer union," as agreed in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Metaphorically, then, there was a bus and even a *Weg*, which the Europeans charted as they went along.

But what of the rational character of British policy? Given Kaiser's own references to it as "obsolete" (p. 13), out of step with "political reality" (p. 39), "totally unrealistic" (p. 66), "soap bubbles" (p. 49), inflated by the "arrogant belief" that Europe could not act without Britain (p. 27), formulated by politicians who were "obsessed with defending the threatened status quo" (p. 56), and managed by a Foreign Office that was "particularly ill-prepared for the new challenges" (p. 41), it is more than a little odd that he should accuse other historians who criticize British policy of confusing "style and substance" (p. 214). The muddle is repeated when, with unconscious irony, he affirms that "[Margaret] Thatcher's approach to further European integration was basically constructive, at least until she realized the full extent of the unwelcome political integration dynamism [she] set off by the Single European Act" (p. 215). A case can be made for describing her liberal policies as constructive, but they were also potentially destructive of European institutions, which would become virtually irrelevant in a world stripped of economic frontiers. The fact that Thatcher sought their destruction yet succeeded only in strengthening them points to a failure of more than merely style. Kaiser vividly describes Britain's difficulties in coming to terms with Europe, but in pursuing the reductionist thesis of a rational policy he transforms a potentially excellent account into a work of polemics.

ROBERT BOYCE

*London School of Economics and Political Science*

I. R. MCBRIDE, *Scripture Politics: Ulster Presbyterians and Irish Radicalism in the Late Eighteenth Century*. New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University. 1998. Pp. 275. \$65.00.

The subjects of political action and Presbyterianism in late eighteenth-century Ireland are hardly new ones. Indeed, the bicentenary of the 1798 rebellion has left

in its wake a vast literature of considerable complexity on these issues. Despite this, historians have tended to approach these problems as discrete items in a historiographical agenda, linked only by a sense of incongruity that the ancestors of today's Ulster loyalists had been rebels in 1798. The most significant achievement of I. R. McBride's work is to integrate these two themes of late eighteenth-century Ulster history into a coherent whole.

The first section of the book deals with the varying types of Presbyterianism present in late eighteenth-century Ireland. McBride's exploration focuses not on institutional phenomena or philosophical positions but rather on sets of ideas grounded in a social base. He makes effective use of sermon rhetoric in an attempt to understand the articulation of religious and social ideas and so delineate the linkages between specific social groups and particular theological ideas. Such a context makes it easier to understand the seemingly puzzling divisions within eighteenth-century Presbyterianism on points that were apparently irrelevant in the Irish context, such as the split between Burghers and Anti-Burghers.

The second part of the book describes how the society that supported such a diverse range of theological views was radicalized following the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1776. McBride describes the rapid diffusion of political ideas, especially those of citizenship, into the lower social orders that previously had been excluded from political activities by legislation. In particular, he highlights the ritual and symbolic function of bodies such as the Volunteers in conveying such ideas. Social change, as we might expect from the first part of the argument, accommodated theological shifts that became part of this popular politicization.

All of this sets the scene for the third part of McBride's thesis, which is an analysis of the republicanism of the 1790s and, in particular, a study of the 1798 rising in the Presbyterian heartland of Ulster. This, he argues, was powered by both social change and the millenarian mood of certain branches of Presbyterianism.

This is a powerful and attractive argument. Some of the elements have been articulated before, most notably by Nancy Curtin in *The United Irishmen* (1994), but never have they been united into such a coherent synthesis. This analysis is particularly important because it rescues religion from its usual place in Irish historical writing as a marker of ethnic or specifically confessional positions. Here the political shifts of the 1770s and 1780s, in which volunteering gave men a sense of belonging to the body politic, led to people reaching for their Bibles for guidance in daily action. Thus politics became, in the words of William Steele Dickson, used as the title for this book, informed by scripture.

Such a contention opens up a whole series of possibilities for fruitful exploration that, although part of the overall argument, are only lightly touched on in this volume. Although a good deal is known about the

circulation of radical literature (such as the writings of Thomas Paine) in late eighteenth-century Ireland, almost nothing is known of the distribution of scripture. We know little about how and where the Bible was read or about the relationships between reading and listening to the text of scripture being read. Further research is needed into the fragmentation of Ulster Presbyterianism in the eighteenth century, using local session records, in the light of McBride's argument.

This is an outstanding and startlingly original book that bristles with ideas and insights into a period whose historiography is often characterized by the repetition of platitudes. It also has the merit of being lucidly written and is a pleasure to read. One can only hope that McBride will continue the work he has begun with Presbyterianism by extending it to the other politico-religious groupings on the island of Ireland in the eighteenth century.

RAYMOND GILLESPIE  
National University of Ireland,  
Maynooth

PAUL WEBER. *On the Road to Rebellion: The United Irishmen and Hamburg, 1796–1803*. Dublin: Four Courts Press; distributed by ISBS, Portland, Oreg. 1997. Pp. 205.

OLIVER KNOX. *Rebels and Informers: Stirrings of Irish Independence*. New York: St. Martin's. 1997. Pp. xvi, 304. \$35.00.

The past decade has witnessed a succession of anniversaries well calculated to quicken not only the pulse but also the moving finger of many an Irish historian, or history enthusiast, interested in the precursors of modern Irish nationalism. Bicentenaries of the outbreak of the French Revolution, the founding of the United Irishmen, and the rebellion of 1798 have all been celebrated within the past ten years. The recent reissue of Thomas Pakenham's popular *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798* (1969) was a predictable publishing decision, although it finds the field of study far more crowded than when it first appeared. Moreover, the standard interpretation of the rebellion has been much refined during the interim. No longer is it simply attributed to a despairing peasant response to the indiscriminate brutality with which the authorities sought to suppress Irish radicalism. Instead, more attention has been paid to the United Irishmen's ideology and to their Faustian alliance with the savagely sectarian Defenders. Indeed, the evidence that they were preparing for an insurrection during the winter of 1792–1793 has cast a somewhat less reprehensible light on the government's often pitiless preemptive violence. Similarly, the distant reach of the United Irishmen has also drawn scholarly attention, with historians tracking them to refuges as far afield as New England and New South Wales.



Oliver Knox and Paul Weber are more properly positioned within the ranks of enthusiasts than of professional historians. Knox served as director of publications for the Centre for Policy Studies and has published several novels in addition to a travel book and pieces in the *Spectator*. He writes with a novelist's ease and fluency and aims his work at a popular audience. Knox focuses on four prominent figures who eventually resorted to an alliance with Britain's Continental enemy in order to effect a revolution: Wolfe Tone, William Drennan, Archibald Hamilton Rowan, and Lord Edward Fitzgerald. It is a rare page that does not carry an extract from a near-contemporary source, and one from Rowan's *Autobiography* (1840) stretches over three pages (pp. 129–31). The quotations provide a contemporaneous flavor, and several are diverting—for example, Tone's account of General Hoche's amatory adventure before the ill-fated French expeditionary force set sail for Ireland in 1796—yet all too frequently their inclusion is unnecessary, or their contents might have been succinctly summarized by the author.

Nor can it be said that Knox adds either to our knowledge or understanding of these men, preferring as he does to dwell at times upon aspects of their lives that do little to illuminate the movement or their contributions to it. The lengthy account of Rowan's transatlantic journey is but one example. As for that most important factor, motivation, Tone is depicted as driven essentially by "bilious hate" of England (p. 30); Drennan by the American example; Rowan by a noble-spirited aversion to injustice, arrogance, and corruption; and Fitzgerald by his idealization of the French Revolution. Their individual intellectual developments are not explored systematically, for Knox flits lightly from subject to subject. He does properly point to the evidence that Tone and Drennan publicly advocated the brotherhood of Irishmen while privately harboring deep suspicions of, if not contempt for, Catholics, yet he fails to explore how they persuaded themselves that the French Revolution had proved that these potential allies were capable of escaping from the dominion of their priests and thus could make good use of political liberty.

The informers of the title are cast as the darkest of villains. They are generally depicted as Judas figures, acting from the basest of motives. Leonard McNally, one of the most useful and successful of them, in that he kept his secret life secret, is described as possessed of a "sniggering taste for some form of secret revenge" but less successfully explained; money "may well have been his main motive" (p. 49). The controller of several of these agents is also roundly condemned, in his case as "the most deadly, insinuatingly effective of *agents provocateurs*" (p. 50), and only Samuel Turner escapes censure as a grasping turncoat. His defection to the ranks of the government's secret army may have been inspired by a fear that "plans for rebellion had got out of hand, and would lead to the ruin of Ireland." Beyond that, he was another of those United Irishmen

who could not entirely suppress "a terrible distrust of the Catholics" (p. 228).

Interestingly, Turner plays a far more central role in Weber's book. Indeed, one of the author's claims to originality is his singling out this agent's career for special attention. Weber seeks to establish that Turner was "flirting with the idea of offering his services to the government" (p. 69) six months before the date accepted by historians—not that the precise timing of this transfer of loyalties is clear in the text. Weber does provide a somewhat more analytical assessment than that to be found in Knox's book of those factors that prompted a leading United Irishman to defect from the cause. Fear for his own survival, as he sensed the authorities fitting a noose for his neck, appears to have weighed most heavily on his mind and in his decision. But Turner was also responding to a deepening conviction that southern Catholics intended, should independence be achieved, to reverse the earlier land confiscations, and responding also to that indelible Protestant belief that separation from England would inaugurate the "Dominion of the Priesthood" (p. 178). Finally, he was by no means unmindful of the monetary value of the services he was capable of providing to the government.

As the title of his book indicates, Weber's principal focus is the popularity and significance of the free city of Hamburg, both as a point of entry to Europe for United Irishmen seeking to establish contact with agents of the French government in order to secure French assistance for the planned rebellion and as a place of refuge. Convinced of the city's importance, he is inclined to overstate the influence of the French representative there. Charles Reinhard is initially described as an able diplomat and the "creator of French policy" (p. 52); however, the author subsequently concedes that French policy makers "showed themselves less committed and enthusiastic about a far-reaching involvement in Ireland than Reinhard in his meetings with United radicals" (pp. 80–81). That caveat aside, Weber faithfully documents the arrivals in Hamburg both of United agents and of refugees, together with the personal and tactical differences they imported from Ireland and carried to Paris (much to the injury of their mission and cause). He also describes the city's emergence as a center of espionage and intrigue. Much of this is founded on diligent research in primary sources, but the value of the book would have been enhanced had it been far more carefully edited.

BRIAN JENKINS  
Bishop's University

ALLAN BLACKSTOCK. *An Ascendancy Army: The Irish Yeomanry, 1796–1834*. Portland, Oreg.: Four Courts, 1998. Pp. 320. \$45.00.

The most consequential civilian defense forces founded in Ireland during the eighteenth century were the Volunteers and the Yeomanry, yet their historio-



graphical fortunes can hardly have been more different. Brought into being as a result of the voluntary initiative of members of the Protestant elite in the 1770s to compensate for the depletion of the Irish military establishment during the American War of Independence, the effect of the extensive historical attention concentrated upon the Volunteers has been to portray them as a liberating, even democratizing, body. Established twenty years later in the more confrontational environment of the 1790s at the behest of the British administration, the Yeomanry have attracted palpably less scrutiny, and such notice as they have been accorded has been distinctly uncomplimentary. Guided by the judgment of Lord Cornwallis, who claimed that they took the "lead in rapine and plunder" (p. 180) in the aftermath of the 1798 Rebellion, the preferred judgment of historians has been to characterize them as bigoted and reactionary. This is not a conclusion from which Allan Blackstock demurs. Whereas the Yeomanry have also been depicted as the Orange Order in arms, however, Blackstock's interpretation is more nuanced. The Yeomanry were not established as a covert means "to arm the protestants"; this followed their foundation. Moreover, they did not generate anti-Catholicism; they merely provided "a channel through which such attitudes could travel and manifest themselves" (p. 276). What is clear from Blackstock's impressively researched, although somewhat unevenly written, book is that during the first decade of the nineteenth century, when the Yeomen were at their strongest, an estimated one in six adult male Protestants was a member—making them the most representative organ of popular Protestant opinion. Given this fact, any competent study of the Yeomanry would be welcome, but Blackstock's thorough account is to be warmly greeted because, as well as providing a reliable reconstruction of the organizational history of that body, he illustrates its centrality to the forging of a popular conservative Protestant sensibility in the late 1790s and early years of the nineteenth century.

It is more than a little ironic that this should be its main long-term significance, since it was an explicit object of Earl Camden, the lord lieutenant responsible for bringing the Yeomanry into being in 1796, that it should not be seen as arming the "Protestant against the Papist." With this in mind, Camden successfully persuaded prominent liberal political figures like the Earl of Charlemont and James Stewart to participate. He also encouraged Catholic involvement. Some Catholics did join, but Camden's aspiration to create a body in which men of every denomination and political hue opposed to political sedition and public disorder could participate productively ran counter to that of conservative Protestants, who favored a more denominationally exclusive policy. This outlook was most strongly shared among Protestants in mid-Ulster, arising from the conviction, borne out of atavistic fears and well-grounded unease as to the intentions of the Catholic Defenders, that their lives as well as their property and

political ascendancy were in danger. This caused many to concur with John Knox of Dungannon that "we rely for the preservation of our lives and properties" (p. 95) on Orangemen, and it was impossible to prevent their admission to the Yeomanry in significant numbers from the outset. Moreover, as disorder intensified and the prospect of a French-aided rebellion seemed more likely, the detailed local knowledge that Orangemen possessed increased their usefulness. As a result, the Yeomanry came to resemble less the respectable, property-based organization Camden had in mind than the mass Protestant organization envisaged by hard-line gentry. This process accelerated in 1798 as the actuality of rebellion caused many Presbyterians who had embraced republicanism in the 1790s to rethink their positions. The dramatic increase in the size of the Yeomanry—from 35,000 in December 1797, to 54,000 in 1800, to 83,000 in 1803—attests to the magnitude of the ideological shift that took place within Irish Protestantism and to the importance of the Yeomanry in that process. This prompts Blackstock to claim, somewhat cryptically, that "the history of the Irish Yeomanry is both more and less than the history of popular Protestantism" (p. 271). Such an observation deserves fuller elaboration than the author accords it, but, thanks to his work, both the role of the Yeomanry in the process and its institutional contours are clear.

JAMES KELLY  
St. Patrick's College,  
Dublin

PETER GRAY. *Famine, Land and Politics: British Government and Irish Society, 1843–50*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press; distributed by ISBS, Portland, Oreg. 1999. Pp. ix, 384. \$55.00.

In this outstanding book, Peter Gray examines the politics of Britain's policies toward Ireland in the 1840s. He analyzes the attitudes of English political society toward the Irish land question in the years before and during the Great Famine. He portrays the reaction of politicians to the collapse of the potato harvest from its first failure in the autumn of 1845. He examines the response of both Robert Peel's government, which was in power until 1846, and the subsequent Whig government led by John Russell.

Although Gray claims that his book was not written to lay blame for the vast number of deaths that occurred as a result of the Irish Famine, he minces no words about the failure of British policy to respond adequately to the food crisis. He attributes that failure to a number of factors but primarily to the view of some Britons that the famine was a God-sent opportunity to transform Irish agriculture by eliminating dependency on the potato, clearing over-populated estates, and introducing free trade in land. The policy failure, he writes, "was due in large measure to the success of the dominant faction in the government in prioritizing another, ideologically driven agenda—that of grasping the heaven-sent 'opportunity' of famine to

deconstruct Irish society and rebuild it anew" (p. 331). One of Gray's major contributions to the study of the Great Famine is his elucidation of the providentialist interpretation of it in Britain, which did as much as *laissez-faire* ideology to restrain the hand of assistance.

An irony of the Irish Famine is that British resistance to providing aid was also motivated by the view that Irish property should pay for Irish poverty. In certain parts of British political society, there was tremendous hostility toward the "indolent Irish aristocracy" (p. 260). Yet the people forced to pay for this hostility were poor Irish peasants, not the landed elite; the latter benefited from the Famine in a number of ways, primarily by the removal of hundreds of thousands of small cottiers from their estates.

I have read this book with great admiration. My only criticism is that Gray sticks rather too closely to his sources: state documents, the correspondence and speeches of politicians, and articles in British journals and the press. (One exception is the *Freeman's Journal*, which he uses extensively.) Even information about the blight itself is taken more from these sources than other ones. Nevertheless, Gray's sources are sufficient, and he amazes the reader with his knowledge of them. The work is well organized and well written, and it stands as an example of the highest scholarship.

SAMUEL CLARK  
University of Western Ontario

JOSEPH MORRISON SKELLY. *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945–1965: National Interests and the International Order*. Foreword by MARY ROBINSON. DUBLIN: IRISH ACADEMIC PRESS; DISTRIBUTED BY ISBS, PORTLAND, OREG. 1997. Pp. 314. \$45.00.

It was not until December 1955 that Ireland was admitted to the United Nations, after the Soviet Union vetoed its original application in 1946. This allows Joseph Morrison Skelly to dispose with admirable succinctness of the first ten years of this book's title in his first paragraph. As the text also tapers away toward the end of the period, the bulk of the book deals with the years from 1955 to 1962. Here Skelly works assiduously through his main source, Department of External (now Foreign) Affairs files in Dublin, as well as through relevant public records, the papers of United Nations (UN) officials, and interviews, not least with Conor Cruise O'Brien, a highly articulate member of the early Irish delegation who championed causes with the same flair he would later devote to denouncing some of them. Indeed, one of the charms of the study is the opportunity it offers for confronting O'Brien drunk with O'Brien sober, or vice versa, depending on ideological taste.

Skelly recounts in persuasive detail, if at times repetitively, the highly accomplished performance of the tiny but talented early Irish team under the sagacious guidance of the head of delegation, F. H. Boland, in the service of three different policies. First came the doctrinal pro-Western position of Taoiseach

(Prime Minister) John A. Costello and Minister for External Affairs Liam Cosgrave, of the Inter-Party government in 1956–1957. Then came the tenacious adherence of Eamon de Valera, prime minister in the new Fianna Fail government from 1957 to 1959, and his Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, to an independent stance devoted to reducing Cold War tensions. Third, following de Valera's resignation in 1959 and despite Aiken remaining at his post, came a reversion, driven by Prime Minister Sean Lemass, to a more pro-Western attitude. This time the stance was taken more on pragmatic than doctrinal grounds; once Ireland became an applicant for full membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961, its government came under a certain pressure, or felt it would, to temper its principles to the prevailing western winds.

Familiar though the general outline may be, Skelly succeeds in bringing out more sharply than previously the differences among the three phases. He makes a compelling case, too, for attributing to both de Valera and Lemass more active roles in the formulation of Irish UN policy than is often assumed.

Despite the greater importance attached to the prime ministers under whom he served, Aiken emerges with his reputation not only intact but enhanced. He was a minister of unusual independence of mind, clearly in charge of his department, however apparently naïve his attitude at times toward the possibilities of compromise between the rival Cold War camps. Skelly does not quite dispose, however, of the widespread belief that a certain tension existed between Lemass and Aiken. His denial of a "distance" between them (p. 170, n. 13) is referenced only to a "private source," in contrast to his usual dense documentation, and in itself hardly suffices to dispel the suspicions, useful though it is to have the conventional wisdom challenged.

It was, of course, relatively easy for the Irish to take principled stands on issues like self-determination for Algeria, apartheid in South Africa, Chinese violation of human rights in Tibet, or even the proposal for discussion of Chinese entry to the UN—a red flag to the indignantly self-righteous American bull of the time—until the danger arose of Ireland being hit in its pocket if its application for entry to the EEC might be damaged by too ardent a pursuit of anticolonial policy at the UN. In a suitably modest way, Ireland was now forced to confront the responsibilities, if not of power, at least of choice between principle and profit.

Skelly sifts the telegrams to reconstruct clearly the ebb and flow of the departmental argument. While the role of O'Brien is sharply delineated, it is possible that the author makes inadequate allowance for the role of personal relations among the diplomats. Anyone writing on events already described in O'Brien's inimitable style (in *To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History* [1962]) risks invidious comparison. But given that O'Brien has commented forthrightly on the tensions between himself and another highly accomplished

member of the delegation, Eamon Kennedy, it would have been useful to have a more detailed treatment of the issue.

Skelly's approach provokes interesting queries on the relationship between domestic politics and the making of foreign policy. O'Brien could reproach an occasionally unhelpful media with sibylline courtesy. But then the media of the time was not often unhelpful. The concern of officials like Boland, Sean Murphy, and Con Cremin with what they perceived as the likely interest of the Catholic Church seems to have emanated from themselves rather than from political or ecclesiastical pressure. The sources available might not, of course, record that type of pressure, although an instructive account of Aiken's response to what he perceived as an episcopal attempt to influence his position on China hardly suggests any great solicitude on his part for ecclesiastical views.

That the cabinet features so little, especially in the earlier years, raises intriguing constitutional issues. There is no reference, for instance, to the role, if any, of the Labour Party—a junior but still crucial partner in the government in 1956—in the formulation of the strongly pro-Western policy. Did Labour simply give the more socially conservative Fine Gael party of Costello and Cosgrave a blank check?

This is the type of tantalizing question left to titillate students of domestic Irish politics by Skelly's clear and competent study of an instructive chapter in the foreign policy of a small state in turbulent times.

J. J. LEE  
University College,  
Cork

THOMAS HENNESSEY. *A History of Northern Ireland, 1920–1996*. New York: St. Martin's. 1997. Pp. xiv, 347. \$45.00.

Thomas Hennessey has written a study of Northern Ireland that will not please extreme partisans. His object is to convey the history of the province, and the development of communal violence there, from the world view of its two communities. It is not surprising, therefore, that this history is depicted as a tragedy in which there is no ultimate good or bad, right or wrong. As the author writes, "No one participant in the Northern Ireland situation is solely responsible for the collapse of Northern Ireland into communal strife" (p. xi).

Hennessey evades the analytical task that John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary set themselves in *Explaining Northern Ireland* (1995): to identify which of a range of theories best explains what the conflict in Northern Ireland is really about, theories ranging from theological to colonial to Marxist and beyond. As McGarry and O'Leary put it, there is a "meta-conflict" in Northern Ireland, a conflict about what the conflict is about. Hennessey eschews such questions and implicitly takes as given that the problem of Northern Ireland lies in the fact that it is a segmented society.

There are, he believes, two communities that have different, and in many ways antithetical, world views, and it is this that has led to conflict. In particular, neither community has "respected the sense of belonging that the Other has seen as central to its own definition of history" (p. xi).

Given this assumption, Hennessey presents a conscientious review of the political history of Northern Ireland. The book is not strong on social history, for which Derek Birrell and Alan Murie's *Policy and Government in Northern Ireland: Lessons of Devolution* (1980) remains the best account, nor on constitutional analysis. It has great value as a compendium of unionist and nationalist thought since Northern Ireland's creation in 1921, and as a statement of a middle ground in Northern Irish historiography.

Hennessey's sources are public, whether secondary or primary, so there is little that an informed reader will not have seen before. This also means that he does not do justice to the role of President William J. Clinton and the United States in securing the Irish Republican Army (IRA) cease-fire of 1994, which led ultimately to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The full significance of the American role only became public with Conor Clery's *Daring Diplomacy: Clinton's Secret Search for Peace in Ireland* (1997). Hennessey's bibliography is also a little dated for a 1997 imprint. He omits Richard P. Davis's study, *Mirror Hate: The Convergent Ideology of Northern Ireland Paramilitaries* (1994), which would have added color to his narrative, as well as my own *The Irish Constitutional Tradition: Responsible Government and Modern Ireland, 1782–1992* (1994), which deals in part with Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, the book draws attention to a great many interesting facts and continuities. One of the latter is the surprising moderation of the political *desiderata* of the loyalist paramilitaries, even very early the conflict (moderate, that is, when compared with the IRA/Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionists). Another continuity is the persistence of the concept of power-sharing in nationalist thinking, which appears to have been introduced by the Irish government and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) as early as 1971.

Closure is not yet possible on the story of conflict in Northern Ireland. This book ends in early 1996, well short of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which itself is a work in progress. Nonetheless, Hennessey's conclusion, a bare six lines, is altogether too abrupt for such a substantial piece of research. He might instead have summarized where Northern Ireland stands after thirty years of intense conflict. The 1998 agreement came about as a result of changes in Ireland and Britain that were already observable in 1996. These include the secularization of the Irish Republic and changes in its perception of the north. More specifically, the Irish government and its moderate nationalist allies in the north, the SDLP, have conceded that a united Ireland can only come about with the consent of a majority in the north. Parallel developments have

been Britain's recognition that there is an all-Ireland dimension to the northern problem and its willingness to accept a united Ireland in principle, should a majority in the north ever declare for this. Britain also destroyed the Unionists' veto at the time of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Moderate unionists have changed substantially, too. They now recognize that northern nationalists are entitled to respect and they have long accepted the principle of power-sharing in government. Finally, there has been the conversion of Sinn Féin to constitutional nationalism, a process which some might describe as a Sinn Féin surrender. This was already in process in 1996. The book ends as it began, therefore, as a descriptive not an analytical work, but it might have been more.

ALAN J. WARD

*College of William and Mary*

JULIE HARDWICK. *The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household Authority in Early Modern France*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 240. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$19.95.

Julie Hardwick seeks to uncover what she calls "an early modern practice of patriarchy" (p. ix) through examining the daily lives and professional and personal relationships of notaries in Nantes between 1560 and 1660. She describes the notarial families as "middling," by which she means at the juncture between lower-level urban officials and merchants and the upper crust of artisans. Hardwick analyzes the notaries both as a representative sample of the Nantais middle class and as a professional group, albeit one with a very weak corporate identity. In delineating and assessing their relationships, both external, with their clients and the larger urban community, and internal, as members of patriarchal families and as heads of households, she emphasizes the notaries' mediation among the various groups constituting early modern French society. The patriarchal household, where both men and women bore responsibility for *bon mesnage* (good household management), formed the model for the early modern conceptualization of authority, including that of the king over his subjects. The great strength of this book is its cogent analysis of the powerful role that negotiation and mediation played in constructing the myriad relationships in the lives of the notaries and their families. Its main weakness lies in the author's difficulty in weaving together the many strands of her argument, and in particular linking convincingly notaries' professional and personal roles in constructing patriarchy.

Despite the political upheavals between 1560 and 1660, the ways in which gender, power and authority were negotiated in early modern Nantais households changed very little. The primary concern of notarial families was to preserve a stable social position at a time when, for them as for the artisan families they resembled, the risk of downward social mobility was

intensifying. Lacking clients, many notaries extended their role as natural mediators into the realm of credit brokerage, which endangered their role as guarantors of public confidence. As the prime mediators between most ordinary citizens and royal authority, notaries literally fabricated documents that translated often disorderly private negotiations into a discourse upholding community hierarchies and values.

Like most recent studies of early modern gender, such as the work of Martha C. Howell on the Low Countries and that of Thomas Kuehn on Renaissance Italy, Hardwick is interested in the interplay between the legal definition of gender roles and the practical, daily negotiation of the meaning of gender in the lives of early modern men and women. Because Breton customary law mandated partible inheritance, women and their families had a significant stake in the management of household wealth, as women brought to their marriages dowries heavily encumbered with lineal property. Husbands were expected to administer well this inheritance for future generations, and Hardwick sees the role of household manager as the root and justification of masculine authority, whether in the household or in the kingdom. While in some ways advantaging women, partible inheritance mostly enhanced the authority of male maternal kin, who assumed responsibility for oversight of the lineal property their family had contributed to the household.

What did amplify female authority in notarial families, as in all early modern families of modest means, was the relatively large proportion of the family's income that women contributed, as much through their labor as through their dowries. Notarial wives spun linen, ran the households, and oversaw servants. Women were also significant because they brought to their marriages the asset of kin from whom they and their husbands could expect assistance in many different circumstances. Yet women's contributions to the survival of families tended to be elided on public occasions, such as baptisms, and in public, notarized documents. The maintenance of patriarchy required continued public affirmations of male precedence and authority that necessarily relegated women to the background.

Although partible inheritance laws played a fundamental role in shaping the management of patrimonies, Hardwick eschews a legalistic, top-down model of patriarchy. She concentrates instead on the daily practices and many mundane forums in which patriarchy was continually renegotiated and sees patriarchy in everyday family life as an indispensable buttress for royal authority, which increasingly based its absolutist claims on the concept of the king as a *bon mesnager* of the French nation. The parallel she draws between notaries as mediators in their professional capacity and their role as heads of households does not hold up so well, making for a jarring transition between the first couple of chapters and the rest. Still, this book consti-



tutes a useful contribution to the debates over how patriarchy functioned in early modern Europe.

GAYLE K. BRUNELLE  
California State University,  
Fullerton

ALEXANDER SEDGWICK. *The Travails of Conscience: The Arnould Family and the Ancien Régime*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 128.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. x. 297. \$45.00.

More than twenty years ago, Alexander Sedgwick published *Jansenism in Seventeenth-Century France: Voices from the Wilderness* (1977). Based not only on reading of the secondary literature but also on research in the theological and polemical sources, that book remains the most accessible and reliable account of the Jansenist movement in the English language. It tells the epic story of reformation and prosecution, from the enclosure to the destruction of the convent of Port-Royal-des-Champs, without the partisanship that characterized many older publications or the reductionism that has marked some newer interpretations. The Arnould family, which played a large role in that story, is the subject of Sedgwick's latest work. This book unfolds within the framework of the narrative constructed in the previous book, and it naturally discusses many of the same episodes, but Sedgwick has not simply repackaged his material. He has done extensive research on several generations of Arnoulds and combined private dramas with public events in an engaging and revealing manner.

Some of the differences between the two books may be illustrated by comparison of the sections about the career of Jacqueline Arnould (1591–1661), known as Mère Angélique. In 1977, Sedgwick identified her, incorrectly, as the eldest daughter of Antoine and Catherine Arnould, who had ten children who survived infancy. Named abbess of Port-Royal in 1602, thanks to family connections but against her own will, Angélique had a conversion experience in 1608 and barred her parents from the convent in 1609. "My parents did not consult me when they made me a nun," she remarked. "Why should I consult them when I wish to live like a nun?" After devoting a few paragraphs to institutional issues during Angélique's administration, Sedgwick devoted most of the chapter to the Abbé de Saint-Cyran, her spiritual director, the leading Jansenist theologian of the 1630s. Sedgwick mentioned Angélique two dozen times in the rest of the book and spent a page on her views on the royal decree (1661) requiring all French clergy to sign a formulary of submission to the papal condemnation (1656) of errors attributed to Cornelius Jansen, bishop of Ypres, from whom the movement derived its name.

In this new book, Sedgwick gives Angélique, now correctly identified as the second daughter, a chapter of her own. Having described her antecedents as well as her relations with her parents and grandparents, he presents a more complete and credible version of her

sentiments and character. Before 1602, she wanted to marry, as her older sister would do, but the family could not afford more than one dowry. After 1608, she knew that she was capable of directing others, but she worried about the sin of pride. In retelling the tale of the confrontation in 1609, Sedgwick does not quote the paraphrased and truncated remark from a secondary source but rather four full sentences from Angélique's own account of the event, recorded, as it turns out, many years later. After acknowledging the important role of women in the Catholic reform movement, he discusses the institutional issues the abbess had to resolve at considerable length, with more emphasis on her leadership. This time, Saint-Cyran gets a few pages at the end of the chapter, and Angélique comes back repeatedly in the following chapters, gathering her sisters and brothers, nieces and nephews around her, one after another, at Port-Royal.

The second book differs from the first not only because Sedgwick has approached Jansenism from a different angle but also because he has studied work on women, family, and clientage published during the last two decades. He has reconstructed the ways in which the Arnoulds and their relatives influenced each other and used their influence to help each other. The women did not all agree about issues such as the formulary, and the men did not all make the same decision when confronted with the choice between serving the crown and leaving the world, but they knew they were connected by something more than blood. Sedgwick addresses the question of how they related and remembered individual and family stories in his introduction, and he returns to that question, here and there, throughout the book, down to the telling chapter on the children of Angélique's nephew, the marquis de Pomponne, whom he labels "Jansenists in spite of themselves." He could have made the book even more informative and insightful than it already is by exploring these current historical concerns about the production of texts and the manipulation of memory more systematically than he did.

JEFFREY MERRICK  
University of Wisconsin,  
Milwaukee

JEAN-CLAUDE BONNET. *Naissance du panthéon: Essai sur le culte des grandes hommes*. (L'esprit de la cité.) Paris: Fayard. 1998. Pp. 414. 165 fr.

As the subtitle makes clear, this book is not about the conversion of the church of Sainte-Geneviève into a French Pantheon during the revolution but a study of the growing cult of great men in the eighteenth century. Although the cult goes back to classical antiquity and enjoyed a revival in the Renaissance, Jean-Claude Bonnet demonstrates that it enjoyed a remarkable resurgence after 1750. Bonnet argues that there was thus a paper Pantheon before there was a building. Furthermore, he contends that, although this promotion of great men was intended to arouse mo-



narchical patriotism, it provided a powerful weapon that could be seized by men of letters for their own purposes. He sees a movement away from allegiance to the king as father of his people to outstanding men as the fathers of the nation, leading irresistibly to the effacement of the monarchy, which inadvertently lost its symbolic preeminence.

Bonnet makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the role of the cult of great men in eighteenth-century French thought, but his attempt to relate this cult to the Enlightenment is unconvincing. Most of the great men honored in the theater, in eulogies presented in the Académie Française, in sculptures commissioned by the crown, and in paintings ordered by the minister in charge of the fine arts were individuals who had served the monarchy in earlier periods. They were overwhelmingly military leaders or royal officials, plus a few churchmen, dramatists, and kings, almost all from previous centuries. Only three can be directly related to the Enlightenment: René Descartes, François Fénelon, and Montesquieu. It was only outside official circles that a few contemporary men such as Voltaire and Benjamin Franklin became the focal points for genuine cults.

Also unconvincing is Bonnet's contention that the cult of great men led virtually ineluctably to the removal of the monarchy. Not only were most of the great men faithful servants of the monarchy, but, in the numerous projects for public squares throughout the first nine decades of the eighteenth century, the king was invariably placed in the center, although in a few cases great men appeared around the outside of the perimeter. These plans centered on the king continued through the reign of Louis XVI on into the early phase of the revolution. Only when opinion turned against the king after 1791 was his figure removed. Then he was not replaced by great men atop central pedestals or columns but by allegorical figures, especially that of Liberty. For example, local officials in Nantes early in the revolution planned a column topped with the figure of Louis XVI on one of the central courts of the city. Only after the flight to Varennes did these officials decide to replace the figure of the king with that of Liberty.

If, as Bonnet argues, there was a paper Pantheon before there was a building, there were also architectural antecedents that it is a shame to omit. Not only were there plans to place famous men around the circumference of public squares as in the project for the western end of Paris by Jean-Nicholas-Jérôme Servadoni or the project for redecorating the Place du Peyrou in Montpellier by Claude-Michel Clodian, but there were many plans to honor great men in entrances to cities, in cemeteries, and on triumphal bridges. Also, we have the plans for a great neoclassical shrine by such architects as Lubersac de Livron and Étienne-Louis Boullée. None of these antecedents to the Pantheon is mentioned or reproduced.

Unlike Mona Ozouf in the third volume of Pierre Nora's series, *Lieux de mémoire*, Bonnet does not

discuss to what extent the creation of the Pantheon succeeded in its goal. From the beginning the revolutionaries excluded kings, royal ministers, and ecclesiastics from the past. They also felt that military heroes were outstanding in too narrow a field. Also, it soon became clear that Frenchmen had difficulty deciding on just who was a great man. Moreover, the interior of the building strikes visitors as empty and unappealing. In any case, few Frenchmen can name more than a handful of individuals interred inside. Probably the real continuation of the eighteenth-century cult of great men is not in the crypt of the Pantheon but in the myriad of statues of outstanding political leaders, philosophers, scientists, authors, and artists erected in the nineteenth century in almost every nook and cranny of Paris, forming "an outdoor pantheon," as June Hargrove has called it.

Throughout this book, there are many insights for those interested in French culture, but finding them afterward is difficult because the index is confined to proper names, and following them there is nothing more than a list of page numbers. Unfortunately, such frustrating indexes are all too common in French publications.

JAMES A. LEITH  
Queen's University,  
Canada

PATRICE HIGONNET. *Goodness beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. 397. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$24.95.

Revisionist historians have insisted for the last two decades that the Reign of Terror was inherent in the French Revolution from the beginning. According to this interpretation, associated primarily with François Furet and Keith Baker, the revolution had no commitment to representative democracy and constitutional government. The Terror, when it emerged, was merely a full-blown manifestation of principles already in place. Patrice Higonnet's suggestive essay is designed to rescue the French Revolution from the stigma of the Terror by demonstrating that Jacobinism, the most complete expression of revolutionary ideology and action, possessed many features of value to contemporary democracy and was not a mere foreshadowing of twentieth-century totalitarianism.

Jacobins, according to Higonnet's argument, were motivated by their desire to establish both the rights of individuals and the universalistic values of citizenship and devotion to the nation. "[N]o society before or since was ever so radical in asserting the unalloyed rights of individuals," Higonnet asserts, as the France of 1789–1791 (p. 69). Jacobin universalism, nevertheless, required the individual citizen to yield primacy to the nation's needs as determined by public opinion, a concept closely related to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's moralized general will. Jacobins eschewed the creation of a nation based on class and sought instead to create

a harmonized society that would work for the general good. Thus Jacobinism sought to maintain social distinctions and the individual right of property. But the movement also hoped to ameliorate economic and social disharmonies by discouraging large accumulations of wealth and providing various forms of assistance for the poor.

As the revolution unfolded, Higonnet argues, conflicts between individual rights and universalistic values appeared. Understanding the public good to be a product of moralized public opinion, Jacobins could neither comprehend nor tolerate dissent. Furthermore, they insisted that citizens undertake moral action in both their private and public lives. The nation ultimately took precedence over the individual citizen, just as national goals and the French language were preeminent over local ambition and regional dialects. Violence in the form of terror was applied to insure the maintenance of the nation's well-being. Public opinion became skeptical of representative government and constitutional rule. The legislative response to the attempted flight of Louis XVI in 1791 was only the first of many actions that engendered doubts about the ability of elected representatives to carry out the sovereign will of the nation. Likewise, the insistence of their opponents on the rigid maintenance of the constitution seemed to Jacobins to be simply an excuse for limiting the progress of the revolution. Jacobins ultimately came to believe that only they were the legitimate voice of the nation.

The origins of Jacobinism can be found in the final decades of the Old Regime. Jacobin secularism, anticlericism, and individualism were all products of the Enlightenment. Likewise, Jacobins inherited the national consciousness that emerged from the late eighteenth century's recognition of the prestige of the French language, the growing rivalry with England, and the demands that Frenchmen assert their rights as citizens. Belief in the authority of public opinion can likewise be traced to the political culture of post-1750 France. Jansenism was responsible for the growing penchant for a moralized public life. The growth of the population and the expansion of the commercial economy, which began to undermine the corporatist structure of society, also contributed to the development of Jacobinism. In this atmosphere, the institutions of the absolute monarchy became increasingly irrelevant, while the models of ancient republics and the new American nation presented themselves as attractive alternatives.

Even though Higonnet does not gloss over Jacobinism's ultimate descent into terror and dictatorship, he insists that such a course was neither inherent in the movement nor a precursor to modern totalitarianism as some revisionists might imply. Unlike twentieth-century fascists or Bolsheviks, who from the start undertook to restructure society, Jacobins initially believed that once the old feudal structure was cleared away that society would "bloom harmoniously" of its own accord (p. 101). V. I. Lenin may have looked to

Jacobinism and the Terror for inspiration, but the Bolshevik concepts of internationalism and class struggle had nothing in common with Jacobin ideology. For Higonnet, the Jacobin ideal, shorn of its terroristic mantle, offers the example of a democratic society where individualism is tempered by the recognition of the greater good of society. Presumably if Jacobinism had not been conditioned by the "illiberal instincts" of the Old Regime, the movement would have constructed more positive means than terror to ameliorate the inherent conflict between individualism and universalism.

Based on wide reading in the secondary literature as well as research in numerous departmental archives, Higonnet's argument is provocative and original. Strongly influenced by the revisionist emphasis on ideology and the continuity between the Old Regime and the revolution, Higonnet nevertheless refuses to accept the inevitability of revolutionary dictatorship and terror. Similarly, while rejecting the thesis that the Terror was simply a product of the circumstances of war and civil strife, he recognizes the gradual evolution of Jacobinism over time and its response to events. The breadth and originality of this essay, however, extend somewhat beyond the ability of the author's sources to confirm its premises. The impact of the Old Regime on Jacobinism, for instance, is largely assumed rather than proven. Nevertheless, Higonnet has provided much for historians of the French Revolution to ponder, and his work will spur fruitful research in the direction he has laid before us.

KENNETH MARGERISON

*Southwest Texas State University*

MICHÈLE RIOT-SARCEY. *Le réel de l'utopie: Essai sur le politique au XIXe siècle*. Paris: Albin Michel. 1998. Pp. 306. 140 fr.

There is no question that something crucial in the history of the West, something fundamental in structuring our contemporary existence, occurred during the 1830s and 1840s and that France was at the heart of it. For Jürgen Habermas, it was the final step in "the transformation of the bourgeois public sphere" in which a nascent plebeian public sphere was submerged under the force of a manipulative and bureaucratic public sphere to which desperate defenders of property and the family resorted, thus abandoning the Enlightenment vision of rational-critical debate that would have been the foundation of a politics for a democratic society. For Michel Foucault, it was the moment when science, alias power/knowledge, began to establish normative dominance in a discourse of progress in which alternative ways of thinking and living were regarded as deviant, requiring "therapy." For Karl Marx, of course, it was the moment of truth in the history of the modern class struggle when bourgeois dominance became transparent because it could only be held by blood and iron, thus awakening the working class to its eventual destiny. And for

Maurice Agulhon, it was the "apprenticeship of the Republic," the moment when ordinary French men and women burst onto the historical stage of democratic development; if they were slapped down, they would rise again (and again) in the making of modern France. Certainly all four perspectives (here vastly oversimplified) lament the path not taken, as Habermas put it, which was a socialist and feminist democracy largely rooted in a discourse that came to be labelled utopian. This word, despite efforts to defend those so described, has been largely removed from reality, describing "pipedreams," utopia therefore less another place than no place. This discursive operation, the removal from the real of the array of "pre-Marxian" ideas that bloomed in the wake of the French Revolution under the impact of early industrialization, is analyzed for the first time in Michèle Riot-Sarcey's remarkable study.

Her project has two goals. The first is to demonstrate the *réel de l'utopie*, which means the ways that this critical and reconstructive thought articulated with the lived reality of ordinary working people's social action. She selects the revolt of the Lyon silk-workers of 1831 and the great Paris strike wave of 1840 as the era's essential "disruptions," momentary flashes that reveal the wide undercurrent of an alternative discourse of "the social." The second is to bring to light the process by which the dominant liberal and republican "discourse of progress" redefined utopia by associating it with folly, social upheaval, and immorality, blaming the very disruptions that gave it reality on its influence. This process constructed utopianism as the general "other" that threatened the truths of natural law and its prescription of a Kantian moral government that defends property and the family and acts for the good of the dependent elements of society (wage workers and women). This was the discourse of the political in which voting for moral and knowledgeable representatives would form the heart of public life, and social action of the demonstrative sort or social reconstruction without legislative sanction would be classified as aberrant, always potentially illegal. In confronting the social (*le discours de non-lieu*) with the political (*le discours de la vérité*) in this way, Riot-Sarcey draws upon streams of thought that include the Frankfurt School, especially Walter Benjamin's notion of the "tempest of progress" that runs roughshod through the land while the angel of history obligingly sweeps the "rubbish" toward the heavens, Pierre Rosanvallon's powerful analysis of the political, and Foucault, a creative and productive combination.

A short review cannot do justice to the nuances of Riot-Sarcey's argument, but some interesting points can be made. In charting the evolution of the reception of "utopian" thought, she shows that the middle-class mainstream proponents of the Lockean political initially regarded the ideas of Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen as "philanthropic." Before the Revolution of 1830, François Guizot and Victor Cousin were opponents of the

regime as well. Saint-Simonism attracted the cream of the Parisian intelligentsia, and they reveled in the vision of a future belonging to creativity. Fourier's liberationist psychology and Owen's challenge to David Ricardo were unproblematic as well. But in the aftermath of 1830, when those acceding to power now had to deal with the social unrest that it wrought, the shift toward the "impracticality," then the "immorality" of their thought began. It was when the "real" of Lyon became tied to their notions of social transformation—and Riot-Sarcey uses the hundreds of letters in the files of *Le Globe*, the Saint-Simonian newspaper, to illustrate the connections—that the press and the officials of the new regime began to get nervous. Suddenly, there was enormous interest in utopians' attacks on the traditional family, their promotion of women's liberation, their ignoring of "regular" political activity, and—horrors—their willingness to abolish inheritance and adjust property relations to suit social need. And the social became political. First, the Revolution of 1830 was legal: a political movement by the defenders of the Charter against the treason of King Charles X; forget the role of the people, unless they, too, were only motivated by liberty. More fundamentally, reform would proceed via legislation by enlightened representatives on behalf of the people, above all to uplift them with moral education and to instill good habits by means of savings institutions and the like. Meanwhile, in addition to prosecuting the "anarchist leaders" of the Lyon rising, the degenerate Saint-Simonians were taken to court and the press was censored. Some utopians (Michel Chevalier is her prime example) returned to their senses, while others played the game of politics (Victor-Prosper Considerant abandoned the master's disdain for it).

Then came the explosions of the 1840s. The Parisian strike addressed a host of practices (piecework, subcontracting, the livret, wages, and hours) that tens of thousands of workers wanted abolished or restructured so that they might "live as free individuals." These demands were met in the establishment press with incomprehension, submitting rather than if change in the organization of work was to occur, it should come through legislation. Utopians (here Étienne Cabet enters the picture, and the author makes far too little of his impact) disagreed, continuing to argue that only fundamental reconstitution of society agreed to by all in their best interest would solve contemporary social malaise. In one of her most important contributions, Riot-Sarcey then stresses that republicans, even those like Alexandre-Auguste Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc who envisaged significant social change, became ensnared in the political: "universal" (manhood) suffrage and appropriate representation became the centerpiece of their discourse. When the February Revolution arrived, they, along with the liberals and doctrinaires who quickly became *républicains de lendemain*, embraced the political immediately (the "utopians" led the charge to put off the elections), thus destroying

whatever potential the "social revolution" might have had.

It is a shame that Riot-Sarcey did not spend more time with the Second Republic. It would have strengthened her argument but also might have forced her to rethink the relationship between the social and the political. In her handling of it, the political seems little more than the discourse of power controlled by a self-perpetuating political class that arrogates to itself the role of moral arbitrator of the nation. To be sure, this describes a great deal of modern French political history. But surely the Second Republic was a period of "apprenticeship" for the people, and not just in learning how to go to the urn and vote for some pre-packaged list of notables. It was also a time of demonstrative politics, of meetings and public manifestations, sometimes with violence, and usually at its peak during electoral campaigns. This is documented in dozens of works, from those of Agulhon on the Var and Philippe Vigier on the Alps through the many studies by "Anglo-Saxon" historians from three continents who in many ways made 1848 their promised land (and not one of whom, along with most of their French colleagues, is cited in this work). Thus Riot-Sarcey's rather lyrical conclusion about the "subterranean" survival and redeployment of utopian visions in times of major social disruption (such as May-June 1968) might have become even more optimistic with the reminder that in the heart of the beast and on an almost quotidian basis, "the political" cannot keep "the social" at bay, for it carries within it, especially in France with its (unfinished) revolutionary tradition, a politics of protest with meaning far beyond the ballot box.

CHRISTOPHER H. JOHNSON  
Wayne State University

SUDHIR HAZAREESINGH. *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 393. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$19.95.

Attacking a republican historiography that sees the Third Republic's first few decades as the definitive moment in the establishment of a modern French democracy, Sudhir Hazareesingh argues in this book that it was during the Second Empire (1852–1870) that the moment occurred. Further, he claims that it happened in the course of a widespread public debate concerning the decentralization of the French state. In order to prove this argument, Hazareesingh surveys the ideological positions of the French elite during the Second Empire. Bonapartism, he claims, had a significant ideological component that included concerns about the merits of a centralized or decentralized state. So also did the legitimists, a group he says "kept the torch of local liberty burning throughout the July Monarchy, the Second Republic, and the Second Empire" (p. 156). But this conception ultimately founded on the contradictory notions of liberty that it

included: one based citizenship on participation, choice, and inalienable rights, and the other on allegiance, hierarchy, and duty. For liberals interested in defending bourgeois interests, political flexibility, liberty, and the rule of law, the inefficiencies and politicization of local governments, apathy, and absence of civic virtue led to an interest in decentralizing the imperial state. These views were also contradictory. Liberals, Hazareesingh shows, held to a strong view of the national interest, gave the state very broad powers, and opposed federalism in the name of maintaining national unity. Thus they retained "a powerful (and not fully resolved) identification with the centralist institutional purposes of the French state" (p. 214) in spite of their rhetoric of decentralization and local liberty. The liberal project was fundamentally flawed, in Hazareesingh's view, and although, along with the legitimists, they placed decentralization in the political mix during the Second Empire, they were unable to gain power when that empire collapsed in 1870.

It was, of course, the republicans who did gain power in the years after 1870, and Hazareesingh's final substantive chapter describes their views on decentralization. By the end of the Second Empire, a majority of what he calls "moderate and constitutionalist republicans" accepted a theory of municipal self-government that differed from both federalism and Jacobinism in that it proposed democratic self-government at the communal level within the context of a centralized state. But he also points to significant disagreement within the republican camp over the extent to which local government should be decentralized, and he admits differences among republicans over the meaning of equality and the representation of working-class interests. Such differences, the author thinks, should not be overemphasized: socialists were a minority of republicans during the Second Empire, and workers remained loyal to moderate bourgeois leaders. By the late 1860s, he says, downplaying differences even among republican elites, those elites possessed a coherent theory—in the form of municipalism—of the republican state that would emerge in the decades after 1870.

This book certainly shows that the Second Empire was not barren of political discussion, even if this is a very old argument by now. But given the number of issues that faced French political theorists at this time, one might question the rapidity with which "decentralization" becomes identified with "citizenship" for Hazareesingh. The evidence he marshalls is primarily drawn from the French elite, even if he has moved beyond the standard expressions of these different political positions. What his evidence shows is not that decentralization was widely agreed upon in the last days of the empire, but that it nowhere found universal support and everywhere generated considerable opposition. Hazareesingh is interested in philosophical and ideological positions, not the practices of political culture, and so, in spite of his emphasis on the local commune, we read nothing about what actually oc-



curred at that level. He is able to argue that republicans favored decentralization only by joining the opportunists in marginalizing those republicans who held a different view. He admits that all the talk about decentralization produced little in the way of concrete reforms during the empire or the republic. In this context, his conclusions that "the intellectual articulation of what held the French political community together was mostly completed" (p. 321) by 1870, and formed the basis for the success of the Third Republic, seems overstated. This is an important book because of the material that it examines; its overall argument, however, seems to me to go beyond what the material can support.

JAMES R. LEHNING  
University of Utah

PIM DEN BOER. *History as a Profession: The Study of History in France, 1818–1914*. Translated by ARNOLD J. POMERANS. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 470. \$65.00.

This book is a wide-ranging history of historical studies in their formative period in France. Pim den Boer goes over much familiar ground: post-Enlightenment philosophical ideas about history, the political uses of the past from one regime to another, and a large cast of historians and their writings (both dissertations and books). But he also adds much about the institutional structures of historical study: book publication, library holdings, archives, journals, academies and institutes, school and university curricula, and state support. On all these matters, the author offers as much quantitative information as he can muster, explicating each set of statistics—and their flaws—in relation to other sets. To demonstrate, for example, the extraordinary importance and popularity of historical writing in the nineteenth century, he calculates that the share of historical works out of all books published rose from 18.7 percent in 1784–1788 to 27.5 percent in 1825 and then to 30.3 percent in 1909 (in contrast to less than ten percent annually since 1945). He also documents major shifts in the kinds of history produced and drawing interest: notably, a decline of the share devoted to church history in tandem with a large increase of French history, both national and local.

This book builds on Charles-Olivier Carbonell's *Histoire et historiens: Une mutation idéologique des historiens français, 1865–1885* (1976) and applies the French historian's methods to a much longer period. It also offers an occasional revision. For example, when den Boer demonstrates that historical study was dominant in nineteenth-century intellectual life, he is refuting Carbonell's earlier revisionist argument, which limited history's heyday to the second half of the century.

Clearly den Boer's research has been extensive and resourceful: he has done considerable archival work (notably in the personnel files of historians) and has carried out many laborious calculations. The list of

secondary works consulted, however, is less complete and less current than usual. The main reason is that the volume under review is a translation—without updating—of the original Dutch version, published in 1988. (The proofreading and index also leave something to be desired.)

A central theme running through this study is the professionalization of history, meaning first of all that growing numbers of people were able to earn their living from historical pursuits in the course of the nineteenth century. In 1815, at the beginning of the Restoration, only seventy-five historians fit that basic definition of professional, but by 1900 more than a thousand did. Members of the nobility became markedly less important as historians: their share of historical publications dropped from twenty percent to seven percent. The greatest growth came in the number of secular, full-time historians salaried as teachers of history, archivists, librarians, and curators of historical museums. Behind the increase of professionals was growing state support, particularly in the second half of the century. State funding for institutes, the national library, and archives rose steeply under the Second Empire, but the greatest gains for history came under the Third Republic, which den Boer goes so far as to label "spendthrift." The biggest share of the increased budgets went to the expansion of history teaching at the secondary and university levels. Sizable increases also went into funding documentary collections, archives, and libraries, as the profession's emphasis on research and specialization grew, reflecting the influence of the German university model.

The author's major effort at revision is a revaluation of the often-disparaged academic historians who preceded Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, founders of *Annales*. Den Boer defends the older historians—notably, Charles Seignobos and Charles-Victor Langlois—against the criticism of being doctrinaire positivists narrowly focused on political events and government documents. By his reckoning, writing on economic and social history around 1900 was much more common than some later historiographers have maintained. Den Boer gives highest marks to a national history that was far from the *Annales* ideal: Ernest Lavisse's *Histoire de France* (1901–1911), the work of sixteen leading specialists. Although that eighteen-volume series focused primarily on the political past and government leaders, it was fuller and more scholarly than any before, yet written for a broad readership. The two volumes by Lavisse himself even provided substantial sections on economic, social, institutional, and cultural history.

Den Boer's most valuable contribution, I think, is his nearly encyclopedic treatment of historical study in many forms. With that wide-angle view and his far-reaching research, he has given us a history encompassing everything from the preservation of historical monuments and the inventorying of archives to succes-



sive educational reforms and the creation of journals . . . as well as the writing of books.

CHARLES REARICK  
University of Massachusetts,  
Amherst

CINZIO VIOLANTE, *La fine della "grande illusione": Uno storico europeo tra guerra e dopoguerra, Henri Pirenne (1914–1923); per una rilettura della "Histoire de l'Europe."* (Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico, monografie, number 31.) Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino. 1997. Pp. 418. L. 48,000.

Historians can enjoy this book by Cinzio Violante on many levels. It offers an engaging look at the work of a great historian, weighs the relationship between some of Henri Pirenne's most notable interpretations and his experiences in World War I, and reviews European historians' engagement with nationalism and with each other at a critical moment in European history and in the development of the historical profession. Like Pirenne, Violante is a distinguished medievalist. Some of his teachers knew Pirenne and others of the famous scholars who figure prominently in the book. For Violante himself this was clearly a labor of love, the fruit of a lifelong commitment to historical study and a wise reflection on Europe's historical culture. His personal involvement becomes explicit in a brief, haunting postscript in which Violante recalls his own experience as a German prisoner in 1944–1945. He was struck, he says, by the cultural breadth and even the scholarship in the Nazi propaganda weekly distributed in his camp and concludes, "Now I know from what distance, from what heights of thought and across what progressive, often unconscious, degradation that unnatural marriage of culture and violence came" (p. 411).

Violante says he has little new information and pays tribute to the research of others, especially Bryce Lyons. Although it does contain fresh material, the book's contribution lies in the connections it reveals. With considerable erudition, Violante uses Pirenne's writings to explore their relationship to new methods and schools of thought, international networks of historians, and the impact of war. The essay begins in 1914. When his son was killed at the front and the Germans occupied Gand, Pirenne was working on his history of Belgium. He had carried it up to the Belgian revolts of the eighteenth century and now found elements of conflict and national consciousness that resonated within his own times, historical interpretation recharged by contemporary crisis.

The German authorities wanted to restructure the University of Gand, requiring Flemish as the language of instruction, and Pirenne was among those who resisted, to the point that he was arrested in 1916 and sent off, first to a prisoner of war camp and later to one for political prisoners. It was, Violante suggests, a formative experience. Life in the camps strengthened

Pirenne's confidence that ordinary people were a source of historical change; and when he gave lessons in economic history to his fellow prisoners, the enthusiastic interest of Russian officers started him thinking more about the place of Eastern Europe in the economic and cultural history of Europe. Pirenne's fame as a scholar (one who had attended German universities and kept in close touch with German historians) soon led to his being sent to Jena where, under surveillance, he established contacts with the local university and made good use of the library before being sent off once more, this time to exile in a small German town.

By then, Pirenne was working on his history of Europe, and the assessment of how these experiences affected that study is the core of Violante's essay. Using Pirenne's memoirs, a close reading of his historical writings, and an impressive array of secondary works, Violante makes a complex and subtle case that this new work represents a new turn in Pirenne's thought. It was written in a more accessible style because of the limited availability of the relevant scholarship (although books were steadily shipped to Pirenne) and contains a consistent refutation of views then dominant in German historical circles. Liberty did not originate with Germanic tribes, which had no state but merely adopted Roman forms, underscoring the rise of Islam as the real break from the ancient world. European civilization was born in Italy, its economy, culture, and religion gradually spreading until finally they reached the backward north. In all this, Violante notes, Pirenne retained much from Karl Lamprecht, whom he had greatly admired and with whom he had carried on a warm correspondence, although Pirenne now explicitly rejected Lamprecht's work.

Having come to believe that the German scholarship he once so admired incorporated ideas of the state, of power, and of race dangerous to history and to society, Pirenne supported the exclusion of German historians from the International Congress held in Brussels in 1923. He had been appalled at the statements issued by German historians in the early years of the war (and Violante provides an excellent account of the historical fuisillades from both sides) and offended by what he took to be their intellectual arrogance. After the war, Pirenne continued to refute German assertions. Nevertheless, in his opening address as president of the 1923 Congress, he warned against the dangers to historical scholarship of nationalism and spoke in favor of historical comparison as the antidote, a call that quickly led to cooperation with Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. Indeed, dozens of the most famous European historians of the era make an appearance in these pages. Their debates about historicism and cultural history sound remarkably modern, the discussions of method somewhat unsophisticated. On reading this essay, historians will find something of

themselves and may marvel at the evocation of an age in which conquered scholars were sent to university towns and historians were such important figures.

RAYMOND GREW  
University of Michigan

H. CLARK JOHNSON. *Gold, France, and the Great Depression, 1919–1932*. (Yale Historical Publications.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 272. \$27.50.

In the past ten years, a new orthodoxy has been established to explain the Great Depression. It stresses the deflationary bias of the interwar gold standard and the monetary policies it imposed, producing a downward spiral of prices and economic activity. H. Clark Johnson contends that the key to the Depression, unrealized until now, was not the gold standard, but its reestablishment without increasing the dollar price of gold. This created systemic deflationary pressure, restricting the quantity of gold available as monetary reserves and discouraging new production. This undervaluation argument, which assumes that the gold supply was the key factor determining money supply and world prices, explains neither the precise timing nor the severity of the Depression as it actually occurred. To tackle these issues, Johnson returns to the terrain of the new orthodoxy, the monetary policies of the major financial powers. He finds flawed policy everywhere. Most errors merely aggravated the deflationary tendency resulting from the undervaluation of gold. France alone, Johnson contends, caused the Depression by its deliberate acquisition and sterilization of a vast quantity of gold from 1928 to 1932.

The argument may sound familiar. British critics claimed in the 1930s that French policy imposed deflation on the rest of the world (particularly in Britain) and skewed the working of the gold standard. But Johnson brings monetary theory and the clarifying perspective of hindsight to bear in a way contemporaries could not, providing an interpretation that is original and provocative to explain the Depression from a "systematic monetary perspective" (p. 5). His arguments are deployed with vigor, providing a complex analysis of the monetary origins of the crisis and suggestions as to how it might have been averted. In language and style, Johnson addresses economists, taking pains to distinguish the points on which he differs with the established orthodoxy. His arguments are refreshing and will prove controversial.

In this short text of under 200 pages, argument takes precedence over detail and nuance. With the fundamental argument—that contemporaries and subsequent economic historians failed to realize the undervaluation of gold in rebuilding the gold standard system—one can only concur. But the importance of this undervaluation and its explanatory power in treating the events and policy choices that produced the Depression are less compelling. Concern that compe-

tition for gold would produce systemic deflation led to the Genoa resolutions of 1922 promoting gold economy measures, never fully adopted, and to warnings from economists that the gold standard needed serious restructuring. Johnson proposes that a thirty percent increase in the dollar price of gold in 1922 (p. 60) could have corrected the effects of American inflation (which, with the gold price unchanged, reduced the real value of gold). He concedes that no one, save gold producers, advocated such a measure, which would have required "unusual leadership and monetary management" by the Federal Reserve. Altering the dollar price of gold would have seriously damaged faith in the gold standard as a stable standard of value and rendered worthless the idea that a fixed gold parity was a guarantee against state tampering with the currency. The mystique that drew currencies back to gold as "the sole prophylactic against the plague of fiat moneys" (John Maynard Keynes) would have suffered. Devaluing the dollar would have meant overt management of a system that thrived on the illusion that it functioned automatically, and was therefore "knave-proof." Monetary (mis)management remains central to interwar difficulties and the origins of the Depression.

Johnson suggests a range of historical alternatives that "might have worked economically" (p. 103): higher interest rates in France in 1924–1926 to prevent inflation; more liberal discounting by the Reichsbank and the Federal Reserve; a devaluation of sterling in returning to gold in 1925; and greater French attention to the impact of its monetary policies abroad. Most of these were politically unrealistic and provide little help in understanding how the policy-making processes in so many countries produced similar policies driving national economies and the world deeper into economic depression. The new orthodoxy claims the gold standard compelled policy makers to adopt deflationary policies. Johnson returns responsibility to the individuals involved: in his conclusion, he hands down verdicts on the personal guilt of economists, bankers, and statesmen for the Great Depression.

Economists, he charges, failed to realize the undervaluation of gold and to "adequately guide policy-makers" in their reconstruction of the gold standard (pp. 186–87). This presupposes, of course, that policy makers heeded economic advice, a supposition contradicted by abundant archival evidence. Among bankers and politicians, Johnson declares Émile Moreau (governor of the Bank of France 1926–1930) and Raymond Poincaré (French premier and minister of finance during the stabilization) most guilty. He singles out France because its policy was "almost deliberately disequilibrating" and had a greater deflationary impact than similar policies pursued elsewhere (pp. 185–86). It is unfortunate that his research in France did not include the rich archival resources available in recent years at the Bank of France; this material shows French policy to have been more peculiar and less

culpable than he argues here. But Johnson's interpretation is stimulating and merits close attention.

KENNETH MOURÉ  
University of California,  
Santa Barbara

MICHEL WINOCK. *Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and Fascism in France*. Translated by JANE MARIE TODD. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1998. Pp. vi, 351. \$55.00.

The volume from which this translation derives did not originate as a single project but rather was compiled from twenty-four previously composed articles, six of which appeared in an earlier book (*Edouard Drumont et Cie: Antisémisme et fascisme en France* [1982]), whereas nine others were published in the journal *L'Histoire* on separate occasions from the late 1970s through the 1980s. Most of the remaining pieces first appeared in such newspapers as *Le Matin* and *Le Monde*. The collected articles were republished in a single volume in 1990 (mistakenly given as 1982 on the frontispiece). Most are closer in quality to what might be found in the *New York Times Magazine* than in the *AHR*; a number address political issues of the day (that is, the 1980s) in ways that have not aged well (for example, discussing Jean-Marie Le Pen's effect "on the next presidential election" [p. 33]). The articles are organized into four general sections (French Nationalism, The Nationalist Imagination and Anti-Semitism, Bonapartism and Fascism, and Figures and Moments), but only the barest effort is made to pull the whole together; the introduction is two-thirds of a page long, and there is no conclusion. No effort appears to have been made, either in the French edition or the translation, to edit out repetition, overlap, or the many references to present issues that are no longer present. The index is limited to a list of names.

The original intended audience for most of these articles is what the French term *le grand public cultivé*. Specialists in French history are unlikely to find much new or original in the collection, whereas English-speaking non-specialists may find some passages opaque, in part because of the many unexplained allusions to details of French history (the "sky blue Chamber") but also because of the nature of the translation. Jane Marie Todd's task of rendering Michel Winock's prose into smooth English could not have been easy, but many translated phrases remain too close for comfort to the French original (a "heraclite movement" [p. 6]; "monocephalous power" [p. 80]; a "hipogriff of political thought" [p. 240]). The careless copyediting only makes things worse ("the progressive bookmark destructure of village society" [p. 192]). Todd is content to use cognate words that indeed can be found in an English dictionary but are far from current ("pruritus" for "itching").

It is a fair question if a translation of a book on French history originally intended for a broad if cultivated French audience can expect to find anything like

a comparable audience in the English-speaking world. Possibly graduate students in history, or advanced undergraduates, will find some of these articles instructive, as might academics from other fields. But more strictly professional concerns, historiography for example, are slighted. There are a few interesting analyses of the work of other scholars, but attention to colorful events or other themes generally believed to be "popular" rate more attention.

These many articles cover a wide range of topics, and no brief review could do justice to all of them. This reviewer's favorite is chapter twenty-three, in which Winock offers an admirably balanced and penetrating evaluation of Georges Bernanos, a nationalist and anti-Semite who challenges easy generalizations about both those labels to a bewildering if also thought-provoking degree. Chapter fourteen, a polemic against the Club de l'Horloge, first composed in 1983 and unpublished after that, should probably have remained so; in English translation it has almost no relevance.

The articles dealing with French anti-Semitism are among the strongest, in part because they are the most historical. Winock succeeds in conveying a sense of the perplexing heterogeneity of French anti-Semites. He effectively shows how, for many of them, the "Jewish invasion" symbolized a threatening modernism, the reason that large numbers of Jew haters were also hostile to the United States. Winock is less engaging and less reliable when commenting on matters outside France. His familiarity with scholarship on Russia in the 1880s seems thin; among other problematic assertions, he writes that "thousands of Russian Jews came to the West, *especially* to France" (pp. 136–37, my italics). But in dealing with areas in which he has done more reading and research, he often fits in admirably concise and penetrating remarks. He notes that the left in France was not so much anti-Semitic, in the sense of feeling hostility to Jews as a race, as it was unwilling to take racial anti-Semitism seriously. Even on the right, anti-Semitism only rarely harbored the murderous visions associated with it later: "Let us repeat: Before Hitler, anti-Semitism was rarely seen as a doctrine of death. For many on the left, anti-Semites were imbeciles; they were not potential executioners" (p. 139). Winock persuasively leads his readers toward the conclusion that a "historical idealism is as powerless as Marxist materialism to account for the fascist phenomenon" (p. 202).

In sum, Winock's book suffers from important flaws and is designed mostly for a non-scholarly audience, but he has nonetheless worked in some pithy and provocative reflections.

ALBERT S. LINDEMANN  
University of California,  
Santa Barbara

ROSEMARY WAKEMAN. *Modernizing the Provincial City: Toulouse, 1945–1975*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 323. \$45.00.

Local studies of the “thirty glorious years” of French modernization are still rare enough to attract immediate attention. Economic progress and social transformation during the Monnet-de Gaulle era are normally viewed as products of central decisions and national forces of change. In her study of a large but initially backward regional center, Rosemary Wakeman tests these preconceptions by examining the interactions between the national drive for change and local and regional factors. Local culture was a conservative force at first, but by the 1960s it had begun to combine with the irresistible modernizing surge.

Historians of postwar France remain transfixed by Jean Fourastié’s bold expression, “thirty glorious years,” which appeared in the subtitle of his *D’une France à une autre* (1979). Few other industrial countries could have laid claim to three decades of uninterrupted progress on almost every economic, social, and even political front. The countries of the former communist system used similar rhetoric, but their eventual collapse in the 1990s exposed the bombast. Of course, the context of the French success was the stable but stimulating world environment created by the United States and its allies after the war, and the whole of Western Europe shared in it. But there was always something special about France.

Throughout French history, however glorious or inglorious, a number of great regions, dominated by large cities, retained their own distinct character. Even the poorest regions could sustain large, central cities, and Toulouse was one of these. By the 1990s, the Toulouse conurbation had built up a population of around 600,000, a large figure for an inland city in southern Europe. The “glorious” years of rapid industrial growth were now long past, however, and the city was moving rapidly into the “post-industrial” future as “a logistics platform for Southern Europe” (to quote its recent web site posting).

Wakeman’s story is one of rapid growth, industrialization, and modernization rather than the readjustment that is taking place across urban Europe today. She stresses structures, trends, political struggle, national decisions, and mentalities, and she uses an up-to-date social-science vocabulary to that end. Nevertheless, her wide-ranging perceptions and energetic research generate a comprehensive history of postwar Toulouse that conforms to the older tradition of the urban biography.

Wakeman’s account of pre-1939 Toulouse emphasizes the survival of a rich local culture and social structures in an economy that had benefited only partially from French industrialization after the 1840s. There was some development of large-scale manufacturing after 1914, including armaments, aircraft, and fertilizers. French air mail was born in Toulouse. Meanwhile, shabby suburbs grew up around the city as workers moved out to seek homes in a depressing, shanty environment. The beginnings of public housing and new streets presaged the urban planning that would mold the city’s growth after the war. Socialism

continued to flourish as the city’s distinctive political tendency.

After 1945, economic disruption and stagnation were countered by the beginnings of planning, notably in the urban sector under Charles-Henri Nicod. Moving into the 1950s, Wakeman provides a detailed account of urban and regional planning, showing how public sector housing was used to densify the city and consolidate the straggling interwar suburbs. Then, on a visit to the city in 1959, Charles de Gaulle offered Toulouse and its region a privileged position within the new national program of economic planning, with heavy public investment in the infrastructure and rapid growth for key industries such as aircraft manufacture. Toulouse could not turn this offer down, despite its implicit threat to socialist traditions in the city. Toulouse went on to become a “balancing metropolis” in 1964, as part of the Gaullist plan to divert much investment and migration away from an overcrowded Paris. Municipal efforts in the 1950s to create an equilibrium between the city and the region were now replaced by a rapid, city-led expansion. A new, technocratic planning produced huge, homogeneous, satellite sectors under the *Zone à urbaniser en priorité* (ZUP) and other powers. Public investment in housing and transport helped accommodate a flood of immigrants while encouraging the growth of large construction firms. Technocratic officials abounded, while the mayors and other leading councilors developed an executive style of life and work. The object of local pride now shifted from the local communities in the old city to the great symbols of technological Toulouse, the Caravelle and then the Concorde.

Meanwhile, in old Toulouse, the world of localized employment and small businesses found it hard to compete in the 1960s. With the French state rapidly removing the supports that had kept small-scale enterprise afloat since the 1920s, and aviation and other modern industries enjoying a variety of subsidies and inducements, the labor market was increasingly reoriented to the big factory districts and transport complexes outside the old city. New-style retailing such as the Monoprix devastated the traditional, one-person shop and the family restaurant.

Nevertheless, Wakeman portrays a transition rather than revolutionary change, with Toulouse gaining from its development pact with Paris. She shows that the old Toulouse would have disappeared anyway; the “thirty glorious years” accelerated a process visible as early as 1946 with the first Monnet plan. The cities of the 1930s can live on in the films of Marcel Carné; their tuberculosis and alcoholism would shock us if they returned today. Cities like Toulouse have wrought much good, and Wakeman has done well to show us the roots, and the results, of this protean change.

ANTHONY SUTCLIFFE  
University of Nottingham

GABRIELLE HECHT. *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*. (Inside



Technology.) Cambridge: MIT Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 453. \$40.00

Historians have generally found it easier to proclaim that broad patterns of power and knowledge shape diverse aspects of human experience than actually to demonstrate the ways in which such processes are played out in the details of everyday life. In her excellent study of nuclear power and nuclear weapons in France in the 1950s and 1960s, Gabrielle Hecht delivers such an integrated study of ideology and practice, moving in a seamless narrative from grand conceptions of technology to the responses of villagers to the construction of a nuclear power plant, from French nationalism to the details of reactor design, and from the decision to develop the *force de frappe* to struggles among competing labor unions.

Hecht's effort "to trace the social, political, and cultural life of reactors as artifacts" is rooted in the literature relating technology to culture and politics, but unlike many scholars in this field, she views this process as a two-way street in which the impact of ideology and power on the development and understanding of technology is matched by the formative role of technology in construction of intellectual and political structures. Thus, the technical design of a reactor might be shaped by a desire to reestablish French "radiance" at the same time that the supposed potential of nuclear energy shaped abstract conceptions of "Frenchness."

This blending of technology and nationalism in a technocratic vision of France's future produced two "technopolitical regimes," each of which struggled to impose its vision on the French nuclear program. The first, which became associated in the early 1950s with the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA), viewed French glory primarily in military terms and sought to organize private companies into consortia that would prepare for the development of French nuclear weapons. The second vision of the nuclear future emerged from the postwar leftist enthusiasm for the development of state institutions that would rebuild France through systematic planning and the mobilization of the energies of the entire population. The newly formed state utility, Électricité de France (EDF), embodied these values and viewed nuclear power simultaneously as a means of reestablishing the economic strength and independence of the nation and of demonstrating the virtues of socialism—and it kept private companies at some distance through a process of competitive bidding for contracts.

Not surprisingly, the integration of the efforts of institutions with such different ideological orientations proved very difficult. Throughout the 1950s there were tensions, as the CEA pressed for reactors that would produce large amounts of weapons-grade fissionable material and the EDF sought to maximize energy production. When the return of Charles de Gaulle threatened to tilt the system radically in favor of the CEA, the EDF responded by emphasizing the role of

economic competitiveness in national glory and employing economic modeling in ways that favored its program. The long struggle finally culminated in 1969, when France abandoned the gas-graphite reactors that had been crucial to the EDF strategy and began to buy American light-water reactors.

The story of how French technocrats laid the foundation for the *force de frappe* without clear guidance from political leaders has long been known, but Hecht places this in the context of a much broader struggle over competing visions of the national good. Comparing the development of a particular nuclear reactor built by each program, she demonstrates how these visions were expressed not only in the details of reactor design but also in the physical layout of control rooms, security systems, labor relations, and even the publicity campaigns aimed at making local inhabitants accept the presence of nuclear power plants in their regions. Moreover, she explores how the workers and the local inhabitants absorbed, reacted to, and made use of the broader ideologies that engulfed the entire nuclear effort in France.

Demonstrating equal skill with analyzing technical blueprints, reading union leaflets, and reconstructing the ideology of government bureaucracies and the local memories of peasant communities, Hecht succeeds in demonstrating how similar structures of power and knowledge were manifested in multiple aspects of French society. Her quite readable (if somewhat repetitious) book makes a major contribution to our understanding of postwar France and may serve as a useful model for those exploring the complex relationship between technology and ideology in other contexts.

DAVID PACE  
Indiana University,  
Bloomington

MAGDALENA S. SÁNCHEZ. *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun: Women and Power at the Court of Philip III of Spain*. (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 116th Series [1998], number 2.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 267. \$39.95.

In 1599, King Philip III of Spain travelled to Valencia to marry his second cousin, Princess Margaret of Austria, recently arrived from Vienna for the ceremony. Once married, the young queen joined her husband's grandmother, Empress María of Austria, and the empress's daughter, the nun Margaret of the Cross, at the Spanish court in Madrid. The three women, self-identified as Austrian Habsburgs, formed a political and familial alliance that opposed the machinations of the king's favorite, the duke of Lerma, to control the monarch's accessibility. Magdalena Sánchez's engaging and well-documented study illustrates, for the first time, these three women's enterprise and power within as well as outside the confines of the royal palace. Her extensive research in Spanish,



Viennese, and Italian archives uncovers and illuminates the centrality of female agency to the politics of early modern Spain.

Bound by their religious activities and private occupations, the king's female relatives have been viewed as marginal to the affairs of government. Sánchez's book sheds light on these shadowy figures to argue instead that the king's frequent ambulations from the palace (to churches, convents, hunting lodges, and nobles' houses), in the course of attending religious functions and making social calls, allowed his female relatives many opportunities for contact. Philip's frequent visits to the Convent of the Descalzas Reales, where Empress María lived with her daughter, resulted in lengthy conversations with both women. (Sánchez duly corroborates the widely held belief that the court's move to Valladolid in 1601 was due to Lerma's worry over the empress's interference in political matters.) Access to the convent's cloistered surroundings permitted the queen to spend more time there with her relatives, securing and solidifying their mutual interests. The royal women thus not only took part in court politics, they created their own competing networks of friends and clients among feuding court factions.

Sánchez deftly recounts the various methods through which the women claimed the king's attention. Married at fourteen, Margaret of Austria was at first overpowered by Lerma, who placed several of his relatives as spies in her household. The queen soon demonstrated unusual political astuteness and negotiating skills in her continuing efforts to send economic aid to her Habsburg relatives. Empress María not only made known her strong opinions on court politics, she often interceded in favor of religious men and women, while Sister Margaret of the Cross channeled petitions from the pope and papal nuncios. Yet the three also exploited their feminine "weaknesses"; Sánchez dedicates an intriguing chapter to the many infirmities suffered by both Empress María and Queen Margaret. She notes how each used these illnesses, especially melancholy and, in the queen's case, numerous pregnancies, to demand compliance from royal attendants and, most significantly, from the king. To Lerma's distress, Margaret habitually interrupted Philip's travel plans by falling ill just before his departure.

What most concerned all three women, however—and what they most strove for—was the protection and sustenance of the royal house of Austria. To this effect, both the empress and the queen actively opposed Lerma, who believed that Spain should watch out for its own interests as a separate country, rather than as a branch of the Habsburgs. Here, Sánchez is insufficiently clear as to the women's actual political influence. Empress María died in 1603 and Margaret of Austria in 1610, yet we are told that Philip intervened on the side of his Austrian relatives in the 1618 Bohemian Revolt as the eventual result of the royal women's influence. Sánchez fails to explain why and how support for the Austrian Habsburgs was main-

tained over the eight intervening years. Although the study's main purpose is to address female activities at court, a more precise account of the strained foreign relations between the two Habsburg branches would have helped clarify the women's impact beyond court circles.

Philip's marriage to Margaret in 1599 was planned to coincide with that of his sister, the infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, to Archduke Albert, Empress María's son. As the young queen made her way to Madrid, her sister-in-law departed for Belgium, never to return to Spain. Archduchess Isabel's obliging letters to the duke of Lerma, a source not cited by Sánchez, depict an isolated court, anxious for news from Spain and increasingly in need of funds and provisions. They also reveal the emotions and concerns of a strong, willful woman caught in the political turmoil of the Thirty Years' War, desperately distant from her beloved country. I believe that an investigation of Isabel's singular position, as counterpoint to her Austrian relatives, would contribute significantly to the family portrait of the royal Habsburg women sketched in this book. Sánchez's engrossing account of the three women at Philip III's court gives ample proof of the importance of women's history—in Spain, for too long silenced—and gives hope that equally illuminating studies of women's political agency will soon follow.

ANNE J. CRUZ  
University of Illinois,  
Chicago

FERNANDO GUIRAO. *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57: Challenge and Response*. (St. Antony's Series.) New York: St. Martin's. 1998. Pp. xvi, 240. \$69.95.

Owing to the undemocratic character of the Franco regime, Spain soon found itself excluded from the main postwar initiatives in both intra-European and transatlantic cooperation. Above all, the Iberian nation was kept out of the European Recovery Program (ERP) and denied membership in such key organizations as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union. As Fernando Guirao argues in this clearly written and generally persuasive monograph, isolation imposed considerable costs on the Spanish economy. How, he asks, was Francisco Franco's pariah state able to survive in the hostile political climate that prevailed after 1945? Traditional interpretations place considerable stress on such factors as massive relief from Juan Perón's Argentina during the period 1946–1949 or American economic aid, especially during the middle years of the 1950s when Spain benefited from the United States' Defense Support Program. Guirao's revisionist approach lays greater emphasis on Spain's foreign trade relations, not least with Western Europe. The years 1945–1957 are portrayed as a period of transition when the remnants of the regime's autarkic philosophy were progressively dismantled in favor of a

new philosophy of development. Francoist Spain's early drive for industrialization increased rather than diminished the country's reliance on trade. Spanish industry was manifestly unable to substitute domestic production for imports. Without basic raw materials and capital goods, economic activity faced a series of impassable bottlenecks. Since outside aid was out of the question for political reasons, these crucial imports could only be financed as a result of the expansion of exports, mainly to Western Europe.

Guirao's thesis is that, in the aftermath of World War II, the Spanish economy was viewed by the leading European powers as a valuable resource at a time of widespread destruction, starvation, and economic dislocation. No serious attempt was made to topple the Caudillo. Indeed, the maintenance of political stability south of the Pyrenees was deemed essential so that the Spanish economy could contribute "to the maximum of its capabilities" to postwar European recovery. As a result, political ostracism was toned down significantly for economic reasons. The "Spanish question" merited no more attention than was strictly necessary for public opinion purposes. Even though Spain's foreign trade was relatively small, it played an important role when relief and reconstruction in Europe had to be carried out on the basis of depleted national resources. Imports from Spain reduced the pressure on imports from the dollar area and saved hard currency for more important needs. The Spanish foreign trade authorities—the heroes of Guirao's book—even provided credit for imports from the peninsula despite the fact that Spain was in enormous need of financial assistance itself. According to Guirao, bilateral trade became the most important factor in the Franco regime's survival after 1945.

Survival in power required domestic economic reconstruction in order to prepare the Spanish economy for the open international system agreed at Bretton Woods in 1944. Adopting a clearly reconstructionist perspective, Francoist authorities drew up a program of essential imports that they mistakenly expected would be paid for by Marshall Plan aid. Later, with the realization that Spanish participation in the ERP would bring political turmoil, the Madrid authorities offered the Truman administration the chance to assist Spain *outside* the Marshall Plan structure. The proposed deal required Spain to make greater concessions in economic policy and trade liberalization than membership of the ERP would have entailed, as long as the Americans did not demand the *quid pro quo* of political liberalization. Unfortunately for Spain, the Marshall Plan was conceived not to prop up authoritarian regimes but to provide political stability to weak democratic governments. Hence such a compromise was unacceptable to the United States. In the opinion of Guirao, access to Marshall Plan aid or direct American aid outside the ERP would have forced the Spanish authorities to undertake necessary economic reforms. Personally, I doubt this contention. The Franco regime consistently reneged on its commit-

ments to greater economic liberalization throughout the 1950s and even after the Stabilization and Liberalization Plan of 1959. Had Spain been included in the ERP, Guirao maintains, Spaniards would have been spared a decade of retardation and low living standards. The vaunted Stabilization Plan of 1959 might have been unnecessary. In the event, bilateral trade relations with Western Europe provided inputs for a long-term process of economic transformation and allowed for a modest rate of growth during the 1950s.

Based on exhaustive archival research, Guirao's book offers a fresh approach to the tired old chestnut of the survival of the Franco regime. I am putting it near the top of my reading list.

JOSEPH HARRISON  
University of Manchester

JAN DE VRIES and AD VAN DER WOUDE. *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xx, 767. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$29.95.

The Dutch nation, in the words of the distinguished Dutch historian G. J. Renier, was born because, during the second half of the sixteenth century, "a state came into existence within whose territory men lived and strove together and shared experience, so crowded and so intense that they found overnight where, it had taken the people of other national states centuries to arrive" (Renier, *The Dutch Nation* [1944]). Renier's observation concerned primarily the political and social scene but in the popular perception could equally have been applied to the underlying economic growth which made this political development possible. This book by Jan De Vries and Ad Van Der Woude goes far toward overthrowing, or at least modifying, this simplistic point of view.

The war against Spain ended in 1609, and a provisional boundary was established along the line where fighting had ceased. It was an illogical line, shaped by the fortunes of war; it lay across the Lower Scheldt, cutting Antwerp and its international market off from the sea. This, according to our conventional wisdom, led to the port's decline and to the transfer of its trade to Amsterdam. But, as this book abundantly demonstrates, the trade of Amsterdam and of its satellite ports had long preceded the closure of the Scheldt, just as it continued to grow after Napoleon reopened the Scheldt and constructed Antwerp's oldest dock basin, which still survives. The Dutch East India Company, always referred to in this book as the VOC, was already trading with Asia through Amsterdam while Spanish guns were still in action around Antwerp.

The two ports had handled very different kinds of trade. Amsterdam was the focus of countless small ports around the Zuider Zee and along the waterways of Holland, while Antwerp was the site of international fairs and a metropolis for trade with southern Europe. Amsterdam carried on a less spectacular, more hum-

drum trade with the ports that lay around the North Sea and the Baltic. The closure of the Scheldt—never closed as securely as is often supposed—gave Amsterdam its opportunity to expand both the volume of its trade and the area of Europe and the world which it served. But this alone could not have brought about the “Golden Age” of the Netherlands unless there had also been “the converging *in time* of several, not necessarily related, developments and their confrontation in space with a complex of physical institutional and technological structures” (p. 626). It is the great achievement of this book that it weaves together these varied and contrasted themes into the tapestry that is the history of the Netherlands during the two centuries it covers. The authors display a great technical range in handling the material at their disposal, much of it neglected by historians who have lacked the necessary skills. Who, for example, would begin a study of economic development from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries with a discussion of the maritime transgression of the Holocene and the climatic changes that have, on the one hand, produced the only solid fuel available and, on the other, rendered much of the land incultivable, and would be able to end with the level of distribution of poor relief? And this without omitting more central matters such as the nature, direction, and capitalization of trade, price levels, and national income.

In these respects, De Vries and Van Der Woude contrast the periods before and after the mid-seventeenth century: the former one of expansion and growth; the latter of stagnation if not of decline. In the same way, they present a picture of the more westerly provinces—essentially Holland and Zeeland—as highly urbanized and in a sense industrialized from an early date, and of the more easterly as having a poor diluvial soil and smaller urban development. This double contrast, in space and in time, is a theme that runs through this book, giving it unity and coherence.

Great Britain has always claimed the doubtful honor of being the “first industrial nation,” and, if for “modern” one may read “industrialized,” how can the authors substantiate the claim implicit in the title of this book? They analyze the criteria by which they define modernity, and the possession of “smokestack industry” is not one of them. The organization of production, the increase in output, and the fullest use of such sources of power as they possessed are, however, measures of Dutch modernity. Much skillful use was made of the Netherlands’ limited resources. Peat became an important industrial fuel, at the expense of destroying much of the best agricultural land. The wind, which always seems to blow with great vigor across the Low Countries, was used first in the draining of land at a time when the rising sea level was putting much of it at risk, and then for a variety of industrial purposes. The Dutch shipbuilding industry was, for example, heavily dependent on wind-powered sawmills. Some 400 windmills were employed for this purpose at Zaan, near Amsterdam. Whereas Great

Britain was making ever greater use of masonry in building and of iron in construction of all kinds, the Dutch continued to build wooden ships and timber-framed houses. On the debit side, there was always a heavy dependence on imported timber, which came in the main from Scandinavia and the Baltic.

The Dutch never wholly escaped from the legacy of their early dependence on the herring. The fishery was the mainspring of their shipbuilding and commercial predominance. They developed a sea-going fishing boat and from it a dual-purpose ship that could be used in other trades during the off-season, but who could have anticipated a “factory ship,” capable of processing the herring at the sea in order to save time?

What, one may ask, was the source of this precocious ingenuity and business management? To some extent, refugees from the Spanish Low Countries brought labor and entrepreneurial skills. But the authors say no to any Malthusian explanation, and they gravely doubt whether the Protestant work ethic has much to contribute. The Dutch Netherlands, unlike the more southerly provinces, were never burdened with a heavy feudal structure, nor did a backward-looking church control an excessive amount of land and retard enterprise. More responsible, surely, as the authors infer at many places, were attention to detail, a capacity to profit from the trivial, and versatility to build it all into a logical whole. Whether these are Dutch characteristics I do not presume to know, but their significance is demonstrated to perfection by De Vries and Van Der Woude. This book represents an integration of many schools of thought, of academic disciplines, and of a vast body of material into a coherent whole. Might one not term it, in its range, variety and complexity, the “first modern history?”

N. J. G. POUNDS  
Cambridge, England

CAROL GOLD. *Educating Middle Class Daughters: Private Girls Schools in Copenhagen, 1790–1820*. (Danish Humanist Texts and Studies, number 13.) Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum. 1996. Pp. 243. \$45.00.

Carol Gold has provided us a very complete picture of the education of women in a small country during a crucial time period. Because the Lutheran Church required its adherents to be able to read the Bible, more women were literate earlier in Lutheran Denmark than in most other European countries. There was even a compulsory education law for all children in 1739; a new law in 1814 required schooling for children aged six to twelve. As in other places, however, legislating schooling did not lead to enough public schools. From 1815 on, teachers had to be licensed by the state. But the schools themselves, Gold discovered, were run mainly by parents, not professional educators. Thus she has been able to investigate an unusual topic: what ordinary parents wanted for their girls’ education.

It was fathers who managed these schools through

boards of directors, with the aid of an occasional ladies' committee. They created the curriculum that they wanted their daughters to follow. Principals followed the orders of their parent boards. At the turn of the nineteenth century, most Danish families were either in business or artisans. Wives helped their husbands in the family trade. The "angel in the house" was not yet the role considered proper to Danish women. Therefore girls' schools, although they taught some needlework and related "female" subjects, also provided a full academic program, including history, geography, natural history, arithmetic, German, and French. A few boys' schools offered a classical education; but most Danish parents preferred "real" education for the modern world for both their boys and their girls. They gave schools names like "School for the Coming Generation" or "School for Civic Virtue." Of course, the education provided was not expected to make of the girls anything but good wives and mothers. One school founder aimed "to train young daughters so that they would be able to follow in the footsteps of their worthy mothers and, each in her time, make a brave man happy" (p. 118).

Most schools operated on the basis of tuition. It was usually only charity schools that were endowed, enabling some to last until the present day. Part of the aim of schooling was to create good citizens. All schools taught religion, and Protestant schools were not allowed to take Catholic or Jewish students. The Jewish schools also aimed at assimilating their youth into the society. They said their prayers in Danish and did not teach Hebrew to girls, although they did provide it for boys. The book shows that the smaller schools followed the curriculum of the outstanding academies for middle-class girls, as did the charity schools for families who could not pay tuition. It was only in the schools aiming to prepare poor girls to become servants that the curriculum was mainly needlework and housework. Collectively these schools educated almost all Danish girls. Gold posits that it may be this early practical and civic education for both sexes that accounts for the success of Danish democratic society.

The author provides charts of the subjects taught and hours devoted to them in some of the outstanding girls' schools, comparing them to boys' schools. She also examines the textbooks with a view to the role models they provided. Although it is true that girls were mainly viewed in relation to the family, and that they learned less in the natural sciences than did the boys, the overall picture presented here does credit to Denmark for the education it provided young women at this early period.

Unfortunately, Gold indicates, as the view of women changed in the Victorian age, many women were left out of the business life of the family. It is at this point, she believes, that the girls' schools began to acquire the bad reputation they had in the latter part of the century. It was not that they did not educate young women, but that they were educating them for an older

ideal, for a period when women were expected to participate in the productive aspect of family life, instead of keeping a home separate from the workplace. Some people even connected the older education for women with ideas of women's emancipation. Gold's work is thus a vindication of these schools, rescuing them from the obloquy of former generations. It is also an excellent case study of a small society that provided almost all its women an enlightened education in a period when this was very unusual.

PHYLLIS STOCK-MORTON,  
EMERITA  
Seton Hall University

HEIDE WUNDER. *He Is the Sun, She Is the Moon: Women in Early Modern Germany*. Translated by THOMAS DUNLAP. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 310. \$39.95.

Heide Wunder is one of Germany's most distinguished early modernists. Now known mainly for her manifold works on the history of early modern women, she started her career with a dissertation on a late medieval regional peasantry. In the late 1980s, no longer constrained by German academe's disapproval of such topics, she turned to women, drawing on her rich, archivally based experience to illuminate the lives of the neglected "distaff" side of Germany's population. Wunder is one of the few scholars of her country who take regular cognizance of English-language research. She is also thoroughly interdisciplinary in her approach.

This survey and assessment of German women's existence from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century is oriented toward economic and social realities rather than toward the norms defined by the elites of government, judiciary, and church. Moving topically, Wunder begins with women's accounts of their lives, giving examples of self-fashioning by the end of the period. Wunder is not persuaded that girls were any less cared for than boys, noting parallel although not identical treatment of the sexes. Within the household, women were full partners, with legal and practical protections of their rights. Partnership is the underlying theme of the entire book. The Protestant Reformation, by rendering divorce legal and elevating marriage, gave the housewife a new ideological dignity in addition to the practical dignity that she already possessed by virtue of her indispensability. By the sixteenth century, the economy focused increasingly on the household. As city and countryside merged, "the division of labor between city and country involved a specialization and intensification of work. This in turn gave rise to a new division of labor between men and women, with new forms of labor, organization of work, and social relationships—namely, the family enterprise" (pp. 69–70). In an era of protocapitalism, the work of women was less visible, subsumed within the domestic unit. The middle-class wife remained in the house, and her clothing became more "buttoned up"



(p. 84). Parallel to this evolution, the professionalization of crafts resulted in the devaluation of women's labor.

Wunder devotes chapter six to reproduction, drawing together a broad spectrum of local and regional studies. She notes that despite maternal mortality, women desired to marry and did not particularly strive to limit their fertility. This is because, in the early modern value system, "independence . . . could only be attained through work, a profession, and marriage" (p. 119).

Wunder appears to urge us to curb our horror at the torture and execution of witches, observing that if we place these trials within the context of punishments meted out to men for a variety of offenses, we will find that men suffered such penalties far more often for a wider variety of crimes. She sees an underlying economic causality at work, for witches were regularly accused of irregular behavior in the workplace (p. 149).

In her brief treatment of the Reformation, Wunder is unequivocal about women's enthusiasm for the religious movements, which she maintains "opened up for women new spheres of action that were not defined by marriage and work, household and community" (p. 181). She pointedly refutes the assertions of a number of her colleagues, this writer included, that the position of German women deteriorated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There are probably several reasons for her dissent. First, her intellectual taproot lies in the rural setting, within which women's multifaceted role was ineluctable and enduring. Second, she implicitly regards the normative literature of governing men, which was often enormously hostile to women, as being without practical effect, and she selects from this body only those parts that reflect kindly on women. Johann Fischart, from whose treatise Wunder draws the images of the sun and the moon as standing, respectively, for man and woman, had predecessors as well as successors in the use of that metaphor, and many of them related these analogies in ways that were most unkind to females. Third, in dealing with up to four centuries, Wunder has possibly taken on an over-long *durée*. Perhaps this is why she does not point out lesser trends, such as the campaigns for confessionalization and social discipline, because these had lost their vigor by the end of the seventeenth century. Whether short-term or not, they had negative effects on women. I must conclude that even within a broad, inclusive context, the "witch craze" deserves our critique, and that it is more easily comprehensible within a mental rather than an exclusively economic framework.

Despite my judgment that, at points, Wunder's book is a little too sanguine and does not allot adequate space to the persistent neomonastic misogyny of the age, it is well worth reading. It is filled with riveting anecdotes and authoritative analysis, bespeaking Wunder's expansive search for evidence and her unquestionable expertise. The publisher ought to bring

out a paperback edition, for no doubt it would be widely adopted for classroom use.

SUSAN C. KARANT-NUNN  
University of Arizona

SHEILAGH OGILVIE. *State Corporatism and Proto-Industry: The Württemberg Black Forest, 1580–1797*. (Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time, number 33.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xx, 513. \$80.00.

Although this book concerns a small region of southern Germany, it raises numerous questions about economic and social history in general and especially about economic growth in an agrarian setting. These are well discussed in the first two and last two chapters but seem somewhat separated from the core of the monograph. To a large extent, this investigation is a case study to test what Sheilagh Ogilvie repeatedly refers to as the original theory of proto-industrialization, a concept that has become rather popular over the last thirty years. In many particulars, Ogilvie finds the "original theory," as expounded especially by its founder, Franklin Mendels, and some of its more articulate exponents, such as Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick, and Jürgen Schlumbohm, wanting. To be sure, even the latter three scholars have felt it necessary to modify their position since the publication of their book, which bore the paradoxical title *Industrialization before Industrialization: Rural Industry in the Genesis of Capitalism* (1981).

Proto-industrialization as a concept has proved fecund, as indicated by the numerous studies that have examined the historical process of economic development and growth using this rubric as a jumping-off place. It may, however, have outlived its usefulness. The book under review demonstrates how such concepts, including the corporatism part of the book's title, tend to be self-imposed, uncomfortable tyrannies. This is not to agree totally with D. C. Coleman's argument that proto-industrialization is one concept too many. Since it has inspired much research, most of it critical in various ways (as is the case with Ogilvie), it was obviously useful. Unfortunately, however, no new consensus has resulted. After the detailed investigation of over two hundred years of a regional industry, it would have been highly desirable if Ogilvie had laid out clearly her own vision of the process as a model for others. For what is involved here, as she repeatedly shows, are basic questions: how did industrialization emanate from an agricultural society, and what role did the state and special interest groups like guilds and large trading companies play in the process?

While reading about the worsted industry in Württemberg, which is the main subject of this study, I was forced quite often to wonder why such a grand old book as Herbert Heaton's *The Yorkshire Woolen and Worsted Industries, from the Earliest Times Up to the Industrial Revolution* (1966) was never referred to. This may merely reflect a generational change and say more



about the reviewer than the author. Similarly, Julia Mann's *The Cloth Industry in the West of England from 1640 to 1880* (1971) could have enriched this study as part of its framework. There were, of course, many other places in Europe, such as Sedan, Verviers, Monschau (Montjoie), and Jihlava (Iglau), that were potential rivals to the Black Forest weavers and merchants in the international market. Precisely because it served a large market across Europe, this region would have to be compared with competitors.

Another aspect of the study is a bit troubling. It begins rather abruptly in the late sixteenth century, when documentation became plentiful, although, as the author insists, there had existed previously a long tradition of woolen weaving. Might then the organization of the worsted industry have learned from some of the industrial and commercial forms of the Middle Ages? Wolfgang von Stromer and others have in recent years unearthed much interesting and very relevant material, such as the operations of large trading companies that contracted with entire guilds throughout Germany. Along somewhat similar lines, I kept referring in my own mind to the excellent study of the cartelization of guilds by Gunnar Mickwitz, *Die Kartelfunktionen der Zünfte* (1936), and wondered why it found no place in the bibliography of a book that dealt with cartelized guilds.

Lastly, the seminal although non-historical work of Ronald Coase (on the firm) and Oliver Williamson would have been potentially quite helpful. One of their basic questions concerns the interplay between the market and the private firm. At what point would the individual weaver in Württemberg have been better off if he could buy and sell on the market rather than being forced to sell to the trading company at Calw? When can an intermediary be dispensed with and when does he in fact provide an important service that improves everyone's position, including that of the buying public at large? While discussing questions that deal with economic theory, I must admit to substantial perplexity by one of Ogilvie's conclusions. How could "wares which were universally agreed to be of poor quality" (p. 469) continue over the long term to find buyers? "Poor quality," I assume, means that equivalent goods sold by competitors were better. On a similar note, I find it hardly surprising that "no reliable confirmation" could be found that "proto-industrial producers" produced below "the cost of labor and other inputs" (p. 460).

The numerous questions that result from reading this book testify to its value. Its general chapters are especially useful. While not central to her theme, Ogilvie also raises a number of basic questions that deserve further elaboration. Among these are such bothersome points as what constitutes a market, and what is rational economic decision making? Too often, I fear, people think of a freely competitive market when they refer to a market in general, whereas non-market economic activity in strictly theoretical terms could well be restricted to actions that are

required by compulsion, such as *corvée* labor on a manor. Similarly, Ogilvie briefly defines "rational" responses in a market as those that are determined by the personal and general value goals of an economic actor. This type of utility maximization seems to me more realistic than the profit or income maximization often found in the literature. In short, there are embedded in this book numerous useful questions that deserve much attention. Nevertheless, my impression is that the subject was unnecessarily restricted by terms that may not have much permanence.

HERMAN FREUDENBERGER  
Tulane University

JACQUES GANDOULY. *Pédagogie et enseignement en Allemagne de 1800 à 1945*. (Les mondes germaniques.) Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg. 1997. Pp. 421, 150fr.

Jacques Gandouly's book is a synthesis both of the study of how best to educate—that is, pedagogy—and of education itself. It relies primarily on secondary sources and the writings of pedagogical reformers. Throughout the book, Gandouly attempts to tie both pedagogy and education to the political, social, and economic evolution of "Germany," by which he means the German-speaking states generally before 1871 and imperial Germany after that date. In his interesting introduction, Gandouly claims that because of the unique reception of the French Revolution in "Germany" in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the concept of *Bildung*, or individual cultivation of knowledge, replaced a more overt political program. As a result, he writes, German educational writing has generally treated pedagogical reform and education as separate from politics. By contrast, in France political concerns have eclipsed consideration of education outside any overtly political context. Therefore, Gandouly believes that there is a definite need for a work that recontextualizes German education and pedagogical reform in the social situation in which they emerged. He distinguishes this book from the earlier work of Maurice Cauvin (*Le renouveau pédagogique en Allemagne de 1890 à 1933* [1971]), which considered German educational reformers without much regard for historical context.

Although Wilhelmine, Weimar, and Nazi Germany are Gandouly's primary interests, he begins in 1800 in order to provide background for later reforms and their reception. This makes it possible for him to trace the lines of continuity from Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and Wilhelm von Humboldt (nicely placing both in the context of the impact of the French Revolution, Napoleonic conquest, and Prussian reforms after the defeat at Jena) to the late nineteenth-century reformers who interest Gandouly the most. For the Wilhelmine period, he gives careful consideration to the reformers who favored *Landerziehungsheime*, the boarding schools in the countryside advocated in different ways by Hermann Lietz, Gustav Wyneken, Paul

Geheeb, and Kurt Hahn. Gandouly then focuses on the promotion of manual as well as intellectual work in the *Arbeitsschulbewegung*, favored by Georg Kerschensteiner and Hugo Gaudig among others. Gandouly successfully shows the extent to which these attempts at reform of German education at several levels reflected broader societal interest (for example, the ideal of the *Gemeinschaft*, the rediscovered unity of the mind and body, the uniting of schools and "real life," the notion of "organic" development of both people and society, and the focus on youth). Finally, Gandouly examines the legacy of these reformist ideas, as well as newer ones, during Weimar and Nazi Germany. He points out both the continuity of ideas about education between Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany and Nazi subversion of such educational ideals.

Gandouly shows clearly the value of placing pedagogical reformers in their historical context. This book has quite useful sections on several reformers of German education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it offers valuable insights into how education and pedagogy both reflect and help to create the political and social context in which they exist. Gandouly is also to be commended for attempting to provide such broad coverage.

Unfortunately, Gandouly stops short of providing the full context for reformers' ideas because he gives only cursory treatment to actual educational practices. Aside from laws and administrative directives, the actual dynamics of schooling in German states and in Germany after 1871 receive little attention. This is surprising, given that Gandouly's own agenda is to reconnect ideas and reality, getting away from the idealist tradition that made such a separation so strong in Germany before the advent of social history in the 1960s. Gandouly overlooks many of the findings of social historians of education; in particular, he does not seem to be aware of a single monograph not in German or French. This is problematic, given the impact of scholars writing in English about German education in the past two decades. For example, one wonders if Gandouly's account of universities would be the same had he used Konrad Jarausch's *Students, Society, and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Academic Illiberalism* (1982). His account of the *Kulturkampf* in primary schooling would have been enriched by Marjorie Lamberti's *State, Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany* (1989). James Albisetti (*Secondary School Reform in Imperial Germany* [1983]) has already placed discussion about *Bildung* into the context of imperial German politics. Mary Jo Maynes's *Schooling for the People: Comparative Local Studies of Schooling in France and Germany, 1750–1850* (1985) would have provided the comparative perspective of the development of French and German primary schools, a perspective that clearly interests Gandouly in several sections of the book.

Although social class does at several points receive Gandouly's attention (here too the above works as well as Fritz Ringer's comparative *Education and Society in*

*Modern Europe* [1979] would have enriched the discussion considerably), gender does not. This is unfortunate, because in a book ostensibly dedicated to social context, much of the context is lacking. Again, even work with secondary sources might have remedied the oversight. Gandouly's consideration of early childhood education would no doubt have pointed out the gendered notions embedded in it if he had been able to consult Ann Allen's *Feminism and Motherhood in Germany, 1800–1914* (1991). Moreover, educational reform becomes narrowly construed when it leaves out the substantial reform effort to open German secondary schools and universities to women in this period (see James Albisetti, *Schooling German Girls and Women: Secondary and Higher Education in the Nineteenth Century* [1988]).

Interestingly, Gandouly ends by noting that the book helps "to show that the knowledge of pedagogy and education outside our [French] borders requires a strong linguistic and historical knowledge. It appears obvious that English will not suffice" (p. 396). He is, of course, correct, but in this case knowledge and use of English, as well as of French and German, could have made his book a formidable work of synthesis of existing scholarship.

STEPHEN L. HARP  
University of Akron

FRANZ-JOSEF BRÜGGEMEIER. *Das unendliche Meer der Lüfte: Luftverschmutzung, Industrialisierung und Risikodebatten im 19. Jahrhundert*. Essen: Klartext. 1996. Pp. 344. DM 49.

Environmental history has been slow to catch on in Germany, in part because its analyses have not articulated well with a strong tradition of socioeconomic and state-institutional historiography. This book goes a long way toward bridging that gap. Franz-Josef Brüggemeier studies the discourses and structures that were brought to bear on the phenomenon of air pollution in the 1800s. Three case studies distributed over the century exemplify developments. The book begins with a dispute over a planned glass factory in Bamberg in 1802; the focus then shifts to Freiberg in Saxony, where smelting operations had begun to occasion lawsuits and protests by 1846; and the book closes with an 1899 claim for damages issued against a steelworks in Hoerde. Throughout, Brüggemeier challenges the widely held idea that pollution was ignored or not perceived in the progress-mad nineteenth century. Instead he shows that, from the beginning, there was a "pragmatic and sober engagement" with the problem of air pollution to which physicians, legal scholars, and technical experts all contributed (pp. 74, 283).

The point at which all of this information intersected and was shaped into policy was the state bureaucracy. One of the great strengths of this book is that it clearly shows how pollution, under the semi-absolutist regimes of nineteenth-century Germany, came under the

"almost autonomous sphere of decision making of the state bureaucracies" (p. 147). Drawing on an impressive array of Bavarian, Saxon, and Prussian archives, Brüggemeier tracks the deliberations of officials who gathered information on industrial undertakings, received complaints, and weighed harms to the public and to neighbors under the terms of the commercial code. Not all of these officials were in favor of industrial expansion at the expense of the environment, but as the result of this book we are able to say definitively that the ones who mattered were. Brüggemeier's research is particularly compelling on the role of the Prussian central bureaucracy, whose rigorously free-market, non-interventionist convictions can be documented as far back as a key administrative decree of 1808 (p. 133). Over the ensuing century, these convictions never wavered and were built into successive versions of the commercial code, stifling government attempts to regulate industrial pollution. Virtually the only brake left on polluters was the threat of a civil suit. This, however, was an expensive and time-consuming procedure, and German judges went out of their way to support the polluting defendant. In one case, a judge insisted that factory owners were unaccountable for what happened to particles and vapors after they left the smokestack (p. 141). Jurists also developed the problematic standard of "*ortsübliche Belastung*," a concept that in theory froze pollution at locally existing levels but that in practice spurred a blatantly classist race to the bottom in the industrial areas inhabited by workers (pp. 144, 229). Brüggemeier usefully notes that this late nineteenth-century "regionalization" of pollution was oddly of a piece with simultaneous efforts to establish nature reserves (p. 296). In both cases, modern industrial society compartmentalized the landscape, dividing in order to conquer.

The state bureaucracies did draw on scientific knowledge when making their decisions, and Brüggemeier details the constantly improving state of medical, biological, and industrial-technical expertise. But the explosion of knowledge was largely unable to supply normative standards and may have even created paralysis: "Problems in detection and ambiguous findings could furthermore be introduced to justify a wait-and-see attitude and the rejection . . . of demands for stronger intervention" (pp. 74, 255).

All in all, the results of nineteenth-century pollution control were "not very encouraging" (p. 309). Nevertheless, Brüggemeier argues, it would be wrong to dismiss these efforts, and foolish to celebrate the strident rejections of industry rooted in "traditional concepts" (p. 109). Environmentalism had to be achieved within the horizon of modernity, an ongoing, risk-taking, socio-technical exploration that knows only provisional truths and pragmatic solutions. The basic procedures and legal principles developed in Germany were sound, Brüggemeier contends; against an established body of criticism that is convinced of the need for radical cultural transformation he argues "it

is not so much a question of seeking entirely new ways, but of exploiting the known possibilities more fully" (pp. 15, 309). This image of a self-correcting modernity is appealing, but it can be questioned whether Brüggemeier's method of focusing on bureaucratic and legal developments fully reveals the source of change. What actually started the phase of greater intervention in the 1890s, for example? There was a shift in the wider cultural climate, and thus bureaucrats may have been driven by the aesthetic and lifestyle movements to which Brüggemeier quite properly, but only briefly, alludes. By 1900, then, it seems that environmental policy—like other aspects of civil society—had slipped out of the one-sided control of government bureaucracies. With its comprehensive synthesis of developments over the nineteenth century, Brüggemeier's book will remain a valuable foundation for further studies.

WILLIAM ROLLINS

University of Canterbury

JONATHAN SPERBER. *The Kaiser's Voters: Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 389, \$59.95.

This is an important work, replete with revisionist insight, which serious students of German politics simply must read. Written by one of the most distinguished and prolific scholars of nineteenth-century Germany, the book advances new ways of looking at the success and failure of German parties as well as suggesting hitherto overlooked features of the party system. It also advances a critique of existing and extremely influential models of German politics, whether M. Rayner Lepsius's notion of social-moral milieus or Karl Rohe's concept of "camps."

Jonathan Sperber's findings are based on multiple regression analysis of the first round of voting returns in Germany's 397 Reichstag districts. In the introduction as well as in the technical appendix, he offers a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of his approach. Suffice to say that the method forces Sperber to divide German voters into five groups: conservatives, liberal parties, minority parties, Social Democrats, and non-voters. Despite these broad categories, however, he is nevertheless able to put forward a wealth of insight about the fortunes of individual political parties.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD), according to Sperber's findings, may no longer be seen as simply a workers' party. Rather, its voters included a broad range of the urban, Protestant population. Social class, in this view, was the least influential determinant of SPD support. Indeed, by 1912, the SPD drew forty-five percent of all Protestants who actually voted. With respect to the Center Party and the other minority parties, Sperber produces fewer surprises. But here, too, he offers insight and precision. He shows, for example, that the minority electorate, especially when Catholic, did not decline over time (an assumption

often made by modernization proponents). Nor, however, did it simply stabilize as the consequence of the increasing reach of an ever denser social-moral milieu. Instead, Sperber argues, it developed a "dynamic stability" in the 1890s and after by attracting new voters and by drawing on other parties. With respect to the national parties (liberal and conservative), he also suggests revisions in the conventional wisdom, especially pertaining to the National Liberals. Like Rohe, Sperber sees considerable movement between the parties but shows that within the nationalist parties the movement is largely one way: from liberal to conservative. More surprising is the degree to which the National Liberals, in the 1870s the most energetic antagonists of the Catholic Church, drew on Catholic support, especially in the cities. Sperber estimates that roughly twenty-five percent of all National Liberal votes came from Catholics. If one considers that Catholics constituted thirty-five percent of the voting public, this means that the National Liberal Party, more than any other party, "came close to matching the confessional composition of the entire electorate" (p. 145).

In the second part of the book, Sperber considers the elections sequentially. Here fewer surprises emerge. Yet the image of politics on each side of the 1890 watershed is rendered with more precision. First, 1890 clearly emerges as an important dividing line, confirming many of the early arguments to this effect advanced by Thomas Nipperdey, Geoff Eley, and David Blackbourn. Second, Sperber sees the Bismarckian period as marked by the considerable influence of non-voters who, by now voting, now desisting, created large swings in the fortunes of individual parties. This finding weakens the assumptions undergirding Lepsius's theory of social-moral milieus, which sees the milieus as crystalizing in the early period of the Second Empire. This assumption, Sperber points out, cannot easily be generalized beyond the Catholic population. Conversely, it is the Wilhelmine era that sees the increasing pervasiveness of political parties, measured, for example, by a higher incidence of party loyalty. Third, Sperber views individual elections as creating sharp (though not permanent) breaks in the trajectory of imperial politics. This is especially true of the elections of 1874, 1878, 1887, and 1907. Sperber thus points to a more dynamic and fluid electoral landscape than the models of Lepsius and Rohe would suggest.

In place of the models offered by Lepsius and Rohe, Sperber suggests that historians turn to the work of the Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan, who argued that European political conflict centered around two issues: nation-building and socioeconomic conflict. In the period before 1890, the first predominated; after 1890, the second did—with a great deal of overlap in each case. Finally, Sperber puts forward suggestions concerning "the century of democratic elections" and offers international comparisons. With respect to the former, his most notable argument is that the Nazis

were not, in fact, the first "popular party" reaching outside the milieus: both the Social Democrats and the National Liberals had already accomplished this to some extent. Finally, Sperber believes that, by the measure of international comparison, German voters of the imperial period were hardly static in their choices of parties, that issues mattered to them, and that the image of the unthinking German voter stuck in his milieu needs to be discarded. Or, as Sperber himself puts it: "I think we need to say farewell to the milieu thesis" (p. 284).

HELMUT WALSER SMITH  
Vanderbilt University

MICHAEL STOLLEIS. *The Law under the Swastika: Studies on Legal History in Nazi Germany*. Foreword by MOSHE ZIMMERMANN. Translated by THOMAS DUNLAP. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 263. \$29.95.

This book is a good translation of Michael Stolleis's *Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus* (1994), a collection of the author's essays published between 1972 and 1993. Readers therefore should not expect a definitive and exhaustive monograph. Specialists in the subject will already be familiar with Stolleis and most of the essays collected here.

For non-specialists or readers unequipped to stagger through the daunting thickets of normal legal terminology and the history of law in German (let alone the mutant concepts dreamed up by National Socialism), this translation offers a useful (if necessarily incomplete) guide. The approach follows more the method of the historiographer and intellectual historian than that of the descriptive cataloguer of Nazi perversions of law, whether in the sense of legislation, administrative interpretation and execution, or exclusion of certain acts and actors (e.g. the SS or Gestapo) from legal accountability. Stolleis is at least as concerned with how professors or other influential members of subsets of the judicial profession commented on the law, arguing for or against continuities between imperial and Weimar norms and those obtaining since 1933, and how such areas as administrative, tax, or constitutional law—not exactly central to National Socialist obsessions—fared in the Third Reich.

This approach turns up many interesting and thought-provoking points, but the reader unacquainted with German legal traditions and concepts may find herself/himself struggling with a level of abstraction unfamiliar to Anglo-American traditions. Stolleis is, of course, a critic of the general line of German jurists who, if they did not actually join the Nazi Party, fellow-traveled with it. But he is a gentle critic, not a polemicist, and his essays generally show how easily the thinking of the judges and law experts (once purged of Jewish and democratic elements after 1933) overlapped to a large degree with that of the party. This is hardly a novel discovery, but the book does provide ample evidence, particularly by examin-



ing the writings and teachings of the Third Reich's legal experts during and after the Nazi period.

The essays are grouped in three topical sections, the first of which serves to introduce the problems of studying legal theory during the Third Reich, including Nazi legal terminology. The second part takes up the fate of specific branches of legal theory (constitutional, administrative, jurisdictional, and military), ending with an essay on the complexities of undoing Nazi verdicts in the case of the White Rose resisters. A final, brief section surveys the legal system and judicial policy in the transition years 1945–1949 and the life of Theodor Maunz, professor of constitutional law under both Nazi and West German regimes, a respected, recycled jurist who nevertheless secretly supported neo-Nazi causes.

One of the author's consistent themes is the attempt by legal theorists between the world wars to turn away from internationally shared legal foundations toward the creation of a German-national "common law." The self-referentiality of much German legal theory in these decades poses a barrier for outsiders, and Stolleis does a creditable job of making much of these thought-processes more understandable. At the same time, the author demonstrates how far legal historians have to go in order to break out of the relatively narrow boundaries of disciplinary self-referentiality. It is, for example, perhaps a mere lapse that the political scientist Kurt Sontheimer is referred to as Karl (p. 66), but it is also symptomatic of the relatively sparse references to works emanating from social scientists and contemporary historians in the sixty pages of footnotes. One looks in vain for acknowledgement of the considerable and growing body of relevant scholarly literature published in languages other than German. Readers therefore might wish to consult such authors as Kenneth Ledford, Hannes Siegrist, or Michael Sunnus to contextualize these essays in an interdisciplinary and international scholarly way.

Having pointed out what Stolleis's book of essays does not (and was not designed to) deliver, it is important to note that it does serve as a record of witness and calls for critical reflection from within the relatively airless edifice of the law faculties and prominent judiciary of the postwar Federal Republic. Stolleis repeatedly raises the thorny issue of continuity, both in terms of personnel and legal arguments, linking the pre- and post-1945 law establishment. His balanced, scholarly, and modulated tone gives perhaps the best indication that the postwar generation does not intend to let elements of continuity remain tacit but also seeks to raise the level of dealing with the past above the polemical.

CHARLES E. MCCLELLAND  
*University of New Mexico*

NEIL GREGOR. *Daimler-Benz in the Third Reich*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. 276. \$30.00.

This book is an important addition to the growing body of scholarship on business enterprises during the Nazi dictatorship. Granted unrestricted access to the large and well-ordered company archive of what is now DaimlerChrysler, Neil Gregor has produced a closely documented and analytically penetrating study of how one of Germany's major corporations responded to the policies of the Third Reich. Although it is basically a company history, focused on the economic choices made by management, Gregor employs his findings to address larger questions. Prominent among these are the extent to which industry was able to pursue its own autonomous strategy in an increasingly regime-controlled economy and the degree to which rationality governed the private sector's allocation of capital, organization of production, and deployment of labor.

Gregor's study leaves no doubt that Daimler-Benz benefited materially from the Third Reich. Adolf Hitler's promotion of the automobile and the rapid economic recovery over which his regime presided rescued the previously struggling company from the throes of the Depression and propelled it, along with the rest of the previously laggard German automotive industry, into an unprecedented boom during the last interwar years. Endorsing the Nazi regime enthusiastically, the firm plunged eagerly into competition for military contracts and registered escalating gains from the rearmament drive. During the war, its profits reached dizzying heights as it supplied the armed forces with airplane engines and tanks as well as trucks and other vehicles.

As Gregor shows, however, the firm's interests eventually proved only partially convergent with those of the regime on which it became increasingly dependent for markets, access to raw materials, and even the allocation of labor. Government demands for ever greater investments in war production ran contrary to what Gregor characterizes as the firm's "core strategy" of building up capital reserves and planning for a resumption of competition in the postwar civilian market. Even during the war, that goal influenced managerial behavior. In the early stages of the conflict, with German forces triumphant on all fronts, the prospect of a swift victorious outcome occasioned concern about a sudden end to demand for military equipment. Management therefore devoted much of its attention to preparing for conversion to postwar production and held back from wholesale commitment to armaments, a response that suggests, as Gregor points out, a need to reexamine the causes of the laggard mobilization of German industry. Later, growing indications that the war would be lost again turned thoughts to postwar survival. Yet in order to avoid the danger of extinction should the government make use of its power to transfer the firm's workers to more compliant companies, management had to continue to meet the ever more urgent demand for war materiel. Its solution was to hoard capital reserves with an eye to the postwar period while substituting for investment the ruthless exploitation of a labor force that by the



latter stages of the war consisted heavily of involuntary foreign workers who were subjected to increasingly inhuman treatment.

Daimler-Benz's adherence to its "core strategy" succeeded in positioning it advantageously for its well-known postwar triumphs. In its case, there was no rock-bottom "year zero" of the sort often postulated in the lore of West Germany's "economic miracle." But the price of the firm's perpetuation, as Gregor points out, was much human suffering and a "process of creeping barbarization" that resulted in the "moral erosion" (p. 216) of those in charge of the firm. He sees in their behavior "the narrowness of the technocratic manager's field of vision" in which "the only thing that seemed to matter was the interest of the company" (p. 217). As to rationality, Gregor finds that it was clearly present in the calculation and pursuit of the firm's own interests, even though that often meant placing rationality in the service of the irrational goals of the Nazi regime. He rejects the view that the Third Reich deserves credit for promoting the modernization of German industry, although he concedes that the crisis management and improvisation to which the erratic policies of that regime repeatedly drove industrial managers may have left them more resourceful after its collapse.

In his introduction, Gregor explains that he chose to view Daimler-Benz "as a single historical actor," with the result that "individuals receive relatively little attention" (p. 14). "Different managers," he maintains, "would not have made substantially different choices" because theirs were "rational choices, and the rationale behind them was a capitalist one." Yet, as he concedes on the same page and reveals later at a number of junctures, significant disagreements sometimes arose among the managers of Daimler-Benz when they faced important choices. As Gregor also concedes, those managers had varying political orientations, and some were Nazi Party members, in one case with privileged access to Hitler himself. Closer examination of the disagreements among the managers and the ideological and political influences that affected their outlooks might well have made this fine book even richer by revealing a more complex set of motivations than simply the pursuit of material gain.

H. A. TURNER, JR.  
Yale University

MICHAEL BRENNER. *After the Holocaust: Rebuilding Jewish Lives in Postwar Germany*. Translated by BARBARA HARSHAV. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Pp. x, 196. \$24.95.

This book by Michael Brenner was first published in German in 1995 and concentrated on the years 1945–1950. The English edition adds a new chapter to assess more recent developments, notably the population increase through immigration from the former Soviet Union and an emergent cultural pluralism of liberal, ultra-Orthodox, and secular groupings.

The opening historical overview reviews the Jewish presence in Germany after liberation, when close to 200,000 Eastern European Jews were cared for in Displaced Persons (DP) camps. Brenner presents a vivid account of how a Jewish culture—newspapers, theater, religious and secular schools—flourished despite inadequate living conditions, while leaders emerged to represent Jewish interests and articulate a common Jewish voice, at least at the zonal level. Trapped against their will in the country of the Holocaust, all but 12,000 DPs left for Israel or the U.S. between 1948 and 1950, once immigration quotas had been modified.

Overall, Jewish community membership in Germany at the time stood at 21,000. Prominent among the founders were German Jews who had been conscripted to forced labor but spared from deportations because they were married to German Gentiles. Brenner implies that DPs and settled German Jews had virtually no contact with one another until the 1950s.

From the outset, however, the common format of Jewish communities has been the *Einheitsgemeinde* led by a secular (German) executive and committed to Orthodox (Eastern European) religious observance. Jewish returnees and Jewish immigrants to Germany from Romania, Iran, or Israel stabilized membership at 30,000. Since 1990, this number has more than doubled as a result of the arrival of Jews from the former Soviet Union. Numerically strengthened, Jewish community institutions today include cultural centers, some primary schools, one secondary school, and several Jewish Studies programs in universities.

Although Jewish community membership in Germany is expanding while contracting elsewhere in Europe, Brenner is not optimistic about the future of Jewish life there. The DPs of the founder generation, he claims, were mentally destroyed by their suffering; the best emigrated while the "recording clerks" (p. 138), not the leaders, stayed on. German Jews were ignorant of Judaism and allowed German Jewish culture to "fall into oblivion" (p. 141), while newcomers brought no Jewish revival. Yet the "Witness Accounts" in the central section of Brenner's book tell a different story. Focusing on survivors and returnees of German background or from Eastern Europe who occupied religious or secular leadership positions in Germany's postwar community, they document how individuals came back to life after liberation and reconstructed their identity as Jews. Common to all were two factors: first, their Holocaust experiences and the sense that they had to draw personal consequences from them for their place in society as Jews, and second, the unpredictability and luck both of surviving against the odds and of making a new beginning afterward.

Rebuilding Jewish life in Germany was marred by anti-Semitism, which erupted as early as 1946. The concluding new section of the book, "Five Decades of Jewish Life in Postwar Germany," opens powerfully with the case of Philipp Auerbach, a Holocaust survivor and Secretary of State in Bavaria who was driven to

suicide in 1952 when a German court convicted him of fraud, a charge that was later proven to be unfounded. In East Germany, anti-Semitism persisted as anti-Zionism, while assimilationist pressures virtually eliminated Jewish communities there. For Brenner, the precarious state of Jewish life in Germany is aggravated by right-extremist and anti-Semitic tendencies but ultimately caused by a "negative demarcation" of Jewish identity as Holocaust memory instead of "a positive knowledge of Jewish culture, whether secular or religious" (p. 156). Today's Jews no longer sit on packed suitcases although they remain "Jews in Germany," not "German Jews" as some champions of normalization would prefer. Jewish life in Germany no longer lacks numbers, synagogues, or certainty but rather a base in religion and culture that Brenner calls "living Judaism" (p. 161). Young Jews turning to Orthodoxy may be a step in the right direction.

The presence of Russian Jews will contribute to community rebuilding only if they are introduced to Judaism by the Jews already living in Germany, many of whom need similar lessons. Brenner concludes that most Jews today do not know why they live in Germany and what it means to be Jewish. This book presents a succinct and readable account of the process of rebuilding Jewish lives, but Brenner's assumption that Jews in Germany have been deficient in "living Judaism" does not tally with the autobiographical sketches of survival and rebuilt Judaism at the heart of his text.

EVA KOLINSKY  
Keele University

LOTHAR ALBERTIN, *Demokratische Herausforderung und politische Parteien: Der Aufbau des Friedens in Ostwestfalen-Lippe 1945–1948*. Assisted by PETRA GÖDECKE. (Forschungen zur Regionalgeschichte, number 14.) Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1998. Pp. xi, 563. DM 78.

Although quite a number of studies on the reconstruction of political life in postwar Germany have been written over the past few years, Lothar Albertin provides us with a refreshingly new angle in this book. Instead of focusing on the formation and organizational structure of political parties, he takes a broader view of politics and looks at the democratization process and education for peace (a concept that remains somewhat nebulous) from May 1945 until the October elections of 1948. Because the widespread devastation, the complete dissolution of authority, and the Allies' focus on the decentralization of Germany in 1945 all dictated a local focus for reconstruction efforts, Albertin chose a regional approach. His grass-roots study of Eastern Westphalia (the administrative district of Detmold) allows him to combine macro-historic and microhistoric methods. Where necessary, he refers to the situation in other areas of Germany, especially in connection with the formalization of party structures. As a focus for his investigation of democ-

ratization, the author selected three case studies: youth, women, and refugees.

Albertin tackles his subject in a very interesting manner by beginning with a description of the loss of humanity and the denigration of the concept of peace during the Third Reich. He then goes on to sketch British denazification and reeducation policies and to give a profile of the region of Ostwestfalen-Lippe. Before delving into a detailed analysis of the policies of Social Democrats (SPD), labor unions, Communists, Christian Democrats (CDU), and Liberals in his three chosen fields of study, he provides an overview of the problems involved in democratizing youth, integrating refugees, and emancipating women. Although the former two were recognized as important issues in which all parties, the churches, and local reformers got involved, the latter was not taken seriously; instead, women were mainly relegated to charity issues and education for peace. Albertin concludes that whereas the mobilization of young men and women in youth organizations never reached a majority of the population and refugees soon established interest groups and parties of their own, the inculcation of democratic values into the young generation and the social and economic integration of refugees were accomplished successfully.

Albertin's main emphasis is on the considerable achievements of the political parties and labor unions. He explains the different dilemmas of each party as it faced the postwar situation. While all parties more (SPD) or less (CDU) internally discussed their involvement in the rise of Adolf Hitler, they desired to become popular parties and therefore had to cater to a public that had in large numbers at least tacitly supported National Socialism. After providing some information on local politics, Albertin focuses on outlining the parties' policies toward youth, women, and refugees. Only the chapter on the Christian Democrats, written by Petra Gödecke, lapses into a detailed account of organizational structures and election results. According to Albertin, without the parties' spirit of local solidarity and their cooperation in youth projects and material help for the refugees, the rapid *Aufstieg aus dem Nichts* (rise out of nothing) (p. 520) would not have been possible. He claims that the extraordinary success of the parties in democratizing Germany was also recognized by the Western Allies and especially by the British (p. 59). Here, however, his documentation remains slightly sketchy, as, despite sporadic recourse to documents from the Public Records Office, the British side of the equation is somewhat absent from the picture, with much of the English and American secondary literature missing (e.g. Ian D. Turner, ed., *Reconstruction in Postwar Germany: British Occupation Policy in the Western Zones, 1945–55* [1989]; Daniel Rogers's *Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System* [1995] is only quoted in the introductory chapter). In a similar vein, Albertin's documentation of statistics is sometimes incomplete (pp. 74–75, 92–93), and current

scholarly debates are at times only mentioned in passing (pp. 43, 103, 263).

The book as a whole, however, is an impressive accomplishment. Albertin's argument that, contrary to conventional wisdom, many attempts at detailed analysis of National Socialism were undertaken at the local level in the immediate postwar era certainly merits attention. The book is easy to use because of a personal and place name index and a breakdown into many subchapters. It is only regrettable that most German publishers do not place emphasis on copyediting; the Germanic sentence structure used would have benefited from simplification.

HEIKE BUNGERT  
University of Wisconsin  
University of Cologne

ANDREAS SUTER. *Der schweizerische Bauernkrieg von 1653: Politische Sozialgeschichte—Sozialgeschichte eines politischen Ereignisses*. (Frühneuzeit-Forschungen, number 3.) Tübingen: Bibliotheca Academica. 1997. Pp. 687. DM 98.

A scholarly generation has passed since German-speaking historians, led by Peter Blickle, put to rest the legend that following the German Peasants' War of 1525, the greatest mass insurrection in prerevolutionary Europe, the farmers of the German lands collapsed into a political torpor that endured for centuries. More than a century later, in 1653, there erupted in central Switzerland a revolt of rural subjects against urban regimes, which contemporaries recognized as a revolutionary challenge to existing political order. The rebels' organizational skill expanded a regional conflict around Lucerne into a true civil war, and before it ended in their defeat, nine months later, they became aware of themselves, their worth, and their power.

Andreas Suter's large book on the Swiss Peasants' War of 1656 began as a Zurich *Habilitationsschrift*. The first of its two parts is a "social drama," a narrative ordered by five moments of decision, at each of which events might have moved differently than they did. The rebellion began in December 1652 when rural subjects reacted to a devaluation, in the midst of a depression, of the coin on which the rural economy most depended. Soon, three armed lads ambushed a party of Lucerne officials, killing one and wounding a second. Unlike their hero, Wilhelm Tell, the killers were hunted down and shot. They came from the Entlebuch, a valley subject to Lucerne and a classic hotbed of rural revolt. From there spread a mobilization that threw much of the Swiss Confederacy into a revolt that turned into civil war. It ended in late 1653 in a crushing defeat, followed by executions, confiscations, and a political settlement that endured for almost 150 years.

Suter tracks the rebels' political education from their initial calculations of costs and risks—impoverishment versus punishment for uproar—through the stages of organization and mobilization, at each of which they deliberately violated the rituals of domina-

tion and subordination, and at each of which they became more conscious of their strength and the justice of their demands. The process took them from resistance to revolt to civil war, each a stage of their political education.

Part two reviews the same history in terms of economic and social and cultural structures, searching for what enabled and what limited the rebels' actions. The Swiss Peasants' War, Suter finds, was part of a general crisis of seventeenth-century Europe, the responses to and outcomes of which varied radically from people to people. The Peasants' War helped to forestall precisely the outcome—absolutist government—that the Fronde promoted in France. In Switzerland, the outcome was a paternalist regime of burghers over rural subjects, the roots of which may go as far back as the Compact of Stans (1484), and the consequences of which are perceptible until 1848. Behind the bricolage that became Swiss political culture, one can detect a culture of liberty that was learned and deepened through collective political action.

Suter's massive and densely documented study combines a brilliant recreation of events with an analytical power rare in any field of historical studies. Its theoretical apparatus draws on Anthony Giddens, Victor Turner, and Claude Lévi-Strauss, accepting only what helps us to grasp the mainsprings of early modern political action. He believes in relevance—behind the book lurk the events of 1989—but eschews all anachronistic modernizing, which makes for microhistory of the very best kind.

In Suter's view, political events are not predetermined by social structures but enabled by culture. The actors do not seek to alter inherited culture, which appears to them not in a complete and transparent form but as "broken" things, bricolages. They draw on their culture to enable collective action, and the creative translation feeds back to alter, in turn, the beliefs that empowered the action. This double process—the acts of will that translate belief into action and action's alteration of belief—creates the space for freedom and (collective) political agency that is proof against both the blind evolution of social forces and the endless epicycles of static cultures.

Suter's book is brilliant in every respect: technically, intellectually, and artistically. The wonderfully illustrated text is clad in interesting ancillary research into the grievance documents and the political executions, and all is underpinned by the superb archival work, precise grasp of geography, and adept use of folkloric materials that together form the signature of social history in Switzerland.

Finally, this is a timely work of historical scholarship. The Swiss today are spending much effort in deconstructing the old patchwork political culture, as they debunk Wilhelm Tell, Hans Winkelried, and the other doers of mighty deeds for liberty in the deep past. Objectively, this work dethrones the democratic claims of a traditional political culture and prepares

the Swiss for becoming burghers of an integrated Europe. Reading Suter's book may prompt some readers to stop and calculate political costs and risks, just as the Entlebuchers did in 1653.

THOMAS A. BRADY, JR.  
University of California,  
Berkeley

FRANCESCO GUIDA. *Michelangelo Pinto: Un letterato e patriota romano tra Italia e Russia*. (Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano: Memorie, number 42.) Rome: Archivio Guido Izzi. 1998. Pp. xvii, 210.

Francesco Guida's book is of particular importance for the modern reader. Michelangelo Pinto used visual propaganda highly effectively, first as editor of an illustrated satirical journal, *Il Don Pirlone*, during the Roman Revolution of 1848–1849 and then as author of the three-volume *Don Pirlone a Roma: Memorie di un italiano dal 10 settembre 1848 al 31 dicembre 1850*, a richly illustrated, biting critique of the failures of 1848 and the return of the reactionary governments. Pinto is equally important for moving in 1859, after an exile in Turin, to the St. Petersburg of the reforming Alexander II and the reactionary Alexander III, where he was an honored representative of Italian culture and national ideals to a Russian society in flux.

Guida divides his biography of Pinto in two parts, three chapters each to 1859 and to his life as a professor at the University of St. Petersburg, as Italian consul in Russia, Holland, North Africa, and Germany, terminating with his retirement in Italy. Born to a well-to-do Roman family in 1818, Pinto enjoyed a solid Catholic and humanist education, culminating in a law degree from the University of Rome, the "Sapienza" then under Dominican direction, and travel in Western and Central Europe. Literature, art, and music made the twenty-year-old turn from a career in law to writing. In the atmosphere of hope for a new liberal society created by the election of the liberal Pope Pius IX in July 1846, he became the co-editor of a new journal, *L'Italico*, beginning with the year 1847 as a forum for topics of public and not necessarily of political interest. But with the creation of a lay and representative government in Rome, the agitation for the termination of the temporal power of the pope, and the revolutions throughout Italy, *L'Italico* and its two successors resulting from mergers with other journals, the *L'Epoca* and the *Speranza dell'epoca*, reacted strongly politically, usually on the side of moderates like Terenzio Mamiani, chief minister for three months in 1848 of the lay government under the pope, but against the compromisers on the issue of papal temporal power for Rome and the Papal State. *Il Don Pirlone* paralleled the journal publications as a daily of "political caricatures" from September 1, 1848, to the last day of the Roman Republic, July 2, 1849. Pinto spent the last months in Turin, attempting to win sympathy and volunteers for the Roman Republic.

In retrospect, Pinto characterized *Il Don Pirlone*, a

cleric out of touch with the people, as an effort "to stigmatize with the whip of ridicule the misleading and lying faces" of the clerical government of the Papal State, while leaving "untouched the sanctity of the Pontiff in the divine spheres of dogma." The caricatures were humorous and biting and have the artistic spontaneity of the political moment. But this moment became increasingly harsh and strident with the murder of the pope's chief minister, Pellegrino Rossi, and the flight of Pius IX to Gaeta in November 1848. The Roman Republic, proclaimed in February 1849, was destroyed by the French expeditionary force of General Oudinot, who buried Liberty itself, as the last caricature of *Il Don Pirlone* saw it.

The retrospective volumes of *Don Pirlone a Roma* reflect the battle for liberty that was waged in blood and tears and, for the moment, lost. The illustrations accompanying long chapters of text are studied caricatures, usually not funny, and where the subject matter allows harshly anticlerical. *Don Pirlone a Roma* was the chief fruit of Pinto's ten years of exile in Turin. He did not return to Rome from his diplomatic mission but traveled to Paris and London, possibly to test his growing resolve to go to Russia against other possible foreign residences and employments.

The Roman, Turin, and travel years had offered Pinto various contacts with things Russian, including meetings with Aleksandr Herzen and acquaintance with Ivan Turgenev and, briefly, with his Decembrist cousin Nicolas in exile. Pinto may have seen himself as a possible successor of those Italian *carbonari* who had influenced the Decembrists and, indirectly, the Populists, although this point is made neither by Guida nor by Franco Venturi, the Italian historian of the Decembrists and Populists. It serves, however, to highlight the essential difference between the arrival of these Italian "subversives" in Russia and the arrival of Pinto. Pinto stood beside representatives of the other European nations in St. Petersburg as an equal, with one phase of Italian liberation and unification just achieved.

In a thorough analysis of correspondence, official documents, the Pinto family archive, and Pinto's own writings, Guida reconstructs the contributions of the "Roman exile" to the vibrant St. Petersburg cultural life through his lectures and writings on Italian literature from Dante to his own time. He married the highly educated daughter of a St. Petersburg family, Lidija Dmochovskaja, and gained the lasting friendship of Turgenev. He also felt the continuing harshness of the Russian political scene. A younger brother of Lidija, Lev Dmochovskij, died as a political prisoner. Pinto's career in the Italian consular service was a natural sequel to his cultural acceptance in St. Petersburg. After his retirement in 1905, he lived in Italy until his death in Milan in 1910.

Guida does not offer a summation and appraisal of the life of Pinto. In an appendix, he publishes Pinto's letter to Raffaele Giovagnoli, a historian of the Roman Revolution. This letter, which may be considered his political testament, expresses a fervent hope that the



Italian nation would endure beyond the social and party strife of his own day, and that clericalism and anticlericalism would both die out as devotion to the nation became universal. Regrettably, Guida did not include a portrait of Pinto in his book. Nor did he publish any plates of *Il Don Pirlone*. American readers will have to be satisfied with Charles Eliot Norton's lively verbal painting of some of his caricatures (see *Notes on Travel and Study in Italy* [1859]; Guida, p. 24).

REINHOLD SCHUMANN  
Boston University

HOWARD LOUTHAN, *The Quest for Compromise: Peacemakers in Counter-Reformation Vienna*. (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xvi, 185. \$59.95.

In 1564, Maximilian II inherited an imperial office confronted by Turkish aggression in the east, Protestant dissent in Germany, and the Council of Trent's uncompromising attempt to reform and restore the universality of Roman Catholicism. Ever since, there has been considerable debate about the emperor's response to these challenges, his apparent failure to master them, and his own personal convictions. His view that he was "neither a Catholic nor a Protestant but a Christian" could be taken seriously or merely seen as recognition that a Protestant Holy Roman Emperor was a contradiction in too many terms, despite the fact that at the time the majority of the inhabitants both in the Reich and in his hereditary lands were Protestant.

Howard Louthan has taken a close look at the imperial court and selected four major figures whom he identifies as the standard bearers for a "middle way" of religious peace. These irenicists came from quite different backgrounds: Lazarus von Schwendi, a Catholic soldier and diplomat; Hugo Blotius, a Dutch Calvinist scholar and librarian; Jacopo Strada, an Italian humanist, artist, antiquarian, and architect; and Johannes Crato, a Silesian Lutheran who became Maximilian's personal physician. Although they had little in common and seldom operated as a coherent faction at the court, they all shared a conviction that peace and stability in the empire could come only from reconciliation among the warring confessions. They drew from different strands of late humanism: Erasmian reform, Melancthonian concern for Christian unity, and neo-Stoicism, all suffused by a shared fear of the violence following the massacre of French Huguenots in 1572. Their political advice, particularly that of Schwendi and Crato, looked to toleration as a means to reconciliation. Strada and Blotius sought to create a universal culture around classical values, neo-Stoicism in Blotius's case, and a revival of ancient artistic and architectural forms in Strada's. All shared a "confessional ambiguity" (p. 126) that was both a strength and a weakness.

Attacked by the proponents of Tridentine Catholicism, particularly the Jesuits, these irenicists found

themselves pushed aside, in part by their own elitism. Louthan presents the last phase of this conflict for the conscience of the emperor as a struggle between moderate humanism and "early Catholic baroque" (p. 140) in which the latter had the advantage because it reflected the general mood of the day. Archduke Mathias's efforts to interpose personally in the Dutch revolt to achieve reconciliation proved both his own ineptness and the unreadiness of Europe to follow either of the only two roads open to religious peace: toleration or reunification. Louthan's epilogue traces the descent of the irenic movement down to the Bohemian revolt of 1618 and the beginning of the Thirty Years' War. What he does not note is that a century after this episode at the court of Vienna, a second brief flurry of religious irenism broke out in almost exactly the same circumstances: Turkish aggression in the east and a need to mobilize Protestant support for the Catholic Emperor Leopold I against both the Ottomans and the French. As in the earlier case, the later events showed that a movement born of politics died when the political impetus subsided. Only in the eighteenth century, when the elite of central Europe was seized by varying degrees of religious indifference, did confessional battles move to the sidelines.

Louthan's work on this project is impressive indeed. He ranges through a massive array of sources in many languages, with a large body of new material from archival sources added to the previous scholarship on the court at Vienna. There are a number of very useful pictures placed in the text where they clearly illustrate a point to be made. The organization of sections is somewhat confusing at times, a product of the diffuse issues and personalities involved. It is not easy to write coherently about so loosely coupled a polity as the Habsburg monarchy. This book is definitely a major contribution to our understanding of the brief reign of Maximilian II and to the international scene within which confessional conflicts and attempts at their reconciliation played out.

JOHN P. SPIELMAN  
Haverford College

JUDIT FRIGYESI, *Béla Bartók and Turn-of-the-Century Budapest*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. Pp. x, 357. \$45.00.

This is an important contribution to our understanding of Hungarian modernism and Béla Bartók's place in it. Judit Frigyesi has combined her musicological expertise with knowledge of the cultural history of turn-of-the-century Budapest to convey a largely convincing picture of the modernist explosion that produced Bartók, Endre Ady, and György Lukács.

Intellectual historical analysis alternates with and provides the setting for musicological analysis of the First Piano Concerto and, as the book's culmination, *Duke Bluebeard's Castle* (1918). Frigyesi discovers the ideological underpinnings of modernism in Romantic



organicism and of Hungarian modernism in Romantic nationalism. She shows how the modernist mainstream, represented for her by Arnold Schoenberg and Anton Webern, attempted to provide the sort of spontaneous coherence demanded by modernist organicism from within the classical (German) musical tradition, while the Hungarian answer, provided by Bartók, was to find the "natural" source for his work in the peasant music of the Hungarian countryside. The author traces the origins of this artistic move to the combination of Bartók's Hungarian nationalism and his ideological indebtedness to Friedrich Nietzsche. She is very adept at showing the parallels between Bartók's aesthetic beliefs and those of Lukács and shows the same sort of parallels with the poetry of Ady. The collaboration that linked all these figures together was that between Béla Balázs and Bartók in *Duke Bluebeard's Castle*, and it is this work, as a symbolist evocation of love, the nature of the soul, and the tragedy of existential loneliness, which crowns Frigyesi's study, both as literature and as the key work in Bartók's transition to a new, modern musical style.

Frigyesi's explanation of the ideological, nationalist meaning of gypsy music in Hungary is exemplary. She is also very good at setting out the relation between modernism and nationalism in Budapest, especially the ambivalence of the Hungarian capital's place in the national self-image. The author expresses some of this ambivalence in her attitude toward the Jewish presence in Budapest's modernist culture. At times, she seems rather reluctant to put much emphasis on the large Jewish presence; at others, and increasingly as the book goes on, the Jewish aspect of the milieu in which Ady and Bartók moved is accepted and even stressed. When it comes to the question of the moral imperative behind Hungarian modernism, Frigyesi reports Lukács's linking of his idea of "metaphysical conscience" to Jewish mysticism (p.113). She returns to this theme when discussing Ady, his life-embracing mysticism, and the intellectual context from which this arose: "Paradoxically, a deeply Jewish belief manifested itself in the anti-Jewishness of these assimilated Jews: they turned away from Judaism in order to embrace a Jewish mystical idea in the new vision of Christianity" (p. 188). She is very circumspect here, but one gets the impression that she would like to suggest that not only Jewish contributions to Hungarian modernism, but also those of non-Jews such as Ady and Bartók, were profoundly, if indirectly, affected by the predominantly Jewish background of the modernist milieu in Budapest.

There are very interesting parallels here with similar developments in Vienna 1900, but one of the imperfections in an otherwise fascinating book is Frigyesi's superficial understanding of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna, due to an over-reliance on Carl Schorske's interpretation of that culture that prevents her from seeing the full set of relationships between Vienna and Budapest. By over-emphasizing Schorske's asocial garden metaphor, Frigyesi misses the equally socio-critical aspects of

Viennese modernism and neglects the correlations of ethnic (Jewish) background with ethical emphasis in art. Hugo von Hofmannsthal is used to represent Vienna as against Lukács's Budapest, but it would be much more interesting to compare Lukács to his real Viennese counterpart, Karl Kraus, who receives barely a mention. It might also be remarked that, considering the supposed internalized art of Vienna as opposed to the committed, national art of Budapest, the fact that *Duke Bluebeard's Castle*, the highpoint of Hungarian modernism, with all its nationalized musical style, still explores the internal landscape of the soul deserves an ironic emphasis. Perhaps, despite the assumptions of this excellent book and much of the rest of historiography of Budapest in 1900, Hungarian modernism was not quite as different from its Viennese counterpart as it seems.

STEVEN BELLER  
Washington, D.C.

RÉTI GYÖRGY. *Budapest-Róma Berlin Árnyékában: Magyar-Olasz diplomáciai kapcsolatok a Gömbös-kormány megalakulásától a berlini háromhatalmi egyezményig, 1932-1940.* [Budapest-Rome in the Shadow of Berlin: Hungarian-Italian Diplomatic Relations from the Formation of the Gömbös Government to the Tripartite Pact of Berlin, 1932-1940]. Budapest: Elte Eötvös Kiadó. 1998. Pp. 303. 1,500 Ft.

Austria-Hungary's defeat in World War I and the consequent dissolution of the Dual Monarchy into small sovereign states created a new international situation for the Danube region. The victorious Great Powers on the continent aimed to profit from the new opportunities by expanding their influence over the area. For Hungary, which was forced to accept the harshest of the peace treaties at the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles, the primary reason for linking up with France or Italy had been their expected support for the revision of the treaty. In 1920, France flirted briefly with the thought of developing influence over Hungary at the cost of making some changes in the new status quo, but its leaders soon realized that this could be done only at the expense of undermining the pillars of France's foreign policy. Its *barrière de l'est* and its *cordon sanitaire* were dependent on Hungary's hostile neighbors, who wanted to hang on to all newly acquired territories, even at the cost of having large and discontented Hungarian minorities in their imperium.

By default, Hungary had to look to Italy, which, with a fascist government, had no constraints on its support of Hungarian revisionism. Benito Mussolini's policy was also revisionist in the Adriatic. Hungary desired to bring about revision peacefully, and for this purpose, it also sought close diplomatic relations with revisionist Germany. To bring about a solid front, Hungarian statesmen wished to act as mediators for the improvement of Italian-German ties. As György Réti points out, Gyula Gömbös was calling for a "Berlin-Rome

axis" in the mid-1920s. This was seen as having the potential to facilitate the achievement of Hungarian goals. Gömbös became Hungary's prime minister in 1932, and soon thereafter Adolf Hitler, intent on destroying the Versailles system, became chancellor of Germany. Réti's book concentrates on this period when Hungary's major foreign policy goal reached the realm of possibility, leading to success by 1938–1941. The monograph, based on Hungarian and Italian archival research, is the first book-length publication on the topic.

Réti shows that Hungary continued a dual policy in the 1930s, stressing its ties with both Italy and Germany. Its preference for Italy in the earlier part of the decade was based on Italy's stronger international position (p. 38). In 1934, the so-called Rome Protocols agreed to by Mussolini, Gömbös, and Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß demonstrated this trend. The increased cooperation of these three states aimed to help Austria against German encroachments, yet out of concern for Berlin, Hungary refused to guarantee Austria's sovereignty. Réti sees the pact as a means for Italy to interfere in the foreign affairs of Austria and Hungary (p. 45). Italy retained its dominant role until 1938, and the author stresses that it was the Italian government that insisted at the Munich Conference that the solution for the Sudeten problem should be accompanied by border rectification between Hungary and Czechoslovakia (p. 60). The outcome was the First Vienna Award, brokered by Germany and Italy.

The displacement of Italy by Germany as the dominant state over Hungary began in 1936 as a consequence of the Ethiopian crisis and the Spanish Civil War. This brought Italy and Germany together in the Rome-Berlin Axis of October 24, 1936. The formation of close ties eliminated the need for Hungary to act as a go-between. The pact also led to the creation of spheres of influence, which put Hungary into Germany's (p. 85). Italy's annulment of its economic agreements with Austria and Hungary in 1937 capped the process that led to an unchallenged German domination in the Danube area (p. 103).

In February 1939, the anti-German Count Pál Teleki became Hungary's prime minister. He tried to revive close ties with Italy, but as Réti points out, the more Italy came under German influence, the less Mussolini and his foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano were interested in Hungary (p. 275). Yet Hungary was forced into the German orbit not solely because of the international constellation but because it became evident to Hungarian decision makers that their ongoing revisionism could now be achieved only with German support (p. 244).

Réti's examination of Hungarian-Italian ties is masterful. He not only shows how much this relationship was influenced by Germany but also demonstrates how policies of others in the international system (such as France, England, and the Soviet Union) contributed to the shaping of decisions in Budapest and Rome. Because of the paucity of historical works on the topic,

and the quality and importance of the monograph, this book should be translated and published in English. Ideally such a translation, unlike the Hungarian original, would offer an index and maps to make the publication flawless.

PETER PASTOR  
Montclair State University

LINDSEY HUGHES. *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. xxix, 602.

Lindsey Hughes's new book is a very impressive volume. Its 470 large pages of text are followed by another nearly hundred pages of endnotes, in two columns and in small print, as well as by a bibliography and an index. There are also extensive prefatory materials and fine illustrations grouped in the middle of the volume. My first reaction was that of joy that such huge historical works are still being published, and in this case published very well, to the great credit of both the author and Yale University Press. I found no more than two or three dozen minor slips, and I was jarred only three times as I read every word of that enormous opus: when Schlüsselburg became Schlüsselberg in the index (p. 599), when 1872 was mentioned as the bicentenary of Peter's death rather than birth (p. 463), and, more seriously, where the issue was content rather than an obvious slip, when Hughes seemed to welcome the so-called "Testament" of Peter the Great as a perceptive introduction to the later policies of the Russian imperial government (pp. 61–62). This last statement comes close to being an endorsement by a serious scholar of the most noxious forgery in her field.

The book is an extremely rich one. It covers all major aspects of the Petrine reign, together with many matters usually omitted, especially in single-volume surveys, and all this information is presented with scholarly precision and with full knowledge of the context. Moreover, Hughes uses Europe in general as her framework, constantly comparing developments in Russia to those to the west of it. Russia thus becomes more understandable, and often it even fits rather well, *mutatis mutandis*, into the European pattern, whether in the matter of criminal law or of cultural tastes. In addition to telling us so very much about Petrine Russia, the author deals persistently with the historiography of her subject. In fact, topic after topic is presented in terms of a historical debate, with Hughes dismissing some views, explicating other approaches, and in general allowing the reader much more than a glimpse of the available literature. Already a leading figure in her field, Hughes will certainly gain in authority with the publication of this massive and remarkably comprehensive study.

Still, the book is not likely to transform our knowledge of Russia in the age of Peter the Great or to provide new and compelling interpretations of it. Sometimes the author's argument seems wrongly focused. Thus, much effort is devoted to proving that in spite of the reformer and the reforms, Russia at the

time remained largely Muscovite in its religious and cultural orientation (and in many other ways). What else could it have been (*pace* the official Soviet dictum, now a relic of the past)? More importantly, Hughes deals effectively with numerous opinions, but she is less successful in stating her own views and making the most of them. Her able and rich depiction of the notorious Drunken Assembly as part of the European (and Byzantine) carnival tradition needs further development and better coordination with Peter the Great's own religion and other religious issues of his reign. Again, her original observation—of a probable connection between the Drunken Assembly and Peter the Great's efforts, from early age until his death, to be someone else, whether a bombardier, a false deacon, a sailor, or an officer of the guard, is cut short with an assurance that that was the age of masquerade all over Europe. Time and again I wished Hughes more decisiveness and more coordination in her huge narrative. As to the wonderful and welcome, almost countless details in the book, both very well known and very little known, they are almost all already part of the Petrine scholarship (with the author, of course, providing the references).

To conclude, it seems most appropriate to thank Hughes for her fine and useful book and to look forward to her future publications.

NICHOLAS V. RIASONOVSKY  
University of California,  
Berkeley

JANE BURBANK and DAVID L. RANSEL, editors. *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*. (Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1998. Pp. xxiii, 359. \$24.95.

In the years immediately following World War II, American studies of prerevolutionary Russian history concentrated on the ideology of dissent. In part, this was an effort to understand either the success of the Bolshevik revolution or the failure of liberal or moderate socialist opposition, but it also reflected the fact that Soviet archives and libraries were inaccessible. In the 1960s, with partial access to the main archival collections, attention turned to the operation of the old regime itself, and in the 1970s and 1980s, again with a focus on 1917, the emphasis shifted to the social and political history of the final decades of the Romanov monarchy.

The volume at hand, edited by Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel, successfully demonstrates that, as a result of the end of the Soviet Union and the virtually unrestricted access to both the central and regional archival collections, American scholarship in the past decade has broadened its scope to encompass a very wide range of topics and methodologies. The volume contains twelve essays on disparate topics, ranging from "The Idea of Autocracy Among Eighteenth-Century Russian Historians" (Cynthia Hyla Whit-

taker) to "Constructing the Meaning of Suicide: The Russian Press in the Age of the Great Reforms" (Irina Paperno) and "The Serf Economy, the Peasant Family, and the Social Order" (Steven L. Hoch). Some of the contributors' names are familiar, and the others undoubtedly will become so in the future, because the level of scholarship is high throughout.

A brief review cannot do justice to so many individual contributions, but it is in their individuality rather than the collective impact of the work that most readers will find the greatest rewards. Part one includes, in addition to Whittaker's perceptive essay, Valerie A. Kivelson's "Kinship Politics/Autocratic Politics: A Reconsideration of Early-Eighteenth-Century Political Culture," which convincingly interprets the 1730 "crisis" as the success of the lesser nobility in achieving its political goals. In "The Imperial Family as Symbol," Richard Wortman draws on his recently published monograph to describe the appropriation of the patriarchal family image by Nicholas I.

In part two, Kevin Tyner Thomas ("Collecting the Fatherland: Early Nineteenth-Century Proposals for a Russian National Museum") and Nathaniel Knight ("Science, Empire, and Nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845–1855") deal with intellectual issues that flowed from the growth of Russian national consciousness and the multinational character of the Russian empire.

Although, as Burbank points out, none of the essays deal directly with foreign policy, the first two in part three—"Lines of Uncertainty: The Frontiers of the North Caucasus" (Thomas M. Barrett) and "An Empire of Peasants: Empire-Building, Interethnic Interaction, and Ethnic Stereotyping in the Rural World of the Russian Empire, 1800–1850s" (William Sunderland)—relate to the results of imperial expansion as well as the issues developed in the works of Thomas and Knight. Part three also includes Hoch's fascinating essay, which emphasizes the importance of the patriarchal tradition and the goal of survival in the peasant tradition. The final essay in part three, Gregory Freeze's "Institutionalizing Piety: The Church and Popular Religion, 1750–1850," shows that in many respects the church, "armed with a more elaborate and efficient apparatus" (p. 235), was able to do things that it had been unable to accomplish in earlier centuries, despite the abolition of the patriarchate and secularization of church lands.

Part four begins with what for this reviewer was the most rewarding of all the essays, Ransel's "An Eighteenth-Century Russian Merchant Family in Prosperity and Decline." This microhistory of one merchant's career shows that many of our traditional ideas about the Russian merchant class need to be reexamined. At least some members were culturally broad-minded and anxious to rise socially. Ransel reinforces the centrality of family patriarchy already emphasized by Wortman and Hoch. Douglas Smith's "Freemasonry and the Public in Eighteenth-Century Russia" argues that the traditional view of the Masonic movement that linked

it to the later emergence of a split between the state and society is flawed and ignores the movement's complexities. Paperno's essay discusses at length how suicide was discussed in the press, largely the press of critical opposition, and asks why, in an era of reform and change, suicide was perceived a sign of sickness and despair.

The volume concludes with a lucid and perceptive attempt at summary by Burbank. Finally, I must mention the excellent index, a feature often not found in collective volumes. The two editors and all of those involved in the production of this book are to be congratulated. On the basis of the work presented here, one can say that the future of American scholarship on imperial Russia is in good hands.

WALTER M. PINTNER  
Cornell University

RAIMO PULLAT. *Die Stadtbevölkerung Estlands im 18. Jahrhundert*. (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz. Abteilung Universalgeschichte, number 38.) Mainz: Philipp von Zabern. 1997. Pp. x, 299. DM 68.

Students of the Baltic region know Raimo Pullat as the author of a substantial corpus of demographic studies on modern Estonian urban history. This book, which first appeared in an Estonian-language edition in 1992, is a broadly gauged, quantitatively based survey of city life in the Estonian lands from the Great Northern War to the reign of Paul I. Its conclusions rest on data meticulously culled from a wide array of archival and published sources. That data is richest for Tallinn, Estonia's largest city and historic capital, and Pullat devotes much of his attention to that city. He nonetheless also offers surprisingly detailed portraits of Tartu, Narva, and many of the smaller towns. Comparative material firmly anchors Estonian events in their northern European and imperial Russian contexts.

Approximately half of the text comprises an exhaustive discussion of population movement. Devastated by war and pestilence in the early eighteenth century, Estonia's cities did not recover their population levels of 1700 until late in the era of Catherine II. These cities, like their counterparts elsewhere in northern and eastern Europe, were unhealthy places where poverty, disease, and an insalubrious climate resulted in appalling mortality rates. Population growth was a function of economically driven migration into the cities from the Estonian countryside, Germany, and the Russian interior.

The remainder of the book examines social structure and economic life. Although quantitative evidence continues to provide the basic framework of historical inquiry, biographical sketches of individuals and case studies of various economic enterprises help to capture the human drama behind the numbers. Pullat describes the eighteenth-century Estonian urban economy as a precapitalist system that looked more to the

past than to the future. Commerce and handicraft manufacture, rather than industry, lay at the heart of productive activity, and many of the smaller towns retained a semi-agrarian character. This was a world dominated by traditional merchant and artisan elites, whose corporate estates controlled political and economic life. Mobility among classes, even within the elites, was restricted by both law and custom. This hierarchy of exclusiveness found physical expression in the allocation of urban space. City centers were home to the elites; humbler folk gravitated toward the outskirts. Trades were concentrated on specific streets; and Tallinn's Castle Hill, which housed the institutions and urban residences of the local nobility, was legally and politically separate from the mercantile lower town. Paradoxically, this was also an immigrant society in which geographical mobility was accepted as a commonplace. An ambitious merchant or skilled craftsman could migrate from Germany, set up a business, and fully assimilate into local society within the space of a few years.

The book also explores the role of ethnicity in an environment where differences of language and culture reinforced the class hierarchy. The elites were largely German, the lower classes predominantly Estonian. Ethnic boundaries were not, however, impermeable. Both nationalities were Lutheran, and Pullat shows that, despite a formal ban on hiring Estonian apprentices, German artisan guilds in Tallinn and Tartu listed members whose origins probably were Estonian. Source material is doubtless scanty, but one wishes for more insight into ethnic assimilation, a process that intensified considerably in the nineteenth century. There was also a growing Russian presence by the mid-eighteenth century, and Pullat's discussion of that minority, which has hitherto attracted little scholarly attention, is a particular strength of this book.

The experience of women and the role of gender as a social category, topics that have generally received sparse treatment in studies of Baltic history, do not escape Pullat's attention. His study of marriage patterns reveals that the quickest path to assimilation into the local establishment for immigrants was betrothal to the daughter or widow of a guild member. Women also played a major economic role in their own right, often as widows who took charge of family businesses. Tallinn's largest carpentry shop in the 1750s was, for example, female-run. One perplexing, perhaps unanswerable, question does remain. Pullat describes merchant and artisan classes essentially rebuilt after the Great Northern War by the immigration of unmarried German men. Were there sufficient numbers of marriage partners within the local elite for them? Or did they turn elsewhere?

This book is easily the best on its subject yet published. It should find an appreciative audience not only among specialists in Baltic history but also among those interested in eighteenth-century Russia or in the demographic history of European cities. It will be an



essential reference point for the further exploration of the early modern Baltic.

ANDERS HENRIKSSON  
Shepherd College

DANIEL R. BROWER and EDWARD J. LAZZERINI, editors. *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917*. (Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1997. Pp. xx, 339. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$19.95.

This excellent volume draws on the expertise of both young and established specialists in the fields of Russian imperial nationalities studies and individual national areas. It not only provides a fresh examination of policies toward the tsar's Asian subjects but documents the execution of some policies on the "frontier" between Russians and conquered peoples and portrays views and reactions to Russian rule. In contrast to many edited volumes, the essays here share numerous and obvious themes so that, despite the wide range of topics, the book exhibits considerable thematic and even conceptual unity. Contributions make use of theoretical scholarship on identity formation, national consciousness, colonialism, and "Orientalism." Many authors use native-language as well as Russian-language sources; the latter include much archival material. One might take issue with arguments and interpretations in various essays, but no entry is weak, and the volume is a pleasure to read.

One major theme addressed by various essays is the process by which the Russians "constructed identity" defining the "other," the "alien" population (*inorodtsy*) of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Encompassed within this theme are issues of classification and hierarchy, the power and problem of naming, "imagining," and, of course, Russian self-definition in response to their defining of others. Most of these are in the first section, "Empire and Orient."

The first two essays deal with "early modern" Russia, up to the eighteenth century, and open the discussion of major themes. Michael Khodarkovsky, in "Ignoble Savages and Unfaithful Subjects," examines constructing identity, "otherness," imagining a hierarchy of peoples, and mutual misunderstanding during "frontier encounters." His essay illustrates how Russian constructions of non-Christian identities laid the foundation for state policies. Khodarkovsky demonstrates that religious identity was central to Russians' construction of native identity, and "religious conversion ended their 'otherness'" (p. 10). In contrast, Yuri Slezkine, in his rich piece, "Naturalists versus Nations," claims that Muscovites *expected* their alien subjects "to keep their own names, gods and oaths" and that "new lands in the east were being incorporated without being fully appropriated (christened, Christianized . . .)" (p. 28).

Co-editor Daniel Brower's discussion of "Islam and Ethnicity" takes the naming of subject peoples as its

point of departure and leads the reader to an examination of Russian rule in Central Asia in the 1860s and 1870s. The policies of K. P. Kaufmann, he argues, stand in contrast to the brutal policies carried out on the Volga and in the Caucasus because they were inspired by the relative liberalism of Catherine II, arguments about "citizenship," and by Kaufmann's own desire to "disregard" rather than persecute Muslim subjects. Brower appreciates the contradictions of actual Russian policy, noting that Kaufmann ordered his subordinates to respect the Muslims while simultaneously conducting bloody warfare (p. 117).

To a greater extent than Brower, other contributors directly address "citizenship" as a legal concept and policy. Dov Yaroshevski's "Empire and Citizen" focuses on government policy and the ways that some imperial bureaucrats thought about citizenship and civil society. Yaroshevski gives several meanings of "citizenship" starting with the modern notion of citizenship "as the assertion of individual rights" (p. 60) and coming rapidly to the Russian imperial use of the idea as "part of the search for new foundations of social control in the eastern parts of the empires" (p. 61). Thus, the term takes on a counter-intuitive meaning that, unless one keeps the definition firmly in mind, may tempt the modern Western reader to form a spurious picture of a liberal Russia.

Austin Lee Jersild's "From Savagery to Citizenship" deals with the Caucasus. Jersild spends less time defining citizenship (*grazhdanstvennost'*) and more on the policies that he considers rooted in the "viability of the notion of *grazhdanstvennost'*" (p. 104). Here Jersild brings to light views of Russian officials concerning the components of citizenship and the changes these would require for the Caucasian mountaineers: the need for military service and "cultural progress," including education in the native language. This essay, like several others in the volume, is gratifying in that it offers an explanation of the Russians' underlying suppositions and aims in pursuing particular policies.

While acknowledging the benefit of seeing the multiple strands underlying imperial policies, one might still criticize these works for placing so much emphasis on the positive *possibilities* inherent in the use of "enlightened" arguments that supposedly played a role in debates about policy. Most policy was not shaped by "enlightened" ideas.

Reminders of dominant attitudes and images in Russian thinking are found in Susan Layton's "Nineteenth-Century Russian Mythologies of Caucasian Savagery" and Robert Geraci's "Russian Orientalism at an Impasse." Layton not only reminds the reader of the atrocities committed by Russians during the conquest of the Caucasus, as recalled by their contemporaries, but links works of literature that "imagine" the Caucasus to historical study. Thus the study of history is enriched and the analysis of literature made accessible. Geraci's examination of "tsarist education policy and the 1910 Conference on Islam" (his subtitle) provides a useful case study of Kazan Tatars but more



broadly clarifies imperial perceptions of Islamic learning from 1870 to 1910 as the root of education policies that affected all Muslims in the Empire. Modern learning or "enlightenment" of Muslims was a threat to Russian rule. For positions of power or influence, "A fanatic without Russian education and language is better than a Russian-civilized Tatar" (p. 153), argued one scholar-official.

This picture is echoed in co-editor Edward J. Lazzerini's essay on Ismail Gasprinski, "Local Accommodation and Resistance to Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century Crimea." As the title suggests, Lazzerini uses the case of modernist leader Gasprinski (Gasprali) to explore "a rethinking of colonialism" and the "synchronicity of colonial and modernist discourses" (p. 171). Gasprinski strove to improve his own community through education. Despite his non-political agenda and professed loyalty to Russia, he was perceived by Russians as "'that' inorodets [alien] . . . in pursuit of a cause ultimately detrimental to the empire" (p. 180).

Lazzerini's essay launches the second section of the volume, "Frontier Encounters," in which the reader is treated to an array of case studies of Russian-native interactions, often from the point of view of natives themselves. Here one finds an emphasis on the "boundaries" between Russians and natives: crossing them, interacting across them, and defining them.

Adeeb Khalid's "Representations of Russia in Central Asian Jadid Discourse" illustrates the well-known jadid social criticism of Muslim society as expressed in early twentieth-century literature and emphasis on values embodied in the West as represented (however erroneously) by Russia. In contrast, Jo-Ann Gross examines the response to Russian conquest of Mirza 'Abd al-Aziz Sami, a Bukharan intellectual not associated with jadidism. In "Historical Memory, Cultural Identity and Change," Gross takes us deep into the historical and cultural context of Muslim Central Asia and the ideal of a "true and just Bukharan state" (p. 208) whose decline Sami lamented and analyzed.

Virginia Martin makes an admirable contribution to the still-thin literature on the pre-Soviet Kazakh (Kirgiz) steppe. In "Barimta: Nomadic Custom, Imperial Crime," Martin demonstrates vividly the efforts of Kazakh nomads to preserve and adjust the act of *barimta* (a "self-reprisal" effected by taking livestock pending the settlement of a dispute) in the face of its criminalization by imperial authorities, who defined it simply as theft.

Touching the theme of "accommodation and resistance" is Agnès Kefeli's essay "Constructing an Islamic Identity," which documents efforts by Muslim Tatars of the Elyshevo village to reconvert Christianized Tatars there. Return to Islam did not, clearly, mean forsaking knowledge associated with their Christian lives, especially Russian language. The converts merely used it for new goals, to "demonstrate the superiority of the Quran to the Gospel . . . compose and copy drafts of petitions to defend their rights" (p. 284).

Thomas Barrett's "Crossing Boundaries" examines trade patterns between the Terek Cossacks and the Chechen. The evidence shows that the Terek Cossacks "did take part in the economy of plunder" (p. 228) and that each party needed the other for trade (Cossacks needed grain and bought arms from the mountaineers) into the nineteenth century.

Perhaps the most exotic frontier of the lot appears in the final essay by Bruce Grant, "Empire and Savagery," on the Sakhalin Giliak (Nivkh). This nicely written piece examines an array of descriptions of the Giliak that depicted them "as anything from savages to socialists" and strives to explain why one view, "the evolutionist view of what it meant to be primitive in a civilizing world . . . rose to the fore" (p. 292).

As intended, this volume propels us toward a fuller and more nuanced view of the Russian Empire qua empire. The contributors offer concepts and a language, borrowed from the social sciences and literature on colonialism and Orientalism, with which to discuss issues not usually associated with Russia (few essays assault the reader with needless jargon). The book also shows the invaluable contribution that scholars can make when they know the native view, culture, and language as well as the imperial. That realization is long overdue.

AUDREY L. ALTSTADT

University of Massachusetts

JEFFREY BURDS, *Peasant Dreams and Market Politics: Labor Migration and the Russian Village, 1861–1905*. (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. Pp. xiv, 314. Cloth \$50.00, paper \$22.95.

The subject of this book by Jeffrey Burds is *otkhodniki*: that is, peasants who left their native villages to seek wage work. To leave, they had to secure passports. Passport data indicate that in the 1890s there were some two million *otkhodniki* from the nine provinces around Moscow that are the focus of Burds's study. His objective is to provide "a recontextualization of Russian peasant labor migration, a restoration of village social relations as the ground for understanding and interpreting peasant experience outside the village" (p. 9). Hence, the first five of seven chapters focus on interactions among *otkhodniki*, village and state officials, labor contractors and employers, and village communities.

Burds's work rests on an impressive foundation of sources, including material from eight central and three regional archives. The footnotes and bibliography take up eighty pages. The edifice that rises on this foundation is comparatively modest, comprising 218 pages of text. It may be that Burds was obliged ruthlessly to abridge his work. Subsections with portentous titles, such as "The Threat to Patriarchalism," are often only one page long. There are many instances of carelessness throughout, ranging from misprints in Table 1.2 to misuse of English words (e.g. "anathama-

size") and translations from the Russian (e.g. *troika*, p. 113; *poderzhannyi*, p. 158) that will sometimes puzzle or mislead non-specialists.

Burds expresses his perspective pithily in the subtitle of part one: "Peasant Labor Migration as a Threat to Village Security." *Otkhodniki* might indeed fail to support their children or pay their taxes; they might bring back alien values. Burds overstates that threat, however. He tends to forget that remittances from *otkhodniki* provided an essential complement and supplement, sanctioned in the nine provinces in question by long tradition, to the economies of families, households, and villages. Most *otkhodniki* kept their wives and children in the village, to which they generally returned at least annually, or when laid off, and then for good when their sons were old enough to replace them in the wage-labor economy. *Otkhodniki* were neither alien nor marginal in the village, yet Burds portrays the relationship as necessarily mutually and severely antagonistic. With respect to the claims of family members and the village community to a share of remittances, he speaks of "expropriation," "redistribution," and once of "raiding the cash economy" (p. 57).

Furthermore, "recontextualization" of these workers means leaving their work almost out of account. Some *otkhodniki* worked year-round in factories or the service sector; others worked seasonally in construction and transport. The nature and term of work shaped their relations with their families and the community, especially since villages tended to specialize in one craft or trade. Burds makes the good point that, because of this specialization, all the *otkhodniki* in a village might be laid off at once because of a slump and that such disasters produced a "pathology of mistrust" (p. 116) of the market. Elsewhere, however, he disregards the distinction between, say, barge-haulers and busboys.

The book ends with two chapter-length case studies. One, "The Culture of Acquisition," is a richly illustrated and impressive study of the spread of consumer culture to the Russian village. In the other, Burds seeks to "trace the development of a distinct culture of denunciation in village parishes" (p. 188). The latter chapter derives primarily from 300 cases drawn from the archive of the Moscow Spiritual Consistory. It is not convincing. Of the twenty-one instances Burds cites, five are petitions for separation or annulment, three represent attempts by communes to expel members who did not meet their obligations, two were the product of routine pastoral care, and only six entail denunciations of peasants by other peasants. Of these, five involve the conversion of Orthodox *otkhodniki* to the Old Belief, which is what one would expect, given the provenance of Burds's sources. Old Believers were prominent among Moscow's industrialists and other employers and supposedly used the promise of employment to lure Orthodox workers into their faith. Three of the denunciations complain in just such terms. Because the converts worked away from their

home villages, relatives and neighbors had to resort to formal procedures, i.e. denunciations, in situations where otherwise they might prefer face-to-face confrontation. It is hard to see in all this a culture of denunciation of which *otkhodniki* were the favorite targets.

This book contains interesting material, but it is at best a supplement to the more nuanced studies of *otkhodniki* by Barbara Engel, R. E. Johnson, and a number of historians writing in Russian.

DANIEL FIELD  
Syracuse University

GARY THURSTON. *The Popular Theatre Movement in Russia, 1862–1919*. (Studies in Russian Literature and Theory.) Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 374. \$59.95.

This is a passionate book from which scholars can learn much about the history of Russian theater, the popular education movement, and the constitution of Russian society in the last half century of the old regime. The popular theater movement began with the efforts of educated philanthropists and propagandists of various persuasions to influence the newly emancipated lower classes and grew into an extraordinary variety of enterprises, ranging from large, well-subsidized public institutions in the capitals serving thousands of people to small, local theatrical circles of workers and peasants operating on their own initiative throughout the country. Thinking of late imperial Russia, it is remarkable to imagine popular productions of such plays as William Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Maksim Gorky's *The Lower Depths* (1905), and Anton Chekhov's *Cherry Orchard* (1904).

The book is divided into two parts. In the first, Gary Thurston describes how the popular theater movement grew out of the concern of intellectuals to bridge the gap between themselves and the newly emancipated common people, a concern shared variously by Lev Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Aleksandr Ostrovsky, and other great Russian writers. In the second part, he discusses the last years of the tsarist regime, the involvement of Gorky and Chekhov in a new popular theater, and the hopes of intellectuals for a common culture in which theater would figure prominently. During this period, Thurston describes theatrical projects—including self-directed local circles organized by workers and peasants—as part of increasingly widespread independent action by citizens in all fields of endeavor, leading to the growth of civil society. In a brief concluding section, he notes how the Bolsheviks suppressed local initiative in theater, confirming their desire for control over all public activity and also their stereotype of peasants as primitive and backward people who had to be taken in hand.

The value of the book is considerable. First, Thurston reminds us that the idea of shared culture involving newly literate peasants was dear to Russia's greatest writers in the postemancipation era and was

therefore an important aspect of Russian intellectual life during this period. Second, he argues that early organizers of popular theaters such as the Ukrainian schoolmistress, Kh. D. Alchevskaia, and two pedagogues from Voronezh, N. F. Bunakov and L. Bunakova, shared in a nationwide effort at national self-improvement that involved people of various classes. In this regard, he contends (rightly in my view) that it is a mistake to treat their efforts merely as self-serving propaganda. Moreover, Thurston demonstrates the humanism that inspired these activists, who sought to bring theater to ordinary people. He rebuffs historians who dismiss promoters of literacy, reading, and cleanliness as "cultural imperialists" (p. 86) and asks pointedly, "Are Alchevskaia and the Bunakovs to be denounced for their cultural imperialism with respect to personal cleanliness?" (p. 120). Third, he shows that peasants who participated in the new social structures of industrializing and urbanizing Russia, including schools and popular theaters, were acting rationally to improve their lives. In this regard, Thurston disputes the views of scholars specializing in peasant studies, who portray Russian peasants as enmeshed in a web of traditional values expressed in a purely oral culture. Instead, he shows ordinary people gaining new understanding and expectations, something that will hardly surprise any scholar familiar either with the surveys of school children carried out in the last decades of the old regime or peasant voting patterns in the first elections to the State Duma. Finally, Thurston demonstrates the pluralism, untidiness, and cultural vitality of late imperial Russian society. During the last decades of the old regime, the division that once existed between the subsidized enlightenment theater projects of educators such as Alchevskaia and the Bunakovs and purely commercial entertainment tended to disappear, and plays by well-known writers were performed for mixed lower-class audiences, including peasants, as a commercial enterprise.

Thurston has given the book a theoretical component, drawn in part from Jürgen Habermas's discussion of the public sphere. On this basis, he contends that the promoters of the popular theater movement stimulated a public discussion of public issues and the identification of public space that ultimately contributed importantly to the development of civil society. Here his conclusions parallel those of Joan Neuberger, who showed in her *Hooliganism: Crime, Culture, and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900–1914* (1993) how newly active ordinary people sought to control public space in less socially constructive ways.

The book is attractively produced, although the absence of photographs is to be regretted. It is the first entry in a new series published by Northwestern University Press, "Studies in Russian Literature and Theory." The quality of this volume bodes well for future volumes in the series.

JEFFREY BROOKS  
Johns Hopkins University

ROBERT D. WARTH. *Nicholas II: The Life and Reign of Russia's Last Monarch*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997. Pp. viii, 344. \$65.00.

Nicholas II has exercised a curious hold on biographers since his (and his family's) execution in 1918. Wealth, power, orientalist fascination with "semi-Asiatic Russia," the lurid Rasputin episode, and an unhappy ending have attracted a public following that finds pathos and tragedy in Nicholas's life while overlooking the more numerous tragedies that he caused. At least ten English-language biographies have appeared in the last decade alone, led by a reissue of Robert K. Massie's *Nicholas and Alexandra* (1967), a perennial favorite with undergraduates, and Eduard Radzinsky's potboiler. In addition, Marc Ferro, Dominic Lieven, and Andrew M. Verner have published creditable scholarly works on Nicholas and his reign. Given such output, one wonders whether we need yet another biography of Nicholas.

Robert D. Warth's entry in this crowded field contributes little new to the current scholarship. Despite an exhaustive and up-to-date bibliography, the footnotes in this study come largely from memoirs, correspondence, Nicholas's diaries and diplomatic papers, and references to older monographs. Unlike Verner, Lieven, or Ferro, Warth concentrates on Nicholas and his reactions to events in his domestic and political lives rather than the broader factors that gave rise both to Nicholas and to the forces that overthrew him: the ideological milieu that shaped him, the restraints imposed on him by his bureaucratic surroundings, or the dramatic upsurge in social and political mobilization that marked the first decade of his reign, culminating in the revolutions of 1905–1907 and the war and revolution that followed in 1914–1917.

Following Nicholas from his upbringing through the mounting crises that punctuated his reign to its traumatic collapse, Warth paints a familiar picture of the last emperor: indecisive unless convinced his prerogative was involved—when he could manifest a surprising cruelty to rebels and recreant ministers alike; affable and exquisitely courteous; subject to religious "fatalism" (if not to fits of clinical depression, a diagnosis Warth avoids); deeply ambivalent about his role as autocrat; a devoted family man; and, above all, a ruler whose personality suited him better to the life of a Victorian bourgeois than that of the autocratic ruler of a modernizing empire. Echoing a venerable tsarist discourse—and Nicholas himself—Warth suggests that courtiers and ministers stood between tsar and people, isolating both from one another and thus increasing a mutual estrangement that resulted in tragic consequences for all. Unlike many biographers, Warth downplays the influence of Alexandra while highlighting that of Nicholas's mother, Dowager Empress Maria Fyodorovna.

Warth organizes his account well, switching ably from foreign to domestic affairs, providing scene-setting transitional passages when necessary. The

sources on which Warth relies lead him to render events from Nicholas's point of view, the blinkered quality of which helps one understand both how revolution came and how it came as a surprise to Nicholas in 1905 and 1917. Specialists will find that this perspective sometimes distorts the portrayal of high politics at home and abroad. In an overbrief conclusion, Warth argues that Nicholas's vicissitudes as a ruler contributed only indirectly to the empire's collapse: more important were the social dislocations occasioned by modernization and declining confidence in autocracy as a system among lower-level servitors and non-bureaucratic elites.

If this study offers little new to specialists on this period in Russian history, it certainly stands out in the throng of popular biographies, to which Warth provides a healthy antidote. He writes in an authoritative yet accessible style, larding his recitation with mordant asides. Non-specialists will find a clear and surprisingly comprehensive overview of this period's tumultuous history. Most impressive, he deals very well with the question most on the mind of Nicholas buffs: Grigory Rasputin. He devotes a chapter to the parade of mystics, quacks, and "holy fools" who trooped through Tsarskoe Selo and demonstrates how Rasputin appealed to the imperial couple's faux-nativist and highly naïve religiosity. While conceding that Rasputin gained entrée through his abilities to assuage the worst episodes of Tsarevitch Alexis's hemophilia, Warth finds Rasputin significant less for any influence he exercised than for how he came to symbolize the regime's corruption to high officials and the leaders of public opinion.

As popular biography, then, Warth's life of Nicholas succeeds admirably. Unlike Massie or Radzinsky, Warth hews very closely to his sources; the result is a clear narrative that indulges neither sensationalism nor sentimentalism. He has written a readable and thoughtful alternative to suggest when one encounters more fanciful biographies in undergraduates' footnotes or on friends' bookshelves. For that reason, at the very least, we should greet the appearance of this version of the Nicholas story.

DAVID McDONALD  
University of Wisconsin,  
Madison

HIROAKI KUROMIYA. *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s*. (Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, number 104.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xiv, 357. \$44.95.

The history of twentieth-century Russia is an extraordinarily violent one, fraught with wars, famines, and political terror. And no region within the Russian empire experienced more violence than the Donbas, or Donets Basin, a vital mining and industrial center on the borderland between Russia and Ukraine. To explain the genesis of this violence is a daunting task, one

that Hiroaki Kuromiya undertakes admirably in his new book. Kuromiya hypothesizes that because the Donbas was a frontier region (which harbored outcasts, fugitives, and the disenfranchised), it became a particular target for Stalinist terror.

Kuromiya's previous monograph dealt with the entire Soviet Union during the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932). In this book, he focuses on just one region but deals with over a century of history, from the early development of Donbas coal mining in the late nineteenth century through the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The value of this approach quickly becomes apparent, as Kuromiya is able to demonstrate the persistence of class antagonisms and violence over a long period of time.

Tensions between management and labor were already rife in the late imperial period, when rude bosses were carted off in wheelbarrows and rebellious workers were flogged. The Revolution of 1905 precipitated strikes, anti-Semitic pogroms, and even greater stratification between Donbas managers and miners. These deep sociopolitical divisions left little basis for cooperation and liberal democracy when the tsarist autocracy collapsed in 1917. Instead the Donbas, and indeed much of the Russian Empire, descended into anarchy and armed conflict. Communist victory in the Civil War restored order but did not resolve prerevolutionary tensions. Soviet leaders found it necessary to rely on old managers and engineers to supervise mines and metallurgical plants in the Donbas. Workers bitterly resented the continued authority of their former bosses, and Soviet officials themselves distrusted these prerevolutionary technical elites and conducted a series of show trials against them.

By the 1930s, newly trained specialists replaced old technical elites, but tensions persisted nonetheless. The hardship of the industrialization drive and the extreme brutality of Stalinist collectivization fueled new social antagonisms. Communist officials often behaved in a high-handed manner, not only toward the thousands of peasants deported for opposing collectivization but also toward rank-and-file workers. Severe material deprivation and starvation during the horrendous 1932-1933 famine further exacerbated popular discontent, and the extravagant lifestyle of some Communist officials did nothing to lessen resentments. Kuromiya explains that it was during this period that the official concept of internal enemies underwent a transformation. Whereas previously enemies had been identified as class aliens ("bourgeois" specialists and kulaks), now the category of "enemy of the people" emerged. It was by using this label that the Stalinist leadership mobilized workers and peasants to denounce thousands of Communist officials who were executed during the 1936-1938 purges. Kuromiya demonstrates that the Donbas suffered disproportionately during the Great Terror, as large numbers of Communist officials, industrial managers, former kulaks, and ethnic minorities were arrested and shot.

As if the Donbas had not experienced enough



bloodshed under Soviet rule, it lay in the path of the Nazi invasion (and indeed was one of Hitler's primary targets). Kuromiya describes the brutality of the Nazi occupation and the genocide against the Jews in Ukraine. Once the Red Army recaptured the Donbas region, Soviet reprisals against Nazi collaborators took an additional human toll. Although Kuromiya does not cover the postwar era in any detail, he does provide an overview of events up through the collapse of the Soviet system and the emergence of Ukraine as an independent country.

The great strength of this book is the extensive and meticulous research on which it is based. Kuromiya utilizes a wealth of archival materials as well as published accounts and interviews to provide exquisite detail about the events he depicts. His source base includes former KGB archives in the Donbas, where he was able to see secret police reports on popular moods and interrogation records. Especially gratifying is his judicious use of these sources. Instead of crowing about their revelations, he is careful to note their limitations and to use them in conjunction with other materials.

At times, Kuromiya's attention to detail crowds out discussion of larger conceptual issues. For example, his theme of freedom and terror is not well developed. Although the Donbas was a frontier steppe region, Kuromiya does not prove his hypothesis that "Stalin terrorized the Donbas because it symbolized freedom" (p. 340). Indeed, the Soviet Union had many frontier regions, including some (Siberia and Central Asia) more far-flung than the Donbas. The viciousness of Stalinist terror in the Donbas might be more attributable to its importance as an industrial center and its location between Russia and Ukraine (both factors that Kuromiya discusses at length but does not highlight in his overall argument). But even if his conceptual framework could be improved, Kuromiya provides extremely valuable research and insight on a number of issues central to Soviet history.

DAVID L. HOFFMANN

*Ohio State University*

[All reviewers of books by Indiana University faculty are selected with the advice of the Board of Editors.]

#### MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

CHARLES LINDHOLM. *The Islamic Middle East: An Historical Anthropology*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 1996. Pp. xxvii, 324. \$24.95.

Western interest in Arab history and in all forms of Islam is still strong, colored by lurid reporting and no less lurid stereotypes of tribalism, fanaticism, violence, and the veil. The fevered and politicized public context makes writing a book that aims to be an historical anthropology of "the Islamic Middle East" both a pressing need and an even more peculiarly difficult enterprise than it would in any case be. The difficulties are also intellectual. A writer on the Islamic Middle

East knows a generation of critical studies that have questioned the links between knowledge and power in Orientalism, as well as uses of concepts such as "religion." Political economy and discourse theory, in easy or uneasy relations, have assaulted traditional approaches and methods. Theories of colonial and postcolonial forms of modernity question the assumptions and institutions of "area" and regional studies, which have also been challenged by grant-giving foundations as much as by sharp debates on approaches to the writing of anthropology and history.

For whom is what sort of book to be written, on what level, and in what framework? Is there a framework for such an enterprise? Should the work be thematic? Chronological? Comparative?

Charles Lindholm, who has written major studies of the Swat Pukhtun of Pakistan as well as more comparative anthropology and work on charisma, opts to try to combine the thematic and the chronological with a strong thesis, namely that Middle Eastern peoples are most deeply motivated in action, feeling, and thought by central values, which he identifies as those of "egalitarianism, competitive individualism, and the search for personal autonomy." These core values that are common also to the West, and especially America, and essential to the modern world, are nonetheless part of difference, for they are part of a particular cultural system based on radical gender separation, honor, and patrilineality that favor distinctions based on gender, race, social strata, power, and other grounds. This system, in turn, seems to have been generated (almost determined) by the ecological conditions of the region. The results, Lindholm argues, are unstable urban civilizations and armed peripheries that generate a cultural heritage favoring opportunistic risk-taking and entrepreneurial activity.

Authority has been personalized down through the ages, whether in prophets, caliphs, sultans, or tyrants. But all attempts at legitimizing a state founder on what Lindholm regards as a profound Middle Eastern belief in fundamental social equality. The only alternative to winning the community's approval is pure patronage and coercion, as in modern Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq. The choice essentially lies between the Messiah and the Manipulator (each with his army), a choice that goes back to ancient Sumer.

The four main sections of the book deal with the conditions of egalitarian individualism, state, and society (in which, rather as in Ernest Gellner's work, the enormously significant Ottoman Empire emerges lamely in seven pages as "an exception"), sacred powers in law and sanctity, and finally what Lindholm considers the recurrent problem of subordination, which focuses on slaves, eunuchs and blacks, women, and love and friendship.

Throughout the book, which is written for readers with no knowledge of the topics, there are insights to jolt the beginner, particularly on religion and its Sufi forms. Specialists will notice the sudden telescoping, summary treatments (the Ottomans being the most



glaring case), and a tendency to suggest age-old cultural and value continuities, say between millennialist rebels in Khurasan and modern Islamic radicals, or the unhappy pattern of personalized rule that suppose a sort of perduring value determinism. The mixture of the material and the cultural is an uneasy one. Citations of very different works and differently reliable studies discussing Swat, Jordan, and Morocco suffice to assert a general pattern of egalitarianism that so much of the other work used appears to deny.

Whole regions and periods unavoidably disappear, a peril of the genre and of the need to produce some sort of global Islamic Middle East object. Even a writer of Lindholm's scholarship cannot prevent the overall impression of a patchwork. It may be that the project cannot be persuasively undertaken.

MICHAEL GILSENAN  
New York University

RICHARD TAPPER. *Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan*. (Cambridge Middle East Studies, number 7.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xvii, 429. \$69.95.

A historian once remarked that if tribes did not exist, anthropologists would need to invent them. Richard Tapper might agree. He has spent much of his professional life studying the invention of tribes and their interactions with other tribes and with states. In this book, he does so by concentrating on the Shahsevan, a major nomadic people living on the frontiers of Azerbaijan in northwest Iran. His methodology involves blending historical research with extensive ethnographic fieldwork.

The book begins with a discussion of the several fundamental definitions of tribe that anthropologists have adopted, how these definitions hold up when applied to the Middle East, and why they are unsatisfying. Tapper is interested in the meanings of the term—or its approximation in the vernacular languages of the Middle East—and how these square with Western meanings. He then draws some distinctions between cultural and political classifications of tribes and between tribes of varying sizes. He also suggests that government officials, and not a few academics, "have taken a highly positivist view of tribes, expecting them to be mappable, bounded groups, with little membership change, and wanting an exact terminology of classificatory and comparative purposes" (pp. 8–9). Although Tapper does not spare anthropologists, his most pointed criticism is of the historian Patricia Crone, who views tribes as a purely pastoral phenomenon despite abundant evidence that tribes were both settled and pastoral. Tapper's introduction is helpful, but there is also a certain insularity that comes with his kind of parsing of concepts and definitions that is most reminiscent of analytic philosophy.

Tapper makes it clear that historical sources on the tribes of Iran are often non-indigenous and thus have limitations. They allow at least three ways of classifying

tribes: by ethnicity, province, and sociopolitical structure. None is particularly useful in sorting the rich variety of tribal formations in Iran. Extrapolation, by which scholars reconstruct tribal society in the past from contemporary ethnographic work, is also flawed.

Tapper devotes the first two parts of his book to clarifying how the Shahsevan were formed. He argues that, by our own times, the Shahsevan had acquired three versions of their origins. The Shahsevan themselves contributed to the construction of these differing versions, as did various outside observers of their political behavior, particularly Russian observers. The most common version is that the sixteenth-century Safavid ruler, Shah 'Abbas, created the Shahsevan in order to widen the base of his personal support. Their subsequent history is then portrayed in terms of how the Shahsevan grew increasingly disloyal to the state in Iran. The second version involves the unification of the Shahsevan tribes in the eighteenth century under the leadership of one of the Shah's "henchmen." The third and present-day version speaks of the Shahsevan as "thirty-two independent tribes with no central authority" (p. 317).

Tapper meticulously examines these different versions by a close reading of the available sources supporting them. He dismisses the efforts of certain Western and non-Marxist commentators to see the origins of the Shahsevan in their name. As for the Marxist-oriented Russian commentators, their socio-economic interpretations are fairly well grounded, although they fall short in their periodization of the Shahsevan's development. Tapper's careful examination of the sources suggests that there were no traces of the Shahsevan before the end of the seventeenth century, which eliminates the first, and most popular, version of their creation under Shah 'Abbas. He also finds no support for claims that a Shahsevan confederacy existed in the early eighteenth century or that it broke down toward the end of the century, as certain Russian observers have contended.

In the third part of his book, Tapper examines the complicated relationship between the Shahsevan and the states with which they interacted in periods of profound historical change. He admits that his sources do not allow him to portray in any detail the structures of everyday life among the Shahsevan, at least not before the twentieth century. He concentrates, therefore, on tribal and government elites. Tapper is at his best when describing the variety and gradations of tribal chiefs and their mediating role between state and tribal society on Russia's Caucasian frontier with Iran. We learn about the complex system of grazing rights that evolved in the mid-nineteenth century and that characterized Shahsevan social organization down until our own times. His description of how traditional forms of economic and political authority connected to tribal descent gave way to more purely materialist factors of accumulated wealth as the Iranian economy opened up to capitalist relations is richly nuanced and non-linear. He also offers a fascinating account of how

Russia used political disorder among the Shahsevan to assert pressures on the Iranian government, not only to contain the disorder on the frontiers but also to gain the upper hand in their historic power rivalry.

In the final chapters of his book, Tapper illustrates how the various constructions of Shahsevan identity determine the way they view their own past. Although they refer to themselves and are referred to as Shahsevan, they do not share common origins, do not possess a language or religion distinct from their neighbors, and are not politically unified. They have never had a stable identity as such. Tapper concludes that to know the Shahsevan is to recognize that their identity has shifted over time and has been represented and exploited differently by distant Iranian rulers in far-off capitals, by Shahsevan chiefs who controlled their land, and by the two main classes of Shahsevan commoners: flockowners and shepherds.

This book is not an easy read. The prose is dense and the details, especially in the middle chapters, are overwhelming. Tapper as ethnographer at times loses the confederacy for the clan. Still, the rigor with which he examines and uses his sources in the deconstruction and reconstruction of Shahsevan origins and identity is commendable. Other scholars of tribe-state relations in the Middle East and beyond will appreciate his methodological interventions. Perhaps the highest praise that can be offered is that Tapper, the anthropologist, merits inclusion in the guild of historians.

PHILIP S. KHOURY

*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

CHARLES E. DAVIES. *The Blood-Red Arab Flag: An Investigation into Qasimi Piracy, 1797–1820*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press; distributed by Northwestern University Press, 1997). Pp. xxi, 453. \$80.00.

Were the Qawasim, ancestral residents of today's United Arab Emirates, engaging in piracy against British and British-protected shipping in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea during the Napoleonic era? Or, put another way, was it fair to call the shores opposite Hormuz the "Pirate Coast"? This is the central question motivating Charles E. Davies's absorbing investigation into events leading to British dominance, first at sea, and then on land, of the greater Persian Gulf region. The question is critical, since British hegemony lasted to 1971. Davies provides a detailed and exhaustive survey of cases of maritime predation by the Qawasim, particularly those based at the port of Ras al-Khaima, and they read like pirate narratives and survivors' tales from any part of the world. Yet although the author concedes that most Qasimi (the adjectival form of Qawasim) raids on merchant vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz and neighboring seas between 1797 and 1820 appear to have had some pecuniary motivation, he hesitates to call them piratical. Why? In short, there were several factors at play beside the greed of a few well-armed men.

This book reads at first like a standard, dispassionate

military history, thick with details of battles, armaments, vessels, tactics, and diplomatic wranglings. Such a perception fades, however, as Davies's subtle approach to the evidence begins to sink in. The author is a barrister, and the first half of his book is a count-by-count indictment of Qasimi maritime predation in the early nineteenth century. After weighing this evidence, particularly from the British perspective but also from that of numerous Hindu and Gujarati merchant-victims, it seems that the expeditions ordered by the East India Company from Bombay in 1809–1810 and 1819–1820 were strictly, though at times imperfectly, aimed at suppressing acts of piracy, unprovoked larceny at sea. The second half of the book, however, argues that these events must be viewed in light of the larger religious and political context of Gulf history. Here Davies departs from tradition to revise our view of, if not quite justify, the predatory acts witnessed by British agents and their protégés during these tumultuous years.

The Persian Gulf in the eighteenth century, as Davies clearly describes it, was a kind of battleground for myriad competing religious, economic, and political interests: a violent and uncertain place for commerce after the decline of Portuguese and then Dutch naval influence. Circa 1800, it must have seemed anarchic. Aside from plunder of passing merchant vessels, the coastal economy offered few opportunities beyond scattered date cultivation and a small but lucrative pearling industry. For Davies, the Gulf Coast was a hard place to make a living, made harder by periodic raids from neighboring tribes, attacks from rival port cities like Muscat, and occasional Persian, Ottoman, Saudi, Egyptian, and European meddling. The political rivalry between Ras al-Khaima and Muscat was of particular concern, and Davies suggests that much of what was called Qasimi piracy in the years 1797–1804 was part of a vigorous response to the expansionist policies of Muscat's ruler, Sayyid Sultan.

Most important to Davies's partial defense of the Qawasim, however, was the introduction of a new sect of Islam founded by an eighteenth-century Arabian Shaikh, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab. Wahhabism, as it has come to be known, called for a return to fundamentals: austere lifestyle, sharply circumscribed morality, violent cleansing of shrines and homes, and general intolerance of heterodoxy, particularly polytheism or things resembling it. Wahhabism swept the Arabian Peninsula and ports across the Strait of Hormuz in the second half of the eighteenth century. By the 1790s, the Qawasim were among many coastal peoples absorbed into an expanding politico-religious Saudi net, yet they, more than their neighbors, seem to have taken this new-found religious enthusiasm to sea in their swift-sailing baghlas and battils. If they plundered passing vessels with alarming cruelty, they did so with the faith of true believers.

Davies identifies a strong link between Saudi religious directives and increased attacks, particularly of Indian vessels; Qasimi Wahhabism included strong

pronouncements against Hindu polytheism, in particular, and the evidence, including some intercepted letters from 1808–1809, is convincing. Ultimately Davies claims Wahhabism and the momentum of Saudi expansion constituted “the prime special cause of Qasimi maritime depredations, especially those of 1808–19” (p. 251). Two other factors that supported the Qasimi raids, as Davies argues, were contracting trade opportunities (resulting from intertribal conflicts and British expansion) and long-accepted patterns of social behavior, particularly the Bedouin glorification of plunder as a means to status. This last suggestion is probably the most tenuous proffered, as it requires a link between land-based Bedouin traditions (which varied in time and space) and coastal groups like the Qawasim. In the end, Davies does not try to settle the question of whether or not the “Pirate Coast” was unequivocally infested with pirates, choosing instead to highlight religious and social factors that suggest ambiguity while conceding that “maritime plunder proved in the short term more lucrative than trade” (p. 242).

This is an important and engaging study, thickly descriptive but also subtly analytical. Davies artfully connects a series of highly controversial incidents of maritime plunder to a layer-by-layer exploration of major shifts in politics, religion, and economy in this complex and splintered region. Throughout, the author demonstrates a clear command of English, Arabic, and other (often new manuscript) sources. He corrects and clarifies cryptic British transcriptions of Arabic terms and place names. Portions of key texts are provided in the appendixes, including some colorful descriptions of vessel seizures. Maps and illustrations are clear and well-placed, and the index is thorough. Davies deserves special praise for illuminating the doctrinal and historical dimensions of religious revivalism, particularly Wahhabism, and its potential for inciting acts of pillage. If anything needs clarification in the world of pirate studies, it is the weight of religion in justifying or motivating such acts.

KRIS LANE

*College of William and Mary*

#### SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

CLAIRE C. ROBERTSON. *Trouble Showed the Way: Women, Men, and Trade in the Nairobi Area, 1890–1990*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 341. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$24.95.

Claire C. Robertson explores the role of women in the trading and market-gardening system that feeds the Nairobi area of Kenya. Unlike West Africa, where market women have long been a subject of interest and study, the history of women traders in East Africa has been largely ignored. Yet their contribution has been enormously important. The “herstory” of women traders stands at the intersection of gender, business, and labor history and consequently requires an interdis-

plinary lens. Robertson takes up this methodological challenge by drawing on a number of techniques, including archival research, survey data, oral interviews, and the study of ethnobotany. Examining trade over a one-hundred-year period, Robertson stresses the integration of Nairobi trade into the East African economy, explores the relationship between trade and family structures, illustrates the way men and the state have sought to control women traders, and highlights the efforts of women traders to carve out their own place in the Kenyan political economy.

Robertson is at her finest when discussing the details of grass-roots commerce, particularly the transformation of precolonial trade, in which men and women held complementary economic roles, to the gender-segregated trade of the colonial and postcolonial era. She focuses on the bean trade, which she sees as “a template for the history of women” in the Nairobi area (p. 3). Dried beans were a woman’s crop, trade commodity, and major source of food. The marginalization and devaluation of beans in favor of maize provides an entry point for evaluating shifts in the gendered character of agricultural production and trade over time. Robertson provides a lengthy and complicated description of bean production and sales in the Nairobi area. This detail is not, however, simply an exercise in agricultural history. It provides the basis for examining struggles over women’s labor and the gendered character of class formation during this period.

Indeed, Robertson challenges the absence of gender in debates over class formation and development in Kenya, most notably the work of Colin Leys. Her data does highlight the differential access of women and men to economic opportunities and women’s disproportional membership in the more marginalized sectors of the economy. She also demonstrates the central role of women’s labor for male prosperity, and consequently the pivotal nature of struggles to control that labor. Robertson offers little insight, however, into the gendered character of the elite, dismissing elite women as overwhelmed by “Western influence” and “imposed notions of invisibility or impropriety” (p. 5). She underplays both gender struggles within the elite and the possibility for gender-based, cross-class alliances. Robertson pays little attention to divisions within the working class, or to the possibility that factors such as ethnicity, religion, and culture might affect gender relations both within and between classes. This is all the more important when one considers the cross-class nature of the current women’s movement in Kenya.

This book is not simply a depressing tale of male power and female subordination. While never flinching from describing the many ways that male power, often augmented by the state, has managed to constrict women traders’ opportunities to accumulate and expand their trade, Robertson does not portray the female traders of Nairobi simply as victims. She demonstrates dramatic shifts in economic and marital practices. Women traders have increasingly contested male control over their bodies and children. They are

"getting custody of children, pushing into new territory in business, and asserting control over their own bodies by rejecting abusers, and restricting their own fertility" (p. 238). The traders have also organized collectively to protect their businesses from harassment by the state, the ruling elite, and male traders. Robertson's discussion of female traders' efforts to resist the Moi regime's anti-hawker campaigns is particularly revealing.

Robertson thus places Nairobi market women and

gender squarely at the center of debates about development and African economic history. Although inclined to overstate the centrality of class and patriarchy, and to underplay the complexities and compromises of daily life, this book is a valuable contribution to the study of gender and African economic life. The triumphs and troubles of the Nairobi market women can no longer be ignored.

JANE L. PARPART

*Dalhousie University*

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## Film Reviews

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JOAN OF ARC. Produced by Peter Bray; directed by Christian Duguay; screenplay by Michael Alexander Miller and Ronald Parker. 1999; color; 240 minutes. Distributor: CBS.

In this made-for-television film, we are presented with a message about Joan of Arc that is both clear and simple: piety should have overcome worldly power and nearly did, but selfish cynicism prevailed. What went wrong in Joan's story is not probed deeply here. Instead, the filmmakers have opted for the tried-and-true formula of a pure young girl led to a horrible death by evil, ambitious men.

Retelling a story familiar at least in outline to most viewers always poses the problem of bringing a fresh approach, and never more so than with Joan. Her popularity through five centuries has produced, in addition to a new biography almost every year, an enormous number of epic poems, plays, oratorios, operas, films, and now TV dramas. This latest contribution to the oeuvre scores well visually, presenting fifteenth-century poverty as ugly and medieval war as unrelentingly brutal; the battle scenes are bloody enough to satisfy Steven Spielberg. The disappointment comes in the film's refusal to grapple with the issues that Joan herself came to see clearly before her death. Leelee Sobieski's performance captures Joan's singlemindedness, stubbornness, and audacity. But the records reveal Joan as being also earthy, witty, cunning, and very ambitious. What is missing in both script and performance is her very real effort to be heard in the world of men.

Joan's brief life was filled with dramatic encounter and inner struggle. The film writer's choice, therefore, to leave out much of the real and to substitute the spurious is hard to explain. And when the writer's fictionalizing goes against the grain of what we know from the records, it is unconscionable. For the sake of clarity, let us begin by identifying the fictions for which there is no historical evidence. First, the film fabricates a meeting between Joan and Joan of Luxembourg (played by Shirley MacLaine) in an unbelievable scene that adds nothing to the plot. Second, the film claims that Joan was hesitant to use the army to attack, thus creating the impression that she was peace-loving. In fact, Joan, driven by her sense of mission to save

France, was often eager, even rash, in calling for battle.

More broadly, this cinematic version paints a skewed picture of what we know of the D'Arc family. It claims that Joan's father tried to kill her when she was born, because she was not a boy. In fact, he did threaten to kill her, but only when she first showed an interest in soldiers; later he honored her by attending the king's coronation, Joan's great moment. The film suggests that she visited her family after her first great success, whereas, having once left Domremy, she never returned. And in this presentation, her brother Pierre is killed in battle. Actually, he survived Joan and found a woman to impersonate her in an itinerant traveling show. To have explored the way the D'Arcs prospered after Joan's death, precisely because of her career, would have been more useful than these fictions and could have shown a family rising from the peasantry into the minor nobility.

Most skewed of all is the picture of Joan's relation to the church. The filmmakers claim that she told the parish priest about her "voices"; in fact, she told no one until she was forced to do so during her trial. The film also provides her with a companion, a sympathetic nun who accompanies her everywhere. But Joan kept no religious person close to her, and no woman, religious or lay. Indeed, she drove away a lay woman who tried to join her. Joan's path was lonelier than the film admits. Finally, the director throws away her ultimate stand for independence, her insistence at her trial that she respected the authority of her inner voices over that of the church. Instead, the focus of the trial scene is on the inner conflict of the bishop who is examining her.

Therein lies the main frustration of the film. The subject was one of the extraordinary women of European history; her actions provided the turning point in the Hundred Years' War and the foundation for the modern French nation. But, in order to make her appear saintly, the film denies her the central activating role in her own story. That role is given to the men around her. Her powerful spiritual insights are interpreted as an exercise in passive obedience. At the stake, she is made to say "Thank you" to God for her martyrdom. Those are words that Joan of Arc is unlikely to have uttered.



For a more believable Joan, one must still go back to George Bernard Shaw's *St. Joan* (1923), made into a film in 1957. For exploration of the class and gender implications of Joan's story, see Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism* (1981), and my own *Joan of Arc: Heretic, Mystic, Shaman* (1986). We can hope that some future filmmaker will create a new drama of Joan of Arc that will do justice to these issues.

ANNE LLEWELLYN BARSTOW,  
EMERITA  
State University of New York,  
Old Westbury

THE DEATH TRIANGLE [*Triunghiul Morții*]. Produced by Oficiul Național Cinematografic, Antena 1, Studioul Cinematografic București, CineTV Film, Filmex; directed by Sergiu Nicolaescu; screenplay by Sergiu Nicolaescu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor. 1999; color; 176 minutes. Romania. In Romanian. Distributor: Romania Films.

Romanian filmmakers have not produced a historical movie since *The Mirror* (1994), a movie about Marshall Ion Antonescu, nor an epic historical film since the good old days of Communist sponsorship for such expensive endeavors. In *The Death Triangle*, Sergiu Nicolaescu attempted (or rather was forced by the new politics of fiscal restraint) to fulfill an old dream by making a movie about the Great War, utilizing mostly private funds. If I were to add that it is the first Dolby Romanian production, I would reach the end of my list of the film's cinematographic qualities. An unbearably dull and long production, incoherently written and unimaginatively directed, *The Death Triangle* has nothing to offer the viewer as visual entertainment or educational experience.

The film's historical interpretation of the Great War offers an opportunity to discuss the construction of public memory of the war from Nicolaescu's vantage point. My comments regarding this aspect of the film are informed by watching the movie and an interview given by the director on Romanian television (Antena 1) a few days before the film's premiere. *The Death Triangle* offers an entirely personal vision of the war, as Nicolaescu himself confirmed when he denied using any historians as consultants for the movie. In fact, he spoke very proudly of the fact that he had for years been reading memoirs of the participants in the war and thus understood the reality of the war better than any history textbook. He gave as prominent examples the memoirs of Marshall Alexandru Averescu (the main character in the film, played by the director himself) and those of Queen Marie. The movie thus attempts to provide a fresco of the historical reality of the war "wie es eigentlich gewesen."

Based on his personal interpretation, Nicolaescu created an image of wartime experience from which the diplomatic and political aspects are entirely absent. Nor is there any reference to the life of the civilian

population in the occupied part of Romania or in Moldavia. Ionel Brătianu, the Romanian prime minister at the beginning of the war and the most important player in the political and diplomatic maneuverings involving Romania during the war, has no lines in the film; he simply appears as an extra in several staff meetings. The only words that deal with the political aspects of the war are placed in the mouths of a very suspicious Averescu, who expresses distrust for all politicians in making wartime decision, and the nationalist poet Octavian Goga ("the poet of our suffering," as many Romanians still fondly identify him). Goga gives a speech that he actually delivered later in life regarding the corruption of all politicians. In fact, these two discourses regarding political life seem intended as a commentary on the current situation in Romania and a veiled suggestion that authoritarian leadership would be the nation's salvation.

Averescu is one of the role models provided by the film. *The Death Triangle* is the first attempt to provide a prominent visualization of this important military player in the war. His stubborn correctness, unflinching loyalty toward the army, and authoritative demeanor vis-à-vis the troops impressed Nicolaescu so much that he centered the movie on Averescu's own wartime experiences. For example, the film makes a point of supporting Averescu's well-known charge that it was the Mărăști battle and not the by now far more famous Mărășești battle that stopped the Central Powers and put an end to August von Mackensen's reputation as the unbeatable "front breaker."

Two other characters are constructed as prominent symbols of patriotic behavior. One is the "Romanian peasant"—a two-dimensional character who embodies the motivations, behavior, and morality of the archetypal Romanian soldier. This character is represented by five brothers who fight and die together at the famous battle of Mărășești. The director emphasizes, lest we overlook these characteristics, the fact that they are literate (contrary to the perception of the officer rank), extremely religious (the oldest brother carries a huge icon with him, a fragment of a church wall representing Christ on the cross), have unquestioning loyalty and deep love for each other, and are fighting to defend their family and land. There is no ambition to kill the other, no hatred for the enemy as enemy, and no desire for glory among these soldiers. On the contrary, great words of wisdom occasionally come out of the mouths of these simple men in the midst of battle. In this regard, Nicolaescu's portrayal of the archetypal Romanian soldier fits very well with the iconography constructed after the war and solidified during the years of extreme nationalist socialism.

The other important character who helps to define heroism and provide moments of poetry in the midst of the battle is Ecaterina Teodoroiu, the Romanian "Joan of Arc" of the Great War. A charismatic presence in life, Teodoroiu grew to mythic dimensions after her death in 1917. The film begins with an image of her in a wedding dress and ends with a similar image

of her floating over the hill on which she perished at Mărășești. This symmetry suggests that her character represents an important leitmotif during the movie, an embodiment of selflessness central to Nicolaescu's vision of heroism and patriotism in the war. Teodoroiu adds a note of exoticism to the story, as she is consistently identified as exceptional; she is the only woman in the film aside from the queen, another exceptional figure, who pursues an active role in the public space.

Teodoroiu also fits the parameters set up by the director in his depiction of Romanian peasants. She is educated but comes from a peasant background, and she remains close to the emotions, the passions, and the pain of the peasants. But she never grows as a character. For example, her motivations for fighting are barely suggested. Her presence is as iconic as that of Queen Marie. Teodoroiu stands for a type of selflessness, a type of exceptionalism, but she is never fully human, never fully developed, in spite of the director's attempt at one point to show her vulnerable side.

The film has a strange and definitely unorthodox take regarding the two figures with whom heroism and leadership were identified right after the war, King Ferdinand and Queen Marie. The king is represented as a caricature of the monarch he aimed at being. Easily influenced, indecisive, and too formal in his interaction with people in both public and private, he is represented as a rather marginal figure in the decision-making process regarding the daily business of the war and the fate of the country in the future. By contrast, the queen appears as almost unbearably powerful. She is always present at the meetings of the chiefs of staff and has a key role in the decision-making process, both politically and militarily. At the crucial moment when evacuation from Iași to Odessa is discussed, she appears as the only one among all the military and civilian leaders not paralyzed by fear. This is certainly one image of the queen that has come down through some of the memoirs of that period (e.g. those of Averescu, Constantin Argetoianu, or Alexandru Marghiloman). It is not the only image, however, and much evidence supports a view that the queen's influence was subtler, more indirect, though no doubt significant. At the same time, King Ferdinand did make the crucial decisions and had the final say on general military strategy.

The multifaceted nature of the front-line experience comes through somewhat in scenes where soldiers question authority, cry for the dead, or are afraid to fight. Those reactions are presented, however, as passing; the only memorable portrayals are those of the five fictional brothers. The director alternates scenes from the soldiers' daily war routine in the Romanian and German camps, which suggest through their symmetry the similarity of all soldiers' experience. But Nicolaescu is also careful to suggest some asymmetries, especially with regard to motivations for fighting and the ultimate goal of the war. These dissimilarities

are meant to suggest the just nature of the Romanian effort, internalized by soldiers even in their moments of fear, in contrast with the German war of conquest without just foundations.

Thus, what this hapless attempt at depicting the reality of the Great War succeeds in conveying is a series of cliché images of the war that reinforce a certain public memory discourse regarding its meaning. Individual characters are somewhat blurred and ill defined, but the notion that the Romanian peasant was a trustworthy, religiously devout (Orthodox), and patriotic soldier comes through very clearly. By contrast, the officer corps and especially the political elite receive very poor press. The civilian experience of the war is depicted only briefly, in a scene of the evacuation of peasant women from a village near Mărășești. Nicolaescu dwells on the magnitude of the front experience, the importance of skilled military leaders such as Averescu, and the loyal rank and file. In this regard, *The Death Triangle* does very little to adjust some of the fundamental narrative lines regarding the Great War and confuses the audience by grossly misrepresenting the relationship between army and civilian leaders.

One question remains: who is the enemy here? The Central Powers are depicted with respect for their military might. In the end, it seems that the corrupt political leadership of the country, the enemy within, was completely other. Here, ironically but not surprisingly, Nicolaescu remains faithful to his own and the Communist Party's nationalist discourse before 1989. "Otherness" has changed, however, from the more clearly defined charge that the enemy within was the bourgeoisie by virtue of their class interests to a looser charge of corruption and indifference toward national interests.

MARIA BUCUR  
Indiana University,  
Bloomington

PRETTY VILLAGE, PRETTY FLAME [*Lepa sela, Lepo gore*]. Produced by Goran Bjelogrić and Dragan Bjelogrić; directed by Srdjan Dragojević; screenplay by Vanja Bulić, Srdjan Dragojević, and Nikola Pejaković. 1996; color; 128 minutes. Yugoslavia. In Serbo-Croatian with English subtitles. Distributor: Cobra Films.

In *Pretty Village, Pretty Flame*, Serbian director Srdjan Dragojević depicts the recent war in Bosnia from the perspective of a Bosnian Serb soldier. The film begins with the story of Milan (a Serb) and Halil (a Muslim), friends from childhood who soon find themselves on different sides of the conflict and, predictably, end up confronting each other in battle. The movie follows only Milan's experiences in the war, documenting his transformation from an honorable soldier who initially protects Halil's house from Serbian looters into a Muslim-hating killer who fantasizes from his hospital bed about stabbing a Muslim inmate with a fork.

Much of the film takes place in an old railroad

tunnel where Milan and six Serbian comrades are trapped by Halil's Muslim soldiers without food, water, or hope for escape. The central scenes focus on their experiences in the tunnel, showing through a series of flashbacks, conversations, and dramatic events something about the character of each soldier, what each had been and done before the conflict, and how and why each joined the Bosnian Serb army. The movie also describes the evolving relationship between the seven Serb soldiers and the American woman journalist who, rather improbably, ends up trapped in the tunnel with them.

As an entertainment consumer, I enjoyed the movie. Its plot is compelling, and the main characters are well developed and engaging (with the notable exception of the journalist, who is both conceptually absurd and tedious). The movie also uses symbolism, foreshadowing, and irony skillfully. As a historian and specialist in the former Yugoslavia, however, it is precisely that use of symbolism that I find disturbing. Initially, I was tempted to say that *Pretty Village, Pretty Flame* is a quintessentially Serbian movie. To do so, however, would imply that there is such a thing as a quintessential Serb. Rather, I will argue that this film simply reproduces every stereotype I have ever heard about Serbian national identity. Admittedly, in some cases, it does so with a fine sense of irony. For example, one character is nicknamed "Fork" because of his obsession with the classic story about how Serbs were already a civilized nation using forks back when the Germans and other Europeans were still eating with their hands. (It is in this context that Milan plans to use a fork to execute the Muslim in the hospital.) More often, however, elements of the Serbian national mythology are presented unselfconsciously. As a result, the film ultimately does no justice either to the Serbs or to the truth about the war in Bosnia.

To begin with, the movie is blatantly sexist (although perhaps no more so than most war movies). All female characters in the movie, if virtuous, are dead and abused. Those permitted to remain alive, meanwhile, are self-absorbed and petty. Moreover, although seeming to decry the senseless brutality of the war, the film clearly reinforces the Serbian male's self-image as a warrior. All of the main characters are warriors, and all non-warrior males are effeminate.

Most troublesome, perhaps, is the film's overwhelmingly fatalistic message, a message also consistent with the stereotypical Serbian self-image. Although Milan and Halil were best friends from childhood, they end up on opposite sides of the war, apparently through no fault of their own (or anyone else's, for that matter). The movie never addresses the causes of the war or what options the two friends had at its outbreak. There is no question but that Milan will join the Serb army and Halil the Muslim. That sense of fatalism is represented metaphorically through a story about the railroad tunnel in which Milan's men are trapped. Once a symbol of Yugoslav brotherhood and unity, the tunnel had been abandoned since the boys' childhood and, in

the local folklore, was said to be the home of an ogre who, if ever released, would burn down the village. In the final confrontation between Milan and Halil, when each claims to be innocent of crimes committed against the other, Halil suggests that it must be the ogre who is responsible.

A disturbing consequence of this fatalistic approach is that it apparently relieves the main characters of any moral responsibility for their actions. At first glance, the movie appears to be relatively balanced and honest in its treatment of wartime atrocities. The director certainly does not whitewash the Serbian soldiers. They burn and loot Muslim villages with little or no direct provocation, and they speak about barbarous acts that they have committed (or, more often, would like to commit) against Muslims and women. Among the soldiers are a former Communist, a thief, a drug addict, and a bonafide Chetnik still loyal to the fascist-allied Serb partisans of World War II. They are not, for the most part, model citizens. Yet, by telling their stories, by showing their virtues and vulnerabilities, the director makes us like them and forgive them their real or potential sins.

It is possible, and indeed desirable, both to understand and to condemn evil. If this film sought to explain how good people can commit evil acts, it might make a real contribution to our understanding of human nature, war, and Balkan history. Unfortunately, it does no such thing. Here again, it is the ogre in the tunnel who seems to be responsible, not real people who made real and wrong choices. Consequently, *Pretty Village, Pretty Flame* will do nothing to help real Serbs, innocent or guilty, to come to terms with and accept responsibility for the evil acts committed in their name and for the goal of Serbian national unity.

CAROL S. LILLY  
University of Nebraska,  
Kearney

**SUMMER OF SAM.** Produced by Spike Lee and Michael Imperioli; directed by Spike Lee; screenplay by Spike Lee, Victor Colicchio, and Michael Imperioli. 1999; color; 142 minutes. Distributor: Touchstone Pictures.

*Summer of Sam* opens documentary-style, without credits, with former *New York Daily News* columnist Jimmy Breslin standing in present-day Times Square, speaking to the camera. He expresses an ambivalent passion for the city and recalls the varied events of the summer of 1977, foremost among them the serial killing spree of David Berkowitz, the "Son of Sam." In closing, he notes that "there are eight million stories in the naked city and this is one of them." That cliché proves ironic, as the film goes on to present much more.

While vividly and graphically reenacting Berkowitz's murders and dramatizing the city-wide panic they provoked, director Spike Lee's larger aim is to reveal the texture of everyday life in 1977 New York as refracted by the crimes. He focuses on the individual

travails of a hairdresser, Vinny (played by John Leguizamo), whose marriage is collapsing amid his philandering, and Ritchie (Adrien Brody), a budding punk rocker who secretly makes money dancing naked, hustling men, and making pornographic movies. The characters' sexual double standards and moral limitations bespeak a corruption pervading the film's portrait of the city and, especially, the Larchmont Avenue neighborhood of the Bronx. With seeming inevitability, and clearly echoing Lee's *Do the Right Thing* (1989), the group dynamics of that masculine, insular, and ritualistic Italian-American community lead to violence. Structurally, *Summer of Sam* attempts to meld the fictional stories of Vinny, Ritchie, and their often vicious neighbors with the "history" inscribed by Berkowitz's killings and his celebrity as "Son of Sam."

Such an attempt follows one of mainstream Hollywood's customary if schematic strategies for presenting history. Individual protagonists personifying ideas, groups, or communities play out their dramas against a sweeping background of social, political, or cultural events. These individuals are typically male and strive concurrently to overcome conflicts in both social and personal realms; resolution accordingly often entails both the legitimation of a social order and the validation of a heterosexual union. While studio-era Hollywood regularly featured "great men" engaged directly in making or remaking history, more recent productions have given at least equal time to "everyday people" coping with mundane as well as more far-reaching aspects of their social lives. Whether the foregrounded protagonists are authentically drawn or entirely manufactured, however, it is frequently the background settings and events—be they nuanced, simplistic, stereotypical, or mythical—that make the films' major historical claims.

Lee himself has employed this strategy in past films. Most obviously, in *Malcolm X* (1993), Lee used the charismatic leader's autobiography as the basis for presenting an overview of African-American experience from the late 1920s through the early 1960s. One might argue that the director's ambition was nothing less than recreating an African-American world long omitted from mainstream U.S. cinema. Writing at the time, Nell Irwin Painter observed that *Malcolm X* "is not a documentary, but it wraps itself in manufactured images of documentary truth" (*AHR* 98:2 [1993]: 434).

Although the same might be said of *Summer of Sam*, the difference here is that the supposedly documentary truths are so patently aestheticized. From Berkowitz's killing spree, the Studio 54 disco, and the rock club CBGB's to Reggie Jackson and the Yankees, the blackout, and New York City's fiscal woes, the historical elements that serve as background to the stories of Vinny, Ritchie, and their neighbors have only the loose and ephemeral shape of media events. A steady stream of tabloid front pages, newsradio reports, and television news segments (featuring current local anchors) not only manufacture a documentary pretense for viewers but link the film's fictional characters to a broader milieu given meaning by celebrity rather than history. Lee himself portrays John Jeffries, a local TV news correspondent, and Breslin figures importantly as the columnist to whom Berkowitz addressed letters during his killing spree. Rather than serving as a needed bridge between journalistic history and overtly fictional stories (or offering insightful commentary about the power of the media to shape events and attitudes alike), this reliance on popular media transforms nearly all of the overt references to the past into media events with uncertain historical status. Not surprisingly, the film's most affecting sequences are two extended set pieces in which, to the music of The Who, Berkowitz continues his killing and the Larchmont Avenue locals become vigilantes; the equally stylized renderings of historical and fictional incidents collapse any useful distinction between the two and mitigates the violence of both. It is finally the homogenizing format of the music video—rather than any thoughtfully adduced historical evidence—that lends coherence to the production.

When Breslin reappears at the end of *Summer of Sam*, "New York, New York" is swelling on the soundtrack, and his reiteration that it has been "one of the city's eight million stories" rings hollow. It is clear that the production has less recounted a historical narrative than presented a superficial period drama. That the well-known filmmaker's principal devices for creating such a drama are popular media themselves only underscores the impressionistic and manufactured nature of the whole.

J. DAVID SLOCUM  
New York University



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## Collected Essays

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These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

### METHODS/THEORY

GARY M. FEINMAN and JOYCE MARCUS, editors. *Archaic States*. (School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series.) Santa Fe, N. Mex.: School of American Research Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 427. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$24.95.

KENT V. FLANNERY, The Ground Plans of Archaic States. JOYCE MARCUS, The Peaks and Valleys of Ancient States: An Extension of the Dynamic Model. GARY M. FEINMAN, Scale and Social Organization: Perspectives on the Archaic State. RICHARD E. BLANTON, Beyond Centralization: Steps Toward a Theory of Egalitarian Behavior in Archaic States. HENRY T. WRIGHT, Uruk States in Southwestern Iran. JOHN BAINES and NORMAN YOFFEE, Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia. GREGORY L. POSSEHL, Sociocultural Complexity Without the State: The Indus Civilization. CRAIG MORRIS, Inka Strategies of Incorporation and Governance. DAVID WEBSTER, Warfare and Status Rivalry: Lowland Maya and Polynesian Comparisons.

### COMPARATIVE/WORLD

DANIEL POWER and NAOMI STANDEN, editors. *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700–1700*. (Themes in Focus.) New York: St. Martin's. 1999. Pp. xxiv, 293. \$59.95.

DANIEL POWER, Frontiers: Terms, Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and Early Modern Europe. NAOMI STANDEN, Nine Case Studies of Premodern Frontiers. EDUARDO MANZANO MORENO, The Creation of a Medieval Frontier: Islam and Christianity in the Iberian Peninsula, Eighth to Eleventh Centuries. NAOMI STANDEN, (Re)Constructing the Frontiers of Tenth-Century North China. PAUL STEPHENSON, The Byzantine Frontier at the Lower Danube in the Late Tenth and Eleventh Centuries. DANIEL POWER, French and Norman Frontiers in the Central Middle Ages. REUVEN AMITAI-PREISS, Northern Syria between the Mongols and Mamluks: Political Boundary, Military Frontier, and Ethnic Affinities. STEVEN G. ELIAS, The English State and its Frontiers in the British Isles, 1300–1600. S. C. ROWELL, The Lithuanian-Prussian Forest Frontier, c. 1422–1600. ANN WILLIAMS, Crusaders as Fron-

tiersmen: The Case of the Order of St. John in the Mediterranean. COLIN HEYWOOD, The Frontier in Ottoman History: Old Ideas and New Myths.

RICHARD SYLLA, RICHARD TILLY, and GABRIEL TORTELLA, editors. *The State, the Financial System and Economic Modernization*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 295. \$64.95.

RICHARD SYLLA, RICHARD TILLY, and GABRIEL TORTELLA, Comparative Historical Perspectives. FRANÇOIS CROUZET, Politics and Banking in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. HERMAN VAN DER WEE and MONIQUE VAN DER WEE-VERBREY, Belgian Banking in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: The Société Générale and the Générale de Banque (1822–1997). P. L. COITRELI and LUCY NEWTON, Banking Liberalization in England and Wales, 1826–1844. FORREST CAPIE, Banking in Europe in the Nineteenth Century: The Role of the Central Bank. RICHARD TILLY, Public Policy, Capital Markets and the Supply of Industrial Finance in Nineteenth-Century Germany. GABRIEL TORTELLA, The Role of Banks and Government in Spanish Economic Development, 1850–1935. PETER HERTNER, Central Banking and German-Style Mixed Banking in Italy, 1893/5–1914: From Coexistence to Cooperation. BORIS ANAN'ICH, State Power and Finance in Russia, 1802–1917: The Credit Office of the Finance Ministry and Governmental Control over Credit Institutions. ROBERTO CORTÉS CONDE, The Origins of Banking in Argentina. RICHARD SYLLA, Shaping the U.S. Financial System, 1690–1913: The Dominant Role of Public Finance. MIRA WILKINS, Cosmopolitan Finance in the 1920s: New York's Emergence as an International Financial Center.

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The following books were recently received in the AHR office. Books listed here do not include works scheduled for review.

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## MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

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## Communications

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*A communication will be considered only if it relates to an article or review published in this journal; publication is solely at the editor's discretion. The AHA disclaims responsibility for statements, either of fact or opinion, made by the writers. Letters may not exceed seven hundred words for reviews and one thousand words for articles. They should be submitted in duplicate, typed double-spaced with wide margins, and headed "To the Editor."*

### REVIEWS OF BOOKS

#### TO THE EDITOR:

Like Harold Brackman [*AHR* 104 (April 1999): 713], we were surprised and chagrined to find that the *AHR* assigned the review of Robert Chazan's *Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism* to Albert S. Lindemann, author of *Esau's Tears*, a study that several scholars have labeled anti-Semitic. In his response, Lindemann attempts to dismiss Brackman's concerns as those of "an obnoxious and fatuous crank."

*AHR* readers should know, however, that Brackman is hardly alone in his assessment of Lindemann's work. Robert S. Wistrich, one of the world's leading authorities on the history of anti-Semitism, characterized *Esau's Tears* as a "deeply pernicious book," which presents Jews as "largely responsible for the irrational hatreds to which they have so often fallen victim." Wistrich states that Lindemann's "presentation throughout is marked not only by sympathy for the arguments of anti-Semites but by an undisguised antipathy toward Judaism and Jews." Moreover, "Lindemann's own knowledge of Jewish history . . . appears little better than that of the anti-Semites whose arguments he echoes . . . He shows no mastery of primary sources, no traces of having done archival research, and almost no familiarity with works in languages other than English or even with the most recent secondary literature." Wistrich concludes, "It is appalling that Cambridge University Press has put its distinguished imprint on so profoundly biased and ignominious a work." ("Blaming the Victim," *Commentary*, February 1998.)

Similarly, John C. Landau, whose review of *Esau's Tears in Midstream* (February–March 1999) is entitled "Antisemitism Relegitimated," states, "The very fact that it has been published by Cambridge University Press, . . . and that its author is a faculty member at the University of California at Santa Barbara, are causes for concern." He concludes, "We must not forget that the assault on Jews by German academics and intellectuals preceded, and helped to lay the groundwork for, the physical destruction of European Jewry."

In his reply to Brackman, Lindemann lists places where his book has been applauded. He omitted, however, [zundelsite.org](http://zundelsite.org), the web site of Ernst Zundel, Canada's most notorious Holocaust denier and disseminator of anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi tracts, where *Esau's Tears* is reviewed glowingly as "a remarkable book . . . the first objective university study of Jewish influence in the modern world." To be sure, an author cannot be held fully responsible for those who praise him, but Zundel's imprimatur should give one pause.

EUNICE G. POLLACK  
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma  
STEPHEN H. NORWOOD  
University of Oklahoma

#### TO THE EDITOR:

Eunice Pollack and Stephen Norwood inform us that Harold Brackman has written a book. I am surprised: From the ugly epithets in his letter to the *AHR*, I assumed that his writing was done mostly with spray cans in dark alleys. How could such a crudely abusive letter, without a scrap of proof for the charges made, deserve a respectful reply?

My reply listed ample and wide-ranging evidence against the charge of anti-Semitism. The differences between that evidence and the hostile reviews by Robert Wistrich and John Landau may be explained as follows.

This field can be appallingly contentious. Readers may be familiar with the vituperative exchanges over Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963). While I would not care to defend Arendt on all points, what particularly strikes me is how often her critics resorted to insult ("self-hating Jewess") and gross misrepresentation. As even Norman Podhoretz, one of those

critics, has recognized, "many of the criticisms were either wrong or unfair, sometimes to the extreme of outright defamation" (*Ex-Friends* [1999], p. 160). Arendt came to believe that there was a coordinated effort, characterized by shameless dishonesty, by prominent Jews and Jewish organizations to ruin her. Similarly, Raul Hilberg, now widely esteemed for his pioneering work, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (1961), has described, in his searing and bitter memoir, *Politics of Memory* (1996), how he was insulted and misrepresented, "for thirty years . . . almost buried under an avalanche of condemnations" (p. 137).

Another point that sheds light on Wistrich's reaction is that in the opening pages of *Esau's Tears* I criticize his book, *The Longest Hatred*, as suffering from "a tendency to a colorful and indignant narrative, accompanied by weak, sometimes tendentious analysis." His review failed to mention that criticism, violating a key professional obligation.

Wistrich's disregard for professional norms in the review went far beyond that. As I and others pointed out in detail (*Commentary*, letters section, April 1999), Wistrich blatantly misrepresented the contents of my book. Richard S. Levy, a leading authority on the history of anti-Semitism, wrote: "I cannot explain [Wistrich's] consistent misreading of Lindemann's motive and content . . . Lindemann, in the company of Hannah Arendt, Jacob Katz, and many others, does not accept the comforting but fallacious notion that Jews have had nothing to do with the generation of antisemitism. That he should have the anathema pronounced upon him . . . is shameful arrogance in a reviewer. Attributing direct quotations from anti-semites to Lindemann himself is unforgivable." Prof. E.Z., the Holocaust survivor I quoted in my response to Brackman, further wrote, "that Professor Wistrich disagrees with you is of course to be expected. But the wildly inaccurate charges and generally hysterical tone of his review are unforgivable." Professor Ralph Ranco: "Since I have just read your excellent book, I found Wistrich's treatment virtually incomprehensible—could he have been reviewing the same book I read? Wistrich produced a mere hatchet job, not surprising . . . considering the fact that he did not . . . declare his interest, i.e., your very justified criticism of the shoddy work displayed in his own books." Revealingly, Stephen Beller, another eminent scholar whose favorable review in the *TLS* I also quoted in my reply to Brackman, considers *Esau's Tears* to be a fundamentally philo-Semitic work, deserving "praise and not calumny." William Rubinstein, in his recent (January 1999) review in *History* (the journal of the British History Association), writes that "*Esau's Tears* merits an important place in any historical assessment of modern antisemitism, while the author deserves a medal for bravery in writing the book."

I could add many such quotations, but I trust that the point is adequately made: Wistrich's review is not generally accepted as judicious, accurate, or even honest. John Landau's review is less shrill and brazen in falsehood but is also filled with remarkable distortions and misrepresentations. The passage from it quoted by Pollack and Norwood gives some sense of his bizarre views. As for Ernst Zundel, that he has quoted me favorably shows nothing; he and other Holocaust deniers have often cited prominent and respected scholars, among them Yehuda Bauer, Jacob Katz, and Raul Hilberg.

Charges of anti-Semitism are serious; those who make them irresponsibly or dishonestly must be held to account. A number of prominent observers have recently remarked that as anti-Semitism steadily declines in the United States, a small but vocal minority of Jews paradoxically trumpets its existence everywhere. This reckless mudslinging brings discredit and disgrace to those who engage in it, aiding and abetting anti-Semitism rather than combating it.

ALBERT S. LINDEMANN  
University of California,  
Santa Barbara

#### TO THE EDITOR:

Regarding my recent exchange with Albert Lindemann in your pages, I was not going to ask for a second bite of the apple until it occurred to me that I made an error requiring a mea culpa.

In an astigmatic fit that sometimes makes me see all white supremacists as looking alike, I momentarily confused the dead James Earl Ray with the very much alive Byron De La Beckwith. The good news, presumably, is that Byron is still available from behind bars to do a book review for you, perhaps even of Lindemann's new book.

HAROLD BRACKMAN  
San Diego, California

#### ERRATUM

In the review of *African American Women and the Vote, 1837–1965* (*AHR* 103 [October 1998]: 1329), reviewer Janice Brandon-Falcone used the year 1921 to refer to the Nineteenth Amendment and American women acquiring the right to vote. The year should have been 1919, when the amendment passed, or 1920, when it was ratified. Professor Brandon-Falcone regrets the error.

THE EDITORS

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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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

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

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
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
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
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
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



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


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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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